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Abstract
South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea has a unique potential to
contribute to permanent peace on the Korean peninsula by improving inter-Korean relations.
However, given Korea’s historical, political, and socio-cultural context, comprehensive
engagement has proved difficult. Any South Korean leader who adopts overall engagement
strategies vis-à-vis North Korea may face constraints and setbacks stemming from the internal
and external environments, including North Korea (the target state), domestic politics, and the
United States. During Kim Dae-jung’s presidency (1998-2003), North and South Korea engaged
in an unparalleled degree of interaction, reshaping the pattern of inter-Korean relations.
President Kim’s Sunshine Policy demonstrated a genuine potential to stimulate limited but
momentous behavioral change from North Korea. With a view to elucidating aspects of Kim
Dae-jung’s leadership that constituted the primary mechanism for the Sunshine Policy (the
What), this study delves into the ways in which personality variables, such as: personal capital;
political skills (the Who); beliefs and philosophy (the Why); and leadership traits and styles,
perspectives, and motivational perceptions (the How) combined to shape his leadership as it
relates to this policy, particularly in terms of procedure and implementation.
A dangerous radical; an exile; a Red; a political prisoner under house arrest; a death-row
inmate; the champion of peace, democracy and human rights; the opposition leader; the
president of South Korea; and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate. The various titles Kim Dae-jung
went by throughout his political life may further the confusion one might struggle with

regarding what type of leader he was, or what he was like as a statesman in terms of
personality and leadership characteristics.
The Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s flagship engagement policy towards North Korea, is
arguably the political arena which most reflects his personality and leadership. The analysis in
this study therefore delves into these characteristics through the prism of his peace initiative.
Grounded on the actor indispensability thesis, which postulates that the removal of one
individual’s actions would lead to a significant change in the outcome, my project suggests that
Kim Dae-jung served as an agent of change to improve inter-Korean relations at a critical
juncture for the South Korean state.
Using the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) as a primary methodological tool, the study
explores the ways in which Kim Dae-jung played the role of peacemaker amid the constraints
constantly imposed by internal and external environments. With respect to policy
implementation, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership was consistent across different periods of time and
across different types of situations. His profile consistently showed a blend of a set of
personality traits: a high need for power, a high in-group bias, and a relationship/process focus.
The content analysis also shows that Kim Dae-jung’s leadership was flexible, in that his
leadership style shifted from the advocate to the pragmatic in tandem with the changing
contextual conditions. The study finds that it was Kim’s perception of the severity of
constraints, rather than the source of those constraints, that led to a change in his leadership
style. The study also suggests that Kim’s inherently advocate leadership orientations were
mitigated, albeit to varying degrees, by an array of personality traits and leadership
characteristics which had been shaped prior to his presidency.
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Sunshine Policy & Kim Dae-jung

A. Sunshine Policy: The Past & the Present
This study will examine the role of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in conducting the Sunshine
Policy of comprehensive engagement of North Korea. The study takes note of the rationale that
while South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea has a unique potential to improve
inter-Korean relations and reduce tension on the Korean peninsula, comprehensive
engagement is an extremely difficult option in Korea’s historical, political, socio-economic, and
cultural context. Any South Korean leader who adopts a comprehensive engagement strategy
will likely encounter various constraints stemming from the external and internal environments
involving domestic politics, the United States, and North Korea, among others. Kim Dae-jung
was sworn into office in January 1998 at a time when North-South relations were at an all-time
low as a result of an incoherent, overall containment policy toward North Korea under the Kim
Young-sam administration. A persistent commitment to inter-Korean reconciliation by the two
minority governments under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun and a decade of
comprehensive engagement policy ended up making an unprecedented level of progress in
inter-Korean relations even amid treacherous contextual conditions and mounting tension
between Washington and Pyongyang over the latter’s nuclear program.
In an effort to prevent the outbreak of a second destructive war on the Korean
peninsula, South Korea’s current President Moon Jae-in engaged in a whirlwind of diplomacy
upon his election, attempting to seize control over the Korea crisis and turning it into a peace
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process. Moon earnestly strived to guide international efforts to defuse the North Korean crisis
while balancing the interests of a belligerent and heavily-armed North Korea and an
unpredictable government in Washington. These efforts facilitated negotiations between
President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, which had faced resistance from both
sides for a long time.
President Moon’s mediation between the United States and North Korea resulted in a
historic summit meeting between a sitting American president and a North Korean leader on
June 12, 2018 in Singapore. Moon expressed willingness to put himself in the “driver’s seat” of
the Korean peninsula, and to serve as a mediator in the conflict between the United States and
North Korea; notably, this echoes President Kim Dae-jung’s approach to an intensifying
confrontation between the George W. Bush administration and the Kim Jong-il regime over the
highly enriched uranium program (HEUP), a clash which led to the second nuclear crisis in
October 2002.
A flurry of seemingly promising developments occurred during the year 2018. These
developments came on the heels of the historic summit meeting between the United States
and North Korea on one hand, and three summit meetings between the two Koreas in
Panmunjom and Pyongyang on the other. This produced euphoria and optimism on both the
diplomatic and the nuclear front. However, since the breakdown of negotiations at the second
summit between the Trump and Kim in Hanoi in February 2019, diplomacy has remained in
prolonged deadlock, not only between Washington and Pyongyang, but also between Seoul and
Pyongyang. North Korea has since returned to its cycle of rebuffing, threatening, and provoking
with a series of missile tests.

3

Regarding inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas are still technically at war after some
70 years of an armistice deal, and have yet to reach a peace treaty. Moreover, the two Koreas
have yet to resume the construction of an inter-Korean railway, reopen joint-tourism ventures
(including the Mt. Kumgang project), or resume the operation of the Kaesung Industrial
Complex. In other words, the two Koreas have yet to pick up where Kim Dae-jung and Roh
Moo-hyun, the two South Korean leaders who adopted the Sunshine Policy, and Kim Jong-il, the
North Korean leader who acceded, albeit reluctantly, to their overtures, left off. 1
Still, what happened in the previous decade under the hardline policy seems to indicate
that the Sunshine Policy, to which the three presidents—Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003), Roh Moohyun (2003-2008), and Moon Jae-in (2017-present)—have been firmly committed, is the better,
if not the optimal, option for any leader who seeks permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.
There is little doubt that permanent peace cannot be achieved without improvement in USDPRK relations. This in turn will be difficult, if not impossible, without improved inter-Korean
relations. In fact, history shows us that all of the meaningful achievements in inter-Korean
relations were made during the administrations of South Korean leaders–specifically, Roh Taewoo, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun–who adopted the engagement, as opposed to the
containment, policy toward North Korea.
During the nine-year period of conservative leadership under President Lee Myung-bak
and President Park Geun-hye, South Korea employed a containment approach that resulted in

1

President Roh Moo-hyun had the second inter-Korean summit meeting with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang between October 2 and
4, 2007. At the end of the summit, the two leaders signed the October 4 Joint Declaration. In the eight-point agreement,
dubbed the “Declaration of the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity,” the two sides agreed to
build military confidence and peace mechanisms between the two Koreas, reactivate extensive economic cooperation,
establish a “special zone of peace and cooperation” on the West Sea of Korea, and the promotion of tourism to Mt. Paektu.
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deteriorating relations with North Korea. This demonstrates that comprehensive engagement is
a superior option to containment in pursuit of more peaceful relations with the DPRK. During
the nine years of hardline strategy, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea was not driven by
pragmatism and flexibility. In this period, all inter-Korean agreements signed under the
Sunshine Policy as well as the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and
Exchanges and Cooperation (1991) were virtually revoked in their entirety. Wide-ranging
sanctions were imposed on the North. The Mt. Kumgang Tourism Project was closed in
September 2008. All inter-Korean relations and trade were banned under the so-called “May 24
Measures” taken in response to the Cheonan incident on March 26, 2010. The Kaesung
Industrial Complex was shut down in February 2016, and inter-Korean trade fell to near-zero in
early 2016. At the end of the nine-year period, inter-Korean relations were not just bad—there
existed no relations whatsoever (M. S. Kim, 2016).

Uniqueness of the Sunshine Policy
It is worth noting that the Sunshine Policy represents a significant departure from earlier
South Korean policy as it was qualitatively different from the country’s previous engagement
policies. In contrast to the previous policies that articulated unification, which is the hallmark of
emotional appeal to the Koreans, as the central goal, the Sunshine Policy replaced unification
with rapprochement through peaceful exchange and cooperation that would lead to the
dismantlement of the Cold War structure as the ultimate long-term goal (Moon, 1999, p. 13; D.
Steinberg, 1999, pp. 59–60; Moon, 2000, p. 3). Moreover, Sunshine Policy replaced strict
reciprocity with flexible reciprocity and exchanged a principle for the linkage between politics
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and the economy with the principle of separation. As its central tenets, the policy was aimed at
inducing incremental, voluntary changes in North Korea for peace, reform, and openness
through the patient pursuit of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation (Kim, 1999, pp. 63–
64). In the process, the emphasis was placed on sustaining political dialogue and the
recognition of the North Korean leader as a partner for peace. All of this constituted the
Sunshine Policy’s core precepts that are generally deemed unique (Levin & Han, 2002, p. 131).
Relevant studies note that Kim Dae-jung’s patient, incremental, pragmatic and functionalist
approach marked a major “paradigm shift” in South Korea’s discourses on inter-Korean
relations and national unification (C. I. Moon, 1999, p. 39). In implementing the Sunshine Policy,
Kim Dae-jung pursued mutual identity shifts, that is, the reformation of identity vis-à-vis North
Korea on the part of the South Korean public as well as the thawing of the frozen mindset vis-àvis the South on the part of North Koreans (C. I. Moon, 1999; K. Y. Son, 2006; J. K. Choi, 2010; C.
Moon, 2012).
By many standards, the Sunshine Policy marked a substantial improvement, both in
conceptual and practical terms, over the policies toward North Korea undertaken under Kim
Dae-jung’s predecessors who had largely contained the North, the policies deemed mostly
reactive, passive, inconsistent, defensive, tactical, and often counterproductive (e.g., C. Moon,
2012; Moon, 2000; Shinn, 2001). By many standards, the Sunshine Policy, South Korea’s first
comprehensive engagement toward North Korea, can be considered more proactive,
consistent, and strategic than previous governments’ North Korea policies while its scope was
more comprehensive with a renewed emphasis placed on “whole-hearted interactions” with
North Korea. Another distinctive aspect of the Sunshine Policy is linked with its timeframe.
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While previous policies had been seeking short-term gains, Kim Dae-jung pursued medium- and
long-term gains, emphasizing patience and endurance (C. Moon, 2012, pp. 26, 30). Moon and
Steinberg (1999, p. 36) note that the Sunshine Policy is not a tactical or instrumental maneuver
for domestic political gains and legitimacy by aiming for a short-term breakthrough to stalled
inter-Korean relations. Rather, it can be seen as essentially “strategic” and “consummate” since
the policy pursues genuine, long-term improvements in inter-Korean relations through peaceful
coexistence and mutual exchanges and cooperation for a sustained period of time.
Furthermore, the Sunshine Policy took a cautious and sophisticated approach in dealing
with North Korea in a bid to mitigate the threat perception and siege mentality of the North
Korean regime. Most of all, the policy sought to build trust between the two Koreas by
demonstrating sincerity and goodwill, which had been a notable rarity in inter-Korean relations
thus far. The priority given to sincerity was the fundamental difference between the Sunshine
Policy and other conventional forms of engagement policy including “conditional engagement”
or “hawk engagement” strategies (e.g., Litwak, 2000; Cha, 2002). In this sense, this study takes
note of the rationale that the Sunshine Policy goes beyond the engagement policy in the
conventional sense.

Criticism of the Sunshine Policy
To its critics at home and abroad, the Sunshine Policy was little more than a failed
experiment, geared toward achieving rapprochement with a totalitarian regime via aid and
one-sided infatuation with its leader. They largely dismiss Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy—as
was inherited by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun—as an ill-conceived strategy for dealing with
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North Korea; it deterred neither North Korea’s dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons nor the
oppression of its own people (Lee, 2009). Lee Sung-Yoon (2009), a critic of the Sunshine Policy,
says, “Kim Dae-jung will most likely be recorded in the annals of Korean history, however, not
for his contributions to the economy or his efforts at advancing South Korea’s political rights as
a dissident, but for his failed North Korea policy as president.”
For its critics, the Sunshine Policy constituted a mere appeasement policy that poured
money into North Korea based on the delusion that the Communist regime could be bribed to
modify its behavior. They argue that the element of punishment and the sense of urgency were
utterly absent in the Sunshine Policy. They regarded reciprocity, a core principle of the Sunshine
Policy, as effectively meaning ‘unilateral giving’ –a practice called “peojugi” in Korean- without
getting a proper return (e.g., H. N. Kim, 2006; S. Y. Lee, 2010).
Critics refuted the policy’s assumption that engagement policy would eventually induce
the North to change its behavior, calling it wishful thinking (S. Y. Lee, 2009; Klingner, 2013;
Straub, 2018). Regarding the Sunshine Policy, critics accused Kim Dae-jung of “naïveté” in
believing that North Korea would abandon its nuclear weapons once it obtained a security
guarantee from the United States. Critics argue that Kim Dae-jung made unilateral concessions
to the Northern leader, allowing the latter to make the most of South Korea’s volatile situation
to change the atmospherics in the Korean peninsula in favor of the communist regime (Lee,
2009).
Meanwhile, some pundits and critics take issue with the dubious rationale that a
behavioral change in North Korea could possibly be made by South Korean actions. This
viewpoint is problematic, they argue, as North Korea’s autonomy in making policy decisions is
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disregarded while the role of the South in affecting its policies and behaviors is overstated. Such
misplaced expectations of North Korea’s change, they posit, were proved unrealistic by the
extent to which North Korea resisted the Sunshine Policy in the initial period of Kim’s
presidency (M. J. Sohn, 2001, p. 259).
Calling the Sunshine Policy “oddly optimistic, one-dimensional, and patronizingly
didactic,” Lee Sung-yoon (2010) argues, “Kim Dae-jung believed he could win North Korea’s
trust with patience and generosity while ignoring the fundamental political dynamics on the
Korean peninsula, that is, the ongoing pan-Korean contest for legitimacy and the threat South
Korea, by its sheer existence, poses to the impoverished North Korean system.” Lee also states,
“Kim Dae-jung conflated his personal ambitions, his considerable powers of persuasion, and his
own political hopes and dreams with the national and security interests of the South Korean
state, and, by extension, the interests of the entire ethnic Korean nation. In this respect, Kim
Dae-jung was a visionary of sorts: he saw things that did not exist in reality.”
Some scholars posit that President Kim Dae-jung’s dealings with his opponents and
critics of the Sunshine Policy were essentially zero-sum, which they believe further aggravated
the political and social polarization in the country (Namkoong, 2004, p. 29). They refer to Kim’s
lopsided, self-righteous, or unilateral leadership as in part responsible for the accelerated
polarization in domestic politics, arguing that this in turn held back Kim’s own endeavors to
engage the North during his term of office (Shin, 2013). Critics accused the term “Sunshine
Policy” per se of having crippled the flexibility of South Korea’s strategy in dealing with North
Korea. They argue that the relevant terms such as reconciliation, exchange and cooperation
served to constrain the scope of the strategies available in a toolkit in a way that forestalled the
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use of a variety of tactical means that would have been available otherwise (Chung, 2011).
Moreover, pundits and observers denounced Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy as
politically motivated. Straub (2018, p. 18) argues that Kim’s sometimes over-the-top rhetoric—
for example, on his return to Seoul from Pyongyang, he declared there would be no more war
on the peninsula—was “hortatory” with regard to Kim Jong-iI, and “the product of his own
wishful thinking and domestic political calculations.”
Unsurprisingly, the so-called “cash for summit” scandal became an unmistakable target
of criticism for opponents of Kim Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy. In reference to the illegal
transfer by the Kim Dae-jung government of a cash payment of US$450 million –of which
US$100 million was ruled as illegal by the Supreme Court- ahead of the summit, Lee (2010)
notes that the Sunshine Policy was carried out through “financial bribes and a disposition
toward appeasing” North Korea. Regarding the cash-for-summit scandal, Donald Kirk, a veteran
correspondent and critic of the Sunshine Policy, notes, “Money would lay the groundwork for
DJ to realize his Nobel dream, an inter-Korean summit to project him as a man of peace on a
global scale” (Kirk, 2009, p. 208).
Much of the criticism was levelled at what detractors viewed as the “trade-off” between
engagement and national security. Detractors claim that the policy was immoral affording the
Kim Jong-il regime vast material resources to develop nuclear weapons, thus threatening the
global security (Stanton et al., 2017). Critics regard the Sunshine Policy as a major culprit behind
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons. The opposition Grand National Party argued
that had it not been for massive aid and humanitarian assistance provided by the Kim Dae-jung
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administration, it would not have been possible for North Korea to develop the highly enriched
uranium program (HEUP) (J., Park, personal communication, November 23, 2016).
President Kim Dae-jung was assaulted for what critics called his double standards on
North Korea’s human rights. While he was considered the champion of human rights
throughout his political life, Kim remained silent on North Korea’s grave human rights
conditions, critics noted (C. Moon, 2012, pp. 35–37). In criticizing Kim Dae-jung and his
Sunshine Policy, Donald Kirk says, “Kim Dae-jung had little to say about human rights in North
Korea, about mismanagement of the North’s economy, about the 1.1 million North Koreans
under arms (2009, p. 214).
Kim Dae-jung was accused of being so obsessed with forging ahead with his peace policy
that he overlooked the potentially adverse implications for political polarization. Stressing the
importance of properly dealing with the domestic opposition in undertaking the Sunshine
Policy, Shin Jong-dae (2013) holds that the engagers should have been more open to critical
views of their opponents and, instead of excluding them, should have had dialogue with them,
and persuaded them of the need to endorse the engagement policy. Shin also notes that Kim
Dae-jung failed to comprehend that the ideological confrontation in the domestic political
landscape between pro- and anti-engagement forces might adversely affect the very
rapprochement process to which he was so firmly devoted.

Achievements
During Kim Dae-jung’s presidency, North and South Korea engaged in an unparalleled
degree of interaction, reshaping the conventional pattern of inter-Korean relations. The leaders
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of the two Koreas had a summit in June 2000 for the first time since the national division in
1948. Following the summit, significant progress was made in inter-Korean relations while the
military tensions were considerably reduced. The two Koreas terminated anti-propaganda
broadcasts towards each other at the DMZ. An inter-Korean military hotline was established
and used on several critical occasions. The first inter-Korean defense ministerial talks were held
in Cheju Island; inter-Korean railways and roads began to be re-linked; economic assistance
and inter-Korean trade increased;2 and the groundwork was laid for a joint project at the
Kaesung Industrial Complex combining South Korean technology and capital with North Korean
labor and resources. Moreoever, a wide variety of inter-Korean busubess ventures were
launched. It was intended to lever up living standards in North Korea and increase its
dependence on the south. South Korean firms were not only authorized but also vigorously
encouraged to interact with the North often through subsidies. As a result, South Korean
companies began to be involved in mining, agriculture, tourism, car manufacturing and textile
production (Abt, 2016). The Mount Kumgang Tourism Project and the Kaesung Industrial
Project were the most remarkable achievements of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. The joint
Mount Kumgang Tourism Project was launched in November 1998. Between 1998 and 2002,
over 500,000 South Korean tourists visited Mount Kumgang by ship.3 Moreover, about 5,400
members of separated families were united on five rounds of reunions during Kim Dae-jung’s
tenure (Ministry of Unification: Statistics, n.d.; H. S. Paik, 2009, pp. 320–321).

2

Under Kim Dae-jung, inter-Korean trade steadily grew from $200 million in 1998, to $400 million in 2000 and 2001, and to
$640 million in 2002. Humanitarian assistance also increased. Between 1998 and 2003.A total of US$46,280 million of aid was
delivered to North Korea at the civilian and government levels (Ministry of Unification; Paik, 2009, pp. 321, 323).
3
By the year 2002, the number of South Korean tourists who visited the Kumgang Mountain totaled over 510,000 while the
number of people who visited each side by crossing the border increased thirteen times (Paik, 2009, pp. 321-322). With the
land route opened in 2003, the number of visitors soared to more than 1.7 million citizens by 2009.
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During Kim’s term of office, more than 40 different types of inter-Korean agreements
were signed between the two Koreas, and government-level inter-Korean dialogues were held
sixty times in a variety of fields including military, economy, society, sports, and culture.
Moreover, regular, biannual reunions of separated families were held between the North and
South.
North Korea, for its part, began to show signs of change in its economic system and
foreign relations during this period. Even with the tensions escalating with the Bush
administration, North Korea showed that it was seeking major changes on external and internal
fronts. After expressing regret over the September 11 terrorist attacks, North Korea signed two
anti-terrorism international agreements in November 2001. The regime announced economic
reforms on July 1, 2002 and attempted innovative ways to improve its economy and industries.
For example, regarding agriculture, the North partially adopted an individual farming and
private ownership system replacing collective farming under the existing “juche” method.
North Korea gradually discarded inefficient Communist systems of production and accepted a
market-based economy. Also, the regime sent a fact-finding team of 400 delegates to Western
countries while extending invitations to foreign economic delegations. On diplomatic fronts,
North Korea moved to improve relations with Japan – e.g., by holding a summit – while
attempting to restore relations with China and Russia. It also opened diplomatic ties with a
number of countries in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand.
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B. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership
The focus of the Study
Why Leader?: Actor indispensability
This study advocates the “actor indispensability” thesis postulating that the removal of
the individual’s actions would lead to a significant change in the outcome. That is, a particular
act of an individual is likely to be a necessary link in some chain of events (F. I. Greenstein,
1975, p. 42). What is worth noting about the actor indispensability notion is that what is at
issue is the actor’s personal characteristics and the degree to which they are indispensable for
an explanation of his/her political behavior. Notably, actor indispensability has been linked to
situations involving transformational leadership (Jentleson, 2018, p. xix).
This study begins with the hypothesis that the Sunshine Policy is the case of a
foreign/security policy in which the political leader’s personal characteristics significantly
influenced the country’s policy behavior.4 The “actor indispensability” model is challenged by
the “action dispensability” thesis, which holds that political behavior in large part hinges upon
situational stimuli to the exclusion of variations in the actors’ personal characteristics. Actor
indispensability also stands in contrast to the “actor dispensability” notion that under certain
circumstances different actors behave uniformly, meaning that individuals vary in personality
but perform identically when exposed to common stimuli (F. I. Greenstein, 1975, pp. 47–48). 5
4

As regards elements of personal characteristics that are most likely to affect the leader’s political behavior, Hermann (1977, p.
19) suggests that such elements as the leader’s political philosophy, cognitive map of the political environment, motives,
decision style, and political training influence how the individual interprets incoming stimuli, develops strategies and chooses
tactics.
5
Regarding how the political leader’s personal characteristics affect the “policy of the group,” or collective political behavior,
Greenstein (1975, p. 42) notes, “the more demanding the political act, the greater the likelihood that it will be influenced by
personal characteristics of an actor. Regarding this issue, Hermann (1977) suggests several conditions. One such condition
concerns how well-defined the leader’s role is, that is, the degree to which the formal requirements of the role limit what the
person can do. In other words, the more room the leader has to interpret what his/her job does and does not entail, the more
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Leader-Context Nexus
While adopting the leader-centric approach, this study is focused on the interactive
process between the leader and the context. In essence, the leader-context interplay is the key
to understanding how the leadership was exercised in a way that helped achieve the policy
goals in this study. With the focus of the analysis lying on the interaction between the decisionmaker and constraints emanating from the context, the study will delve into how President Kim
Dae-jung perceives and reacts to political constraints stemming from the context in undertaking
the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea. Machiavelli found all of human life and history to be
determined by only two forces: virtù (competent statecraft, or, in today’s parlance, “good
leadership”) and fortuna (chance, or, in other words, contextual influences). Machiavelli
conceded that however competent the rulers were, they could control only half of their fate.
This means that even the most competent rulers will need a degree of luck to go down in
history as successful leaders (’t Hart, 2014, p. 212). Theorists and experimentalists have held
that the leader’s success depends on the situation and that the personality characteristics
required for effective leadership will vary with the situation (Winter, 1987, p. 196). Fred
Fiedler’s (1967) study on leadership effectiveness suggests that a leader’s motivation towards
task accomplishments versus maintaining positive relationships is more or less fixed. Fielder
posits that particular types of contexts – e.g., defined by such variables as the scope of their

the impact he/she may have on the position. Another condition Hermann suggests relates to the degree of accountability the
leader has for the policies or behavior of the group. Hermann posits that the higher the position the political leader holds in a
group, the more likely his/her personal characteristics are to influence the group’s decisions (Hermann, 1977, pp. 19–20).
According to Greenstein (1975, p. 42), when a set of conditions are met, then this leads to a case of “non-substitutability”
wherein the actions of an individual, as rooted in their distinctive goals, perceptions, and motivations, are necessary in
explaining the outcome. Among the conditions Greenstein suggested are 1) the individual with distinctive beliefs or grounds;
and 2) the situation that is ambiguous enough to allow some leeway in response. An overview of the leadership and contextual
conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy informs us that the case properly fits the conditions for the leader’s personal
characteristics to have a substantial impact on the overall policy process.
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power, structure of the task at hand, and the climate of leader-follower relationships – may
“favor or disfavor” certain types of leaders (e.g., t’Hart, 2014, p. 212). This leads to the rationale
that the outlook is most promising when leaders are in control, the task at hand is
straightforward, and they have positive relationships with their constituents (e.g., ’t Hart, 2014,
p. 212).

Sunshine Policy: South Korea’s First “Leadership-Driven” Engagement Policy toward North
Korea
South Korea’s engagement policy is the product of a long, evolutionary process. In this
sense, Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy can be seen as an extension of earlier engagement
policies of the previous governments. The country’s engagement with North Korea began with
the July 4th, 1972 Joint Communique under Park Chung-hee (1961-1979), which was followed
by the Nordpolitik under President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993). Roh’s engagement, in turn, was
followed by the Sunshine Policy under President Kim Dae-jung. The Sunshine Policy was
inherited by President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), and was revived by President Moon Jae-in
(2017-present). The previous engagement policies all stressed the importance of peaceful coexistence with North Korea through exchanges and cooperation (Moon and Steinberg, 1999:
12).
Despite the historical importance conferred to the first inter-Korean document, the July
4th Joint Communique was a mostly tactical move on the part of both sides. Park Chung-hee’s
engagement with North Korea can be seen as largely “situation-driven” considering that the
policy was motivated to cope with the US-China détente centered around President Nixon’s
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visit to China in February 1972. In fact, Park cared less about the substantive content of the
joint document than about its sheer existence as he sought to use inter-Korean dialogues to
consolidate his domestic power to perpetuate his dictatorial rule through the Yushin –
revitalizing reforms – system (Koh, 1974, 1980; M. Lee, 1989). Roh Tae-woo’s engagement with
North Korea as part of his foreign policy dubbed (Koh, 1974, 1980; M. Lee, 1989) Nordpolitik
was also in part “situation-driven.” Still, in this case, the leadership factor was equally
important as his apparently pragmatic leadership –in terms of the leadership typology– led him
to actively adjust his strategy to the ongoing trend of global détente and engage North Korea.
As a result, Roh Tae-woo’s engagement policy toward North Korea led to such achievements as
the Basic Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation as
well as the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1991. 6 A major
goal of the Nordpolitik was to induce the North to open itself to the outside world and
encourage it to build diplomatic relations with the West, particularly the United States, and
Japan (J. Kim, 2010, p. 76). Despite all of the positive developments that occurred between the
two Koreas during Roh’s presidency, his engagement policy failed to improve inter-Korean
relations in any tangible way . This is mainly because the policy failed to understand and
alleviate North Korea’s perception of the threat it faced from the South. The Roh
administration’s diplomacy with North Korea’s communist allies helped to somewhat reinforce

6

The Basic Agreement effectively paved the way for improved inter-Korean relations, serving as a conceptual milestone in the
dismantlement process of the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. President Roh stressed that North Korea should not
be seen as an enemy but as a “partner of the national community to share prosperity.” The Basic Agreement signed in
December 1991 between Prime Minister Chung Won-shik (South Korea) and Premier Yon Hyong-muk (North Korea) was the
first successful application of the principle of the “parties directly concerned.” The principle indicates that South Korea should
take the initiative in dismantling the peninsula’s Cold War structure. This effectively constitutes a core concept of the Sunshine
Policy (The KDJ Government The SP, 1999, p. 19).
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the South’s international legitimacy vis-à-vis the North (J. Kim, 2010), but contrary to its stated
goals, the Nordpolitik strategy ultimately severely undermined North Korea’s strategic posture,
worsened its isolation from the international community, and intensified its siege mentality.
Under President Roh’s Nordpolitik, the South obtained diplomatic recognition from its erstwhile
communist adversaries including the Soviet Union and China whereas the North was left
without significant headway in normalizing relations with the United States and Japan.
In fact, the Sunshine Policy, which was adopted by Kim Dae-jung five years after the end
of Roh Tae-woo’s tenure, was South Korea’s first engagement policy that was primarily
“leadership-driven.” The leadership-driven engagement strategy made it possible to make
headway in inter-Korean relations regardless of whether constraints and difficulties were
imposed by the internal and external environments. In this sense, the Sunshine Policy can be
seen as representative of Kim Dae-jung’s effort to address what was seen as the shortcomings
of the previous engagement policy adopted by President Roh Tae-woo. It seems fair to say that
the Sunshine Policy was designed to address the weaknesses of Roh Tae-woo’s engagement
policy toward North Korea. Kim Dae-jung’s persistent endeavors to reduce North Korea’s threat
perception and build trust between the two Koreas in conducting his peace initiative can be
properly understood in this context. The spirit of the policy was sustained by President Kim’s
immediate successor President Roh Moo-hyun under the name of the Peace and Prosperity
Policy. Roh Moo-hyun’s version of the Sunshine Policy was meant to expand the scope of
economic and cultural exchanges with North Korea based on the principles of the flexible -or
diffuse- reciprocity and the separation of politics and economy while striving to resolve the
North Korean nuclear issue. In addition, President Roh aimed to address what he regarded as

18

the shortcomings of the Sunshine Policy under his predecessor such as issues of transparency,
citizen participation, and bipartisan support in implementing the policy. President Moon Jae-in
has also implemented a version of the Sunshine Policy intended to make improvements on
previous iterations.

Kim Dae-jung’s Election During a Time of Turmoil
Just about a month before Kim Dae-jung’s election, South Korea had been badly hit by
the Asian financial crisis that erupted in the waning period of Kim Young-sam’s presidency. The
worst ever crisis in the country’s history and arguably the most traumatic event since the
Korean War forced South Korea to agree to a $58 billion bailout package from the International
Monetary Fund, one of the biggest loans in the IMF’s history. This led to massive layoffs and
bankruptcies of big banks and industrial firms, which prompted citizens to join the so-called
“Gold Collection Campaign” with the purpose of donating to the national treasury (Fackler,
2011; McMillan, 2001). Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations remained at an all-time low as a
result of the five-year-long hardline policy under the Kim Young-sam administration. Having
brought the country’s economy out of the financial crisis about two years and a half ahead of
the IMF target of four years, Kim Dae-jung was successful in holding the first inter-Korean
summit in June 2001 (Kihl, 2005; Song, 2001, p. 154).
The contextual conditions at the time of Kim Dae-jung’s election in December 1997
constituted a critical juncture that was a catalyst not only for the country’s economic, political,
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and societal transformation, but also for the restructuring of inter-Korean relations. 7 In the
wake of South Korea’s overall containment policy toward North Korea under the Kim Youngsam administration, the North-South relations were highly unstable and antagonistic, which
could well have further exacerbated economic conditions that were already in shambles. At the
time, the South Korean people were in desperate need of strong, effective leadership that
would push the limits of the possible amid the evolving crisis.

C. Research Questions
How was it possible for President Kim Dae-jung to undertake the comprehensive
engagement policy toward North Korea amid all the constraints imposed by the external and
internal environment?


What was the role of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in undertaking the Sunshine Policy?
o What aspects of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership constituted a key mechanism, or
crucial enabling factors, for the Sunshine Policy?
o How did Kim Dae-jung’s leadership characteristics influence his leadership as
relevant to the Sunshine Policy?
o What were the downsides of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the
Sunshine Policy?
This study begins with the quest for understanding the role of President Kim Dae-jung’s

7

The concept of “critical junctures” is a fundamental building block of historical institutionalism. The causal rationales in the
relevant literature suggest a dual model of institutional development comprising relatively long periods of path-dependent
institutional stability and reproduction that are sporadically punctuated by brief moments of institutional flux -referred to as
critical junctures- during which more dramatic change is possible (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 341).
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leadership in conducting the Sunshine Policy, South Korea’s first comprehensive engagement
strategy in dealing with North Korea. This study takes note of the rationale that Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership constituted a critical enabling factor for the Sunshine Policy, as noted by many
insiders and outside observers. However, an understanding of specifically which aspects of his
leadership served as a major enabling factor has been murky at best, with one exception: his
ideas and beliefs have been highlighted as one important factor. The analysis is intended to
identify the primary mechanism involved in Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. The analysis will
explore how Kim Dae-jung’s personality traits and leadership styles, as well as his personal
capital, political skills and characteristics, which had been developed and shaped in his early
life, affected the way in which his peace initiative was undertaken over the course of his
presidency and the nature of the concerned policy. The analysis will also enable a proper
understanding of the downsides of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as reflected in the process of the
Sunshine Policy.
Sub-Questions
The first sub-question to address in this study is: Who was Kim Dae-jung as South
Korea’s first president to adopt the comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea?
The study suggests that his presidential leadership was intimately linked with his life
experiences prior to his presidency since this is when “personal capitals” and “political skills”
were largely shaped. This part of the inquiry is addressed in the Who chapter of this study.
The study then poses questions such as: What was the origin and conceptual basis of
the Sunshine Policy? How were relevant ideas and beliefs developed and how did they evolve
over the course of his political life before the presidency? Where can the Sunshine Policy be
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conceptually situated in the relevant literature on engagement policy as a foreign policy tool?
How were his ideas and beliefs reflected in the form of the Sunshine Policy during his term of
office? This set of inquiries will be dealt with in the Why chapter.
The study then delves into the queries in the How chapters in which the analysis is
aimed at understanding the fundamental mechanism of the Sunshine Policy in terms of 1) the
procedural or the decision-making aspect; and 2) the implementation aspect of the policy. The
questions to be addressed in this part of the study are as follows: What kind of constraints and
difficulties were posed to the Sunshine Policy during Kim Dae-jung’s tenure? How did he
respond to all of these constraints imposed by the external and internal environment?
Another set of questions to be examined in the How chapters are: What was Kim Daejung’s leadership like in regard to the Sunshine Policy? With the help of the Leadership Trait
Analysis (LTA), the analysis seeks to explore the following queries: What type of leadership
styles did Kim Dae-jung show in conducting the Sunshine Policy? Was his leadership consistent
regardless of the nature of the context and interests of important constituents or did it change
depending on the context and interests of important constituents? Under what conditions did
his approach to leadership change? The study also seeks to explore whether, and if so, how Kim
Dae-jung’s perspectives on major sources of constraints influenced the ways in which he dealt
with relevant constraints in implementing his North Korea policy.

D. The Who-Why-How-What Framework
This study will apply the who-why-how-what framework suggested by Jentleson (2018)
in his recent publication on leadership—specifically, on the leadership of individuals who had
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won the Nobel Peace Prize in global peace and security. This framework provides us with the
tools necessary to do a “holistic” analysis of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the
Sunshine Policy.
I. The Who Chapter
Who was Kim Dae-jung?
In Jentleson’s framework, the profiles of the leaders comprise varying combinations of
two key variables: personal capital and political skills. According to Jentleson, personal capital
means the “qualities the leader brings to the position separate from those inherent to it that
strengthen the capacity to be transformational.”8 He defines political skills as the means to
properly wield personal capital, get things done, and ensure the public support for one’s
leadership (Jentleson, 2018, p. xxv; Keohane, 2010, pp. 25–26). Political skills constitute another
key set of characteristics as it is not enough to have elements of personal capital for a leader to
achieve foreign policy goals. In cases where positive changes are made through formal
diplomacy, a leader’s professional stature becomes a key source of personal capital. This is the
case of interest in this study as it concerns a leader’s statesmanship in relation to specific policy
domains. In this case, the personal capital comprises the leader’s expertise, prior achievements,
and overall prestige that the individual brings to the position held (Jentleson, 2018, p. xxiv).
The Who chapter of this study comprises two sections: A) Biographical sketch of Kim
Dae-jung’s life prior to the presidency and B) Personal capital & Political skills. The chapter will
also briefly discuss some other elements of personal characteristics deemed useful in

8

He notes that personal capital is distinguished from social capital, which relates to bonds of shared identity within a broad
community, and from political capital, which mainly concerns resources to be distributed and rewards to be conferred.
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understanding Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy. In this chapter, Kim
Dae-jung’s early life and experiences prior to his presidency are examined as the crucial
formation process of his personal capital, political skills, and leadership characteristics, which
would constitute essential components of his presidential leadership to be exercised in
conducting the Sunshine Policy. The discourse will be focused on identifying major elements of
Kim Dae-jung’s personal capital and political skills, a toolkit which he would bring to his
presidency for use in conducting the Sunshine Policy.
II. The Why Chapter
Why did Kim Dae-jung adopt the Sunshine Policy and strive to make peace with North Korea?
Regarding the Why chapter, Jentleson (2018) notes that a vision is “a political story”
akin to what is more broadly seen as “narratives.” Jentleson (2018, p. xxvi) observes: A vision
tells us "where we want to go," it is "about the future;" it "guides action;” “defines meaning,"
and it “is simultaneously backward looking and aspirational.” The Why chapter in this study
discusses Kim Dae-jung’s guiding vision which provided the motivations for his unrelenting
quest for reconciliation and rapprochement with North Korea. In this chapter, the philosophical
and conceptual bases of the Sunshine Policy are discussed along with its origin and the
evolution of Kim Dae-jung’s ideas and philosophies on unification which culminated in the
Three-Stage Unification Formula in 1995. Then this chapter discusses the ideas and the set of
core principles underlying the Sunshine Policy as well as its guiding rules. Also, the Sunshine
Policy will be conceptualized in theoretical terms through discussion of how to conceptually
situate comprehensive engagement in the existing literature on engagement policy as a foreign
policy tool.
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III. The How Chapter
How did Kim Dae-jung pursue his peace initiative amid all the constraints imposed by the
external and internal environment?
The “How” part of this study comprises four chapters. Loosely speaking, this part of the
study addresses Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in relation to two different aspects of the Sunshine
Policy: 1) the decision-making system, and 2) the implementation of the policy. These chapters
explore the ways in which Kim Dae-jung’s leadership traits and styles affected choices he made
in undertaking the Sunshine Policy. Chapter 4 will begin by discussing the two methods used in
this study: the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA), and qualitative elite interviewing. President Kim
Dae-jung’s leadership profile comprises his personality traits and leadership styles linked with
the Sunshine Policy pertaining to his entire term of office (1998-2003). This chapter will
investigate how the decision-making system adopted in relation to the Sunshine Policy was
affected by Kim Dae-jung’s personality traits and characteristics. The decision-making model
discussed in this part of the study concerns the fundamental mechanism involved in the
relevant policy-making process throughout Kim’s presidency. Data obtained through qualitative
interviews were used in exploring the decision-making system and process adopted in relation
to the North Korea policy under President Kim Dae-jung. The first section of the following three
chapters on the implementation of the policy examines how Kim Dae-jung addressed major
constraints stemming from the internal and external environment in implementing the
Sunshine Policy. A part of these chapters addresses Kim Dae-jung’s perspectives on major
sources of constraints that could have or effectively impeded the course of his policy
implementation. Holsti (1962, p. 244) holds that a political leader "acts upon his “image” of the
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situation rather than upon “objective” reality." The interview data, which were collected
through the author’s personal communications with Kim Dae-jung’s long-time associates and
presidential advisers including those officials directly involved in the policy process, were used
to explore President Kim’s perspectives on major sources of constraints imposed on his peace
initiative.

Methods
1. Leadership Trait Analysis
In this study, the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is used as a primary methodological tool
to assess Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style as a function of the interplay of seven personality
traits, as will be discussed in detail in the “Methods” section of Chapter 4. The LTA, developed
by Hermann (e.g., 1980, 1984, 1987, 2001, 2005, 2008), is an at-a-distance assessment
technique for content analysis of verbal materials. A crucial assumption made with at-adistance techniques is that psychological characteristics of individuals can be assessed by
analyzing words they speak (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Winter, 1980,
1993; P. E. Tetlock, 1983; Winter et al., 1991). Used as materials in the analysis were Kim Daejung’s speeches, press conferences, and interviews that are available in the public domain as
well as transcripts of the conversation he had his North Korean counterpart during the first
inter-Korean summit meeting on June 14, 2000. Specifically, only segments of the text materials
dealing with North Korea or related topics were used for content analysis so that the results
were reflective of Kim’s leadership in relation to the North Korea policy. The analysis combines
a quantitative content analysis approach in order to create and assess Kim Dae-jung’s
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personality profile revealing his cognitive content and styles as well as his motivations with a
qualitative analysis of the relationship between his leadership profile and the nature of the
Sunshine Policy.
2. Qualitative Interviewing
In this study, qualitative elite interviewing was used to collect data. Specifically, the
study employs semi-structured, open-ended, in-depth interviews as a supplementary
instrument to delve into the leader’s perspectives on, and perceptions of, the contextual
conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy, as well as into the nature of the relevant decisionmaking machinery. The interviews were conducted with the individuals who were involved in
the relevant policy making and implementation process and/or served as close aides to
President Kim for a long time prior to and/or during his presidency.

IV. The What Chapter
What aspects of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership constituted a key mechanism for the Sunshine
Policy?
In this chapter, a set of conclusions will be provided on the basis of the analysis from
previous chapters. The What chapter will begin by discussing how elements of Kim Dae-jung’s
personal capital and political skills, which were formed throughout his political career prior to
his presidency as explored in the Who chapter, influenced how he engaged in his peace
initiative during his term of office. I then recapitulate the outcome of the analysis done in the
How chapters. Specifically, I will discuss how the unique combination of Kim Dae-jung’s
personal traits and leadership styles affected the nature of the Sunshine Policy. I also discuss
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whether, and if so, how, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style changed across the three periods of
interest depending on the context–or with the passage of time–and/or the source of
constraints. I will also discuss important results of the analysis, including the mechanism
involved in whether, and if so, how, Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on each of three major sources
of constraints influenced how he dealt with relevant constraints imposed on his peace
initiative, as manifested in his leadership style.

Conclusion
In the conclusion section, I will integrate the results of the analysis and suggest answers
to research questions I posed in the introduction. I will summarize discourses on how Kim Daejung’s leadership characteristics affected the nature of the Sunshine Policy in terms of the
procedural and implementation aspects of the policy. Based on the outcome of the analysis, I
will encapsulate the aspects of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership that constituted a crucial mechanism
for the Sunshine Policy as well as its downsides. I will then discuss the contribution of my study,
limitations, next steps, and the future of the Sunshine Policy.

Significance of the Study
The study intends to explore the leadership factor of the Sunshine Policy holistically and
in a methodologically rigorous and analytically sophisticated manner. It is worth noting that
such studies have been a sheer rarity when it comes to the topic in question. The existing
studies on the Sunshine Policy have discussed a variety of dimensions of the policy including the
leadership, the origin and the conceptual evolution of the policy, its functionalist aspect, its

28

implications, concerned ideas and beliefs, and so forth.9 Notably, those analytical studies
focused on an enabling factor of the Sunshine Policy mainly delve into an ideational dimension
of the policy –e.g., collective identity formation, and ideas and norms involved in the policymainly employing a constructivist approach to the subject (K. Y. Son, 2006; J. K. Choi, 2010; C.
Moon, 2012).
Even though many researschers and practitioners discuss the role of Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, their focus has been largely confined to the
leader’s philosophy and beliefs on the grounds that the policy was the fundamental epitome of
Kim Dae-jung’s philosophies of unification and strategies of engagement aimed at achieving the
ultimate goal of inter-Korean rapprochement and peaceful unification (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 6).
This study is intended to fill the gap, and to take a further step towards a holistic understanding
of the fundamental dynamics of leadership as the most critical component of the development
and implementation of the Sunshine Policy.
This study is expected to contribute to the fields of leadership, decision making, and
foreign policy by offering insights into the role of leadership in understanding global peace and
security. Also, the study’s elaborately designed analytical framework tailored to the goal of the
research will make a meaningful contribution to the methodological development of the field of
study.

9

Studies on the Sunshine Policy include Koo Bon-hak and Nam Chang-hee (2001), Sohn Moo-Jung (2001), Kim Hak-joon (2003),
Kim Hong-Soo (2005), and Cho Young-chul (2010). These studies discuss the origin and the chronological evolution of the
Sunshine Policy. The researches by Koo Young-rok (2000) as well as Kwon Eun-dak and Lim Jae-cheon (2006) explore the
functionalist aspect of the Sunshine Policy. Studies by Ju Sung-whan (2007) and Ju Sung-whan and Kim Jin-soo (2006) adderss
the implications of South Korea’s engagement of North Korea under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun shedding light on trade
and conflict between two Koreas (Y. G. Kim, 2013, pp. 183–184).
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Chapter 2. Who was Kim Dae-jung?

A. Biographical Sketch
Childhood
Kim Dae-jung was born on January 6, 1924, in a small village on a remote island called
Hauido in South Cholla province. His childhood was one of the gloomiest and darkest periods of
Japanese colonial rule for Korea (Kim, 2011a, pp. 27–29). He was born to Kim Un-shik, a tenant
farmer, to whom he attributed his artistic talents, and Chang Su-keum, a strict but very
affectionate mother (Kim, 2011a, pp. 30–34). Kim Dae-jung was the firstborn son of his mother
and the second son of his father.10 Even though his mother and the four children were living
separately from the first family, Kim Dae-jung grew up going back and forth between the two
families and had close sibling relationships (Kim, 2011a, pp. 27-37). Until he left for Mokpo -in
1936- in fourth grade at Normal school, he was educated in Hauido. He went to school in
Hauido until 1936 when he left for fourth grade in Mokpo at Normal School.
Kim Dae-jung indicates that he inherited his father’s artistic talent and his mother’s
political instinct involving a natural aptitude to judge a matter logically and verify it through
practice. Kim Dae-jung honored his mother’s role in making him a politician. Describing her as
highly inspiring and self-sacrificing, Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir that his mother inspired
him with an acute sense of right and wrong. She was utterly devoted to educating her children,
especially Kim Dae-jung, her eldest and the most pampered son (Kim, 1996, pp. 3–4; Kim,

10

Kim’s mother was his father’s second wife. His father had one son and three daughters with his first wife, who reportedly
later died, while having three sons and one daughter with Kim Dae-jung’s mother.
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2011a, pp. 31–5). In his boyhood, he was well-behaved and rarely argued with others. He also
says he was timid and even frightened of ghosts (Kim, 1996, p. 26). A pragmatic aptitude, which
Kim Dae-jung would demonstrate over the course of his political life for forming coalitions with
his critics and opponents, to the extent that such acts were instrumental in furthering his
causes, appears to be in part attributable to the unique situation he found himself in with
regard to his family history and the roles he chose to play as the second son of his father and
the first son of his mother.

School Age (Ages 9-11)
In his childhood, Kim Dae-jung was fond of studying and excelled in school. At the age of
nine, he began to attend a local Seodang, a traditional village school providing Confucian
elementary education. At Seodang, students were assessed through recitations instead of the
examinations given in a modern school system. His parents were elated whenever he was
awarded the top place at Seodang. When he won first place, his devoted mother prepared
some delicious food including rice cakes and drinks to serve to his teacher and classmates (Kim,
1996, p. 114).
A year later, Kim was transferred to the four-year regular elementary school that was
newly built in his village. Even as a little boy, he was attracted to politics. Serving as village
chief, his father was eligible to receive a free newspaper. While learning the Chinese characters
at Seodang, Kim Dae-jung was an avid reader of newspapers. With an intense interest in history
and politics, he would devour the front page, which covered the political news. At school, he
recalls that he would raise uncomfortably sharp political issues and enjoy discussing politics and
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his own analyses (Kim, 1996, p. 3; Kim, 2011a, p. 30, 38, 47).

Adolescence (Ages 12-19)
In 1936 when Kim Dae-jung was in the fourth grade at elementary school, his mother
persuaded his father to move to Mokpo to provide their gifted son with a better education
environment (Kim, 2011a, p. 38). He went to the prestigious Mokpo Commercial High School,
ranking first at the entrance exam among the mix of Japanese and Korean students. For the
next three years, he stayed at the top of the class and would exhibit brilliance that annoyed
some of the Japanese teachers (Kim, 2011a, pp. 42–50; Kirk, 2009, pp. 6–7). Kim Dae-jung’s
interest in politics was further intensified during this time. In his memoir, he recalls that the
encouragement from some Japanese teachers who praised him for his oratorical talent and
ability to speak in public significantly whetted his appetite for politics (Kim, 1996, p. 3). In this
period, Kim Dae-jung realized that he had a talent for clearly conveying his thoughts and
knowledge to others. He believed that his gift for teaching and ability for persuasion was linked
with his passion for politics (Kim, 1996, p. 3).
In the meantime, Kim Dae-jung felt deeply frustrated with the abolitionist policy of the
Japanese colonial rule, in which the Korean language class was abolished, and Korean students
were banned from using their own language and forced to change their names to Japanese
ones (Kim, 2011a, pp. 42-46). Disturbed by the brutal Japanese policy, his grades began to fall in
his senior year (Kim, 2011a, p. 50). In those days, the school authorities used to have the
students attend a monthly session wherein the school’s Japanese military instructor would
speak about the political situation. Kim Dae-jung often asked questions that used to corner the
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instructor (Kim, 1996, p. 4). While in high school, he was often criticized for being an “impure
element.” His school record, which was revealed in a biographical documentary in the Japanese
NHK-TV broadcasting network in the early 1990s, indicated that he had “a strong critical
attitude” and should “be put on a watch list” (Kim, 1996, p. 4).
During his high school days, Kim Dae-jung was a favorite student among many Japanese
teachers (Kim, 2011a, pp. 45-47).11 He discusses in his autobiography how one Japanese teacher
gave him crucial mentorship in his formative years by teaching him invaluable life lessons on
the importance of pragmatism and the balance between flexibility and adherence to principles
(Kim, 2011a, p. 46).12 Kim Dae-jung indicates in his writings that despite his firm resistance to
the Japanese colonial rule and system, he maintained a pragmatic spirit. That is, he did not
personally hold a grudge against the Japanese. Instead, he differentiated between hatred of the
system and hatred of the people. This appears to evoke Nelson Mandela’s practical attitude
toward the Whites, demonstrated throughout his crusade against apartheid. 13

Young Adult (Ages 20-25)
After graduation from high school, he planned to go to Konkook University–or Kenkoku
University in Japanese–located in Manchukuo. However, in December 1941, with the fighting
between the United States and Japan raging on upon the outbreak of the Pacific War, he
changed his plan as he dreaded the possibility of being drafted into the Japanese army. Instead

11

He says in his memoir that his Japanese teachers neither discriminated against Korean students nor treated them with
contempt (Kim, 2011a, p. 43).
12
In his memoir, Kim Dae-jung reminds himself that the Japanese teacher taught students to “firmly adhere to the principle of
life,” saying that to abandon it was like abandoning life itself” (Kim, 1996, pp. 124–125).
13
While vigorously pursuing his goals of ending apartheid and achieving African nationalism, Mandela was never viscerally antiwhite, differentiating between hatred of the system and hatred of whites (Jentleson, 2008, pp. 144, 160).
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of going to college, he chose to join a Japanese shipping company (Kim, 2011a, pp. 48-50). With
the Japanese leaving Korea upon their surrender on August 15, 1945, the company was left
with twenty or so workers without an owner. Kim Dae-jung ran the company as the workers
elected him to become the company manager. He then decided to run another company
acceding to the request from the employees of the biggest shipbuilding company in Mokpo
(Kim, 2011a, p. 55). Around this time, Kim moved to launch his own company engaged in
marine cargo transportation (Kim, 2011, p. 62).
Upon the liberation of Korea from the colonial rule, Kim Dae-jung began to engage in
political activities aspiring to contribute to the establishment of the new country. In 1945, Kim
joined the local chapter of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence, led by
Yeo Un-hyung, which would later become the People’s Committee. At the time, many patriotic
and conscious young men in the thoroughly left-wing Mokpo joined the People’s Committee
(Cumings, 2005, p. 366). The U.S. forces that arrived in Korea several weeks after the Japanese
surrender outlawed the committee as leftist, if not communist (Kirk, 2009, p. 8). Kim Dae-jung
then briefly joined the New Democratic Party or Shinmin-dang in Korean.14 In fact, Kim’s
membership in leftist political parties in the wake of the country’s liberation would later
become part of the charges in the indictment filed against him in September 1980 when he was
sentenced to death for sedition and violation of the National Security Law at the military

14

On December 27, 1945, the announcement was made at the Moscow Conference that Foreign Ministers of the United Sates,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed upon a period of trusteeship for Korea, not to exceed five years. In Korea, the
announcement was met with a growing wave of discontent, chagrin, fury, and eventually violence. Kim Dae-jung personally
believed that the trusteeship, although humiliating, would be a better option than a divided, independent state. According to
Kim Dae-jung, this is why he joined the New Democratic Party Shinmin-dang which was campaigning for a left-right
collaboration. Kim’s disenchantment with communism at the time was also affected by his conservative father-in-law, the
father of his first wife (Kim, 2011a, pp. 58–59). However, as soon as he realized that the party was supportive of communism
and the Soviet Union, Kim withdrew his membership (Dae Jung Kim, 2011a, pp. 58–59).
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tribunal (H. H. Lee, 1997, p. 180).

Political Awakening: Korean War & Pusan Political Crisis (Age 26-29)
Kim Dae-jung was on a business trip to Seoul when the Korean War broke out. After
suffering setbacks during the war –to be discussed in detail below– Kim Dae-jung decided to
resume his business.15 In October 1950, Kim took over the local Mokpo Daily, which was the
first-ever local newspaper in postcolonial Korea, and served as its president and publisher for
two years. Additionally, engaging in a shipping business that was booming, he thrived as a
businessman in his twenties (Kim, 1996, p. 5; J. Kim, 2010, pp. 79, 81–82).
During the war, Kim Dae-jung went through two critical events which gave him a rude
awakening and led him to enter politics: 1) the Korean War (1950-1953), and 2) the Busan
Political Crisis (1952). On the second day of the war, the South Korean troops, which were
vastly inferior to their northern counterparts in human and material resources, abandoned
Uijongbu, the gateway to Seoul. President Syngman Rhee assured the frightened Seoulites over
the radio that he would do his utmost to secure the capital. As it later turned out, Rhee had
already fled south to Daejon when he made the announcement on the radio. The following day,
the South Korean army blew up the Han River Bridge, cutting off the major route leading south.
Hundreds of refugees and soldiers who were crossing the bridge were killed in the explosion
that was set off without warning. Watching as all this happened, Kim Dae-jung, along with
many other Koreans, felt deeply frustrated and pondered over the importance of leadership (C.
S. Kim, 1998, p. 148; Kim, 2011, pp. 69–69; Lee, 2015).

15

As the war was prolonged, people were increasingly becoming desensitized and came to live ordinary lives at the time.
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During the Korean War, Kim states in his autobiography, he endured some harrowing
experiences at the hands of the North Koreans and thus became disenchanted with
communism. In September 1950, Kim was arrested, imprisoned, and was almost killed by the
Communists. He only narrowly escaped from being shot to death (Kim, 2011a, p. 73). His
witness of the cruelty committed by the North Korean army made the danger of communism
clear to him. Kim Dae-jung shuddered at accidentally watching a person be executed on the
spot at a people’s court on the street by the North Korean soldiers (Kim, 2011a, p. 69). As
reflected in his own writings, Kim Dae-jung sought to explain away his alleged affinity with the
communism and the North Korean regime that persistently hounded him throughout his
political career.
Another incident that led to a political awakening in Kim Dae-jung and made him decide
to enter politics occurred in the middle of the War. At the time, Syngman Rhee’s reelection
appeared difficult in the National Assembly through indirect presidential election as he lost
support from the opposition Korean Democratic Party. In a bid to challenge this constraint and
perpetuate his rule, President Rhee tried to amend the constitution. 16 However, the January
1952 vote of the National Assembly blocked Rhee’s scheme. In the summer of 1952, the Rhee
government resubmitted the amendment bill to the opposition-led National Assembly, setting
off the so-called “Pusan Political Crisis.” In an attempt to get the bill passed with a two-thirds
majority, Rhee declared martial law, suspended the National Assembly, and intimidated the
assembly into approving a constitutional amendment for direct presidential election which

16

President Rhee proposed a constitutional amendment to replace the indirect presidential election by the members of the
National Assembly, as stipulated by the constitution, with a direct, popular election. Rhee believed he could control the
outcome of the direct election.
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cleared the way for his third-term and eventual life-long term of office (Cumings, 2005, p. 347;
Robinson, 2007, p. 122; Kil, 2010, p. 35).17

Formation of Lifetime Goals: Democracy & Unification
The experience of a tragic war left Kim Dae-jung with his lifetime goal of achieving
rapprochement between two Koreas and genuine democracy in South Korea. He was badly
shocked to see how easily representatives of the people yielded to the will of a dictator and
how a single corrupt leader brought the whole country to a crisis and threw the people into
despair. According to Kim Dae-jung, the Korean War taught him that a deceitful leader might
lead to a failed society, and by extension, a failed state. He concluded that the real well-being
of the people could never be achieved unless a genuine democratic system was established and
one-man rule, which had changed the constitution at its will and had downgraded the National
Assembly, was brought to an end (Kim, 2011a, pp. 86-87). Believing that all the tragedies
resulted from the corruption of politics, Kim Dae-jung decided to enter politics at the end of the
war.

Trials Suffered before the First Election (Ages 30-39)
His political career was full of trials from the beginning. After getting out of the shipping
business, Kim ran for the National Assembly in May 1954 as an independent, only to be ranked
fifth among eight candidates (Kim, 2011a, pp. 88-89). After his first run for election, it took him

17

In the process, the government arrested twelve assemblymen, censored the press, and threatened to dissolve assembly
entirely, which Rhee had no legal authority to do.
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nine years to win a seat in the National Assembly and to actually engage in legislative activities.
Throughout nine years of running for election (1954-1963), Kim Dae-jung’s strength and
resilience were repeatedly tested. In May 1956, President Rhee won an easy victory in his bid
for a third four-year term after the presidential candidate of the opposition Democratic Party
died just before the election. Rhee, however, faced trouble from Chang Myeon, the victorious
vice-presidential candidate from the Democratic Party.18 After Chang was wounded in an
assassination attempt in 1957, Kim Dae-jung joined his Democratic Party. After joining the
opposition party, he ran again for the National Assembly in 1958, this time in Inje, Kangwon
province. This time, he could not even register as a candidate as the Rhee government spared
no effort to block his election (Kim, 2011a, pp. 94-101; Kirk, 2009, p. 21).19 In the ensuing June
1959 special election which was held after Kim Dae-jung won a lawsuit he had filed against the
electoral district, Kim was defeated again.20 Eventually, Kim Dae-jung won election on his fourth
try in May 1961 following successive electoral defeats in 1954, 1958, and 1959 (e.g., Kim,
2011a, pp. 88-104; Kirk, 1999, pp. 19-26). However, his political career was thwarted again as
the National Assembly was dissolved a few days after his election by General Park Chung-hee
who led a military coup. The Democratic government led by Prime Minister Chang Myeon was
helplessly toppled by Park’s coup (e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 128-129, 130-8; Kirk, 2009, pp. 19-23).

18

Chang Myeon, known as John Myeon Chang in the West, served as Prime Minister when the Democratic Party was in power
(from 1960-1961). This was the only democratic government in Korea’s history until the end of the President Roh’s presidency
(1988-1993). Chang was then the hope of the Koreans who longed for change in government. Kim Dae-jung was heavily
influenced by Chang Myeon, whose words and deeds he found impeccable as a devout Catholic. Kim Dae-jung was baptized in
June 1956 with Chang Myeon serving as his godfather (Kim, 2011a, pp. 91-92).
19
For example, in the spring 1958 election, government goons used every means possible to block his registration as a
candidate. Kim managed to register his candidacy after a considerable uproar, only to see the registration invalidated by
physical force. Charging fraud, Kim got the Supreme Court to rule in his favor, invalidate the vote, and order another election.
20
This time, Kim appeared to have realistic chances of success. However, the government tried every tactic to hamper his
election, enforcing an open ballot among soldiers who were known to be mostly supportive of the opposition, conducting a
propaganda campaign labeling Kim as a “commie,” and carrying out vote rigging (Kim, 2011a, pp. 94-101; Kirk, 2009, p. 21).
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Kim Dae-jung continued to challenge a series of obstacles that were imposed on his election.
Upon the lifting of an authoritarian decree in early 1963, he ran again for election as the
Democratic Party candidate from Mokpo, his hometown district. This time, he easily won the
election for the first time in nine years (Goldstein, 1999, pp. 43–44). After all, Kim Dae-jung’s
election to the National Assembly in 1963 (at age 45) was his first political success. All the
adversities and setbacks he went through before entering politics afforded him tenacity,
resilience, and perseverance, an important source of his personal capital. Notably, how Kim
Dae-jung achieved his first political success apparently had a significant bearing on how he
would deal with constraints and obstacles he would face throughout his political career.

Early Political Career (Ages 39-46)
Kim Dae-jung became a member of the opposition Democratic Party in 1956 at age 32
with the backing of Dr. Chang Myeon. His political career began in earnest in 1960 upon his
appointment as party spokesman by Prime Minister Chang Myeon, a tribute to Kim’s growing
reputation for eloquence (Kirk, 2009, p. 23). Kim Dae-jung was elected to the National Assembly
in 1961, 1963, 1967, and 1970. Kim Dae-jung worked his way up through the ranks of the
opposition Democratic Party until he became its presidential candidate in 1971. Upon engaging
in legislative activities in 1963, he quickly emerged as a national figure. He soon distinguished
himself as an orator who could easily mesmerize a crowd with his verbal talent (Kirk, 2009, p.
27). Kim Dae-jung’s stellar performance as an opposition lawmaker led him to emerge as the
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most dreaded political rival to President Park Chung Hee.21 This reportedly made him the target
of the assassination plot attempted by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in August 1971.

The Turning Point in Kim Dae-jung’s Political Career (Age 47)
President Park Chung-hee regarded Kim Dae-jung as a serious threat to his rule and a
nuisance that had to be silenced in light of his legislative activities in the National Assembly. In
the 1967 assembly election, President Park reportedly made systematic efforts to defeat Kim
Dae-jung even though the latter won by a landslide.22 It was the 1971 presidential election that
marked a crucial turning point for Kim Dae-jung the politician (aged 47). His ideas on
unification, developed through his legislative activities in the 1960s, began to be made public in
the form of policy proposals in the early 1970s. In a press conference on the campaign trail in
October 1970, Kim Dae-jung issued four innovative proposals on South Korea’s policy toward
North Korea: 1) security guarantees from the four major powers (the United States, Japan,
China, and Russia) to achieve peace on the Korean peninsula; 2) full (cultural, social, economic)
exchange with North Korea and South Korea’s normalization of relations with communist
countries; 3) peaceful coexistence with North Korea; and 4) peaceful unification based on the
three-stage unification formula featuring peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and

21

On April 20, 1964, Kim Dae-jung conducted a filibuster for five hours and nineteen minutes, arguing against the arrest of a
fellow lawmaker and party member. This earned him recognition by the Guinness Book Records for the longest speaking record
in the National Assembly (Kirk, 2009, p. 27).
22
Kim Dae-jung, on his part, fought back zealously, charging that the ruling candidate was a henchman of the government and
that the election would be rigged. Despite Park’s concerted efforts to defeat him, Kim Dae-jung easily prevailed. In the election
at large, the ruling party won overwhelmingly, securing more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. This was
more than enough to allow for the constitutional amendment to enable Park Chung-hee’s third term (Kirk, 2009, pp. 29-30, e.g.,
Kim, 2011a, pp. 176-190).`
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peaceful unification. (Kim, 2011a, pp. 205-207; 258-267).23
Kim Dae-jung’s 1971 proposal on North Korea policy aroused interest and passion
among many South Koreans. At the time, the ‘theory of Unification through Marching North’
still remained a dominant discourse on unification in South Korean society as the Korean War
had ended less than 18 years earlier. In the atmosphere of those days, it was difficult to issue
any proposals unless they were anti-communist or dedicated to the annihilation of
communism. In fact, Kim’s proposals were made against the backdrop of emerging signs of
détente in the global Cold War structure as was evidenced by the Nixon Doctrine on February
18, 1970. Still, Kim Dae-jung’s proposals sounded creative since they were announced even
before the visit to Beijing in July 1971 by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s secret envoy,
following the so-called pingpong diplomacy, and President Nixon’s subsequent visit to Beijing in
February 1972 (S.S. Park, personal communication, November 23, 2016). In actuality, Kim Daejung’s 1971 proposals would be implemented in the form of the Sunshine Policy twenty seven
years later. Moreover, Kim’s proposals on the four-power security guarantee would later serve
as the conceptual foundation for the Six-Party Talks (2004-2008), which brought together the
two Koreas and the four powers to the negotiating table to address North Korea’s nuclear
problem.
On his visit to the United States in February 1971 as a presidential candidate, Kim Daejung revealed his proposal for the Three-Stage Unification Formula in his press conference at
the National Press Club in Washington D.C. His proposal included an array of innovative ideas
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Such proposals were made in addition to a set of other policy proposals including industrialization based on agricultural
development, participatory mass production, and abolition of the homeland reserve forces.
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such as: 1) tension reduction through mutual abandonment of the use of arms; 2) inter-Korean
exchanges in non-military fields; and 3) South and North Korea's simultaneous entry into the
United Nations; 4) and the cross-recognition of South Korea by China and Russia and North
Korea by the United States and Japan (Kim, 2011a, pp. 262-265).
As a presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung enlisted American legislative support and
actively cultivated contacts in the United States, Japan and elsewhere in pursuit of international
support for his causes. His initiative began in February 1971 by calling on two Democratic Party
politicians in Washington, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator J. William
Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Both senators,
who opposed the U.S. role in Vietnam, expressed sympathy and support for Kim Dae-jung in
their zeal for American style democracy and their revulsion over the excesses first of Rhee
Syngman and then of Park Chung-hee (Kirk, 2009, p. 40).

Political Ordeals Suffered under the State-led Anti-Communist Campaigns (Ages 48-63)
With regard to the country’s North Korea policy under Park Chung-hee, Park announced
the historic July 4 (1972) Joint Communique with North Korea, to the surprise of many South
Koreans.24 While welcoming the move, Kim found it incomprehensible that President Park, who
had been undertaking an extremely hardline approach toward the North and repressing those
calling for inter-Korean reconciliation, took an abruptly conciliatory turn stressing the need to
promote inter-Korean exchange and reconciliation in pursuit of peaceful unification. Kim Dae-
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For an English version of the July 4 South-North Communique (1972), go to: https://peacemaker.un.org/korea-4julycommunique72
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jung then realized that this was no more than a political ploy designed to allow Park Chung-hee
and Kim Il-sung to consolidate their respective rule since very little was done to follow through
on the inter-Korean agreement.
Having emerged as Park Chung-hee’s arch-rival in the wake of the 1971 presidential
election, Kim Dae-jung became a major target of the state-led anti-communist campaign
designed to stifle all forms of dissent. Kim Dae-jung was deeply disturbed by the ways in which
President Park used the alleged threat from North Korea to tighten his grip on power amid
growing popular aspirations for democracy and thus to perpetuate his rule. Throughout his
term of office, Park took a series of extra-legal measures by declaring “emergency decrees”
repeatedly – nine times – to stifle opposition, mainly from intellectuals and Christian
clergymen, to his rule. Kim Dae-jung condemned the Park regime for abusing National Security
Law as an expedient tool to oppress dissidents. In accusing the government of abusing National
Security Law for political purposes, Kim Dae-jung said, “It is such an evil law that cannot exist in
a democratic state. We also know that it has been arbitrarily misused by those in power, not for
anti-communist purposes but for political aims to suppress scholars, reporters, literati, and
students” (Kirk, 1999, p. 36). Notably, however, he took a highly pragmatic position on the
National Security Law. Kim stopped short of demanding its repeal, taking a practical and
nuanced approach that was distinct from the leftist claim at the time. Instead, he focused his
criticism on Article Four, claiming that the notorious article “be applied to only those who have
explicit anti-state purposes” (Kirk, 1999, p. 36). The anti-communist campaign targeted at Kim
Dae-jung continued into the subsequent Chun Doo-hwan government. The fabricated procommunist spy allegations led Kim Dae-jung to be sentenced to death under the Chun regime in
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May 1980. The so-called “Red Campaign” was in full swing especially during election times. 25
Under the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan governments, Kim survived a death
sentence (1980), imprisonments (1976-1978, 1980-1982), numerous house arrests (1973-1976,
1978-1979, 1985-1987), aborted assassination attempts (1971, 1973), and an abduction (1973).
Throughout his political career, Kim Dae-jung suffered from an egregious form of regionalism
initiated under the Park regime. This regionalism featured political and economic favoritism
shown towards the southeastern Kyongsang province and discrimination against the
southwestern Cholla province. President Park Chung-hee virtually excluded the Cholla region
from the economic development plan he earnestly pushed for, leaving the entire region long
destitute and underprivileged (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). This helped create the domestic political
culture wherein voters were motivated not by the policies and competencies of the candidates
but rather by regionalist prejudices. Many voters tended to vote along strict regional lines, thus
squeezing the two Cholla provinces into a losing position. Kim Dae-jung, who was often mocked
for his origins in Mokpo of South Cholla, accommodated grievances of the Cholla population
and became their advocate, champion, and unquestioned leader (Cumings, 2005, p. 366).
Noting that Park’s regional discrimination policy originated from pernicious regionalism, Kim
posited that regionalism is “the biggest political, moral blunder” committed by Park Chung-hee
under his 18-year rule, denouncing it as “a crime against history” (Kim, 2011, p. 152). 26
25

For example, in the election of December 1992, the media linked an episode involving North Korean spy Lee Sun-shil with
presidential candidate Kim Dae-jung. The newspapers spread a story in the headlines that the North was backing Kim Dae-jung
for president, rooting for Kim Young-sam’s defeat (J. S. Kang, 2010). Candidate Kim Young-sam, for his part, unleashed anticommunist attacks against Kim Dae-jung, his longtime adversary, whom he falsely accused of being supported by Pyongyang
(Oberdorfer, 2001, p. 287).
26
Kim Dae-jung condemned regionalism by saying, “Regional discrimination is like a cancer cell that may snatch away our life
any time (Kim, 1996, p. 94). I believe that, if our people want to become an advanced nation, we must unfailingly pass through
the process of completely liberating ourselves from this evil practice (p. 88) … There is no more urgent matter than this. Unless
we do so, the future is not bright for us (p. 94).”
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After spending two years and two months in exile in the United States, Kim Dae-jung
returned home in February 1985. Upon his arrival at the Kimpo airport, he was immediately
whisked away and put under house arrest. Kim’s return home intensified the nationwide prodemocracy protest. In June 1987, Kim Dae-jung was cleared of all outstanding charges, had his
political and civil rights restored, and became free to run for office. He was defeated again in
two presidential elections in a row in 1987 and 1992 before being elected as the eighth
President of the Republic of Korea in December 1997 at age 74. Kim Dae-jung’s election marked
the first-ever peaceful transition of power from the ruling to the opposition party in Korea’s
modern history.

B. Personal Capital and Political Skills
1. Personal Capital
Kim Dae-jung’s experience as a democratic activist and an opposition leader throughout
his forty year-long political career prior to his election as president afforded him ample sources
of personal capital comprising various personal bona fides. However, it is worth noting that the
leadership qualities required to govern or preside over specific policies as a president can be
different from those required to be an effective opposition leader. This is in part because of the
difference in the degree of accountability involved or of necessity for pleasing or placating
important constituencies. Those running for office or leading the opposition do not have to be
responsible for the effectiveness of specific policies and thus may criticize the leadership
without any direct obligation to deal with the problems. Therefore, opposition leaders may
appear more confident in their proposals or express the black and white worldview on their
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campaign trail in enlisting support from the populace and the media (Hermann, 2003).
While serving as an opposition leader whose leadership mainly derived from popular
support, Kim Dae-jung’s personal capital took a strong moral dimension involving such
elements as courage, sacrifices, charisma as well as a sense of commitment to causes such as
democracy, human rights, and peaceful unification (e.g., Jentleson, 2018, p. xxv)
Meanwhile, the personal capital Kim Dae-jung brought to office as the president who
would preside over the overall implementation of the North Korea policy and relevant
diplomacy was more closely linked with his professional stature based on such elements as
expertise, prior achievements, and overall prestige that he brought to office. This is because, in
conducting his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was more focused on managing the policy
process and engaging in diplomacy than on enlisting public support, communicating with the
public, or responding to his critics and opponents.
Kim Dae-jung’s political capital developed throughout his political career is comprised of
tenacity, charisma and international recognition. Regarding the area of North Korea policy, his
knowledge and expertise in the field constituted another crucial source of personal capital.

1) Tenacity
Prior to being elected president of South Korea, Kim Dae-jung’s life remained constantly
uncertain, as it was full of trials and tribulations. It took him nine years after his first try in 1954
to be elected to the National Assembly and engage in legislative activities. It took him 26 years
after becoming a presidential candidate in 1971 to be elected president in December 1997. In
the process, he lost three presidential elections in 1971, 1987, and 1992. In his political life, Kim
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Dae-jung experienced four different brushes with death, spent six years in prison and over a
decade under house arrest, and endured two exiles abroad. He survived an abduction, two
assassination attempts, a death sentence, constant surveillance, and extensive defamation.
He was called by many different titles in his political life: a presidential candidate, an
opposition leader, the ringleader of a treasonous uprising, a death-row inmate, an exile, a
red/communist, a dangerous radical, the president, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.
Throughout his political life, Kim Dae-jung intensely pondered the theme of “challenges
and responses.” Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on this leitmotif is clearly manifested in his letters
to his family members while imprisoned. In his letters, he expressed a firm belief in the human
being’s power to produce creative and courageous responses to challenges and in making a
change.27

2) Charisma
According to Weber (1947, p. 361), charismatic authority is outside the realm of
everyday routine and the profane sphere, as distinguished from the cases of rational and
traditional authority (Weber, 1947, pp. 328–329).28 Other scholars suggest contrasting
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Kim Dae-jung says that he learned much and discovered, in the difficult times, a conviction for Toynbee’s philosophy of
history (Dae Jung Kim, 1987, p. 62). He called Toynbee his intellectual mentor. Toynbee’s “A Study of History” is the text that
gave Kim a sense of how to steer his life (Kim, 1987, p. 63; Kim, 1996, p. 42). Kim Dae-jung says in his letter (dated July 27,
1981), “Human beings cannot be dealt with by the natural science theory of causality. In the material world, the same cause will
produce the same consequence, irrespective of time and place, but with human beings, because the human spirit can vary so
greatly in their response to the same cause, different results occur. Depending on their imagination and courage, human beings
can develop quite different results from historical condition, and the history of mankind is no more than the stage for this
drama of diversity” (Kim, 1987, p. 63).
28
Max Weber notes that the term charisma is “a quality of an individual personality” by virtue of which “he is set apart from
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.”
Weber holds that such qualities are not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary,
and on the basis of them the concerned individual is treated as a leader (Weber, 1947, pp. 358–359).

47

viewpoints on charisma. Referring to charisma in the Weberian concept as “a confusing and
undemocratic form of leadership,” at best, and as “a type of tyranny,” at worst, Burns (2003,
pp. 26–27) posits that effective charismatic leadership takes the “creative leader-follower
interaction” dimension into consideration in which the leader provides initiatives that followers
“pick up, amplify, reshape, and direct back onto the leader.” Similarly, organization scholars
such as David Nadler and Michael Tushman (1990) note that charismatic leaders are supposed
to “envision, energize, and enable” the followers. Hermann and associates (2001, pp. 97–98,
108) posit that charismatic leaders are aware that recognition of power and authority are in the
“eye of the beholder.” These leaders are willing to include others and have them onboard in the
process of moving towards their goal so as to enhance the chances of success.
Assuming that the two different notions of charisma suggested by Weber (1947) and
Burns (2003) represent two extremes on the spectrum, a close examination of Kim Dae-jung’s
political life and his perspective on the leader-follower relationship leads to the conclusion that
his charisma would fall somewhere towards the middle of the spectrum. That is, Kim Dae-jung’s
charisma was multifaceted in nature. On one hand, it presumably conformed to the traditional,
Weberian concept of charisma and the notion of leadership embedded in the country’s
Confucian culture. On the other hand, his charismatic personality was shaped by the political
career he pursued as a democratic activist and dissident politician. This means that Kim Daejung’s charisma was affected by the notion of the leader-follower relationship in the democratic
context as posited by Burns (2003), as well as Nadler and Tushman (1990).
Regarding the relationship between the leader and the follower, Kim Dae-jung posited
that the leader “walk only a half-step ahead of the people” and that in doing so, the leader walk
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hand in hand with the people (K. H. Choi, 2010, p. 47). From Kim Dae-jung’s viewpoint, the
leader is someone who leads the masses, but the individual should neither go alone or walk far
ahead of the people nor mingle in the masses. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung’s leadership
combined the two different notions of charisma, as discussed above.
Studies (Bass, 1981; Byars, 1972, 1973; Hermann & Kogan, 1977) suggest that
charismatic leaders focus on two distinct functions at the same time: that of pushing the
organization toward completion of a task, and that of maintaining group spirit and morale. For
Kim Dae-jung, the leader is supposed to articulate a compelling vision, be a good example,
show consistency in behavior, exude personal confidence and enthusiasm, empathize with the
masses, express confidence in people, and most importantly, come up with “a solution” to
problems with which the people struggle. In short, Kim believed that the leader is responsible
for “envisioning, energizing and enabling” people, as Nadler and Tushman (Nadler & Tushman,
1990, pp. 81–83) put it.
Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was in part ascribed to the sheer power of his political
discourse and persuasiveness in argument. As a dissident politician, Kim Dae-jung would exude
a charismatic appeal, captivating crowds at a mass rally as easily as a small audience in an
important forum (Kirk, 2009, p. 27). Studies surmise that much of the charismatic appeal of
political leaders is attributed to their oratorical skills. Ann Ruth Willner (1968, p. 103) observes
that charismatic leaders are commonly described as “eloquent” or “spell-binding” orators
equipped with the ability to “arouse audiences to heights of enthusiasm and emotion.”
Tucker (1977, p. 388) posits that one quality that may be common to charismatic
leaders is “a contagious faith and confidence in the community’s capacity to overcome, under
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their leadership, its distress.” Apparently, this is the case with Kim Dae-jung, whose life prior to
the presidency was marked by seemingly incessant hardship and adversity. To overcome this,
he had to gather courage, holding faith and confidence in the capacity of the people in his
mind. Kim Dae-jung had articulated such a faith and confidence as a source of his courage.
Another notable dimension of charismatic leadership is linked with the ability to
promote change. Unquestionably, Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was also derived from this. Tucker
(1968, p. 736) stresses this dimension, positing that “Whatever the particular social setting
(religion, politics, and so forth), charismatic leadership rejects old rules and issues a demand for
change.” Kim Dae-jung’s charisma was closely associated with his predilection for innovation. In
strategizing the rapprochement process, Kim Dae-jung was all the more inclined to be
innovative in his ways of thinking and to break with time-honored ways of thinking and acting in
dealing with North Korea.
Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s charismatic charm had an authoritarian streak, a trait noted
in Weber’s thesis. While Kim Dae-jung was the opposition leader, the epithet “imperial” was
often used before his position when critics described him. Critics would note that Kim Daejung’s presence within his party was so powerful and absolute that it rendered the party highly
personalized in nature. This certainly would conjure up a negative image linked with an
authoritarian or magisterial streak, either in the leader’s personal characteristics or in cultural
ethos at the time. In a conversation with the author, a former aide to President Kim used the
term “bossy” to describe such an aspect of his leadership.
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In a way, this can be seen as the remnant of the so-called the Three Kim era. 29 The three
Kim politics were seen as linked with patrimonialism wherein personal relationships radiate
outwards from an organization’s leader as the three leaders tended to dominate their
respective parties and to be in absolute control. Moreover, the Three Kim politics were often
accused of being of factionalism wherein a cohesive clique of individuals is interconnected by
dint of friendship and collegiality. Under the three Kim’s leadership, their political parties were
each built around a faction as key positions of each party were monopolized by a faction (Choi
et al., 2014). Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s National Commission for New Politics (NCNP) (19952000), the four out of eight executive members of the party were the Donggyo-dong faction
and played dominant roles within the party. Not unlike the cases of the other two leaders, Kim
Dae-jung’s NCNP was so dependent on its charismatic leader that it assumed highly
personalized characteristics.

3) Professional Stature based on Knowledge and Expertise
As regards the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s personal capital in large part derived
from his professional stature based on his knowledge and expertise that was the product of his
focused effort, hard work, intellectual ability, interest, and critical lifetime events. Regarding
the concept of expertise, some scholars emphasize focused effort, hard work, and deliberate
practice (e.g., Ackerman & Beier, 2003; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). This
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In the wake of the fiercely competitive 1971 presidential election, the competition between Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam
and Kim Jong-pil, the three opposition leaders, dominated South Korean politics for more than a decade. In this period, the
three Kims shaped the leader-centric politics in South Korea as they formed, dissolved, merged, and split parties according to
their political needs (J. N. Choi et al., 2014).
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conceptualization surmises that anyone who is sufficiently motivated can become an expert at
something and that the combination of deliberate practice and specialized training are
necessary ingredients of expertise (Preston & M. G. Hermann, 2006, pp. 8–9). In contrast, other
scholars stress the importance of pre-existing abilities in attaining expert performance and
gaining knowledge (e.g., Ackerman, 1987; Connell, Sheridan, & Gardner, 2003; Herrnstein &
Murray, 1994; Hunter & Hunter, 1984). They claim that, in addition to deliberate practice and
experience, natural ability also matters. Still others underscore the importance of critical events
in a leader’s life, noting that such events can also lead to the development of expertise (e.g.,
Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings, 2002; Citrin & Sides, 2004). They posit that such events are
particularly important during one’s “impressionable years” when political socialization rapidly
occurs. Such events include wars, protests, arrests, fighting for ethnic or religious identity,
discrimination, depressions, coups, riots, as well as traveling, studying, and living abroad
(Preston & M. G. Hermann, 2006, p. 6). The critical events and experiences Kim Dae-jung
underwent at personal and national levels directly or indirectly influenced the formation of his
beliefs and ideas about democracy and rapprochement.30 All this, in turn, affected the
development of his interest and expertise in the unification policy.
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s education, he got into higher education relatively late in life.
At age 39, he obtained a one-year diploma in Business Administration. At 42, he completed
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Kim Dae-jung’s critical lifetime experiences include his abduction from Japan (1973) by the South Korean intelligence agency
under President Park Chung-hee, four brushes with death, six years of prison, a death sentence, ten years of house arrest and
forced exiles in Japan (1973) and the United States (1982-1985). Moreover, he lived through critical junctures in South Korea’s
history such as the period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945), the division of the Korean peninsula (1948), the Korean War
(1950-1953), the 12 years of Syngman Rhee’s rule (1948-1960), the April Student Revolution (1960), the May 16 military coup
(1961), the 18 years of Park Chung-hee’s rule (1961-1979), the Yushin system (1972-1979), Chun Doo-hwan’s military coup
(1979), the Gwangju Democratic Uprising (1980), and Roh Tae-woo’s June 29 Declaration that marked the country’s transition
to democracy by adopting direct presidential election and amnesty and restoration of civil right for dissidents including Kim
Dae-jung (1987).
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another diploma in Industrial management, and at 45 a master’s degree in Economics from
Kyung Hee University in Seoul. At age 68, he earned a doctoral degree in Political Science at the
Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Moscow in 1992.31 Since he did not go to
college, Kim Dae-jung sought to demonstrate his intellectual qualifications while engaging in
legislative activities. He was well known as the best-informed member of the National
Assembly. Kim Dae-jung says he effectively owed this reputation, somewhat paradoxically, to
the very fact that he did not attend college. Regarding this, he said, “Instead of having been
defeated by this deficiency, I turned it into a fierce will to educate myself (Kim, 1996, p. 118).
Kim Dae-jung notes that he wanted to “encourage those who have not had the privilege of
attending college to make up their minds to overcome the shortcoming by dint of hard work
and self-study. He adds, “I am just an example that it can be done” (Kim, 1996, p. 119).
Notably, Kim Dae-jung’s knowledge and expertise in various issue domains were further
intensified and enlarged during his time in prison. Some of the letters he wrote were published
in English under the title “Prison Writings” in 1987.32 Appended to his messages to his family
members including his wife, three sons, and daughter in law, were brief essays in which he
summed up his readings and relevant reflections. The letters were written under severely
limiting conditions that circumscribed his freedom of expression.33 With his letters being subject
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His dissertation was titled “The Drama and Hopes for Korea's Democracy: Regarding the Growth and the Theory of Formation
and Development of Democracy in Korean Society, 1945-1991.”
32
The Prison Writings (University of California Press) are comprised of a collection of 29 letters sent to Kim’s family from
November 1980 to December 1982, a period when he was under a death sentence, later commuted to life in prison, for a
conviction on sedition charges that would later turn out fictitious. Finally, he was allowed to go to the United States ostensibly
for medical treatment in a deal between the Chun regime and the Reagan administration.
33
While imprisoned, five wardens watched him all the time, alternating two at a time (Kim, 1996, p. 106). He was only allowed
to write once a month on a single small sheet of paper the size of an aerogram. He eventually developed minuscule handwriting
to put as many letters as possible on both sides of paper but still could not make any corrections or changes on his writing once
put down (Kirk, 2009; Paige, 1988, p. 91).
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to strict prison censorship, he found it hard to extensively address certain topics -including
Korean politics- freely in his letters. Still, his lengthy musings on a wide array of topics reflected
considerable energy as well as the breadth and depth of his knowledge and mind. His reading
habits in prison encompassed the fields of philosophy, theology, history, economics, politics,
and literature.34

4) Commitment to Peace and Reconciliation
Kim Dae-jung’s North Korea policy derived from his beliefs, values, and motives pursued
throughout his life. Kim Dae-jung’s view of politics was closely linked with his commitment to
reconciliation and peace. In his mind, a set of causes he pursued such as democracy, economic
development, reconciliation with adversaries, rapprochement with North Korea, and peaceful
unification were intricately interrelated. Kim Dae-jung’s beliefs and motives were closely
connected with his sanguine view of politics and politicians.
Kim Dae-jung had strong conviction in simultaneous pursuit of economic development
and democracy. He firmly refuted the rationale that developmental dictatorship is a necessary
evil and that democracy or human rights can be sacrificed for economic development, as
claimed by Park Chung-hee. Kim Dae-jung believed that democracy and the economy can and
should go hand in hand.
His belief in democracy was addressed in his 1994 article in Foreign Affairs titled “Is
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Regarding Kim’s reading and writing in prison, Glenn Paige (1988) observes, “Kim’s reading program constitutes a liberal arts
education in a prison university, in which he serves as both teacher and student. … “On one point, however, Kim’s thinking
seems unusual for one so prominent in Korean professional politics, and if further developed in thought and action, it may
become his greatest contribution to the politics of his nation and the world.”
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Culture Democracy? The myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values” (Dae Jung Kim, 1994a).
Singapore’s former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew holds that cultural differences make the
"Western concept" of democracy and human rights inapplicable to East Asia where the concept
of collective responsibility and Confucianism are practiced. In refuting Lee’s claim, Kim Dae-jung
argues that East Asia actually has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and
traditions, and possesses the “necessary conditions to develop democracy even beyond the
level of the West.”35 In this article, Kim expresses a firm conviction in a resilient “people power”
that was demonstrated through elections and popular movements in Asian countries including
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Kim emphasizes that the biggest
obstacle is not the region’s cultural heritage but the “resistance of authoritarian rulers and their
apologists.” An array of underlying rationales he refers to lends itself to the conclusion that
“culture is not necessarily our destiny, and democracy is.” The article also demonstrates how
Kim’s belief in democracy relates to his ideas about reconciliation, which constitutes a core
value of his North Korea policy. Kim Dae-jung notes that the ultimate goal in Confucian political
philosophy lies in bringing peace under heaven, as indicated in the Chinese aphorism meaning
“to do so, one must first be able to keep one’s own household in order, which in turn requires
that one cultivate self’ Kim explains that this teaching is a political philosophy that emphasizes
the role of government and the ruling elite’s moral obligation to bring about peace under
heaven. On balance, Kim Dae-jung’s firm belief in democracy stems from his belief in the value
of peace, of which the precondition is forgiveness and reconciliation with adversaries.
Kim Dae-jung’s belief in reconciliation effectively functioned both at the individual and
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In doing so, he cites Asian philosophies involving Mencius, Confucius, and Korea’s Tonghak philosophy.
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the national levels. During his term of office, Kim strived to forgive and reconcile with his
political foes, Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, who had attempted to kill him, while
seeking to reconcile and build genuine trust, with North Korea. Upon taking office in 1998, Kim
Dae-jung adhered to his pledge not to retaliate against his political foes and moved to pardon
two of his predecessors, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, who had been convicted of
treason, mutiny and corruption for their roles in the military coup in 1979 and the brutalities
committed against civilians in the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Movement. 36 Kim Dae-jung also
sought to forgive and reconcile with Park Chung-hee. As part of his proposal for “reconciliation
with history,” he put forth the idea of building Park Chung-hee’s Memorial Library on the
campaign trail ahead of the 1997 election. Kim kept his promise by providing about $18.6
million to support the commemorative project from 1999 to 2001 amid a vehement objection
from civil society (Kwon, 2012).
Kim Dae-jung’s belief in forgiveness and reconciliation was rooted in his Catholic faith.
Having been baptized in 1957 with former Prime Minister Chang Myeon as his godfather, Kim
was a devout Catholic throughout his life. His spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation based on
his faith was reflected in his letters to his wife and children while imprisoned. In these letters
(Kim, 1987), Kim professes faith under adversity. He developed ideas on divine presence and
influence through active self-questioning and reasoning on the basis of extensive readings in
theology and reflection on the human condition and purposiveness. Kim Dae-jung attributed
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Chun Doo-hwan was sentenced to death in 1996. The Gwangju massacre broke out on May 17, 1980, when martial law was
declared by South Korean military leaders to suppress a rising popular demand for democratization. The military leadership led
by Major General Chun Doo-hwan dispatched paratroopers to Korea’s major cities. The southwestern city of Gwangju in the
Cholla province was the center for pro-democracy demonstrations, with students and professors engaging in protests against
the new junta. Official figures put the death toll at 200 with another 1,000 protestors injured (“Flashback: The Kwangju
Massacre,” 2000).
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the fact that he was able to endure all the ordeals and tribulations, personally, to his faith in
God, and publicly, to his belief in democracy and his trust in the people of Korea (Dae Jung Kim,
1994a, p. 205).
From a broader perspective, Kim Dae-jung’s commitment to forgiveness and
reconciliation seems to have been the product of his life-long struggle with tribulations inflicted
by his political opponents. From his struggle, he learned that forgiveness could be the key to
achieving social cohesion and national development. He believed that politics based on
retaliation and haste will only result in further polarization of the country as well as spiritual
devastation not only for the victims but also for the assailants (Choi, 2010, p. 132). In his final
statement at a trial on September 17, 1980 wherein he was sentenced to death, Kim Dae-jung
said, “Even when I was sentenced to death by the military court, I did not want to engage in
political retaliation. … Democracy will definitely arrive in the 1980s. Fight on with hope and
courage. But when you win, please don't forget that I don't want to see retaliation” (Kim, 1996,
p. 124). Throughout his struggle against dictatorship, Kim Dae-jung stresses, he never gave way
to pressure from dictatorial leaders. In the process, he says he tried to advocate and engage in
nonviolent, peaceful oppositions. This was largely because of the lessons he learned from the
history of the Western democratic process, says he. In this sense, Kim Dae-jung greatly admired
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. for their nonviolent resistance, which he
considered as a source of inspiration (Dae Jung Kim, 1994a, pp. 205–206).

5) International Acclaim and Recognition
When Park declared the 1972 Yushin constitution designed to grant himself the right to
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an unlimited term of office, Kim decided to go into exile abroad and enlist support of his
campaign against dictatorship from the international community and media. This is because he
believed that he could have easier access to freedom of expression while staying outside the
country (Kim, 2011a, p. 270). Kim Dae-jung’s unrelenting crusade for democracy and human
rights gained him international fame and recognition. 37
On his visit to the United States in December 1972 as the opposition leader, Kim Daejung gathered support from academic, political, and religious bodies (Kirk, 2009, p. 43). Starting
with Columbia University on December 14, 1972, Kim Dae-jung went on a speaking tour at
colleges and universities across the United States (Kim, 2011a, p. 274). When Kim Dae-jung was
abducted in Tokyo by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), it was U.S. intervention
that saved his life.38 Kim Dae-jung was put under house arrest and remained imprisoned until
Park was assassinated in 1979 at the hands of the KCIA chief (Gittings, 2009). Kim Dae-jung was
then thrown back into prison after a second military coup staged by General Chun Doo-hwan,
who arrested him and sentenced him to death on trumped-up charges of instigating the May 18
Gwangju Democratic Uprising in 1980. Kim Dae-jung was on the death row until another U.S.
intervention. This time, the Carter and Reagan administrations (one leaving, one incoming)
jointly intervened in late 1980 to keep him alive (Cumings, 2005, p. 366). President Chun Doohwan commuted Kim Dae-jung’s death sentence to life imprisonment, and then to 20 years in
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He was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize seven times before receiving it in 2000. He received numerous international
awards such as the Bruno Kreisky Human Rights Award while in prison (1981), the George Meany Human Rights Award (AFLCIO) (1987), the Union Medal from the Union Theological Seminary in New York (1994), and Philadelphia Liberty Medal (1999).
38
With his hands and feet tied on a small boat, Kim Dae-jung was about to be thrown into the East Sea when the ship was
intercepted by a helicopter presumed to belong to the U.S. forces. As a result, Kim was returned home to Seoul safely (See,
Kim, 2011a, pp. 287-298). As it later turned out, U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib decisively and successfully intervened upon being
informed of the KCIA’s plot to abduct and assassinate Kim. Donald Gregg, the then CIA station chief and later ambassador to
South Korea later revealed the details of American intervention that saved Kim’s life (Goldstein, 1999, p. 57).
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prison. In a deal with the Reagan administration, Chun let Kim go into exile in the United States
in exchange for being invited to Washington as the first visiting head of state after President
Reagan’s inauguration (Cumings, 2005, p. 388). A growing list of leaders and groups who led or
joined the international campaign to keep him alive included the U.S. Congress and academe,
the Japanese government, Germany’s Socialist International Party, President Jimmy Carter,
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chancellor Willy Brandt and President (then Mayor) Richard von
Weizsacker as well as Pope John Paul II (Kim, 2011a, pp. 402–403; MacShane, 2018).
Kim Dae-jung’s exile in the United States and his position at Harvard University
(December 1982-February 1985) gave him a good opportunity to build a vast network of ardent
supporters and sympathizers. Building on the sympathy and endorsement he had gained from
politicians and scholars since he became a presidential candidate in 1971, Kim Dae-jung earned
fame among many Americans and Korean-Americans. He became a celebrity among liberal
politicians and intellectuals as a champion of democracy and human rights struggling against
injustice and oppression. The longer he stayed in the United States, the more fans followed him
from political, entertainment, academic, and non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and
even the U.S. government (Goldstein, 1999; Kirk, 2009; Ungar, 1984, pp. 97–101).
Upon his decision to return to Korea after more than two years away from home,
Senator Edward Kennedy, a strong supporter of Kim, along with other congressmen sent a
letter to President Chun appealing for a guarantee of safety for Kim Dae-jung and restoration of
his civil rights (Goldstein, 1999, p. 88). On the eve of his return, he was given a sendoff in
Madison Square Garden attended by 3,000 people. On the day of his return February 8, 1985,
an American delegation including 50 journalists and 22 other escorts and well-wishers and two
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congressmen accompanied him back to Seoul in the hopes that their presence would prevent
another tragic murder like that which shot down Benigno Aquino, a leading opponent of
President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, on the Manila tarmac in 1983. 39 Upon their
arrival in Korea, Kim’s entourage was met by security agents who whisked him out of sight right
away. Kim was then placed under tight house arrest and strictly banned from outside contact
(Jordan, 1997; Kirk, 2009, p. 107).40

2. Political Skills
As with other policy areas, Kim Dae-jung’s political skills regarding the North Korea
policy largely centered around: 1) skills to build coalitions; 2) verbal talent and writing skills; and
3) persuasive ability.

1) Coalition Building
Kim Dae-jung’s political experience in connection with the so-called “three Kims politics”
helped him develop adroit political skills and acumen.41 As a politician having worked his way up
through the opposition party, Kim Dae-jung learned how to cope with the largely
disadvantageous political environment that imposed enormous constraints deriving from his
narrow power base in the Cholla province and frail base of financial support along with the
39

The delegation included Edward Feighan, Thomas Foglietta (House representatives), Patricia Derian (former Deputy Secretary
of State for Human Rights), Robert White (former Ambassador to El Salvador), Raul Manglapus (former Philippine foreign
minister), Pharis Harvey (Reverend), Bruce Cumings (Professor), Mary Travers (Singer) etc. (Burgess, 1985; Haberman, 1985;
Kirk, 2009, p. 107).
40
According to Bruce Cumming who was part of an American escort group: with thousands of riot police deployed on the
roads, enormous numbers of Koreans supporting Kim Dae-jung were exclaiming that he was their “great leader” holding
placards hailing his return (Cumings, 2005, p. 386).
41
The three Kims' era refers to the period (mainly 1960s-1980s) in which the three politicians with the same family name –e.g.,
Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam, and Kim Jong-pi) – had a major effect on South Korean political landscape.
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hostile media. Kim Dae-jung was often portrayed as having impure political thoughts by the
mainstream conservative media. During his unyielding struggle against dictatorial rules, Kim
Dae-jung was often labeled as tough, radical, and aggressive. As a dissident politician he was
called a communist when he addressed peaceful unification, a radical when he spoke of
democracy, and a liar when it came to his political behaviors (Lim, 2012, p. 157). 42 In a highly
unfavorable domestic political environment, Kim Dae-jung sought to gain influence by building
networks and relationships at home and abroad. Kim Dae-jung said he sought to build coalitions
with rivals and opponents domestically within the boundaries of preserving his political identity
as a center-left, pro-democracy opposition politician while sticking to principles he had been
upholding. Kim Dae-jung formed a cooperative partnership with Kim Young-sam, his long-time
rival, to augment the struggle against dictatorship, and twice supported him to become the
opposition party leader (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, p. 205).43 After returning to Korea from exile in
the United States in February of 1985, he led opposition forces in coalition with Kim Young-sam
to fight for democracy in Korea.
Under the Roh Tae-woo administration (1988-1993), Kim Dae-jung played a major role
in promoting bipartisan collaboration at the Naitonal Assembly as the head of the leading
opposition party. In the 13th general elections held in April, 1988, his Democratic Peace Party
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Kim Dae-jung was harshly denounced as a liar by his opponents on two particular occasions. When he made his political
comeback in 1997 to run for president, two and a half years after he retired from politics, and following his defeat in the 1992
presidential elections, he was severely condemned of being blinded by greed for power. Also, when he effectively broke his
promise with Kim Jong-pil as part of the DJP collation to amend the constitution to switch to the parliamentary cabinet system,
he fell under severe criticism (Dae Joong Kim, 2002).
43
Upon being informed of the news on May 22, 1983, that Kim Young-sam was staging a hunger strike in promoting a prodemocracy movement in Korea, Kim Dae-jung, while in exile, swiftly embarked on a drive to support his rival. Kim traveled
around the United States to gain endorsement for Kim Young-sam’s hunger strike. He also formed the Washington D.C.
Committee on behalf of Kim Young-sam along with equivalent committees in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles (S. Han,
2012).
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(DPP) won the second largest number of seats at the National Assembly only after the ruling
Democratic Justice Party (DJP). Kim Dae-jung sought to cooperate with President Roh and his
ruling party whenever necessary while working with Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil, the other
opposition leaders. As a result, bills were mostly passed unanimously at the National Assembly
as negotiations went relatively smoothly between the two sides of the aisle (Kim, 2011a, pp.
516-517).44
In boosting his posture and achieving his goals, Kim Dae-jung would occasionally build
coalition with his opponents. With his force becoming further isolated around the Cholla region
and the anti-communism propaganda campaign being in full swing, Kim Dae-jung opted to form
what many viewed as the “odd coalition” with Kim Jong-pil, the leader of the conservative
United Liberals Party, who was formerly President Park’s right-hand man and the KCIA director.
The so-called DJP coalition was intended to secure victory in the 1997 presidential election. 45
Not surprisingly, Kim Dae-jung was accused of being opportunistic in relation to this move (J. S.
Kang, 2010).46

2) Oratorical and Writing Skills

44

During this time, there was little room for arbitrary decisions to be made by the ruling party as the two sides of the aisle
would frequently meet and talk. With the National Assembly being dominated by the opposition parties, Kim Dae-jung argued
that the ruling and opposition parties should negotiate, compromise, and make concessions in running state affairs.
45
Regarding this controversial decision, Kim Dae-jung argued that he had been convinced that such a choice would not impair
the causes he pursued (e.g., Kim, 2011a, pp. 619-620). According to Kim Dae-jung, he was not against making compromises and
collaborating with his political opponents insofar as he believed that the outcome would not undermine the principles he
sought to adhere to.
46
In response to such accusations, Kim Dae-jung stresses that he refused to join forces with opponents in cases where the
resulting coalition was assumed to undermine his principles. Kim explains that he rejected President Roh Tae-woo’s proposal
for a three-party merger involving the ruling party and the two opposition parties even though it could have guaranteed his
victory in the forthcoming presidential election. This is because, he claims, he believed that such a move was incompatible with
the democratic principles he was committed to upholding (Dae Jung Kim, 1996, pp. 31–32).
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Much of Kim Dae-jung’s political skills stemmed from his ability to present his ideas
verbally and in writing. Kim Dae-jung appeared to be a born mass leader armed with oratorical
skills as was shown on the campaign trail in 1971. Appearing dedicated and fearless, he would
magnetize a massive crowd with his public speech. His famous speech at Jangchoongdan Park
on April 18, 1971, which was made after the Constitution was amended to allow Park Chunghee a third term, and ten days prior to the presidential election, drew a crowd of as many as
one million people (Ji Hyun Kim, 2015). Willner surmises that much of charismatic affect is
produced “less by logic and ideas than by emotional stimuli” (Willner, 1968, p. 103). However,
this is not necessarily the case with Kim Dae-jung. In fact, his oratorical prowess and charismatic
appeal were closely linked with logic and ideas. Another contributing factor was that he was an
energetic seeker of knowledge and information. His energetic, scholarly-quality reading
combined with his ardent quest for knowledge and information across a broad scope of areas
furnished his leadership some inner quality that appeared unusual for a politician, observed
American journalist Haberman (1987).
Very interestingly, Kim Dae-jung confessed that it was through omnivorous reading in
prison that he honed his intellectual ability and writing skills. While imprisoned (1976-1978,
1980-1982), Kim Dae-jung learned to survive solitary confinement by reading, writing, and
tending flowers. By reading, he gradually achieved stability and peace of mind, experiencing
some pleasures amid an extremely monotonous prison life (Kim, 1996, p. 108). His extensive
readings ranged from philosophy, theology, and history to politics, economics, and literature.
He states in his memoir (1996, p. 42), “As I was reading masterworks of great scholars and
thinkers, it dawned on me. Were I not in prison, I would have lived my life without

63

understanding such truth. In this sense, I was even thankful for being in prison.” He says in his
autobiography, “My intellectual, personal maturity formed during my time in prison. The prison
was indeed my university … In my life after prison, I often felt a craving for my time there
whenever my hectic life did not allow me to read. It may be hard to believe, but I sometimes
felt like it was worthwhile to spend some time in prison considering the invaluable lifetime
knowledge and understanding I encountered there” (2011a, pp. 411-412).

Speech Writing
While in office, President Kim was careful to accurately reflect his views and ideas in his
speeches. According to Lee Hoon, an official who worked as a speech writer for Kim Dae-jung
both prior to and during his presidency, in drafting a speech, President Kim would revise drafts
as many times as needed to ensure that his remarks perfectly represented his thoughts and
beliefs. An extreme degree of meticulousness and precision was displayed by President Kim
here. That being so, presidential speech writers would assist him mainly with putting his ideas
into words in the initial phase of drafting a speech. In case he did not like the manuscript
drafted by a speech writer, he would record his own voice on a recording device while
articulating his thoughts in words. Then a speech writer would write down words from the
recorder and submit a copy of the draft to the president. Then, President Kim would continue
to revise the manuscript until he was perfectly satisfied. He always made sure that the final
draft of his speech reflected his ideas and beliefs “a hundred percent.” To this end, he revised,
edited, and proofread his own draft, multiple times, first with a blue fiber-tip pen, and from the
second time onwards with a red fiber-tip pen, in highly conscientious manners (H. Lee, personal
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communication, November 22, 2016; e.g., Lee, 2016).

3) Persuasive Ability
Kim Dae-jung’s persuasive ability relates to the teaching and preaching side of his leadership.
Kim Dae-jung had a talent for elaborating at length about his thoughts and ideas with
modifications of emphasis from audience to audience. That is, he had a knack for adapting
language and expressions to the capacity of his audience. He would use scholarly words and
expressions when talking with scholars, and would explain in layman’s terms and use more
analogies when speaking to the general public (S.H. Jeong, personal communication, September
27, 2016). Regarding this ability, Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir, “I believe I have a gift for
teaching. … Had I not become a politician, I would probably have become an educator because
of the makeup of my character. I am sure I would have made a good professor. Sometimes, I
have a sense that politics and teaching are inherently related” (Kim, 1996, p. 3).
Kim Dae-jung’s proficiency as a public communicator and ability to speak and write
based on a compelling logic afforded him an enormous sense of efficacy. Kim Dae-jung’s vision
was foundational to his persuasion. Therefore, in conversing with people, Kim Dae-jung never
lost sight of the end goal, that is, where he was headed with his logic and persuasion (Jeong.
S.H., Personal communication, November 22, 2016). Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s ability to
persuade, Kim’s long-time associate, says, “Kim Dae-jung would never just say one thing to
somebody. Rather, he would come to the same subjects or end goals in multiple different ways.
He had the knack of beginning with the point that was not expected by anyone and eventually
making a strong point.” Kim was enormously self-confident in his ability to persuade, believing
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that “he could always convince everybody no matter how” (S. Costello, Personal
communication, November 3, 2017).

3. Other Important Personal Characteristics
1) Sense of Realistic Pragmatism
Kim Dae-jung’s aptitude for building coalition is closely linked with a sense of
pragmatism he would emphasize throughout his political life. In presenting the version of
pragmatism he seeks to defend, Posner (1993, p. 28) surmises that pragmatism “emphasizes
the scientific virtues –e.g., open-minded, no-nonsense inquiry, prefers ferment to stasis, … likes
experimentation, likes to kick sacred cows –within the bounds of prudence-, prefers shaping
the future to maintaining continuity with the past,” and “attacks dogma.”
Regarding his emphasis on pragmatism, Kim Dae-jung was famously quoted as saying
that politicians should “possess both the intellectual awareness of the problem worthy of a
scholar and a sense of reality characteristic of a merchant.”47 Kim Dae-jung also says in his
autobiography that a politician should be able to opt for the second best if the best choice is
not available and that if circumstances dictate, a politician should go for the second worst if it
helps avoid the worst option. He also claims that a politician should take stock of reality, no
matter how harsh it is, in seeking the truth that is key to advancing to the future, and should
not be obsessed with the truth and overlook the reality.
Kim Dae-jung exhibited a particular mix of pragmatism, flexibility, idealism, and
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Regarding this remark, Kim Dae-jung explained, “If we are going to succeed in any field, we must have both feet firmly
grounded on principles, like intellectuals, while at the same time making free use of both hands, like merchants employing
various methods. We must pursue a balanced development of both these aspects” (Kim, 1987, p. 55).
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adherence to principles. Regarding this aspect of leadership, former Ambassador to Korea
James R. Lilley (1986-1989) said, “What I especially admire about Kim Dae-jung is his particular
mix of pragmatism and idealism” (Kim, 1996, p. xiv). Regarding the ideological basis of his
Three-Stage Unification Formula, Kim Dae-jung cited “open nationalism,” “positive pacifism,”
and “global democracy.” He emphasized that the principle of “open” nationalism was
contrasted with “extensive, aggressive, xenophobic, or closed-minded” nationalism that might
exploit other countries for its own narrow, selfish national interests. By the principle of “global
democracy,” he stressed, he meant a democracy that would transcend the “selfish single
country orientation” of traditional democracy (Kim, 1997, pp. 9–13).
Although fighting against the dictatorial rules of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee, he
was not necessarily opposed to everything they advocated. This was also the case with his
position on the controversial 1965 normalization treaty between Korea and Japan. 48 Judging
that the normalization with Japan was in line with the national interest, Kim advocated the
need for the normalization treaty. In short, his position was a “conditional approval” of the
treaty. That is, he supported the treaty only under the condition that no disadvantage occur on
the part of the Koreans in terms of provisions of the treaty. For such a posture, Kim was badly
criticized and even ostracized by members within his party (Dae Jung Kim, 2011a, pp. 154–160;
S. Kim, 2015). Kim Dae-jung’s worldview was quite realistic, positing that there be neither a
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President Park signed the Korea-Japan Relations Treaty, which normalized diplomatic and economic ties two decades after
Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule. The treaty threw the Park government into turmoil as the provisions of the
treaty, which included an article stipulating that Japan provide some $300 million in grants and $200 million in long-term and
low-interest loans, were seen as “humiliating” by Koreans. The treaty was vehemently opposed by students, intellectuals, and
opposition lawmakers, setting off massive demonstrations on the streets of Seoul. Kim Dae-jung was representative of
moderates in the party making the case against hardliners. Kim Dae-jung objected to the hardline argument opposing the
treaty, claiming that national interest demanded diplomatic ties be established with the former colonial master (Kirk, 2009, p.
27).
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permanent ally nor a permanent enemy in international politics. He took note of the fact that
many states with colonial history had been establishing diplomatic relations with former
colonial powers, and that Korea was in need of going along with the tide of the rapidly rising
Japanese economy.

2) Sophisticated Cognitive Qualities
Regarding the issue of effective problem solving, Kim Dae-jung stressed the need both
to pursue grandiose goals and to carefully consider small matters (Kim, 1996, p. 47-49). Kim
Dae-jung’s fine-grained cognitive qualities and a broader strategic intelligence combined to
make for a unique quality of his leadership characteristics. Kim Dae-jung said that he held Otto
von Bismarck, Germany’s first chancellor, in the highest esteem. In a meeting with his cabinet
members during his term of office, Kim praised Bismarckian diplomacy for its subtlety and
attention to details. Kim noted that this led Germany to improve its relations with neighboring
countries (Funabashi, 2007, p. 215).
Kim Dae-jung said that he was inclined towards perfectionism. He says in his memoir
(1996, p. 116), “No matter what I undertake, I try to do it perfectly to the best of my ability.
That is why I seldom embark on a task without careful planning and adequate preparation.” His
tendency to view a phenomenon both as a whole and divided into smaller parts, coupled with
his inclination towards perfectionism, led him to perform tasks with careful planning and
preparation.
Being highly meticulous and precise, Kim Dae-jung had a habit of jotting down whatever
information he deemed essential in tiny script on his little green-colored notebooks that were
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individually numbered. This habit easily evokes the miniscule letters he used to write to
members of his family while imprisoned under gravely restrictive conditions. In reading
materials, he would underline texts he considered important. In addition to making notes,
meditation was another crucial means for him to distill the knowledge and information he
acquired during the day into his own. He would meditate on the information, arrange his
thoughts and ideas, and put them into writing every day before going to bed (e.g., personal
communications with S.H. Jeong, S.J. Yim; I.B. Kim). For Kim Dae-jung, this is how he piled up
the data neatly in his head for possible future use.
Kim’s close allies indicate that Kim Dae-jung had a highly sophisticated mind and knew
how to read other people’s minds (Kim S. J., Personal communication, October 16, 2016). Yang
Sung-chul, the former ambassador to the United States under Kim Dae-jung, describes Kim Daejung as “a very thoughtful person and a very genuine figure about humanities and about
Korea.” He notes that, more often than not, President Kim’s interlocutors “were persuaded by
his such seriousness, such sincerity, such determination, such persistence, and such
confidence” (S.C. Yang, Personal communication, October 12, 2016). 49
Kim Dae-jung indicates in his writings (1996, 2011a) that he is not the type of person
who is innately courageous, as considered by many, and that he is the last person to be called a
radical, as always described by his detractors. Rather, he describes himself to be “tenderhearted” and as “timid” as he was in his boyhood. He says that he had what may be called “the
courage of a timid person” (Kim, 1996, p. 121).
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This is what Ambassador Yang said verbatim in his interview given in English with the author.
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3) Self-Restraint & Composure
This personal characteristic concerns the leader’s emotional fitness for office. Delving
into the issue in the widely discussed Presidential Character, Barber (1972) suggests two
behavioral criteria for assessing presidential performance: how actively a president exercises
power; and whether political participation is a fundamentally positive experience for the
president. Considering that Kim Dae-jung had a quite sanguine view of politics 50 and that he was
active in exercising authority in making decisions and implementing policies, he can be seen as
an active-positive type of president. As predicted in Barber’s conceptual model, President Kim
was largely immune from distracting emotional perturbations that could have impaired his
public performance and leadership.
Even under extremely stressful situations, Kim Dae-jung would act in remarkably calm
manners and put on a poker face. He would rarely burst out laughing at any funny jokes or
hilarious situations, and instead would only gently smile (S.H. Jeong, Personal communication,
November 22, 2016). Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung is said to have occasionally made jokes and
properly knew how to use his sense of humor as a tool to invigorate conversation (K. H. Choi,
2010, p. 197).
According to his aides, Kim Dae-jung was the type of individual who will “take the
situation on” in response to stress or negative feelings. In coping with a stressful situation, he
would willingly confront the problem and try to deal with it head on.51 He rarely if ever
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Kim Dae-jung would often express his positive views on politics. He says in his autobiography that he neither hated or
disparaged politicians, and rather found the people-centered politics -e.g., politics intended to open the world led by the
people- to be “the most sacred task” (assigned to human beings) (Kim, 2011, p. 55).
51
Relevant studies suggest that there are three general ways in which people respond to negative feelings they are
experiencing. They may withdraw from the situation, take the situation on, or panic (Hermann & Hermann, 1990, pp. 217–218).
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appeared anxious, agitated, impatient, irritated or angry, always maintaining composure in the
face of heavy stress or hard choices.
Yim Sung-joon, the Presidential Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security (20022003), attributes these qualities of Kim’s personality to his remarkable sense of efficacy, which
he says was intimately linked with his unique personal history and life experiences punctuated
with successive tribulations and ordeals. That is, Yim explains, the fact that President Kim
worked his way up in politics and went through all sorts of hardships and ordeals in his life was
a major contributing factor to his overall sense of efficacy (S.J. Yim, Personal communication,
December 7, 2016).
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Chapter 3. Why the Sunshine Policy? Philosophical & Conceptual Bases of
the Sunshine Policy
A. Evolution of the Sunshine Policy
Origin of the Sunshine Policy
Kim Dae-jung’s knowledge and expertise in a broad range of relevant areas culminated
in the Three Stage Unification Formula (TSUF) in 1995. This constituted a major source of Kim
Dae-jung’s personal capital he brought to office as the country’s first president to adopt the
comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. Regarding the unification issue, Kim
Dae-jung developed in-depth knowledge and expertise by constantly studying and educating
himself. Kim Dae-jung’s beliefs and ideas on unification constantly evolved throughout his prepresidency years. The conceptual framework for his North Korea policy that was created in the
late 1960s continued to be refined and adapted in tandem with the changing historical and
socio-political context. This conceptual evolution ended up with a highly-calibrated conceptual
framework dubbed the Three-Stage Unification Formula (TSUF) published in 1995. The TSUF
had a significant conceptual bearing on the Korean National Community Unification Formula
(KNCUF) (Hanminjokgongdongchae tongilbangan), which has been adopted as the country’s
official unification scheme under successive South Korean governments since President Roh
Tae-woo (1987-1993).52 After all, the TSUF served as the conceptual underpinnings of the
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The title of the official unification plan slightly changed from the KNCUF to the National Community Unification Formula
(NCUF) (Minjokgongdongchae tongilbangan) in 1994 under President Kim Young-sam. The NCUF upholds independence, peace,
and democracy as basic principles of unification. This unification formula prescribes a three-phase process for unification: 1)
reconciliation and cooperation; 2) the formation of a Korean Commonwealth; and 3) the realization of a unified state following
general elections in accordance with the unification constitution.
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Sunshine Policy.
A treasure trove of Kim Dae-jung’s knowledge and expertise was attributable to various
factors involving focused effort, hard work, experience, and critical events in life, as discussed in
the Who chapter. Kim Dae-jung’s exile in the United States (1982.12-1985.2) served as a crucial
opportunity to enhance his expertise in numerous issue areas relevant to his peace initiative.
Kim’s scholarly endeavors during his exile resulted in the publication of relevant works including
the Mass-Participatory Economy that was published in 1985 by Harvard University Press. Kim
Dae-jung’s ideas about economic reforms needed in Korea as presented in this book have been
central to the debate about the engagement policy and the political economy underpinning it.
After losing his third run for the presidency in 1992, Kim Dae-jung publicly announced
his decision to quit politics and headed to the United Kingdom to research German unification
(S. J. Han, 2017). His trip to the United Kingdom was intended to study problems of the
European Community and the German unification as a visiting scholar at Cambridge University
(Kim, 1996, p. 19). Kim Dae-jung says in his memoir, “From the German experience I have
become wiser and learned two most important lessons. One is that we must not be impatient
for reunification. The other is that we must not attempt reunification by absorption.
Reunification is important, but how we achieve it is even more important” (Kim, 1996, p. 21).
He adds that the lesson he learned was not “Don’t pursue reunification,” but rather “Start the
reunification process as soon as possible but proceed by stages.” During the Cold War,
unification was not possible since Koreans were bound by the shackles of maintaining the
status quo. However, now that the Cold War was over, the shackles removed, and communism
disintegrating, Kim Dae-jung thought the time was ripe for beginning the process and Koreans
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could avoid serious problems and be successful (Kim, 1996, p. 21).

The 1960s
The seeds of Kim Dae-jung’s ideas on unification on the Korean peninsula were sown in
the 1960s as he engaged in legislative activities as the National Assemblyman for the opposition
Democratic Party in November 1963.53 In the 1960s, the two Koreas, severely affected by the
winds of the Cold War, remained in a state of unabated mutual hostility in which they refused
to recognize each other’s existence and avoided all forms of contact. South Korea’s unification
policy changed from a belligerent “March to the North” in the 1950s under President Rhee
Syngman to the “Unification through Victory over Communism” in the 1960s under President
Park Chung-hee. Park effectively put the unification issue on the back burner, adopting the
strategy of ‘Construction First and Unification Later.’ Meanwhile, North Korea under Kim Il-sung
sought to achieve the communization of the whole peninsula based on the “Four Military Line
policy” (Kim, 1997, pp. 299–300).
In addition to the primacy of democratization in dealing with unification issues, Kim’s
beliefs and ideas on unification and national security conceived in the initial period of his
political career largely revolved around the following points: self-reliance; independent foreign
policy; the need for the government to abandon the Hallstein doctrine and to depoliticize
unification issues; the elimination of undemocratic, anti-unification clauses from the Anti-
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Kim Dae-jung was elected to the National Assembly for the first time in May 1961 after four consecutive electoral failures.
However, his first election only lasted two days with South Korea’s National Assembly being dissolved amid Park Chung-hee’s
coup d’etat.
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Communist Act and the National Security Law; and the liberalization of unification discourses at
the civilian level.
From the beginning of his political career, Kim Dae-jung actively engaged in legislative
activities in the fields of unification and security policies. Under President Park Chung-hee
(1961-1979), unification issues were intensely politicized while related laws like the AntiCommunist Act and National Security Law were manipulated to repress his political opponents.
Kim Dae-jung warned the Park regime to stop banning people from engaging in unification
discussions, insisting on the desirability of such discussions especially in theoretical and
scholarly terms (Kim, 1991, pp. 41–42).54 Kim also criticized the government’s dependent
foreign policy strategy of bandwagoning with the United States in the international Cold War
confrontation. In July 1966, Kim also urged the Park Chung-hee government to abandon the
Hallstein Doctrine,55 which had been cited in severing South Korea’s diplomatic relations with
two African nations and North Korea. Indicating that even West Germany – along with Romania
– began to relinquish the doctrine, Kim expressed concern that South Korea’s foreign policy
may go against the tide of international relations as well as the national interest (Kim, 1991, pp.
38-9). Under the prevailing political conditions in South Korea, Kim’s claim was outside of the
permissible bounds for discussion of the unification issue set by the Park Chung-hee regime. His
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At an interpellation session on state affairs at the National Assembly in 1964, Kim Dae-jung called for a change in the
government’s deeply partisan approach to dealing with unification issues and the establishment of a government body devoted
to unification issues (Kim, 1991, pp. 11–25). Kim’s efforts at the time finally led to the establishment of the cabinet ministry of
the "Board of National Unification" (Kim, 1997, p. 304).
55
The so-called Hallstein Doctrine, which served as a central tenet of the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FDR or West
Germany) foreign policy from the mid-1950s to the early-1970s, prescribed that the FDR would not establish or maintain
diplomatic ties with any nation that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany). This doctrine
indicated that the FDR would regard those countries recognizing the GDR or maintaining diplomatic relations with it – barring
the Soviet Union as one of the Four Powers responsible for Germany – as committing an “unfriendly act” possibly leading to
severance of diplomatic relations.
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statement was seen as deriving from suspicious intent and reckless ideas advocating for
exchange with the communist enemy (Kim, 1997, p. 305).
Kim Dae-jung’s advocacy of the country’s independent, self-reliant foreign policy
became more salient with the outbreak of the Pueblo incident on January 23, 1968, in which
the U.S. spy ship was attacked, and its 82 crew members were detained by North Korea for 11
months.56 At the time of the incident, Kim Dae-jung harshly criticized the Park Chung-hee
government for its inability to play a role in managing the crisis and its marginalized stance in
negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang despite America’s One Korea policy of
recognizing South Korea as the only legitimate government on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1991,
pp. 66-67).

The 1970s
Evolution of Kim Dae-jung’s beliefs and philosophy on unification
During Kim Dae-jung’s unsuccessful presidential bid in the 1971 elections against a
backdrop of intense political-military confrontation between the two Koreas, Kim Dae-jung
presented to the public what was then viewed as a highly innovative idea of “the Four-Power
Guarantee of Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” suggesting an institutionalized security
guarantee by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, the four nations with the
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On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S. Pueblo, a U.S. spy ship, was attacked and captured by the North Korean navy. The seizure of
the U.S. navy vessel and its 83 crew members, one of whom was killed in the attack, came three days after the so-called the
Blue House Raid. In the incident, 31 North Korean spy agents infiltrated South Korea’s presidential Blue House in a botched
attempt to assassinate President Park and killed 26 South Koreans in the process. The seizure of U.S.S. Pueblo and the abuse
and torture of its crew by the North Korean regime during their 11 month detainment marked a major Cold War incident
heightening tensions between the two opposing ideological blocks. [For more information on Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on the
Pueblo Incident and the Blue House Raid that occurred in January 1968, see Confederation of Republics by Kim Dae-jung (1991,
pp. 57–68).
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biggest stake in the security of the Korean peninsula. Kim’s 1971 proposals on inter-Korean
relations also addressed the following issues: the reduction of tension on the Korean Peninsula
through the mutual abandonment of war and armed aggressions between two Koreas; and
inter-Korean exchanges in non-political areas such as the media, sports, and mail. Even though
the idea failed to materialize due to his narrow defeat by Park Chung-hee, Kim Dae-jung’s
proposal on the four-power security guarantee would later serve as the conceptual foundation
for the the Six-Party Talks, which began in earnest in 2004. The Six-Party Talks brought the two
Koreas along with the four powers to the negotiating table to address North Korea’s nuclear
problem. (Kim, 2011a, pp. 217–9). This was followed by Kim Dae-jung’s presentation of the
“Three-Stage Unification” Formula in 1972 (Kim, 1997, p. 300).57
Kim Dae-jung became an ardent evangelist for the Sunshine Policy starting in the early
1970s. With the themes of détente and reconciliati2on marking a watershed in the Cold War
system in the early 1970s, Kim Dae-jung desired to capitalize on a subtle but visible change in
the international situation, seeking to form a peaceful atmosphere on the Korean peninsula
(The KDJ Government The SP, 1999, pp. 50–51). Beginning with the Nixon Doctrine in 1969,
there were signs, although faint at the time, of the winding down of the Vietnam War as well as
a series of events indicative of easing tensions and détente among the great powers such as:
West Germany’s Ostpolitik, U.N. membership for the People’s Republic of China, and the
normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States and Japan. These visible
trends notwithstanding, the Cold War confrontation in Korea showed no sign of abatement.
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(For comparison between the unification proposals of the two Koreas and Kim Dae-jung’s Three Stage
Unification Formula, see Kim, 1997, pp. 30–31).
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Kim Dae-jung then made the historic proposal to take advantage of the global trend of
relaxation in a bid to promote peace on the Korean peninsula (Kim, 1997, pp. 300–301).
Kim’s unification philosophy is composed of two conceptual components: Three
principles of Korean unification and the Three-Stage Unification Formula (C. Moon, 2012, p. 30).
In its initial version, the Three-Stage Unification Formula that was first presented in 1972 had
suggested three stages of unification: peaceful coexistence; peaceful exchanges; and political
unification. The first stage of peaceful coexistence was to provide an institutionalized structure
and mechanism for: 1) renunciation of war as the instrument of policy; 2) negotiation of a
peace agreement; 3) the establishment of a structure for peaceful coexistence based on the
mechanism of mutual oversight; 4) simultaneous membership in the United Nations; and 5) the
creation of an institutionalized system for the four major powers’ guarantee of non-aggression
and a peace agreement between two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 308). In a campaign to promote his
unification plan and its viability, Kim held a press conference at the Seoul Foreign
Correspondents Club in July 1972. He raised the issue of the two Koreas’ simultaneous
membership in the United Nations, causing a major shockwave in the political landscape. Kim’s
proposal was based on his conviction that national unification could only begin from the
premise of mutual recognition of each other as a partner for dialogue (Kim, 1997, p. 309).

The 1980s
In the 1980s, Kim Dae-jung integrated institutional elements into his unification formula
to yield the new concept of a Federation as a transitional phase prior to complete unification
(Kim, 1997, p. 310). In the mid-1980s, the unification discourse became active and diversified in
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South Korea with heated, often emotionally charged, discussion taking place among civil
society. During this period, Kim Dae-jung sought to lay the theoretical groundwork for his threestage unification formula. As a result, his unification formula made significant headway in
theoretical depth and evolved into a practical scheme for the South Korean government to
pursue unification (The KDJ Government The SP, 1999, p. 53).
Kim Dae-jung presented the unification formula dubbed the “Federation of the Two
Korean Republics” Unification Plan (aka: “The Confederation of the Two Korean Republics”
Unification Plan). The discourse mainly dealt with the first stage of unification. In this formula,
the Peaceful Coexistence and Exchange under Symbolic Federal Structure was suggested as the
first stage, in which the two states retained their sovereignty. It is notable that, in the 1980s,
Kim Dae-jung’s formula used the term “symbolic federal structure” to effectively mean the
confederation system as the first stage of unification.
In the first stage of unification, both Koreas are enjoined to recognize the existence of
two completely independent governments based on different ideologies and systems. That is,
the two independent governments continue to be in charge of their respective foreign
relations, internal and military affairs while the symbolic federal government administers
peaceful coexistence and exchange (Kim, 1997, pp. 316-317).
Kim Dae-jung noted that both governments shall focus on the promotion of mutual
exchanges and cooperation either directly or through the “symbolic federal structure,” which
he defined as a loose confederation, without interfering in each other’s internal affairs. Kim
Dae-jung believed that the transition can and will be made to a Federal structure, and that, in
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the process, the political authority should be incrementally transferred to the central
government from the two independent governments (Kim, 1997, pp. 310-311).
Kim Dae-jung’s Three-Stage formula calls for a transitional phase of the confederation
as the “necessary, and the inevitable prerequisite to national reunification. In this regard, Kim
Dae-jung’s proposal was practically different from that of North Korea, which argued for a
direct transition to a federal stage straight from the division and confrontation.
At the time, however, Kim Dae-jung’s formula was accused of being identical to North
Korea’s proposal under the military government’s campaign to label him as “a red” or “a
commie.” With his unification formula being distorted by the military government, Kim Daejung strived to underscore the differences between his unification formula and Nroth Korea’s.
In this context, Kim Dae-jung sought to clarify his ideas on national unification through the
principles of the “Three Nos”: no violence, no communism, and no anti-Americanism. Regarding
the principle of “non-Communism,” Kim Dae-jung posited that democracy should be the
ultimate goal for Korea and that North Korea should be given opportunities to voluntarily
accept the principles of democracy. He envisaged that, after a reasonable lapse of time, North
Korea would move towards a market economy and democracy. The possibility will then emerge
for the transition to a Federal system (Kim, 1997, pp. 311-313).
Kim Dae-jung’s unification formula envisioned a Federation comprised of two local
governments as the second stage of unification. In this stage, both republics would no longer
retain sovereignty, and a newly established federation would manage foreign policy, national
defense, and important domestic affairs, leading to a fully-fledged Federal system. In this stage,
the formula posits, the two Koreas will retain each government as regional authorities.
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The final stage would be complete unification made up of one nation, one state, and one
government that would be based on an open-market economy and democracy (Moon, 2012, p.
31).

The 1990s
The July 7th Declaration was issued in 1988 by President Roh Tae-woo while Kim Daejung sought to clarify the contents of his proposal and its difference from the North Korean
plan. Even though Kim Dae-jung agreed in principle with President Roh’s July 7 th Declaration, he
found it regrettable that it made no reference to a peace structure between the two Koreas. In
a bid to fill this gap, he exerted efforts to systematize the concepts and ideas behind his
formula. In the 1990s, Kim Dae-jung sought to explain the inter-relations between
confederation and federation, and elucidate relevant concepts. He also expounded on the
process of transition from confederation to federation, and the transition to full unification
(Kim, 1997, p. 313).
In April 1991, Kim Dae-jung presented the “Confederation of the Two Korean
Republics,” a revised version of his unification proposal. In another revision to his previous plan,
the previous expression of the “loose federal stage” was replaced with the “stage of
confederation.” Kim Dae-jung also re-conceptualized the three stages of peaceful coexistence,
peaceful exchange, and peaceful unification as three guiding principles specifically for the first
stage of confederation. The reconceptualization reflected a shift in his fundamental perception
of the issues that could easily be a bone of contention between the two sides. Under the
revised formula, peaceful exchange does not necessarily require peaceful co-existence to be in
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place, as previously posited (Kim, 1997, p. 314). In other words, a realization occurred on the
part of Kim Dae-jung that there could be two different types of exchanges: “peaceful exchange
within peaceful coexistence” and “peaceful coexistence from peaceful exchange.” 58 Such
perceptual modification accelerated the systematization of Kim’s unification formula which
became more realistic (Kim, 1997, p. 314).
While staying in the United Kingdom in 1993, Kim Dae-jung visited Germany four times.
During these visits, Kim Dae-jung observed how serious Germany’s problems had been in the
wake of reunification by absorption. He discovered that even though reunification ended the
political division, the ensuing economic and social differences caused an internal division in
German society. In the newly-reunified Germany, the perception was growing that West
Germans were first-class citizens and East Germans were second-class citizens. Regarding this
issue, Kim Dae-jung observed, “In the past, there were two nations for one people, but now
there are two communities in one nation (Kim, 1996, p. 20). Kim Dae-jung became acutely
aware of the importance of the process of reunification and the experience of an interim stage
prior to complete unification. Going through a proper process of rapprochement and
unification was all the more important, Kim Dae-jung believed, considering that Koreans
engaged in a fratricidal war, and thus may be the only people in the world who hate each other
so fiercely. He feared that otherwise unification would bring about serious confusion and
struggle, and its aftermath would be far worse than in the German case (Kim, 1996, p. 21). 59
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A contemporary parallel of the rationales can be the distinction between “denuclearization as a precondition for peace” and
“denuclearization as the outcome of a peace process.”
59
In a 1990 meeting in Germany, Chancellor Willy Brandt advised Kim Dae-jung that “Korea should learn valuable lessons from
policy mistakes that Germany committed. I think it is fortunate for Koreans that Korea will be reunified after Germany (Kim,
1996, p. 21).
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Three-Stage Unification Formula (1995)
With a view to furthering his research, in 1995 Kim Dae-jung established an institute for
unification research named the Asia-Pacific Peace Foundation. Kim then moved to recruit Lim
Dong-won, a former general with an extensive scholarly and bureaucratic background, as the
secretary general.60 Lim joined Kim Dae-jung in completing the Three-Stage Unification Formula
and devising the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung’s vision, as reflected in the conceptual
framework of the unification plan dubbed the Three-Stage Unification Formula, was analytic,
prescriptive, and normative in nature.61
Kim Dae-jung’s ideas were further elaborated in terms of specificity and concreteness,
culminating in the 1995 publication of ‘Kim Dae-jung’s Three-Stage" Approach to Korean
Reunification (Kim, 1997, p. 302).62 Kim’s newly revised Three-Stage Unification Formula
addressed the importance of a peace agreement and non-aggression treaty between two
Koreas as crucial stages deemed necessary to realize peaceful coexistence. It also calls for arms
control measures, strict verification procedures, and an international warrant of the Korean
peace structure. Moreover, the formula suggested that Korea’s peaceful unification should
neither be dependent on the superiority of power by either side nor on the absorption of one
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As a representative responsible for arms control and diplomatic issues under the Roh administration, Lim Dong-won led the
inter-Korean negotiations in the run up to the signing of the following two historic inter-Korean agreements in December 1991:
1) the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (aka the Basic Agreement);
and 2) the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (aka Denuclearization Agreement). Lim Dong-won
attended the eight rounds of North-South High-Level Talks as well as more than sixty inter-Korean negotiation sessions until the
agreement was reached between two Koreas in 1991 (Lim, 2012, pp. 76, 85).
61
Jentleson (2008, p. XXVI) defines three aspects of a vision as follows: analytic, identifying the problem of what is wrong with
the president; prescriptive, providing a solution for a better future; and normative, doing so while avoiding deeply rooted
cultural taboos.
62
The basis of Kim Dae-jung’s ideas on national unification, which was represented in his Three-Stage Unification Formula, can
be summed up as the three fundamental precepts: 1) unification is the sacred task for all Koreans; 2) diplomacy ought to be
based on the principles of national self-determination and practical interest; and 3) the democratization of Korea is not only a
shortcut to unification but a central tenet to observe in the process of achieving unification (Kim, 1997, p. 303).
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side by the other (Kim, 1997, p. 314). Under this formula, Kim suggested three guiding
principles of unification: Self-Reliance; Peace; and Democracy. The principle of self-reliance
means that all national issues, including unification, ought to be solved by the country itself on
the basis of the spirit of self-determination without relying on outside forces. The principle of
peace posits that all national issues be settled not through violence but by way of peaceful
negotiation. The principle of democracy requires that the unification processes be democratic
and relevant decisions be made through national consultation and consensus (Kim, 1997, pp. 913).
The three conceptual elements constituting the ideological basis of Kim Dae-jung’s
Three-Stage Unification Formula are: “Open Nationalism; Positive Pacifism; and Global
Democracy” (Kim, 1997, pp. 9-13). The nationalism he referred to is “open nationalism,” as
opposed to “extensive, aggressive, xenophobic, or closed-minded” nationalism that oppresses
or exploits other nations for its own narrow, selfish national interests. “Positive Pacifism,” the
second ideological basis of Kim’s unification formula, denotes the positive concept of peace
transcending the negative or minimalist stance of merely opposing war. It means an active
creation of peace like the pursuit of a nuclear-free world or the establishment of a Northeast
Asian security cooperation system. Global Democracy, the third element, implies the broader
international application of its lofty principles, going beyond the selfish single country
orientation of traditional democracy. Noting that the ideas of Global Democracy can be found
in Asia’s democratic thoughts, institutions, and traditions, Kim Dae-jung noted that the time
had come for broader views of Asian democracy to exert more constructive influence and to
overcome the limitations of Western democratic practices (Kim, 1997, pp. 9-13).
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The Three-Stage Unification formula (1995) proposes three stages of unification:
Confederation; Federation; and Complete Unification. Under this formula, the process of
unification involves a transition from confederation to federation, and to either a centralized
government or several autonomous regional governments as in the case of the federal system
of the United States or Germany (Kim, 1997, p. 25).

Confederation
The first stage of confederation between the two Koreas would be composed of “one
nation, two states, and two independent governments.” In this stage: (1) the two governments
would maintain their status quo of opposing ideologies and conflicting political and economic
systems while exercising the existing authority in their respective territories. That is, the current
governments of North and South Korea would maintain all the existing authority and power in
foreign affairs, defense, domestic affairs; (2) the government would consist of an equal number
of delegates from each side; (3) the confederation would operate on the basis of unanimous
voting to prevent any misgivings; and (4) the primary task of the confederation would be to
implement the three policy guidelines of peaceful coexistence, peaceful exchange, and peaceful
unification (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, p. 154).
The principle of peaceful coexistence entails the need to provide an institutional peace
mechanism to avoid any contingency or armed confrontation that could impede the unification
process. This would involve the reduction of military armament that is the conversion of
offensive military deployments to ones that are completely defensive in nature. Kim Dae-jung
posited that this would help ensure the building of mutual security and confidence between the
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two sides. The principle of peaceful exchange aims to promote mutual interests and restore
national identity and homogeneity via extensive inter-Korean exchanges in broad spheres
including politics, economy, society, and culture. This would help avoid the discord and
antagonism manifested in the case of Germany after reunification. Regarding this principle, Kim
Dae-jung stressed that South Korea would also reap considerable economic benefits, for
example, by utilizing North Korea’s high quality, low wage workforce. He also noted that North
Korea’s considerable natural resources and basis for tourism would significantly benefit both
sides (Kim, 1997, pp. 10-11). Meanwhile, the principle of peaceful unification rejects the
possibilities of either unification by force or by absorption via the use of the country’s superior
economic power. Peaceful unification under this formula indicates a transition to a unified state
through the peaceful democratic process of negotiation (Kim, 1997, pp. 2–3). Notably, all this
would constitute the fundamental concepts underlying the Sunshine Policy that would be
adopted by President Kim Dae-jung.
The first stage of a North-South Confederation is meant to be “a cooperative system
between the two governments that peacefully manages the state of division toward
unification.” It is worth noting that this is not a form of unification but a form of cooperation for
peaceful coexistence as a preparatory phase for unification (Lim, 2012, pp. 158–159). In other
words, this stage is a transitional mechanism aimed at realizing the foundation for
reconciliation and cooperation. During the phase of confederation, several key confederal
organs would be established such as the Inter-Korean Summit as the supreme decision-making
body; the Council of Confederation as the inter-Korean legislative organ; and the Inter-Korean
Ministerial Council as the executive body (Kim, 1997, p. 3). In essence, the goal of this stage
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would be to induce North Korea to change voluntarily; build political trust; restore a unified
national identity; build an inter-Korean economic community; realize arms reduction; and
change the armistice into a permanent peace regime (Lim, 2012, pp. 158-159). In actuality, this
set of goals constituted the North Korea policy agenda under the Kim Dae-jung administration.
In his article in 1993, Kim Dae-jung expressed his hope that the confederation of states
would begin to be implemented in 1995, the 50 th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from
Japanese colonial rule.63 He said, “If the nuclear issue can be resolved by early 1994, I feel this
can be accomplished.” Noting that the unification approach through a confederation of states
had been echoed by the then Kim Young-sam government as part of the then officially adopted
unification formula, Kim Dae-jung hoped that the first stage of unification would be launched
during the Kim Young-sam administration.64 Under Kim Dae-jung’s formula, the next stage of
the South-North Federation would be possible only after a considerable period of
confederation as a preparatory phase given the prolonged period of deepening heterogeneity
between the two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 22). The formula posits that, during a confederal stage,
concerted efforts would be made to propagate democratic values in both Koreas, especially by
North Korea. With exchanges and cooperation continuing to expand during the confederation,
the formula holds, North Korea would inevitably accept gradual democratization before entry
into a Federal phase (Kim, 1997, p. 26).
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The article published in Security Dialogue (December 1993) was a response to an article by Helmut Schmidt: “Lesson of the
German Reunification for Korea.”
64
Regarding the first stage of the unification plan, there existed a notable difference between the Kim Young-sam government
and Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung’s unification formula was based on the notion that the confederation, the first stage of the
Three-Stage plan, can be established without much difficulty if the people in both Koreas desire unification and if the
authorities in the two Koreas make the political decision based on popular aspirations. That is, the popular support for
unification was considered sufficient to warrant a confederal system. Meanwhile, the then South Korean government felt that a
confederation would not be possible without mutual confidence in place between the two Koreas (Kim, 1997, p. 18).
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Federation
The second stage of Federation would involve “one nation, one state, one system, and
two regional autonomous governments.” Under the federal system, diplomacy, defense, and
important internal affairs would be managed by the federal government, while the remaining
internal affairs would fall under the jurisdiction of the two Korean regional autonomous
governments (Kim, 1997, p. 25). Kim Dae-jung noted that the federation system would be
similar to that of the United States with the federation government being in charge of foreign
affairs, defense, and vital dimensions of domestic affairs. At this stage, the independent
governments of the two Koreas would switch over to local autonomous governments which
would take care of most domestic affairs (Kim, 1993).
The federation is intended to alleviate the shocks and confusion expected from the
unification of the two starkly divergent systems (Kim, 1997, p. 22). During this phase, an elected
office of a federal president and legislature would be established on the basis of a federal
constitution. The legislature under this system would be bicameral, based on regional and
functional representation. Also, the membership of the two Koreas in all international
organizations including the UN would be unified under this system (Kim, 1997, p. 25). The
proposal discusses the importance of this stage, noting that the mere entry into the second
stage of federation can be seen as “de facto unification” (Kim, 1997, p. 15). Kim Dae-jung noted
that after about a decade of confederation, it would be possible to enter into the federation
stage. In the meantime, he explained, under the confederation stage North Korea would have
established diplomatic relations and economic exchanges with the West. Kim Dae-jung
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expected North Korea’s economy by then to follow the example of China’s market economy
(Kim, 1993).
With regard to the process of unification of the two Koreas, Kim Dae-jung stressed the
principle of self-reliance. He said, “Maintaining amicable relations with neighboring countries is
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for unification. This we must achieve independently,
by ourselves, since the Koreans have the right and the responsibility to determine their own
destiny.” He went on to say, “While the importance of international cooperation should never
be underestimated, … I want to make it clear that, although we will continue close cooperation
with all of these parties, we cannot accept them as actual participants in the process.
Reunification itself must be a matter of the Korean people” (Kim, 1993).

Complete Unification
The third and final stage is the state of complete unification, meaning “a unified state of
either a centralized government or several regional autonomous governments as in the case of
the federal systems in the United States or Germany” (Kim, 1997, p.25). Kim Dae-jung posits
that the final decision on the form of a unified system in the third stage –either a centralized
government or decentralized federation- would have to be made in the next generation by the
people themselves.

Kim Dae-jung’s TSUF and NCUF, South Korea’s Official Unification Plan
Regarding his government’s official unification scheme, Kim Dae-jung followed suit after
his predecessors who adopted the National Community Unification Formula (NCUF) (1989) as
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the country’s official unification plan instead of insisting on his own three-stage unification
formula. On September 11, 1989, President Roh Tae-woo announced the Korean National
Community Unification Formula (KNCUF) (Hanminjokgongdongchae tongilbangan) at the
National Assembly in the form of the special presidential statement. Kim Dae-jung noted that
President Roh’s KNCUF was essentially based on the same conceptual framework as his ThreeStage Unification Formula (Kim, 1991, p. 212). In fact, the KNCUF, which was announced in
September 1989 by President Roh Tae-woo, and was subsequently revised under the
administration of Kim Young-sam, had accommodated much of Kim Dae-jung’s proposal.
In devising the formula, efforts were made on the part of the Roh administration to
collect views on how to achieve unification from various groups of society including three
opposition parties, the Democratic Peace Party (Kim Dae-jung), the Democratic Unification
Party (Kim Young-sam), and the New Democratic Republic Party (Kim Jong-pil). In gathering
bipartisan opinions on unification, Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo had frequent talks with
Kim Dae-jung, then the head of the opposition DPP.65 In the process, Chairman Kim Dae-jung
sought to get his ideas on how to achieve unification to be reflected in the national unification
plan. To do so, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his ideas both in the form of discussions and written
notes to the unification minister demanding that they be reflected in the formula (H.K. Lee,
Personal communication, October 6, 2016). As a result, the NCUF came to incorporate a good
deal of Kim Dae-jung’s ideas on unification (Lim, 2012, p. 153).
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In doing so, the unification minister was also working with advisers from the four political parties who were members of the
Special Committee for Unification at the National Assembly.
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Upon taking office, President Kim Young-sam presented the National Community
Unification Formula (NCUF), which was a revised version of his predecessor’s Korean National
Community Unification Formula (KNCU), on August 15, 1994, the National Liberation Day. The
NCUF proposes three stages of unification. The first stage is that of Reconciliation and
Cooperation based on the principles of self-reliance, peace, and democracy; the second stage is
a Confederation; and the third stage is a Unified State (1997, Kim, p.29).66 It is worth noting
that, in practice, President Kim Dae-jung rarely mentioned the unification formula or the three
stages of unification during his presidency, instead constantly emphasizing the promotion of
exchanges and cooperation between two Koreas.

Kim Dae-jung’s Policy Proposals
On the basis of the philosophies and ideas reflected in his Three-Stage Unification
formula, Kim Dae-jung made an array of policy proposals. In suggesting how to create the
atmosphere of maximum confidence between two Koreas, Kim urged the North to scrupulously
execute all of the provisions agreed upon with the United States. Also, he claimed that the
South, for its part, should positively consider either amending or abolishing the controversial
National Security Law. Kim Dae-jung also claimed that a unification approach that seriously
undermined the other party through the use of force or caused unbearable economic cost
could not be considered a “genuinely serious plan” (Kim, 1997, p. 32). Kim held that the
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Kim Dae-jung, the then leader of the opposition Democratic Peace Party, contributed substantial thoughts and ideas through
discussions he had with then Unification Minister Lee Hong-koo, who led the process of devising the pan-national, bipartisan
formula of national unification at the instruction of President Roh Tae-woo (H.K. Lee, personal communication, October 6,
2016).
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approaches to unification must be based on the objective and proper understanding of the
realities in which the two Koreas are situated and that a radical and emotional approach to
unification must be rejected at all cost (Kim, 1997, p.32).
In his speech titled “A New Approach towards North Korea” at the University of London
in August 1993, Kim Dae-jung, as the chairman of the Kim Dae-jung’s Peace Foundation,
presented the fundamentals of his unification formula, addressing the newly emerging postCold War context in the wake of the collapse of the socialist bloc. This would later constitute a
significant aspect of his Sunshine Policy. In this speech, Kim Dae-jung made policy suggestions
as follows: (1) to shift the stance from hostility and competition to reconciliation and cooperation; (2) the principle of autonomy and self-determination; (3) the declaration to
effectively renounce the intention of a “unification by absorption”; (4) the support of North
Korea’s economic development and the enhanced cooperation with international organizations
in solving the problem of North Korea’s nuclear development; (5) the support for moderates in
North Korean domestic politics; and (6) the development of concrete programs for the gradual
social fusion of the two Koreas (“The KDJ Government, the SP,” 1999, pp. 51-52).
Kim’s Dae-jung’s policy ideals as reflected in the Three-Stage Unification formula had
influenced U.S. policy toward North Korea before he was elected as president of South Korea in
December 1997 (Kim, 1997, p. 320). Upon the outbreak of North Korea’s first nuclear crisis in
March 1993, Kim Dae-jung, while on his visit to Great Britain in April 1993, suggested the idea
of “a package deal” involving “give and take” regarding the nuclear issue and diplomatic and
economic concessions. At the time, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea under President
Kim Young-sam was based on the notion that North Korea still remained intent to convert the
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South to communism and thus was far from being a proper partner for dialogue, compromise,
and negotiation. However, Kim Dae-jung believed that South Korea’s policy toward the North
ought to be fundamentally modified to account for the end of the Cold War. Regarding how to
address North Korea’s first nuclear crisis, Kim Dae-jung presented his proposal on a package
deal in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington in May 1994. He suggested that a
solution would not be possible without a direct meeting with Kim Il-sung. Kim also proposed
that the United States consider sending a respected elder statesman like former president
Jimmy Carter.67 His proposals were materialized in the form of Carter’s visit to Pyongyang in July
1994, and the subsequent signing of the Agreed Framework between the United States and
North Korea in October 1994. In practice, Carter’s meeting with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang
proved instrumental in defusing the crisis situation by turning a precariously escalating
confrontation into dialogue and negotiation (Kim, 1997, pp. 320-323).
Regarding North Korea’s nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung claimed that entry into the
confederal stage would serve as a crucial medium to solve the problem (Kim, 1997, p. 19). Kim
argued that the 1994 U.S.-DPRK nuclear accord would help develop political confidence not
only between Washington and Pyongyang but between Seoul and Pyongyang. Moreover, he
claimed that political confidence building through the implementation of the 1991 North-South
Basic Agreement on Non-Aggression, Reconciliation, Exchanges, and Cooperation –concluded
under the Roh Tae-woo administration– as well as military tension reduction measures, and the
completion of the cross-recognition of two Koreas by the four major powers would all help
facilitate the establishment of the confederation. While such factors were not necessarily
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Kim Dae-jung’s speech at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. On May 12, 1994 (Dae Jung Kim, 1994b, pp. 11–31).
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preconditions for entering into the confederation, they would contribute to a prompt entry into
a confederal structure (Kim, 1997, pp. 320–323).
As reflected in his Three-Stage Unification Formula, Kim Dae-jung believed that if the
North and the South agreed, it would be possible to establish a confederation without going
through the stage of reconciliation and cooperation. After becoming president, however, Kim
came to believe that it would be difficult to skip the reconciliation and cooperation stage and
immediately enter into a confederation. Consequently, the Sunshine Policy began by
implementing the first stage of reconciliation and cooperation as stipulated in the National
Community Unification Formula (Lim, 2012, p.159). For this reason, the Kim Dae-jung
government’s North Korea policy was officially titled the “Policy of Reconciliation and
Cooperation” even though it has been more commonly called the Sunshine Policy. In short,
President Kim Dae-jung’s goal was to complete the first stage of his unification plan by the end
of his presidency (K.H., Choi, personal communication, October 18, 2016). From his perspective,
the historic first North-South summit and the Joint Declaration in 2000 effectively marked the
beginning of the first stage of reconciliation and cooperation in the country’s unification
process (Lim, 2012, p.159).

B. Concepts and Principles of the Sunshine Policy
Sunshine Policy: Ideas and Principles
The term “Sunshine Policy” dates back to 1994. Kim Dae-jung initially employed the
term in an attempt to convince the U.S. government of the need to seek a soft-line approach to
dealing with North Korea. On September 30, 1994, Kim Dae-jung, then a defeated presidential
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contender, delivered a speech entitled “Sunshine Policy from a Position of Strength” at the
Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. Highly commending President Carter for his role in
defusing the North Korean nuclear crisis through negotiations with Kim Il-sung in Pyongyang,
Kim Dae-jung stated, “America must patiently adhere to the Sunshine Policy which had proven
to be the only effective way to deal with isolated countries such as North Korea.” Citing a
famous Aesop’s Fable of “The North Wind and the Sun,” Kim argued that the warmth of
sunshine would be more effective than strong wind in inducing North Korea to quit the policy of
isolation and confrontation and instead to engage in behavioral modification (C. I. Moon, 1999,
pp. 36–37).

Goals
The Sunshine Policy was intended to pave the way for peaceful unification by achieving
peaceful co-existence through inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The policy’s goal
was to lay the foundation for peaceful unification by breaking off the vicious cycle of adverse
actions and reactions through peaceful co-existence and peaceful exchanges and cooperation
(Moon, 1999, p. 38). Specifically, the policy’s goal lied in dismantling the Cold War legacy on the
Korean Peninsula in five key areas: 1) improvements in Inter-Korean relations; 2) normalization
of U.S.-North Korea relations and Japan-North Korea relations; 3) promotion of North Korea’s
participation in the international community; 4) prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons;
and 5) replacement of the armistice agreement by a peace treaty (Ministry of Unification,
2002).
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In his inaugural address in February 1998, Kim Dae-jung officially declared that he would
relinquish the previous policy of pursuing unification through the absorption of the North. He
also underscored the need to promote exchanges and cooperation via the implementation of
the Basic Agreement on Non-aggression, Reconciliation, Exchanges and Cooperation that was
signed between two Koreas in February 1992.

Three Principles of Sunshine Policy
The Sunshine Policy is based on three fundamental principles, as outlined in Kim Daejung’s inaugural speech: 1) No tolerance of armed provocation by North Korea; 2) the official
abandonment of unification by absorption – that is, the cession of any measures to undermine
or threaten North Korea; and 3) the promotion of exchanges and co-operation with North
Korea.
Kim Dae-jung considered maintaining a strong security posture as the top priority in
conducting the Sunshine Policy. Referring to no tolerance of North Korea’s provocation as the
policy’s first principle, Kim Dae-jung made it clear that he would never relax South Korea’s
vigilance against the North while pursing peace. Even though any armed aggression by North
Korea would not automatically trigger the immediate suspension of inter-Korean exchange and
cooperation, this principle indicates that aggression would not be tolerated either (Moon, 2012,
p. 27). In this regard, Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy was rooted in the traditional wisdom that
those who seek peace must prepare for war. Even though this may sound paradoxical, this
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constitutes the essence of the Korean conflict where peace and war constantly overlap. 68 The
ambivalence deriving from the fact that the two Koreas seek reunification while each regards
the other as its main enemy resulted in a two-pronged approach simultaneously involving
peaceful co-existence and a strong security posture (Moon, 2012, p. 30). In relation to this
principle, the Sunshine Policy laid much emphasis on a strengthened U.S.-ROK alliance as the
foundation of improved inter-Korean relations, which constitutes elements of historical
continuity. Stressing the need to secure a position of strength in dealing with North Korea, Kim
Dae-jung regarded the U.S.-ROK alliance as the central force in building a permanent peace
regime and assuring stability not only on the Korean peninsula but also in Northeast Asia as a
whole (Dae Jung Kim, 2001; K.-S. KIM, 2002).69
The second principle of abandonment of unification by absorption indicates that the
Sunshine Policy repudiates the so-called collapse theory postulating North Korea’s imminent
collapse. Kim Dae-jung viewed the collapse theory as misleading at best on the ground that any
sign of change –such as an uprising by the people or some sector in the regime, or systematic
resistance by the military or the party– was absent inside North Korea.70
Instead, Kim Dae-jung sought to change North Korea incrementally, believing that the
collapse of the Northern regime could backfire and undermine peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula (Moon, 2000, p.15). Underscoring the importance of mutuality in dealing with
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In this sense, Moon Chung-in (1999, p. 54; 2012, p. 22) reasons that Kim Dae-jung consistently pursued peace, but that he
was not “an ideal pacifist” even though he was “a liberal idealist”. That is, he was acutely aware of the vulnerability of peacemaking and peace-keeping while being convinced of the virtue of peace. Kim properly understood that a weak security posture
may prompt an adversary’s hostile action, which in itself could jeopardize peace.
69
Kim Dae-jung’s speech on March 8, 2001, at the American Enterprise Institute and Council of Foreign Relations in
Washington.
70
Kim Dae-jung’s interview with Newsweek on February 20, 1998.
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the North, Kim Dae-jung described the Sunshine Policy as a “win-win” strategy that would
contribute to peace and safety not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in the entire world. 71
Regarding the mutuality involved in his strategy, Kim noted that the South could give the North
the following benefits: assurance of security; the support to revitalize its economy; and the
support to lead it to become a responsible member of the international community. With
regard to North Korea’s responsibilities in return, Kim Dae-jung indicated the abandonment of
its nuclear weapons and missiles as well as engagement in inter-Korean exchanges and
cooperation would be required (“Interview with President Kim Dae-Jung,” 1999).
Kim Dae-jung, who had long explored unification policy, was expected to prioritize
unification over other issues when he was elected president. Nevertheless, he gave far greater
emphasis to reconciliation and normalization in inter-Korean relations over unification. The
reasons for this lied in Kim’s highly pragmatic considerations of his North Korea policy.
Upon assuming the presidency, Kim Dae-jung changed the articulated theme of the
North Korea policy from unification to engagement (Steinberg, 1999, p. 60). Regarding the
possibility of unification, President Kim said, “It is impossible to achieve reunification in the
foreseeable future, so it is not proper to discuss this kind of hypothetical situation. It might also
cause some misunderstanding. At present, I feel the issues they are interested in are
maintaining peace, holding exchanges, and cooperation” (“Interview with President Kim DaeJung,” 1999).72 Kim Dae-jung emphasized that the goal of the Sunshine Policy be to create a

71
72

Kim Dae-jung’s speech in Oslo, Norway on December 7, 2001.
Kim Dae-jung’s interview with International Herald Tribune on March 9, 1999.
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“favorable environment” in which North Korea would voluntarily change its behavior and adopt
reforms and open up to the outside world.
Kim Dae-jung was concerned that the discussion of unification by the South might
intensify North Korea’s threat perception based on its permanent siege mentality by making it
suspect a South Korean aspiration of unification by absorption. Therefore, he chose to delay
discussion of the final form of unification, an issue of divergent views between the two sides,
until an appropriate solution could be identified. This way, Kim Dae-jung’s strategy aimed to lay
solid stepping stones for unification, firmly grounded in reality. From his viewpoint, ameliorated
inter-Korean ties may lead to a “practically unified situation” and if this continued for long, then
the systematic differences of the two sides would gradually disappear (K. Y. Park, 2001, p. 74).
With regard to the third principle of exchange and cooperation, Kim Dae-jung strictly
adhered to the separation of politics and economy throughout his presidency clearly departing
from the linkage principle adopted by the previous governments. In doing so, Kim Dae-jung
sought to eliminate the vicious cycle practically linked with the linkage principle wherein any
temporary amelioration in inter-Korean ties would be far too readily undone when confronted
with a political logjam or armed provocation by the North. After all, it was the separation
principle that enabled the Kim government to promote exchange and cooperation
uninterruptedly even amid political bottlenecks or occasional provocative acts committed by
North Korea (C. I. Moon, 1999, pp. 39–40).

Guiding Rules of the Sunshine Policy
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The Kim Dae-jung government took a gradual approach in intensifying exchange and
cooperation with North Korea rather than hastening to integrate legal systems and institutions
between the two Koreas (White Paper on Korea Unification, 2001, p. 25). In prioritizing tasks in
implementing the North Korea policy, the Kim Dae-jung government observed a set of guiding
principles: (1) “Easy tasks first, and difficult tasks later”; (2) “Economy first, politics later”; (3)
“civil society first, government later”; (4) “Give first, and take later” (Lim, 2012, p. 212).
Attributing the failure of the previous administration to improve inter-Korean relations to a
rigid adherence to such principles as government first, civil society later, linkage between
politics and economy and strict reciprocity, President Kim Dae-jung adopted an innovative set of
concepts such as: “civil society first, government later”; “separation of politics and economy”;
and “flexible reciprocity.”
Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung separated inter-Korean exchange and cooperation from the
North Korean nuclear issue while separating inter-Korean dialogues from U.S.-DPRK relations.
That is, he sought to forsake the linkage thesis that had been operating in terms of inter-Korean
relations and North Korea’s foreign relations with other countries such as the United States. For
example, inter-Korean relations had been predicated on parallel progress in U.S.-North Korea
relations under the Kim Young-sam administration. In a sweeping policy change, Kim Dae-jung,
upon taking office, urged the United States and Japan to engage and normalize relations with
North Korea regardless of the degree of progress made in inter-Korean relations (Shinn, 2001,
p. 29).
Regarding practical components of the Sunshine Policy, Chung-in Moon (2012, pp. 2629) sums up the “five operating principles” as follows: 1) strategic offensive; 2) flexible dualism
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based on the separation of politics and economy; 3) credible military deterrence; 4)
international collaboration; and 5) emphasis on domestic consensus. 73

C. Conceptualization of Comprehensive Engagement (Sunshine Policy) as a Foreign Policy Tool
The review of the existing studies about engagement as a foreign policy tool helps
elucidate how to categorize the Sunshine Policy as a foreign policy tool. It helps to understand
why the policy is categorized as ‘comprehensive engagement’ as distinct from other cases of
engagement policy such as U.S. engagement of adversary states. Generally referred to as
‘comprehensive engagement’ in both scholarly and practical terms, the Sunshine Policy is
distinguished not only from appeasement but from other cases of engagement policy as the
Sunshine Policy involved a lengthier process, a longer-term evolution of the adversary, and a
greater emphasis on cooperation than other cases of engagement and cases of appeasement
(For information on the difference between appeasement and engagement, see R. Schweller,
1999; Litwak, 2000; Rock, 2000; R. L. Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000; Resnick, 2001). As in other
cases of engagement, the Sunshine Policy does not exclude the simultaneous use of elements
of containment such as negative sanctions like economic sanctions and military deterrence as
“complements” to engagement (e.g., Cha, 2002; Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000; Resnick, 2001; R.
Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000; R. Schweller, 1999, p. 15).
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Regarding the fifth component, Moon indicates that South Korea’s conventional North Korea policy was guided by two
implicit operating logics: clandestine management of inter-Korean relations and domestic political utilization. Having been a
victim of such political manipulation, President Kim Dae-jung proclaimed that his government would not politicize inter-Korean
relations (C. Moon, 2012, p. 29).
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Concept of Engagement
Both scholars and practitioners have long been grappling with the issue of how to
conceptualize engagement. Robert Suettinger, a former member of the Clinton administration’s
NSC, stated that the term engagement has “been overused and poorly defined by a variety of
policymakers and speechwriters” (Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000, pp. 18, 27). Some definitions of
engagement are focused on its means, and others on its goals. Table 1 shows how engagement
policy has been defined as a foreign policy tool in the literature.

Table 1
Definitions of Engagement
Author, Year

Definitions of Engagement as a Foreign Policy Tool

Litwak, 2000
A. Johnston &
Ross, 1999
Haass &
O’Sullivan,
2000
Nincic, 2011

Positive sanctions
The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the nonstatus quo elements of a rising power’s behavior
A foreign policy strategy that depends to a significant degree
on positive incentives to achieve its objectives

Johnson and
Ross, 1999
Resnick, 2001

R. L.
Schweller &
Wohlforth,
2000
Shambaugh,
1996

Positive inducements that are tools of external leverage
designed to advance the nation’s interests
The promise of rewards, rather than the threat of
punishment, to affect the target state’s behavior
The attempt to influence the political behavior of a target
state through the comprehensive establishment and
enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple
issue-areas (diplomatic, military, economic and cultural)
The use of non-coercive methods to ameliorate the nonstatus quo elements of a rising major power's behavior
A process and a vehicle to the ultimate goal of integrating a
target state into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and
normative international system

Focus:
Means
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Focus: Goal
Nincic, 2011
Johnston and
Ross, 1999
Haass and
O’Sullivan,
2000
Shambaugh,
1996

The attempt to influence the political behavior of a target
state
(A foreign policy strategy intended) to ensure that the
growing power is used in ways that are consistent with
peaceful change in regional and global order
(Positive inducements meant) to shape the behavior of
problem states

(A foreign policy strategy intended) to integrate the target
state into the existing rule-based, institutionalized, and
normative international system
Schweller and The goal of engagement is not simply tension-reduction and
Wohlforth,
the avoidance of war but also an attempt to socialize a
2000
dissatisfied power into acceptance of the established order.
Cha, 2002

A process of strategic interaction designed to elicit
cooperation from an opposing state.

Opposite of Engagement is Disengagement or Isolation: It is worth noting that some
scholars reason that engagement has to be defined in terms of means; engagement may share
goals with other policies, but it can be distinguished by its means. Considering that contacts and
exchanges are among the most critical means of engagement, the opposite of a policy of
engagement seems to be a policy designed to comprehensively reduce or withdraw contacts
across multiple issue areas with an adversary state. Therefore, disengagement or isolation by
means of negative sanctions are considered conceptually opposite to engagement. It is also
noteworthy, however, that disengagement or isolation is conceptually distinct from the
containment policy (Geldenhuys, 1990, p. 6).
Engagement vs Appeasement: Even though the engagement approach is often criticized
for being no more than appeasement (as both are linked with positive sanctions), appeasement
is not equivalent to engagement. Simply put, the two terms are distinguished mainly in terms of
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means. Appeasement is defined as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target
state by ceding territory and/or geopolitical sphere of influence to that state (R. L. Schweller &
Wohlforth, 2000, p. 81).74 While appeasement is a strategy with relatively short-term aims,
engagement implies a lengthy process and a distant time horizon. That is, engagement is a
broader approach, placing greater emphasis on cooperation. Engagement seeks increased
leverage and a longer-term evolution of the adversary’s economic and/or political system. The
policy also seeks to enmesh the adversary in a web of rules, institutions, and commercial
connections (Rock, 2000, pp. 22–23).

Containment vs. Engagement
Furthermore, engagement does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign
policy tools, such as sanctions or military force. Therefore, in practice, an overlap of strategies
between engagement and containment may occur (Haass & O’Sullivan, 2000, p. 114). This
indicates that the opposite of containment is not engagement but appeasement, to the extent
that containment is the policy of preventing a target state from expanding its territorial scope
and/or sphere of geopolitical influence.75 This means that a sender state can engage the target

74

The well-known cases of appeasement are Great Britain’s appeasement of the United States at the turn of the 20th century and
Nazi Germany in the 1930s (Johnston and Ross, 1999, p. 14; Resnick, 2001, p. 562). Appeasement employs more direct and
militarized means than does engagement, and does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence.
75
The concept of containment originated from diplomat George Kennan’s doctrine of diplomacy designed to transform the
Soviet Union from a revolutionary power into an orthodox great power. Kennan’s position was that modifying Soviet behavior
required both positive and negative inducements. That is, it was as important to reward the Soviets for their conciliatory gestures
as it was to resist their aggressions. In short, Kennan’s concept of containment addressed the possibility of conditional
engagement as a long-term strategy (Gaddis, 1982, p. 71).
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state while also containing it. However, it is impossible for a sender state to appease and
contain a target state simultaneously (Resnick, 2001, pp. 564–565).76
The twin concepts of containment and engagement have been invoked in US foreign
policy since World War II, when the United States, the hegemonic power of the Western
hemisphere, resorted to all available means to dispel what they viewed as the expansionist
penchant of the communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. In the Cold War Era’s fierce ideological
confrontation, foreign policies adopted by US allies were derived from a grand strategy devised
by the United States. Under the constantly evolving international milieu, the demise of the
Soviet Union was followed by the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and
then by an increasingly multipolar international order characterized by greater diversity and
less hierarchy. Despite a continued preference on the part of the United States and the
international community for this sanctions-oriented policy toward adversary states, the
dissolution of Cold War alignments has opened new opportunities and created new rationales
for engagement.
President H.W. Bush’s conviction that the US should take unique responsibility to foster
the development of democratization and market economies was followed by the Clinton
administration’s strategy of engagement and enlargement (Litwak, 2000, p. 2). 77 Under
President Clinton, the United States engaged North Korea through the 1994 Agreed
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This is because as the sender state cannot cede a sphere of geopolitical influence to the target state while preventing the same
state from expanding its territory or sphere of influence. This also indicates that whereas a state can appease and disengage another
state simultaneously, it is impossible for a state to engage and disengage with another state.
77
The H.W. Bush administration adopted engagement in dealing with China before and after the shooting of pro-democracy
demonstrators in Tiannamen Square (e.g., Skidmore & Gates, 1997). Also, U.S. foreign policy toward an emerging China under
President Clinton, was designed to enmesh China in various international regimes and binding commitments so as to minimize its
potential for disruptive behavior and facilitate the smooth integration of China into the international order (Shambaugh, 1996, p.
184).
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Framework, committing North Korea to halt and eventually eliminate its existing nuclear
program. Moreover, Clinton adopted a policy of comprehensive engagement, seeking to
integrate China into the international community as a responsible member. 78 Under the Obama
administration, the United States not only sought to “reset” the strained US relationship with
Russia, but reoriented strategies toward the disparate group that had been previously
designated “rogue states”. President Obama’s shift in nomenclature from “rogues” to
“outliers”—specifically targeted at North Korea and Iran, in whom he had inherited twin
nuclear challenges—was a signal that the pathway was open for adversarial states to rejoin the
“community of nations”, provided they came into compliance with international norms (Litwak,
2012, p. 1).
Ultimately, foreign policies and initiatives adopted in dealing with problem states in the
post-Cold War period mostly fall somewhere along the continuum between containment and
engagement. Policy choices made by the United States in dealing with rogue states largely
derive from the government’s assessment about the effectiveness of incentives or penalties in
modifying the behavior of those states, as opposed to differences over the degree to which
these states posed a threat to the nation and its allies (Litwak, 2000, p. 3). Negative pressures
against adversaries in the state’s foreign policy can be arrayed along a continuum
encompassing diplomatic criticism, economic sanctions, military force, and subversive
intervention. Among these strategies, economic sanctions and military coercion constitute the
two most widely used means of containment (Nincic, 2011, p. 2).

78

President William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: White House,
February 1995).) see the following link: https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps1340/1996stra

106

Regarding foreign policy instruments in dealing with unsavory states, studies suggest a
range of possible strategies. Robert Litwak (2000, p. 246) suggests three alternative choices: (1)
rollback (e.g., an overt policy to change the regime); (2) comprehensive containment (e.g.,
politico-economic isolation and military deterrence); and (3) conditional containment (e.g.,
mixed policies that integrate an engagement component into an overall containment
approach).
Regarding the range of foreign policy instruments, Victor Cha (2002, pp. 42–43) proposes
the following three alternatives:79 (1) containment-plus-isolation, combining military presence
with diplomatic ostracism; (2) containment-plus-coercion, which would supplement
conventional deterrence with counterproliferation measures meant to dismantle the WMD
threat through diplomatic pressure and military action; (3) containment-plus-engagement,
which stresses a strong military defense posture complemented by conditional diplomatic and
economic inducements. The last option, which he termed “hawk engagement,” is referred to as
“the most desirable option.” The first two options that Cha suggests appear mostly equivalent
to the strategy of comprehensive containment while the third option, containment-plusengagement, is equivalent to the strategy of conditional containment in Litwak’s typology.
These studies discuss possible strategies the United States may adopt in dealing with
problem states. It is worth noting that relevant discussions in the literature do not even
consider strategies more oriented toward engagement like conditional engagement and
comprehensive engagement. In other words, comprehensive engagement in the form of the
Sunshine Policy is effectively considered a non-starter in other cases. Litwak (2000, p. 246)

79

Specifically, Cha’s study addresses U.S. policy toward North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
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posits that the study chose not to consider “strategies further along the policy spectrum toward
engagement” such as conditional engagement since such alternatives are “not politically
plausible,” although theoretically possible (Litwak, 2000, p. 246).80 Ideal types of foreign policy
strategies suggested by Litwak (2000) and Cha (2000) can be summarized along the policy
spectrum as in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Ideal Types of Foreign Policy Strategies suggested along the Policy Spectrum in
Relevant Studies
Rollback  Comprehensive Containment  Conditional Containment  Conditional
Engagement  Comprehensive Engagement (Litwak, 2000)
Containment-plus-Isolation  Containment-plus-Coercion  Containment-plus-Engagement
(=Hawk Engagement) (Cha, 2002)

Cha’s (2002, 2005) studies on engagement policy toward North Korea can be of help in
understanding the nature of the Sunshine Policy as compared to a more typica’ form of
engagement.81 In fact, the “hawk engagement” that Cha proposes shares many core attributes

80

Regarding U.S. policy toward adversary states, Litwak notes that the case of U.S. policy toward China in the 1990s may fall
under the category of “conditional engagement” (Litwak, 2000, p. 118).
81
Nincic’s (2011) conceptual framework for engagement foreign policy also facilitates the understanding of the concepts and
mechanisms underlying South Korea’s engagement policy toward North Korea under President Kim Dae-jung. Nincic (2011, pp.
58–90) suggests two types of theoretical models -the exchange model and the catalytic model- which help to understand
conceptual mechanisms involved in the engagement strategy as a foreign policy tool as well as the conditions for the successful
use of the strategy. When applying this conceptual framework to Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, the policy properly fits the
conceptual underpinnings of an ambitious type of exchange model. This is because the policy revolved round flexible or diffuse
reciprocity -deriving from the concepts of non-equivalence and non-contingency- from the perspective projecting a more
distant time horizon and sought a fundamental change in the relationship between the two Koreas from a long-term
perspective (e.g., Y. G. Kim, 2013, pp. 186–187). Nonetheless, the Sunshine Policy is distinguished from the catalytic model in
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with previous U.S. engagement strategies like President G.W. Bush’s engagement policy toward
North Korea especially from 2006-2008.82 After all, the policy of hawk engagement, which is a
mixed strategy of containment-plus-engagement, appears largely equivalent to the policy of
conditional containment or mixed strategies integrating an engagement component into an
overall containment approach (e.g., Litwak, 2000, p. 246). Calling the Sunshine Policy
“unconditional engagement,” Cha expresses skepticism about its utility in addressing the North
Korean nuclear issue (2005, pp. 153, 159). Meanwhile, hawk engagement and the Sunshine
Policy have in common the tenet of a strong defense posture based on the strong U.S.-ROK
military alliance. Otherwise, however, these two strategies are in stark contrast to one another
in terms of the perspective on fundamental variables such as North Korea’s presumed
intentions, the source of threat, goals of engagement, and the type of reciprocity involved,
among other things.

that the policy neither sought nor depended upon a change in North Korea’s internal system for its success. For a catalytic
process to be activated in a target state, positive inducements of the engagement policy should serve to create some political
space so that elements of civil society or liberalizing forces within the regime can be bolstered. This way, the target’s political
equilibrium becomes unstable or the disequilibrium shifts from the latent to the manifest stage (Nincic, 2011). In fact, the
Sunshine Policy was cautious not to raise the threat perception of North Korea and thus stopped short of pursuing its internal
political change while still seeking to bring its overall interests in line with those of the international community.
82
This is the period in which North Korea’s nuclear issue made good progress in the context of the Six Party Talks.
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Chapter 4. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Decision-making
System (1998-2003)

A. Methods
1. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)
1. 1. What is LTA?
According to Burns (1979), leadership over human beings is exercised when persons
with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional,
political, psychological, and other resources to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of
followers. The theory of leadership suggests that successful leadership stresses the importance
of the “match” between “what the leader is like, what relevant constituencies want, what the
setting calls for, and the nature of the relationship between leader and led” (M. G. Hermann &
Gerard, 2009, p. 32). Burns (1979, p. 434) posits that political leadership is tested by the extent
of real and intended change achieved by leaders’ interactions with followers through the use of
their power bases. In this sense, Burns (1979, p. 18) suggests that leadership is considered
“relational, collective, and purposeful.” Leaders play a pivotal role in the bargaining required to
build a consensus between their domestic constituencies and their international counterparts
around a particular option. Moreover, in conducting foreign policies, leaders must operate
under various constraints from the external and internal environment.
Leadership style is defined as the ways in which leaders relate to those around them –
whether constituencies, advisers, opponents, or other leaders- and how they structure
interactions and the norms, rules and principles they use to guide such interactions (Hermann,
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2005, p. 181). Leadership style helps to explore how the leader as the negotiator, who steers
the government toward a certain foreign policy in the “two-level game”, deals with domestic
and international constraints in shaping foreign policy (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 88; e.g.,
Putnam, 1988; Evans et al., 1993). Leadership style is instrumental in determining the processes
leaders are likely to follow in working toward goals, the structure of decision making, from
whom they will seek advice, and the kinds of settings they prefer (M. G. Hermann & Gerard,
2009, p. 32; e.g., Preston, 2001; Kowert, 2002; Mitchell, 2005; Kille, 2006).
Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) is a technique designed to assess leadership styles based
on key personality traits and discern behavioral expectations from personal characteristics (e.g.,
M. G. Hermann, 1980, 1984, 1987; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2005, 2008).
This is linked with the idea that how political leaders construe the constraints in their
environment, shape their ideas, strategies, advisory systems, and the political behaviors they
engage in through their governments (Hermann, 2008, p. 3). LTA, which is a multi-method
approach combining the rigor of quantitative content analysis and the contextual richness of
qualitative approach, is particularly appropriate when addressing complex questions about the
role of individuals in macropolitical events (Stephen B. Dyson, 2009). This content analysis tool,
which has become available in Profiler Plus software, has proven itself to be a reliable,
systematic way of conceptualizing and measuring personal characteristics of political leaders in
a way that helps understand and predict how they behave and what type of decisions they
make (N. Levine & Young, 2014).83

83

The automated system eliminates inter-coder reliability issues as the computer impeccably reproduces the results of a given
set of materials each time. Regarding the validity of the at-a-distance assessment technique, Hermann (2008) discusses how the
four types of validity (content, predictive, concurrent, and construct validity) have been ascertained by this method. For
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LTA presumes that frequency represents salience to the speaker.84 The trait analysis of
this study will be conducted in the following three steps: 1) Measuring seven personality traits;
2) Assessing cognitive and motivational propensities; 3) Assessing leadership styles.
The traits of belief in ability to control events and need for power interrelate to suggest
how likely leaders are to challenge or respect constraints. The interplay of conceptual
complexity and self-confidence is indicative of how responsive or sensitive they are to incoming
information in making decisions. Meanwhile, the other three variables (task orientation,
distrust of others, and in-group bias) are used to assess the leader’s motives for seeking the
position of power. The resulting individual differences combine to indicate the leader’s
leadership style (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann, 2005, 2008; M. G. Hermann &
Gerard, 2009; e.g., M. G. Hermann & Hagan, 1998; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Keller, 2005; Kille,
2006).

a. Measurement of Personality Traits
This content analysis technique determines an individual’s leadership style as a function
of seven personality traits: (1) Belief in ability to control events (BACE); (2) Need for power
(Power); (3) Conceptual complexity (CC); (4) Self-confidence (SC); (5) Task orientation; (6)
Distrust of others; and (7) In-group bias (IGB) (M. G. Hermann, 2005). The seven variables are

example, in examining the concurrent validity, the ratings from profiles of 21 leaders as developed by LTA were compared with
similar ratings issued by people who had observed or interacted with these leaders such as journalists, historians, biographers,
psychologists, and political scientists. The correlations between the two sets of ratings averaged 0. 84 across the group of 21
leaders.
84
An important focus of this content analysis lies upon “the degree to which” the leader exhibits certain behavioral
characteristics. That is, the more frequently leaders use certain words or phrases in their spoken or written products, the more
salient such content is to them, and the more representative it is of their beliefs (M. G. Hermann, 2008).
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indicative of the leader’s cognitive content, cognitive style, and motivations. The seven traits
provide information on how political leaders respond to constraints in their environment, how
they process information, and what motivates them to act.
1) Belief in ability to control events (BACE)
In leadership literature, belief in ability to control events refers to a belief in an
“internal” locus of control in the political domain (Keller & Foster, 2012, p. 587). 85 Leaders with
a high BACE score are confident in their potential for success and thus show high self-efficiency.
They are more likely to take risks, and perceive risky situations as affording more opportunities
than threats, than leaders with a low score on this trait (Y. Y. I. Vertzberger, 1998, p. 68). These
leaders tend to be proactive in initiating proposals rather than awaiting input from others. Once
they decide, they will push ahead with confidence and hardly compromise with others. In
contrast, those leaders with a low BACE score–that is, with an “external” locus of control–will
take a wait-and-see approach and assess the situation before taking any action. When
confronted with a formidable task, these leaders are more likely to delegate authority to their
lieutenants so as not to take responsibility in case things go wrong (Hermann, 2005, pp. 188–
189).86
2) Need for Power (Power)

85

Locus of control is defined as one’s belief about the extent to which results of one’s behavior are contingent upon an internal
locus or an external locus. An internal locus of control refers to one’s belief in the controllability of events. When someone
believes in the controllability of events, the individual regards its outcome as derived from their own attributes and skills.
Someone who does not believe in ability to control events sees the outcome as derived from forces that work outside one’s
own agency, such as luck, chance, or fate (Rotter, 1966; Y. Y. I. Vertzberger, 1998, pp. 67–69).
86
The coding of the belief in ability to control events focuses on verbs reflective of the responsibility for initiating or planning
an action.
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Leaders who are high on the need for power scale focus themselves on consolidating
power or having “influence” on others (e.g., Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978;
M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987). They often come across as “charismatic,” “daring”,
and “charming”, like a “dashing hero” (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 191). They are particularly good
at solving problems when meeting with other leaders face to face. They are skilled at sizing up
situations. Studies also show that leaders with a high need for power are more adept at hiding
their intentions and working behind the scenes. In attaining their goals, they tend to take
cautious, gradual steps lest the other party or their enemies should interfere with their planned
course of action (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 190–191; e.g., Winter, 1973).87 Notably, studies
suggest that leaders with power motives are more likely to exploit and take risks than leaders
with achievement or affiliation motives (Terhune, 1968; Winter, 2003). Hermann posits that
leaders who score highly on need for power will resort to “Machiavellian” tactics or
“manipulate” the environment in order to gain the upper hand and make themselves appear as
winners (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 191).88
3) Conceptual Complexity (CC)
Conceptually complex leaders are responsive to a broader range of “stimuli” from their
environment. They are more likely to see diverse causes of a certain situation and perceive
ambiguity in the environment. In essence, “flexibility” is key to behavior for these leaders (M.
G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 195-196). Meanwhile, those leaders who are low on this trait tend to
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Leaders with a low Need for Power are less likely to be in charge and are more open to sharing power with others. They are
not reluctant to allow others to receive credit for achievement. They serve as the agent for the group representing their
interests in policy-making. They value a team spirit and relationship of trust. They find it important to make their followers feel
strong and motivated (Hermann, 2005, pp. 190-2).
88
Coding of the need for power centers around verbs representing action proposed or taken by the leader or the government.
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rely on their own stereotypes to assess contextual information and react rather “inflexibly” to
stimuli. For these individuals, interpretation and consistency become key to behavior. 89
4) Self-confidence (SC)
Leaders whose score is high on self-confidence tend to be more immune to incoming
information. They are less likely to be pushed around by whims of contextual conditions or to
feel compelled to adapt to a changing situation. For these individuals, consistency is seen as key
to behavior (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 195). Conversely, leaders with a low self-confidence score
tend to be more subject to the whims of situational contingencies. Without a well-developed
sense of self-worth, they tend to keep searching for information from the environment to
figure out how to perform their tasks (M. G. Hermann, 2005). 90
5) Task vs. Relationship Focus (Task)
Regarding Leadership Trait Analysis, three traits are intended to measure the leader’s
motivations: task-focus, in-group bias, and distrust of others (Hermann, 2005, p. 197). Taskoriented leaders are often “taskmasters” focused upon pushing a group to carry out tasks to
achieve the goal (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 199). They tend to see the world in terms of
problems and their role as problem solvers (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 197-199). These leaders
tend to be obsessed with achieving “standards of excellence.” It is worth noting that the task
motive is consistently linked with success as an entrepreneur (McClelland, 1961; Winter, 1996,
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The coding for the conceptual complexity focuses on words denoting that the speaker can consider varying dimensions in the
environment (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 196–197). Words such as “approximately, possibility, trend” are suggestive of high
conceptual complexity while words such as “absolutely, without a doubt, certainly, and irreversible” are considered indicative
of low conceptual complexity (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 196).
90
The coding for self-confidence centers around pronouns such as “my,” “myself,” “I,” “me,” and “mine.” Sentences containing
such pronouns are seen as conveying an enhanced sense of self-worth and a display of self-confidence (see R. C. Ziller, 1973; R.
C. Ziller et al., 1977; House, 1990).
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pp. 141–142) Winter (2005, p. 561) notes that, more likely than not, the achievement
motivation–e.g., that is, task focus–rarely if ever translates into success in the political arena.
Put simply, task-oriented leaders appear quite flexible in business settings, but often prove rigid
in politics. Meanwhile, process-focused or relationship-focused leaders tend to prioritize the
“process” or “the people” over “what needs to be done.” For these leaders, collegiality, loyalty,
and commitment to the organization are crucial (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 197-199). 91
6) Distrust of Others
Leaders who are high on distrust of others tend to be suspicious of the intentions of
others, especially their rivals, opponents, or critics. Individuals who are low in distrust prefer to
put things into perspective and assess others’ motives not in a blanket manner but based on
more realistic cues.92
7) In-Group Bias (IGB) 93
Studies have explored how leaders’ beliefs may affect how confrontational their state
will be in dealing with adversaries (Druckman, 1968; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977;
Kelman, 1983; Dodge et al., 1986; Hagan, 1993; Vasquez, 1993; Hagan, 1994; Hermann &
Kegley, 1995). In-group bias refers to a view of the world in which one’s own group holds center
stage. The leader has strong emotional attachments to this in-group and makes decisions that
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The coding for task focus or relationship focus revolves around words indicating work on a task as well as concern for others’
feelings, desires, and satisfaction. These two functions operate on a continuum, with one extreme representing a focus on a
task and the other extreme a focus on group maintenance.
92
In coding for this trait, the focus lies on nouns and noun phrases reflective of the leader’s distrust, doubt, and misgivings
about others’ acts and behaviors.
93
The coding for IGB focuses on the modifiers referring to the leader’s own group that are reflective of favorable feelings,
strength, or the need to maintain group honor or identity (M. G. Hermann, 2005). A score for each trait is the percentage of
times in a document that a leader refers to words or phrases that meet the criteria suggested in coding guidelines. The leader’s
overall score for a given trait is the average of these percentages across all the documents under examination.
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benefit the group. The higher the score on this trait, the more isomorphic the leader and group.
For leaders with a high score on this trait, anything that happens to the group is considered
equivalent to what happens to the leader, and vice versa.94

b. Assessment of Cognitive and Motivational Propensities
1) Propensity to respond to constraints
The leader’s scores for the belief in ability to control events (BACE) and need for power
interrelate to assess the leader’s propensity to respond to constraints (McClelland, 1975;
Winter & Stewart, 1977; Hermann, 1980; S. G. Walker, 1983; Hermann & Preston, 1994; Kaarbo
& Hermann, 1998; Keller, 2005). Leaders with a high BACE and a high need for power are likely
to challenge constraints. In doing so, they are skillful in exerting both direct and indirect
influence, or in using both direct and indirect tactics. Leaders with a low BACE and a high need
for power tend to challenge constraints, and to feel more comfortable doing so in an “indirect”
fashion. That is, they are excellent at maintaining power “behind the throne,” where they can
“pull strings” but be less accountable for the outcome (M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 188). Leaders
with a high BACE and a low need for power are also predisposed to challenge constraints.
However, these leaders are, in general, less effective in doing so, since they are too direct and
open in using power and less skilled in reading how to manipulate the situation. Meanwhile.
leaders with moderate or low scores on both traits are more likely to respect constraints
(Hermann, 2005, pp. 187–192). Leaders who are inclined to challenge constraints will seek to

94

Meanwhile, those leaders who are low on in-group bias are less likely to view the world in black-and-white terms and are
more willing to categorize people as “us” or “them” based on the nature of the situation or problem at hand.
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meet a situation head-on, resolve an issue quickly, act decisively, and assertively push to
address the problem (Driver, 1977; Hermann, 1984; Suedfeld, 1992). These leaders prefer to
bring policy-making under their control (Hermann & Preston, 1994; Hermann & Kegley, 1995;
Kowert & Hermann, 1997). Those leaders who are predisposed to respect constraints tend to
be more open to bargaining, trade-offs, and compromise, and deal with problems on a case-bycase basis (e.g., Driver, 1977; R. C. Ziller et al., 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Suedfeld,
1992; Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998).
2) Propensity to process information
The degree of a leader’s propensity to process information is a function of two
personality traits: self-confidence and conceptual complexity. These two traits interrelate to
suggest how open the leader will be to contextual information in making decisions (M. G.
Hermann, 2005, pp. 192–194; e.g., Driver, 1977; Ziller et al., 1977; Jonsson, 1982; Stuart &
Starr, 1982; M. G. Hermann, 1984; M. Snyder, 1987; P. D. Stewart et al., 1989b; Suedfeld, 1992;
Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998). When leaders’ scores on conceptual complexity are higher than their
scores on self-confidence, they are prone to be open to information. These leaders are more
sensitive to input in making decisions and more responsive to interests, demands, or ideas of
others. When leaders’ scores on conceptual complexity are lower than their scores on selfconfidence, they tend to be closed to information. When leaders’ conceptual complexity and
self-confidence are both high, they are likely to be open to information.95 When the scores on
both traits are low in relation to other leaders, the individual is prone to be closed to

95

These leaders benefit from the best qualities for the characteristics inherent in these two traits. Their high self-confidence
promotes their patience in the situation while their high contextual complexity will make them capable to check the
environment to discern what is most feasible at any point in time.
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information and adopt the ideas of their advisers. Such leaders tend to show some sign of
narcissism, relishing the spotlight, and pursue extreme moves (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 1924).96 Meanwhile, those leaders with moderate or low scores for both self-confidence and
conceptual complexity are prone to be closed to information (M. G. Hermann, 2005).
3) Orientation to Politics (Propensity to be driven by threats versus opportunities)
A leader’s scores on distrust of others and in-group bias interact to provide evidence
concerning how confrontational their country will be, or whether the leader is driven by the
threats or by the opportunities to solve problems through diplomacy (Hermann, 2005, pp. 199–
200). This reflects “leader orientation to world affairs,” which refers to “the core beliefs and
interests” possessed by leaders (Hagan, 1994, p. 29). It is noteworthy that these trait categories
are fluid and susceptible to change depending on the situation leaders find themselves in. In
this sense, these traits are seen as the most flexible and adaptable of the seven traits of
interest. Table 2 summarizes how distrust of others and in-group bias interrelate to determine
leader orientation to politics or motivational perception.

Table 2
Leader’s Motivational Orientations toward the World
In-Group
Bias
Low

96

Distrust of Others
Low

High

Moderate: They do not see the world
as inherently hostile or threatening
to their state’s security. Conflicts are

Opportunity-grabbing (Looking out for
opportunities): These leaders see the
world as a dangerous place full of threats.

Hermann’s studies exploring 87 heads of state and 122 political leaders show that conceptual complexity and self-confidence
are correlated to 0.10 and 0.33 respectively. This suggests that all combinations of the traits scores can be found among
political leaders (M. G. Hermann, 2005, pp. 193, 194).
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High

seen as issue-specific or situationallybound. Other nations are seen as
typical actors who are motivated by
the same kinds of pressures that
guide their own nation. They tend to
be flexible and restrained in their
foreign policy behavior as they
recognize certain constraints exist
that limit what they can do. They find
it possible and feasible to cooperate
with other states toward solving
problems.

Still, they have relatively moderate and
complex views of the nature of the
threats. The major theme of their
worldview is opportunity as they are on
the lookout for opportunities amid
difficult conditions. They strive to figure
out how to take advantage of the
opportunities they find as they believe
that, otherwise, they could lose
everything. Adversaries are viewed as
having limited goals and capabilities such
that they do not pose a direct threat to
the leader’s nation’s security. There is
room for diplomacy which allows for
bargaining, compromise, and even certain
limited forms of cooperation. Skilled
diplomacy is an important means of
containing the adversary’s behavior.
While being open to confrontation and
the use of force, they tend to be flexible
and restrained in addressing threats.

Zero-sum: They perceive the
interaction with adversaries as
essentially zero-sum. They view the
environment around them as
comprised of winners and losers.
Their worldview revolves around
the either-or proposition.
Therefore, they become extremely
cautious in walking a fine line
between becoming a winner who
gains everything and becoming a
loser who loses everything. That is,
they tend to believe: “If I go too far,
I cannot just lose but lose
everything. If I don’t make it work,
I’m gone. Therefore, I have to win
at all costs.” They are significantly
more permanent in their
perception of the environment than
are those leaders who are on the
lookout for opportunities and, to an

Focused (Focused on opposition & enemies):
They have the most extreme beliefs about
the nature of the political universe. They
see adversaries as posing unrelenting and
immediate threats. They view adversaries
as evil actors whose ambitions are
unrestrained and expansionist in nature.
Bargaining and restraint are not even
considered as viable options. In contrast
to the other orientations, there is a strong
offensive dimension to this type of
motivational orientation. In comparison to
those leaders with a zero-sum type of
worldview, they are more focused or
targeted in dealing with their opponents.
That is, they are particularly focused on
dealing with adversaries, believing that
they can win so long as they properly deal
with them. In other words, they are not
worried about everything, as in the case
of those leaders with a zero-sum type of
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even greater degree, those who
focus on opposition and enemies.

worldview. Rather, they tend to be only
concerned about their adversaries.

Note. The typology for leadership orientations toward adversaries was originally created by
Hagan (1993). Hagan’s (1993) framework delved into the relationship between domestic
politics and war proneness; Hermann (2005) subsequently adapted and reinterpreted this
framework in a way that incorporated the motivational traits of distrust of others and in-group
bias into the reformulated conceptual structure. It is worth noting that the analysis in this study
deals with more conventional political situations–e.g., involving interactions between the
leader and those opposed to him or his policy, such as accommodation, co-optation, dismissal,
criticism, resistance, and confrontation. Considering that the subject of discourse in this
analysis is distinguished from the type of situations addressed in the existing studies, the
conceptual framework–as adapted by Hermann (2005)–was further adapted and reinterpreted
in this study to suit the cases involving more ordinary political decisions than decisions on
whether to go to war or how to deal with enemy states. In this analysis, the categorical
variables such as pragmatic, military, and radical regimes were respectively replaced with
opportunity-grabbing, zero-sum, and focused orientations, with amended narratives. Adapted
from “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis, by M. G. Hermann, in J. M. Post (Ed.), The
Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton
(p. 200), 2005, University of Michigan Press.
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c. Assessment of Leadership Style
The analysis in this study pays heed to the four leadership traits that provide answers to
the two questions discussed above: (1) How do leaders react to political constraints in their
environment- do they respect or challenge such constraints? (2) How open are leaders to
incoming information –do they selectively use information or are they open to information
directing their response?
Table 3 summarizes how leaders’ management of political constraints and processing of
information interact to determine four types of leadership style: advocate, strategist,
pragmatist, or opportunist.

Table 3
Leadership Style as a Function of Responsiveness to Constraints and Openness to Information
Processing of
Information
Closed to
Information
Open to
Information

Dealings with Constraints
Challenge Constraints

Respect Constraints

Advocate (Crusader or
Ideologue)
Strategist

Pragmatist
Opportunist

Note. Adapted from “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals” by M. G.
Hermann, T. Preston, B. Korany, and T. M. Shaw, 2001, International Studies Review, 3(2), p. 95.
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186566)
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Advocates are prone to challenge constraints and be closed to information. 97 They are
considered “cognitive misers” in that they are the least concerned with contextual conditions of
the four styles of leadership in terms of leadership typology (M. G. Hermann, 2001; M. G.
Hermann, 2009). These leaders bear their own agenda in mind when taking office and seek to
accomplish it during their term of office. In pursuing their goals, they are proactive, rarely
waiting until the time is right to take action. They adopt a hands-on approach to setting political
goals and achieving them. They extend their power base and influence. In the process, they
tend to push the limits of what appears possible, and otherwise demonstrate assertive political
behavior. They sought to maintain formal and informal control over the focus of their group.
They are predisposed to repress or ignore opposition depending on its strength. In making
decisions, they are selective in processing information tending toward the types of information
that may promote their agenda. They are likely to take charge and work to be in control of
events and situations. They select advisers who may serve as implementers, that is, those who
are committed to furthering the agenda and to “spinning, selling, and persuading” others of
that agenda. Advocate leaders often come to power in authoritarian systems, strong one-party
systems, in democracies where the “winner takes all,” and hierarchically structured
revolutionary or terrorist groups (M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009).
Meanwhile, strategic and pragmatic leaders are more attentive to situations as they
seek to use and benefit from them (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 96). Leaders who challenge
constraints but are open to information are strategic leaders. As with advocates, strategists
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When it comes to Leadership Trait Analysis, advocates are considered identical with ideologues or crusaders in terms of
typology (Stoessinger, 1979; Hermann et al., 2001; Hermann & Gerard, 2009).

123

come to power with a set of goals but tend to be flexible in the use of means to reach these
goals. Appearing maneuverable and flexible in pursuing their agenda, strategic leaders are
“cognitive managers.” They seek control over information and challenge constraints, but prefer
to do so informally in manipulative or Machiavellian manners. In pursuing their agenda, they
find a well-tuned sense of political timing to be crucial. They are adept at walking a fine line
between actions designed to achieve the goals and moves to avoid risks, mistakes, and failures.
In the process, they seek to take advantage of opportunities and avoid threats. For these
leaders, it is important to “size up” the other party and to get a sense of their position before
deciding on next moves (M. G. Hermann, 2005). They often engage in “tit-for-tat” behavior in
interacting with outside parties. They are best when they meet face-to-face with other leaders
and do so in order to obtain more specific information about the issues at hand (Hermann et
al., 2001, pp. 95–96; Hermann & Gerard, 2009, pp. 34–35).
Leaders who respect constraints and are closed to information are pragmatists. These
leaders struggle with the dilemma that they want to make some progress toward their goals
while working within the bounds of their positions. They search for ways to reach their goals
and maintain the support of important constituents while not alienating or excluding
opponents. In dealing with political opponents, they seek to bargain with them and come up
with ways to accommodate various viewpoints to achieve a compromise. They seek to build
consensus or compromise between conflicting parties. They are driven by the situation. These
leaders seek to become agents of their constituencies and are willing to work on the agenda of
their constituents. In essence, they are “diplomats and mediators at heart.” They believe in
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debate and dialogue and value the power of persuasion (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001: 96;
Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 35-36).
The opportunists, who are the opposite of advocates, respect constraints and are open
to information (hypothesis testers/native scientists). They are the most “buffeted by the
political winds” since they are most sensitive to contextual information. These leaders are
expedient, defining the issue and taking a position based on the agenda of important
constituencies. Bargaining lies at the heart of the political game. They tend to act as a broker
and intermediary between various political groups. For them, others’ views and positions
become crucial in shaping their agenda (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 95, 98-99).

1. 2. The Use of Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) in This Study
Scoring and Norming Group
The leader’s scores on each of these traits will be determined by numbers that range from 0 to
1. To judge whether the leader’s scores are high, moderate, or low on a certain leadership trait,
the trait’s numerical score is compared to the average score for the trait of a norming group. A
norming group consists of the aggregated scores of other leaders on the traits of interest. In
this study, the data on a group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders who were in power from 1998 to 2008
were used as a norming group. The norming group data were based on Margaret G. Hermann’s
research on political leadership across different world regions (see Hermann & Sakiev, 2018).
The logic is that an average and a standard deviation is calculated for a norming group
of leaders and the leader’s individual score for each trait is compared to the relevant mean of
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the norming group of leaders. Typically, when the leader’s score on a certain trait is higher than
one standard deviation above average of the norming group, his/her score is considered high
on that trait. In this study, the leader’s score on a trait is higher than a half standard deviation
above the average of the norming group, his score is deemed high on this trait. The use of a
half standard deviation, rather than one standard deviation, was intended to increase the
degree of differentiation in the strength of the leader’s trait scores. This is so that some scores
which would have fallen into the moderate range if a full standard deviation had been used can
be more distinct in strength. This in turn has the effect of making a leadership style ‘more
distinct’ than using typical differentiation would have shown. By employing a half standard
deviation to determine the average range of the norming group, the individual’s leadership
style that would have been assessed to be a mixed style can be categorized in a more discrete
way as a particular type of leadership style.
Types of Coded Materials
Leadership Trait Analysis allows for measuring personality traits through content
analysis of materials that are available in the public domain. The materials transcribing leaders’
utterances verbatim constitute the primary documents for this method. Considering that this
study explores Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the North Korea Policy during his
tenure, verbal materials of Kim Dae-jung’s speeches, press conferences and interviews dealing
with North Korea-related topics including peace, war, security, inter-Korean relations,
unification, etc. that are available online or in the form of paper publications were used in this
analysis.98 Regarding the source materials that address other topics in addition to North Korea-
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For the list of documents used for content analysis in this study, see Appendix A.
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relevant issues, only those text segments addressing North Korea-related topics were extracted
for content analysis. This is because the focus of this research lies in President Kim’s leadership
traits and styles as relevant to the North Korea policy. Therefore, the LTA results discussed in
this analysis concerning the leader’s personal traits and leadership styles are “practically and
exclusively” relevant to the policy in question. Therefore, the results can serve as a useful proxy
for Kim Dae-jung’s approach to leadership as relevant to his North Korean policy. Moreover,
only those interview responses and speeches that comprise 500 or more words were used for
the profiling purpose in the analysis in order to assure significance of the resulting trait scores
for each material and thus to assure confidence in the resulting personality profile. This is based
on the theoretical ground that the greater the length of the document, the more accurate or
significant the result of the content analysis.
Contextualization of Materials
For analytical purposes, Kim Dae-jung’s five-year term was divided into three periods
based on the changing nature of the environment in terms of the severity of constraints
imposed on his North Korea policy. By categorizing materials by time, audience, and topic, the
content analysis can assess how sensitive a particular leader was to the context in terms of
leadership traits and styles (M. G. Hermann, 2008, p. 7). If the leader’s trait scores show
variability, the research will explore how and when the leader was likely to change his behavior,
and under what contextual conditions he changed his approach to leadership (M. G. Hermann,
2008, p. 19). With the coded materials all dealing with North Korea-relevant topics, this
research further contextualized the profile by categorizing materials by time and audience. That
is, for the purpose of profiling, the LTA results were contextualized to account for the changing
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environment based on the passage of time (in terms of the degree of constraints imposed on
the Sunshine Policy) and on each of the three major sources of constraints.
Therefore, in this study, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style was explored in relation to
three different periods of time and three different sources of constraints, that is, the United
States, North Korea, and the domestic political environment. This is because the study
examines whether the leader’s trait scores show a pattern of change across the three types of
the environments of interest, that is, whether the leader’s trait scores were affected by the
evolving situation in relation to North Korea policy during his tenure. Kim’s trait scores based on
the North Korea-related materials targeted at domestic audiences were used to assess his
leadership styles in relation to the domestic environment involving political constraints and
obstacles he faced in implementing the North Korea policy. Similarly, the trait scores based on a
set of materials targeted at foreign audiences were used to analyze Kim’s leadership styles
relating to the external environment and external constraints, such as the United States, posed
to the Sunshine Policy.
In the same vein, his trait scores based on the full set of North Korea-relevant
documents used in this analysis were used to evaluate his leadership styles regarding his overall
North Korea policy. These overall scores are assessed to examine Kim’s leadership as relevant
to the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy given that the underlying system
framed around the National Security Council was adopted at the beginning of his term and
remained in operation throughout his presidency in relation to the North Korea policy.
Moreover, the overall scores based on the North Korea-related materials–as contextualized to
account for his leadership characteristics by the three periods of interest–were used to
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investigate President Kim’s leadership in dealing with North Korea, or constraints imposed by
North Korea, for each period of interest.
Translation Issue
As President Kim Dae-jung’s interviews and speeches were made in Korean, those
materials that had been translated into English for publication purposes were used for content
analysis in this study. Regarding concerns about the effects of translation on the results of the
analysis, tests have been conducted in which persons trained from other countries conducted
the content analysis in their original language, and the results of their analyses were compared
to the results generated by another group of researchers who did the same on the English
translation. Such tests have been conducted with documents in French, Swahili, Russian, and
Mandarin Chinese. On average, the results of the tests have shown 87 percent overlap (M. G.
Hermann, 2008, pp. 7-8). In this study, both interview responses and speeches were used for
content analysis. Speeches are regarded as equally important, if not more so, than interview
responses as types of documents subject to the analysis. This is partly because of a significant
degree of representativeness involved in Kim Dae-jung’s speeches. This will be further
discussed in the section of Political Skills of the Who chapter.

2. Qualitative Interviewing99
Qualitative interviewing is used in this study as the data collection method. Semistructured, open-ended, in-depth interviews were conducted as a supplementary tool to
explore President Kim’s perspective on the contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine
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For the list of questions the author asked the interviewees in relation to this study, see Appendix B.
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Policy as well as the nature of the relevant decision-making system. Semi-structured, in-depth
interviews were done with individuals who were involved in the policy process or closely
assisted Kim Dae-jung for an extended period time prior to his election as president, and
throughout his presidency and implementation of the Sunshine Policy.
Selection of Interviewees
Interviews in this study provides a critical source of data as the existing materials fail to
provide sufficiently substantive information deemed necessary to explore the leader’s
perspectives on major events or developments and the innerworkings and dynamics of the
relevant advisory system. The interviewees were recruited in this study in ways that could
ensure the credibility, accuracy, and balance of the analysis (e.g., Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 6170). Interviewed in this study were those individuals who had firsthand experience with Kim
Dae-jung and the Sunshine Policy and thus whose words can serve as credible evidence for the
conclusion of the analysis. Some interviewees represented different points of view or provided
alternative interpretations or perspectives on the events and developments relevant to the
policy of interest. This presumably had the effect of making the data more balanced and
thorough.
Specifically, the interviewees in this study were those individuals who were directly
involved in the decision-making and implementation process of the Sunshine Policy as well as
Kim Dae-jung’s longtime aides and close associates. The interviewees also included those who
had a significant interaction with him, such as working as a personal secretary, an interpreter,
or a biography writer, as well as a couple of former opposition lawmakers who were opposed
to the Sunshine Policy.
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The list of the individuals who participated in the interviews for this study include
former government officials who served under the Kim Dae-jung administration. The positions
held by these officials include those of Unification Minister, Deputy Unification Minister,
Ambassador to the United States, Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), Deputy
Director of NIS, First Secretary to NIS, Chief Presidential Secretary, Presidential Press Secretary,
and Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomacy and Security. 100
Characteristics of interviews
In-depth, qualitative interviewing was employed in this study as a data collection
method. The type of responses sought in the interviews were ones involving rich and detailed
information. The interviewees were expected to share examples, experiences, narratives and
stories relevant to the topic of the study and interview questions. Moreover, as the questions
asked were not fixed but open-ended, interviewees were encouraged to respond any way they
desired –e.g., elaborating upon responses or raising other issues. This also means that the
researcher did not have to adhere to a given set of questions and, may change the wording or
skip questions if they were considered inappropriate at the time of the interview. Also, the
interviewer was able to make up new questions on the spot to follow up on new insights, and
ask a separate set of questions to different interviewees (see Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 29).
The interviews conducted in this study were ‘semi-structured’ in that the interviewer
sought to focus on the planned items that spoke to the research questions. That is, the
researcher had a specific topic to explore, prepared a given set of questions in advance, and
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For the list of interviewees, see Appendix C.
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planned to ask follow-up questions, focusing on the planned items that were closely relevant to
research questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, p. 31).101
Period of Interviews
Most of the interviews were conducted from September to December in 2016 with 20
interviewees in South Korea. All of the data collected in Korea during this period were in Korean
except for one interview (with Yang Sung-chul) that was given in English. An additional two
sessions of interviews were conducted in the United States (Syracuse, New York) with the two
American interviewees (Leon Sigal and Stephen Costello) in English in September and
November of 2017. At the beginning of interview sessions, interviewees were asked if they
agreed to be recorded or quoted in the dissertation. The interview data was recorded only
when the interviewees gave consent to the recording.

B. Decision-Making System Involved in the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003)
1. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): DecisionMaking System (LTA)
In this study, Kim Dae-jung’s overall leadership profile, comprised of the seven
personality traits as relevant to the Sunshine Policy for his five-year term of office, is used to
explore how his leadership characteristics affected the nature of the decision-making system
involved in the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung’s mean scores as well as the strengths of these
scores, determined by comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders (Table 5), are
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Meanwhile, in an unstructured interview, a researcher has a general topic in mind, but the majority of the questions are
formulated as the interview proceeds in accordance with interview responses. Both structured and unstructured interviews
seek responses given in vivid detail. The major difference lies in the degree of control the researcher retains over the interview.
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shown in Table 4. The scores concern Kim Dae-jung’s term of office (1998-2003), representing
his overall personality profile as relevant to North Korea policy.

Table 4
Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as
regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Kim Daejung
(19982003)

Belief in
Ability to
Control
Events
(BACE)

North
Korea
Policy

0.35
Moderate

Need
Conceptual
for
Complexity
Power
(CC)
(Power)
0.36
High

0.57
Moderate

SelfConfidence
(SC)

Task/Relat
ion-ship
Focus
(Task)

Distrust of
Others
(Distrust)

InGroup
Bias
(IGB)

0.33
Moderate

0.53
Low

0.15
Moderate

0.25
High

Note. Number of the documents used for content analysis: 68; Number of the total words
contained in the documents used for content analysis: 77262. Materials used for content
analysis: Interview responses and speeches on North Korea-relevant topics.

Table 5
Norming Group Statistics (Means and Half Standard Deviations): 79 Pacific Rim leaders (19982008)
Pacific
Rim
Leaders
Mean
SD (1/2)

BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

0.34
0.03

0.27
0.03

0.59
0.04

0.32
0.06

0.62
0.04

0.14
0.04

0.16
0.025
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µ-σ

0.31

0.24

0.55

0.26

0.58

0.10

µ+σ

0.37

0.30

0.63

0.38

0.66

0.18

0.135
(0.14)
0.185
(0.19)

Note. Data courtesy of Margaret G. Hermann102 and Social Science Automation.103 Belief in
Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Selfconfidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB).

The results based on the Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) shows that, regarding North
Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile was distinct in relation to a norming group for
the three traits. Specifically, Kim Dae-jung’s profile showed a high need for power, a high ingroup bias, and a low task focus across his five-year term of office. It is noteworthy that these
three personality traits are “exclusively and consistently” distinct in terms of the strength of
scores in comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders across the three periods
under analysis, as illustrated in Table 6. This profile provides crucial information on the type of
decision-making system that President Kim Dae-jung adopted in relation to North Korea policy
during his presidency.

Table 6
Average Trait Scores and Score Strengths Compared to a Norming Group for Kim Dae-jung as
regards the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003) by Three Periods of Analysis (Leadership Trait Analysis)
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The norming group data were provided by Margaret G. Hermann based on her research on political leadership across
different world regions. The data used in this study were on 79 heads of state in the Pacific Rim region who were in power from
1998 to 2008 (see Hermann & Sakiev, 2018).
103
For the Profiler Plus text coding platform provided by Social Science Automation, see the following link:
https://socialscience.net/
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Period 1 (19981999)
North Korea
- N of doc: 28
- N of words:
26872
Period 2 (2000)
North Korea
- N of doc: 19
- N of words:
29869
Period 3 (20012002)
North Korea
- N of doc: 21
- N of words:
20521

BACE

Power

0.36
High

0.37
High

0.35
Moderate

0.36
High

0.33
Moderate

0.34
High

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

0.54
Low

0.14
Moderate

0.28
High

0.29
Moderate

0.53
Low

0.11
Low

0.25
High

0.59
0.34
Moderate Moderate

0.53
Low

0.20
High

0.21
High

0.56
0.35
Moderate Moderate

0.55
Low

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the
total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control
Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Taskfocus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). For the norming group data, refer
to Table 5.

2. Advisory System under President Kim Dae-jung as Relevant to the North Korea Policy
According to George and Stern (1998), a leader’s decisions on structuring the
policymaking system is significantly affected by his/her own preferences based on the prior
experience, perceived expertise, and competence in foreign policy and national security affairs.
After all, the president’s personality will help shape the institutional structure of the decisionmaking system as well as the practical management of the structure. All this indicates that
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discrepancies in presidential preferences for management and decision-making style will lead
to variations in the advisory system and the attendant decision-making process.
The classic works on advisory systems by Richard Tanner Johnson and Alexander
George, which address an advisory structure and patterns of interaction among advisers,
differentiate among formalistic, competitive and collegial systems. 104 George (1980) suggests
that three variables –cognitive style, orientation toward conflict, and sense of efficacy- as well
as experience, competence, and interest in foreign policy have implications for a president’s
choice of collegial, formalistic, or competitive models. 105 According to George, these elements
combine to determine how the president will develop a policymaking system and how he will
define his role and that of his advisers. Regarding this classification, there has been a general
consensus among scholars and practitioners that advisory systems mostly take one of two
forms: formalistic or collegial (Haney, 1997, pp. 44–46; A. L. George & Stern, 1998, pp. 203–204;
Mitchell, 2005, p. 11).106
Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung established a decision-making system by creating the
National Security Council Standing Committee (NSSC) and its Secretariat that was in charge of
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Originally, Richard Tanner Johnson (1974) created the typology suggesting three basic management styles. Alexander
George (1980; 1998) then elaborated on the Johnson typology specifying the characteristics of each advisory system.
105
The cognitive style dimension in George’s study addresses the president’s beliefs about context as well as his preferred ways
of acquiring information, selecting advisers, and interacting with them (A. L. George, 1980, p. 147; A. L. George & Stern, 1998,
pp. 201–203). The second personality dimension of a sense of efficacy relates to management and decision-making tasks. This
dimension relates to the president’s feelings of competency in performing tasks. This dimension influences the nature of the
advisory system by determining the specific type of role that the president takes in the system. A third personality dimension
addresses the president’s general orientation toward interpersonal conflict over policy among advisers, which has an impact on
the nature of debate. This indicates that the president may or may not want to avoid face-to-face confrontation and seek
consensus on solutions before decisions are made. In addition, George claims that these personality dimensions are
complemented by a president’s prior experience and competency in foreign policy (George and Stern, 1998, pp. 202-203, 262).
106
Many scholars concur that the typology may be comprised of the two categories of formalistic and collegial models
considering that the competitive system may not be regarded as a full-fledged category generalized across administrations
since it is somewhat anomalous and viewed as specific to U.S. former President Franklin Roosevelt.
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providing staff support for the standing committee.107 Under the administration of President
Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung’s predecessor, inter-Korean issues were under the jurisdiction of
the National Security Council. Nevertheless, under Kim Young-sam, there was no supportive
mechanism in place and no minutes of the meetings were kept even though important
discussions were held on national security and North Korean issues.
Under President Kim Dae-jung, the NSSC was established as a regular, primary
deliberation forum for North Korea and security policies. The meeting was attended by the
heads of all ministries and departments relevant to national security and unification issues
including Minister of Unification, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of National Defense,
the Director of the National Intelligence Service, the Senior Presidential Secretary of National
Security and Foreign Affairs, and the Director of Coordination from the Office of the Prime
Minister (Lim, 2012, pp. 172–173).108 Under President Kim Dae-jung, the NSSC deliberated on
major North Korea policy issues and significantly contributed to the president’s decision-making
throughout his five-year tenure.

Formalistic System (George/Johnson)
The decision-making model Kim Dae-jung adopted in relation to North Korea policy was
a formalistic system in terms of the Johnson and George’s typology. The Kim Dae-jung
administration’s formalistic model can be depicted in simplified terms as in Figure 2.

107
108

The senior presidential secretary would concurrently head the NSC Secretariat and the NSSC.
The director of coordination was able to voice his views but would not participate in decision votes.
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Figure 2. Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) under President Kim Dae-jung

Under President Kim Dae-jung, the National Security Council was normalized as a fullblown decision-making mechanism. The NSC Standing Committee (NSSC) was held on a weekly
basis, every Thursday at four o’clock. As a supportive mechanism for committee operation, a
working-level meeting attended by mostly deputy minister-level officials would be held every
Tuesday to prepare the agenda for the standing committee meetings to ensure the system’s
efficient operation (S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016). The system was
formalistic in nature, following well-defined procedures that facilitated orderly policymaking. At
the end of each meeting, a report that included minority views would be drafted and submitted
to the president. Once approved by the president, the presidential memo would be distributed
to the members of the committee for thorough implementation (Lim, 2012, pp. 173, 177).109
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In contrast to the formal model, the collegial system largely relies on informal procedures. In this model, the president seeks
to create a team of advisers who will work together to identify, analyze, and solve policy problems in a way that synthesizes
divergent points of view. As an active member of the group, the president leads the decision-making team and shares
responsibility with his key advisers, who are mostly ‘generalists’. Divergent views arise from the interaction within the team,
and the vetting of different views leads to the most feasible policy, rather than the best policy as sought in the formal model.
This system intends to use divergent views as a means to find policy solutions that are ‘substantively sound and politically
doable.’ In the collegial model, the president stands at the center as the hub of the information network and often reaches
down the information channels. Building consensus and the collegial atmosphere are emphasized in this system as a way to
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Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to have a mechanism for control and
coordination in place that would protect the policymaking process from bureaucratic politics
that could cause holdups or malfunctions in the process. The system’s control and
centralization were effectively maintained with the help of Lim Dong-won, President Kim’s most
trusted adviser and virtual chief of staff. The presidential preferences and guidelines were
conveyed to cabinet heads, deputy ministers and other subordinates through Lim Dong-won,
who played a central role as a liaison between the president and the advisory- and the workinglevel group (Y. S. Yang, personal communication, October 22, 2016).

3. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits & the Decision-making System as Relevant to the
Sunshine Policy
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile indicates that a high need for power combines with a
low task-focus to result in unique leadership characteristics that are reflected in the decisionmaking system he adopted in relation to North Korea policy. It is notable that, in this study, the
high in-group bias of the leader is a relatively less important variable in delving into the relevant
advisory system. This is because the two motivational variables of in-group bias and distrust of
others are the personality traits that are the most flexible and adaptable to the situation in
which the leader finds himself (M. G. Hermann, 2005). That is, these two motivational traits are
far more instrumental when delving into the implementation aspect of the policy rather than
the decision-making aspect of the policy.

avoid the worst excesses in bargaining, infighting, and conflict linked with the competitive model (Haney, 1997, pp. 44–46; A. L.
George & Stern, 1998, pp. 203–204).
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1. High Need for Power
Kim Dae-jung’s high score on need for power was clearly manifested in the inner
workings of the advisory system he adopted in conducting his North Korea policy.
Formal System
Studies suggest that leaders with a high need for power tend to prefer a formal,
hierarchical advisory system to tighten their control over the policymaking process. As a result,
their policy preferences often dominate both the policy deliberations within advisory groups
and the nature of the final decisions. These leaders are likely to centralize decision making
within tight inner circles of trusted advisers and to pursue direct personal involvement in policy
formulation (Preston, 2001). The hierarchy of the system enables the filtering of information
and exclusion of dissenters from the decision-making process. The president, the final decisionmaker, usually sticks to a formal channel and rarely reaches down to bypass a cabinet secretary
to get information from subordinate officials (A. L. George & Stern, 1998; Mitchell, 2005, pp.
11–12). In his comparative analysis of several American presidents in terms of their personality
traits and the impact of these traits on their preferred advisory systems, Preston (2001) found
that Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, and George H.W. Bush were high on need for power in
relation to the foreign policy.
In terms of Kim Dae-jung’s model of decision-making, the formalistic feature centered
around tight inner circles was primarily the case for Period 2 (2000), in which the relevant
decision-making largely revolved around secret endeavors to achieve the inter-Korean summit.
In the other two periods of study–Period 1 (1998-1999) and Period 3 (2001-2002)–the relevant
decision-making process became normalized and relied more on the system involving the NSC.
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Channels of Communication
As shown in the diagram, Kim Dae-jung’s decision-making model positions the president
at the top as the final decision maker so that the president takes full responsibility for the final
decisions. Moreover, this system respected hierarchy, and formal channels of communication
dominated the central decision-making mechanism. The president stuck to the channels of
communication and seldom reached down to bypass a cabinet head to gain information or
advice from lower-level officials or subordinates. In this system, access to the president was
limited. In fact, deputy or working-level officials had virtually little access to the president while
members of the cabinet and presidential secretaries had relatively easy access to the president.
When they directly briefed the president, the Senior Presidential Secretary for Foreign Affairs
and Security and Lim Dong-won, the chief of staff, were present in order to remain informed of
what was reported to the president as part of the policy process (e.g., personal
communications with D. W. Lim; S. H. Jeong; H. Seo). Regarding the access to the president,
informed sources indicate that top adviser Lim had the ear of the president since he had the
most open access. This, they note, endowed him with authority and made him serve as an
esteemed custodian manager with an effective control on the overall policy process.
Briefings to President Kim were done either verbally or in writing as he was largely open
to both types of reporting. Equipped with a breadth and depth of knowledge and expertise in
the field, Kim Dae-jung is said to have been able to absorb any type of information instantly on
the spot (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016). Regarding the advisory
system, Kim Dae-jung defined the role of each cabinet head as a functional expert rather than a
generalist on relevant issue areas, which constitutes another characteristic of the formalistic
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model (See Lim, 2012, p. 207). Equipped with functional expertise, advisers in this system
served to provide specialized advice on specific policy problems. Another notable aspect of this
system was that the members of the advisory group had mostly bureaucratic backgrounds, as
opposed to scholarly or academic backgrounds, with many years of experience working for the
government in the relevant field (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, November 22, 2016).
Highly-Centralized System
Showing a leadership essentially distinct for a constantly high need for power regarding
the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s decision-making system can be classified as a “formal
and highly centralized” system in terms of David Mitchell’s typology (2005). As discussed above,
the system revolved around the hierarchical advisory structure and the president’s sustained
influence over the policy process. In making decisions, members of the advisory group devised
policy options within the presidential mandates and guidelines that reflected President Kim’s
ideas and preferences. They also operated only within the bounds of presidential instructions
when implementing the policy. The failure to observe such guidelines or any moves made
outside the bounds of the presidential instructions were considered a dereliction of duty and
would lead to the exclusion of the “disobeyer” from the process altogether even though such
an incident was a mere rarity, if it happened at all.110 This way, President Kim Dae-jung sought
to take charge and maintain consistent leverage over the overall policy process in conducting
the Sunshine Policy (D. W. Lim; S. H. Jeong; H. Seo, personal communications, September and
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A case in point is President Kim’s dismissal of his unification minister due to his failure to follow presidential instructions as
the chief delegate of the inter-Korean talks held at Kumgang Mountain in November 2001. The eagerly-anticipated inter-Korean
talks, which the Kim administration managed to hold following the six-month-long deadlock in inter-Korean relations, broke
down quickly when the South Korean representative, Unification Minister Hong Soon-young, entered into a dispute with his
North Korean counterpart. By doing so, he failed to comply with presidential instructions to reach an agreement with the North
at the end of the talks. President Kim then moved to dismiss him as the Unification Minister.
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October, 2016). All this demonstrates that effective presidential dominance and centralization
characterized the decision-making process Kim Dae-jung adopted vis-a-vis his North Korea
policy.
Under this system, very little conflict emerged across relevant bureaucracies and among
the members of the policy group. One group that was hard-pressed to cope with a changed
strategy adopted under the new president was South Korea’s Armed Forces. However, the
Defense Ministry generally endorsed President Kim’s Sunshine Policy throughout his term of
office.111 When the government was struggling to bring the North back to the negotiating table
amid heightening tensions between Pyongyang and Washington, the Defense Ministry agreed
to postpone the publication of the Defense White Paper designating the North as the “main
enemy” (S. J. Sohn, 2002).
The role of the NSSC under the Kim Dae-jung administration was particularly important
when there occurred an overlap of issues across relevant ministries. The differing views were
coordinated and synthesized at this forum through intense debates and discussions among its
members. When members of the NSSC failed to reach a consensus, their positions including
minority views were reported by Lim Dong-won to the president so that the final decision could
be made at the presidential level (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016). In
this sense, strictly speaking, the NSC under the Kim Dae-jung administration can be more
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Following the submarine incident that occurred on June 22, 1998, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who were directly
involved in handling the situation, defined the incident as a North Korean “armed provocation.” Nevertheless, he stopped short
of threatening the North with retribution in kind which had been the norm of past practices. Meanwhile, Defense Minister
Chun Yong-taek expressed his strong endorsement of the new government’s engagement policy in his speech at the U.S. Center
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on July 10, 1998, in Hawaii. Minister Chun said that a continued policy of
engagement would increase transparency in the North’s international situation and weaken the position of its hardliners and
thus reduce the chances of any armed provocations (Y. J. Oh, 1998b).
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appropriately described as a mechanism for policy deliberation and coordination, rather than as
a final decision-making body, observes Seo Hoon, the agency’s Deputy Director at the time (H.
Seo, personal communication, November 25, 2016).
Under this system, dissenting views and conflicts were almost always reconciled through
active coordination conducted at the NSSC. In case dissension occurred and council members
had difficulty reaching consensus on certain policy issues, Lim Dong-won would intervene to
coordinate differing views or make suggestions in a way that facilitated consensus-building. It is
noteworthy, however, that the relationship between the top presidential adviser Lim Dong-won
and other members of the advisory group was not so much hierarchical as lateral and mutually
cooperative. As a member of the NSSC, Lim actively joined policy discussions with other
advisers without seeking to be in control of the deliberation process (H. K. Kim, personal
communication, November 30, 2016; S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016).
Still, Lim maintained effective control over the decision-making process not least because other
advisers were keenly aware of the fact that Lim’s views put forward at the meetings were
faithfully reflective of the president’s views and ideas on the issues at hand. In fact, members of
the government shared the notion that President Kim and Lim Dong-won were,in effect, of one
heart and mind when it came to North Korea policy (S. H. Jeong, personal communication,
November 22, 2016). Moreover, it was difficult for a member of the advisory group to challenge
Lim’s views considering his extensive knowledge and expertise on North Korean and security
affairs (S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7, 2016).
Another crucial reason for the relative lack of conflict in the policymaking process in this
system was that final decisions were always made by the president (D. W. Lim, personal
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communication, October 19, 2016). Regarding major issues of the North Korea policy, the
president’s policy preferences dominated the policy process, and final decisions reflected his
preferences. In other words, with few exceptions, the president’s views and judgments
ultimately prevailed when there were disagreements at the advisory or bureaucratic levels.112
This is also intimately linked with President’s Kim’s interest and expertise in the issue area.
Studies posit that leaders who view themselves as having expertise in a domain tend to be
more willing to play an active role in policymaking and to be reluctant to delegate their
authority as a final decision maker (e.g., Preston, 2001).
Role of the Chief of Staff
In the formalistic system, the presidential chief of staff can promote the efficient
management of the policymaking process. Lim Dong-won provided President Kim with a
relatively unique combination of military background, academic credentials, along with
bureaucratic and governmental experience. A native of North Korea, Lim was formerly a soldier,
diplomat, and a lead delegate to the North-South High-Level Talks, which led two Koreas to sign
the historic Basic Agreement in December 1991. A graduate from the Korean Military Academy
(Class of 1957), he was a unique individual who was both well-versed in theory and longexperienced in practice on the issues of national security, diplomacy, and unification. Beginning
in February 1995, Lim Dong-won assisted Kim Dae-jung as the Secretary General of the AsiaPacific Foundation.113 Along with extensive experience in strategic planning as a former military
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For example, regarding the South Korean delegation of 337 people’s week-long trip to Pyongyang in August 2002, President
Kim decided to authorize the group’s visit despite objections by relevant bureaucracies including the National Intelligence
Service (NIS) (Lim, 2012, p. 279).
113
The Asia-Pacific Foundation was established by Kim Dae-jung in January 1994 for the purpose of achieving 1) peaceful
unification of the Korean Peninsula; 2) democratization of Asia, and 3) realization of world peace. Its programs included
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officer, Lim’s unique experience and background combined to reinforce strategic vision of the
Sunshine Policy.
As the deputy architect of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-jung, Lim Dong-won
became President Kim’s most trusted adviser, confidant, and propagandist on the policy.
Playing a central role as a liaison between the president and the policy group, Lim served as
President Kim’s de facto chief of staff for the overall policy process involving both the
procedural and implementation aspects of the Sunshine Policy. Serving as a custodian manager
of the overall decision-making system, Lim conducted effective interagency coordination of the
policy between the executive branch and other government agencies and reconciled disputes
between advisory members and relevant bureaucracies.
Lim also served as a high-leverage advocate of the Sunshine Policy. Considering that he
engaged in substantial policy advocacy, it is difficult to see him as an honest broker. A chief of
staff as an honest broker is policy-neutral and usually acts as a mere conduit for the
information prepared in the advisory group. Rather, it seems fair to say that Lim Dong-won
played a gatekeeper’s role in this system considering that he helped promote the efficiency of
decision-making and protected the president from being overloaded with resolving lower-level
policy disputes. In the process, a degree of filtering likely would have taken place, and the
information deemed irrelevant to the president’s agenda may have been screened out (e.g.,
Alexander L. George & Stern, 1998; Mitchell, 2005). However, it is worth noting that the nature
of final decisions made by the president would not have been affected, if at all, by the

research, education, and public affairs. In this period, Lim Dong-won also assisted Kim Dae-jung with refining the Three-Stage
Unification formula, which was published in 1995 (Lim, 2012, pp. 158-159).
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presumed filtering. It seems safe to assume that Lim and President Kim largely shared views
when it came to North Korea policy, so closely that any screened-out ideas would not have
been considered as viable options by the president himself.
Nature of the Control
The fact that the decision-making system was highly centralized, formalistic in nature
leads to the reasoning that the phenomenon of anticipatory compliance of groupthink may
have occurred in this system, as in the typical case of a formal model that is hierarchical in
nature. Relevant studies have suggested that groupthink may prompt premature closure or
excessive consensus seeking in the deliberation process. Studies have shown that particularly
systems with formal, highly centralized structures will have a higher propensity for groupthink
because a leader in such a system expresses a set of preferences (Mitchell, 2005, pp. 226-227).
It is worth noting that the president’s control over the policy process in this system was
not so much of a direct, outright sort, but was rather indirect, subtle, and behind-the-scenes in
nature. This is closely tied to some attributes of the need for power trait, involving the tendency
to manipulate the environment in order to be in control of the situation (Terhune, 1968;
Winter, 2003). A holistic understanding of the need for power relevant to this qualitative
dimension is vital for a proper understanding of Kim Dae-jung’s model as linked with his
leadership characteristics (Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978;
Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990).

2. A Low Task-Focus: Relationship/Process-Focus
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Kim Dae-jung’s constantly low score on task-focus indicates that he was relationshipand process-oriented in his behavioral predispositions. The analysis demonstrates that Kim Daejung’s relationship/process-focused orientation was manifested not only in how he
implemented the Sunshine Policy but also in how he organized the relevant decision-making
system (e.g., Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; Winter, 2003; M. G.
Hermann, 2005; Winter, 2005). Stressing the importance of “teamwork” and the concept of
“family” among his advisors, President Kim sought to build a collaborative, collegial atmosphere
and encouraged his advisers to engage in joint efforts at problem-solving, observe his aides.
This way, the system clearly prioritized cooperation over competition.
A close look into the system reveals that Kim Dae-jung’s version of the formalistic model
was not of a rigid, authoritarian sort, as noted by several members of the administration.
Stressing the importance of discussion and debate for policymaking, the system was rather
quite flexible and reasonable in nature, they noted (S.H., Jeong, personal communication,
September 27, 2016; H. Seo, personal communication, October 25, 2016).
George and Stern (1998, p. 208) observe that policymaking in complex organizations
normally proceeds on two simultaneous tracks: the formal, visible, and official track on one
hand, and the informal, less visible track on the other. As in other cases of formalistic
policymaking systems, Kim Dae-jung’s model incorporated some informal elements.
Throughout Kim’s term of office, informal dinners were held at the end of each official NSC
Standard Committee (NSSC) meeting. These dinners were intended for members to have an
opportunity to exchange ideas and information, resolve misunderstandings, and discuss any
issues that may not have been covered during official meetings. In fact, relevant sources
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indicate that this was highly instrumental in building a spirit of teamwork and enhancing mutual
understanding and good atmosphere among members of the advisory group (D. W. Lim,
personal communication, October 19, 2016; S. J. Yim, personal communication, December 7,
2016).
President Kim’s motivational orientation toward process and relationship with regard to
North Kora policy was also reflected in how Lim Dong Won supervised the relevant decisionmaking system. Even with the NSSC meetings fully normalized as a mechanism of systematic
decision-making, this model also incorporated person-centered elements in that Lim Dong-won
played a virtually indispensable role in the overall decision-making and implementation
process. President Kim consistently maintained leverage over both the substance and the
process of North Korea policy-making through Lim Dong-won, who closely assisted him in
various positions ranging from the Senior Presidential Secretary to the Intelligence Chief to the
Unification Minister and Special Advisor on Foreign Affairs and Security.
It is safe to posit that presidential chief of staff Lim Dong-won’s personality and
management style also had an impact on how the system operated. Notably, Lim was not a
domineering or interfering type of chief of staff but an unostentatious, considerate, and
respectful manager, as indicated by those officials involved in relevant policymaking. To be
sure, Lim Dong-won’s low-key personality and the fact that he was a good team player affected
the nature of the decision-making system involved in Kim Dae-jung’s North Korea policy.
Regarding the way presidents are remembered by his former aides, lieutenants of such
US presidents as Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford, and H.W. Bush had little to complain
about their erstwhile boss and mostly praised them (F. Greenstein, 2000, p. 181). Greenstein
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(2000) surmises that this is “an illuminating postpresidential indicator of a president’s success
as a team builder.” Meanwhile, the veterans of the Johnson, Carter, and Clinton presidencies
mostly represented mixed views of the presidency they served. If at all, Kim Dae-jung’s case is
more comparable to the former than to the latter. That is, as far as the North Korea policy was
concerned, the lieutenants of President Kim mostly expressed highly favorable view of the Kim
presidency. In some ways, the analysis suggests that this was in part because Kim Dae-jung’s
was concerned with building relationship within his advisory group and acted an effective team
builder in managing the policy-making machinery.

3. Personal Experiences and Expertise (Kim Dae-jung’s Personal Capital)
Expertise + High Need for Power = Director Leadership Style
In managing the decision-making machinery in relation to North Korea policy, Kim Daejung displayed the activist presidential style of the director in Preston’s typology (2001).114 The
Director’s leadership style refers to a type of leader with extensive expertise in the issue area as
well as a high need for power. According to Preston (2001), U.S. leaders who have shown
themselves as Directors in leadership style include Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman in
domestic policy, and John Kennedy and Dwight Eisenhower in foreign policy. 115 In essence, Kim
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As with Mitchell’s (2005) study, Preston’s (2001) research applies presidential management to George and Johnson’s
formal/collegial dichotomy, but suggests that certain dimensions of leadership style such as the need for control (and
involvement) in the policy process and the leader’s sensitivity to context be incorporated into the framework. His typology is
based on the interrelation of these two elements with prior policy experience or expertise. In delving into Kim Dae-jung’s
decision-making system, a part of Preston’s framework that addresses the interplay of the two leadership attributes – the need
for control and policy experience/expertise- were used in this analysis. This is because Kim Dae-jung’s leadership characteristics
are particularly salient in terms of these two variables. Kim’s leadership profile shows a consistently high score on the need for
power throughout his presidency and across the three periods of analysis.
115
Preston (2001) suggests that three leadership traits in particular -need for power, conceptual complexity, and prior policy
experience or expertise- play crucial roles in shaping presidential leadership style (Preston, 2001). Preston found that, with
regard to foreign policy, Dwight Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy showed a director style of leadership as they scored highly on
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Dae-jung’s marked sense of personal efficacy was intrinsically linked with his knowledge,
expertise, and interest in the field. Kim Dae-jung’s expertise in the field of North Korea policy,
which constitutes a major source of his personal capital, consists of multiple dimensions: his
innate intellectual ability; intense interest; extensive knowledge; and critical experiences he
underwent throughout his four decade-long political career as a dissident politician.
Scholars (e.g., Merelman, 1986; Beck & Jennings, 1991; Jennings, 2002a; Citrin & Sides,
2004) suggest that critical events in a leader’s life may lead to the development of expertise.
Kim Dae-jung’s critical life experiences discussed in the Who chapter would likely have both
directly and indirectly contributed to his interest and expertise in the North Korea policy. Such
critical experiences appear to have been a source of stability and decisiveness in his approach
to leadership in undertaking the peace initiative. Even in turbulent periods of his presidential
term, especially in the waning period of his presidency, Kim Dae-jung maintained remarkable
composure, remaining imperturbable, measured, and decisive in the face of heavy stress and
the pressure of hard choices. All of this constitutes crucial components of Kim Dae-jung’s
personal capital and important characteristics, as was discussed in the Who chapter.
Possession of domain expertise makes individuals more willing to actively advocate for
their preferred positions, strongly dissent from others in the group, and seek greater control
over the policymaking process (e.g., Horai et al., 1974; Alexander L. George, 1980; M. G.
Hermann, 1986; D. D. Stewart & Stasser, 1995; Preston, 2001; Tjosvold et al., 2001). Those
leaders perceiving themselves as possessing expertise in the policy domain tend to have greater
both need for power and prior experience in substantive policy areas. Lyndon Johnson and Henry Truman were classified as
‘Magistrate’ in leadership style as they were low on prior experience or expertise in foreign policy even though they were high
on need for power. Meanwhile, George H.W. Bush was low on need for power but had extensive experience in foreign policy
showing the activist presidential style of the ‘Administrator.’
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self-confidence and become interested in being actively involved in relevant policy processes.
Having both perceived and recognized knowledge and expertise in the field, Kim Dae-jung
advocated for his own policy views, framed issues, and set specific policy guidelines.
Another salient aspect of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership concerns the use of analogy which
is reflective of the degree of expertise. The use of analogy is intimately associated with the
persuasive ability. Vertzberger (1990, p. 384) holds that “Experts perform better than novices in
analogical problem solving, both when the problems share structural features but not
superficial features and when problems share only superficial but not structural features.” A
vast reservoir of intellectual and practical knowledge developed throughout Kim Dae-jung’s
political career led him to use logically sophisticated analogies drawn from across temporal and
cultural contexts, rather than just simple ones from his own generation and culture, as noted by
several associates of President Kim Dae-jung (e.g., Stephen Benedict Dyson & Preston, 2006).
Kim Dae-jung showed a relatively low degree of reliance on advisers for expert advice as a
source of authoritative wisdom and creativity. He was so confident in his ability to define
situations and make decisions and judgements that he relied on his advisers mainly for details
of the information and relevant numerical data (S. H. Jeong, personal communication,
November 22, 2016). For him, advisers were mainly a source of tactical and technical support in
conducting the Sunshine Policy.
For all the established intellectual foundation he laid for the North Korea policy, Kim
Dae-jung lacked practical experience in the field. Relevant studies suggest that an individual’s
competence is based on a combination of experience, deliberate practice, and specialized
knowledge regarding a particular field (Connell et al., 2003, p. 144; Mayer, 2008). This criteria
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leads to the reasoning that one missing component of competence in Kim Dae-jung’s case is
‘deliberate practice.’ In seeking to compensate for such a defect, Kim Dae-jung recruited Lim
Dong-won, a longtime practitioner with a scholarly bent. Lim helped complete Kim Dae-jung’s
theoretical framework of unification. Upon taking office, President Kim appointed Lim as his
point man on the Sunshine Policy.
Lim Dong-won’s unique combination of bureaucratic background involving hands-on
experience working as a lead delegate to the inter-Korean high-level talks, which led to the
historic 1991 North-South Basic Agreement, and his military and academic background all
constituted valuable resources for President Kim’s North Korea policy. This was all the more so
as Kim Dae-jung lacked the knowledge in the military field or the practical experience applying
his methodology in deling with North Korea (Y.S. Yang, personal communication, October 22,
2016).
Presidential Involvement in the Decision-Making Process
Relevant sources observe that President Kim provided his chief of staff and the heads of
Cabinet with significant authority and discretion, as long as they worked within the bounds of
the general guidelines based on the three principles of the Sunshine Policy. 116 Kim Dae-jung
delegated considerable authority and discretion to his lieutenants and advisers. In a way, this
manifests his confidence in his own ability to be in effective control of the policy process, as
well as his keen sense of efficacy. Kang In-duk, a prominent conservative who formerly worked
for the KCIA and was President Kim Dae-jung’s first Unification Minister (1998-1999), notes that
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At the same time, he was strict in applying this principle in that anyone who broke the mold and acted outside the bounds
would be excluded from the policy process altogether, as in the case with the unification minister who refused to follow
presidential instructions when engaging in the talks with North Korea in November 2001.
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he was given full discretion to perform his tasks as the Unification Minister. Therefore, Kang
says, when organizing and managing inter-Korean events, including minister-level talks, he was
only supposed to brief the president on his plans (I. D. Kang, personal communication,
November 8, 2016). Placing perfect trust in Lim Dong-won, President Kim also gave his top
adviser much discretion. Therefore, when necessary, Lim was able to make major decisions on
the spot and report it to the president afterward. Moreover, having trust in members of his
advisory group, Kim reportedly approved almost all of the policy recommendations made by
the Standing Committee (NSSC) during his term of office (Lim, 2012, p. 176-177).
Regarding presidential involvement in the policymaking process, the pattern he showed
does not necessarily fit with theoretical predictions for leaders exhibiting the activist leadership
style of the director as Kim Dae-jung was not directly involved in the regular policy-making
process. Instead of joining regular deliberations held at NSSC meetings on a weekly basis, he
was briefed afterward about details of the deliberations and suggestions made at the meetings.
President Kim then reportedly prepared his own comments or instructions for the chief of staff
to distribute to the members of the advisory group.
When there were crucial issues on which the president himself needed to make
decisions by seeking ideas and suggestions from relevant ministries and agencies, he would
convene and preside over the Council of Ministers on Foreign Affairs and National Security; this
happened about three or four times a year. In meetings held at the presidential Blue House,
North Korea and security-related issues were discussed on a broader scale than at the NSC and
among a greater number of officials including the Prime Minister and heads of other relevant
ministries along with the members of the NSC. The meeting was also aimed at setting broader
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goals and guidelines of the government’s security and North Korea policy. Serving as a
chair/moderator in this meeting, President Kim actively joined debates and discussions with
members of his cabinet and coordinated different views to make final decisions (D. W. Lim,
personal communication, October 19, 2016; S. H. Jeong, November 22, 2016; S. J. Kim, October
14, 2016).
In this model, the president maintained effective and efficient control over the decisionmaking system without being regularly involved in the decision-making process primarily by
virtue of the role of Lim Dong-won, his most trusted adviser, in managing the system. Notably,
his moderate score on belief in ability to control events (BACE) in his overall personality profile
suggests that he was not necessarily in pursuit of robust control over the decision-making
machinery even though he sought to have influence over it in a way that ensured his position
would ultimately prevail. These characteristics denote a subtle but significant difference in
behavioral dimensions of leadership.
Regarding the decision-making system in relation to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s
unique personal style as reflected in a high need for power, a moderate belief in ability to
control events (or a moderate internal locus of control), his focus on process and relationships,
and his interest and expertise in the field, took the form of an effective but indirect control over
the overall decision-making process.
Regarding the relationship between leader and advisers, the literature posits that highpower leaders are more likely to show assertive interpersonal styles and actively challenge or
seek to influence the policy positions of their advisers. They are generally deemed more likely
to override or ignore conflicting or opposing views of advisers (e.g., George and Stern, 1998;
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Mitchell, 2005). According to those involved in the policy process in relation to the Sunshine
Policy, however, this was not necessarily the case for this system. That the control exercised
over the system was quite indirect and subtle constituted another unique aspect of Kim Daejung’s interpersonal style, which was evidenced in a constantly high score on the need for
power coupled with a moderate level of belief in ability to control events (BACE)–in his overall
(or average) profile (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005). The analysis posits that the unique aspect of
the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy was attributable to Kim Dae-jung’s
high need for power and relationship/process focus combined with the charisma factor of his
personal capital.

Personal Capital and Personality Traits
Charismatic Factor, Relationship Focus, and High Need for Power
Another notable aspect of this system is limited access to the president. According to one of his
speech writers, President Kim would not meet with him in person, and instead communicate
with him only indirectly by exchanging manuscripts or handing over recorded tapes of his own
words (W. K. Kang, 2014). Several informed sources indicate that President Kim was rarely, if at
all, accessible by deputy minister-level officers or working-level officials when it came to the
decision-making process.
Despite Kim’s supposed aloofness or disengagement, the “insiders” interviewed for this
study held that Kim was not an authoritarian leader. Several members of President Kim’s
advisory group indicated that he had actively engaged in policy discussions with members of
the advisory group and had not been imperiously self-assured or arbitrary in issuing
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instructions. Rather, the sources observed, President Kim had sought to be a good listener and
open-minded when engaging in discussion with his aides.
Still, it is noteworthy that a charismatic factor of his personal capital, combined with his
relationship focus and characteristically high need for power, made for a system with a unique
character, a system which featured hierarchy and remoteness in terms of access to the
president, and, at the same time, promoted communication and collegial relationships among
members of the advisory system.
Regarding the North Korea policy, in this system, there were few if any advisers who
would comfortably make outspoken comments or suggestions deemed disconfirmatory of a
planned course of action when speaking with the president.
All this helps corroborate the reasoning, as discussed above, that there existed a
phenomenon of groupthink among the advisory members in this system. Among contributing
factors to this phenomenon may have been the mastery of subject matters of the president
himself and the charisma factor of personal capital. That is, his professional stature based on
knowledge and expertise along with his charisma may have generated “a structure of
incentives” that could induce many actors to comply with the real or perceived stances and
preferences of their superior (Schafer & Crichlow, 1996; t’Hart, 1990). This may have led to a
degree of anticipatory compliance in this system.
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Chapter 5. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted?: Policy
Implementation (Period 1: 1998-1999)
Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty

A. Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA)
1. Periodization of the Analysis
In this section of the study, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile is presented for the period
of his presidency (1998-2003) in relation to seven personality traits such as belief in the ability
to control events, need for power, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, task-orientation,
distrust of others, and in-group bias. For analytical purposes, Kim Dae-jung’s five-year-long
presidential tenure was divided into three sub-periods (e.g., 1998-1999; 2000; 2001-2002) in
consideration of changing contextual conditions and changes in the severity of constraints
posed to the Sunshine Policy. Kim’s leadership profile as relevant to North Korea policy is
constructed not only for the entire presidency but for each period of interest and with respect
to the three different types of environment or sources of constraints from domestic politics,
North Korea, and the external environment including the United States.

Period I (1998-1999): Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty
Throughout this period, Kim Dae-jung strived to break the prolonged deadlock in interKorean relations, which had long been exacerbating under his predecessor’s highly inconsistent
and fairly hardline approach to dealing with North Korea. In this period, North Korea continually
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tested President Kim’s resolve in conducting the Sunshine Policy, committing a series of
provocations against the South and the United States. Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy in this
period was primarily designed to “set the stage” for his peace process. In doing so, he aspired
to replace the negative feedback loop with a positive one so that the history would undergo a
fateful turnaround. His unflinching, assertive, yet extremely cautious endeavors to develop ties
and build trust with North Korea while convincing the Clinton administration and the broader
international community to be in lockstep with his Sunshine Policy were all aimed to achieve
this goal. Amid all the difficulties and constraints imposed by the internal and external
environment that could have impeded the pace of his peace process, Kim Dae-jung managed to
pull off achieving a set of key goals he had set for this period including the opening of the
Kumgang Mt. tourism project and President Clinton’s adoption of the Comprehensive Approach
as a revised North Korea strategy, among others. By the end of this period, the Sunshine Policy
commanded resounding support from the international community including Japan, China,
Russia, and many other Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries. Moreover, North Korea
began to break out of its diplomatic isolation, normalizing diplomatic relations with many
countries in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as well as with Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand (Armstrong, 2013, p. 283). Despite Kim Dae-jung’s persistent
endeavors to promote inter-Korean relations, virtually little progress had been made in interKorean relations at the government-level by the end of 1999.
Period 2 (2000): Heyday of the Sunshine Policy
By almost all conceivable standards, the year 2000 constituted the heyday of the
Sunshine Policy. On the North Korean front, the first inter-Korean summit was held on June 13-

159

15, three months after Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin Declaration. The June 15 North-South Joint
Declaration and subsequent developments surrounding the Sunshine Policy constituted a
remarkable change in inter-Korean relations as a series of landmark events and developments
followed the summit. Considering a seemingly endless cycle of mutual distrust, military
confrontation, a crisis, and a negotiated settlement of the crisis that had hampered peace and
security on the Korean peninsula for almost 50 years, the changes made in the wake of the
summit constituted substantive progress in inter-Korean relations. Moreover, in the year 2000,
the North-South summit paved a timely pathway toward improvement in US-DPRK relations,
which was highlighted by Vice Marshal Jo Myung-rok’s visit to Washington, D.C. to meet with
President Clinton and the resulting U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique, which was followed by
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2000.
Period 3 (2001-2002): Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis
With President George W. Bush taking office, the external environment surrounding the
Sunshine Policy swiftly deteriorated, as hardliners and neoconservatives led by Vice President
Dick Cheney expressed their hostile views on North Korea. President Bush, for his part, began to
advocate the ABC–anything but Clinton–strategy in dealing with North Korea; this meant that
he intended to employ a sharply distinct strategy from what the Clinton administration used
toward North Korea. Upon taking office, President Bush expressed his will to shelve a missile
deal that had been stricken between North Korea and the Clinton administration (Sanger,
2001). In protest against President Bush’s hostile posture, North Korea began to withdraw from
all inter-Korean dialogues and cooperation projects it had joined. Moreover, during this period,
South Korean domestic opponents and conservative critics became more vehement in their
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opposition to the Sunshine Policy, severely hampering its implementation. The Mankyongdae
incident led to the collapse of the so-called DJP (Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil) coalition
government and eventually forced resignation of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, President
Kim’s point man on North Korea policy, through a parliamentary no-confidence vote.
Meanwhile, a series of developments that occurred in terms of the US-DPRK relations posed
the greatest-ever challenge to the Sunshine Policy. The September 11 (2001) terrorist attacks
on the United States and President Bush’s axis of evil statement in the State of the Union
address in January 2002 further exacerbated military tension on the Korean peninsula. To add
insult to injury, Assistant Secretary Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2002 as President
Bush’s special envoy ended in the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework and eventually
resuslted in North Korea’s 2nd nuclear crisis and its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) on January 10, 2003.

2. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy (1998-2003): Policy
Implementation (LTA)
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile as it relates to the Sunshine Policy for the three periods of
interest and the three sources of constraints is summarized in Table 7.

Table 7
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Three Periods under
Analysis and for Three Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)
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Personality
Traits

Source of
Constraints
North Korea
(Overall)

Foreign

Domestic

North Korea
(Overall)

Foreign
(Little
Constraint)
Domestic

North Korea
(Overall)

Foreign

Belief
in
Ability
to
Control
Events
(BACE)

Need
for
Power
(Power)

Conceptual
Complexity
(CC)

Selfconfidence
(SC)

Period I (1998-1999)
0.37
0.37
0.56
0.35
H
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Leadership Style:
Advocate
0.36
0.31
0.60
0.44
M
H
M
H
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
0.38
0.41
0.54
0.28
H
H
L
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
Period II (2000)
0.35
0.36
0.55
0.29
M
H
L
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
0.29
0.33
0.56
0.33
L
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
0.40
0.38
0.55
0.24
H
H
L
L
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
Period III (2001-2002)
0.33
0.34
0.59
0.34
M
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
0.32
0.29
0.61
0.35
M
M
M
M

Taskfocus
(Task)

0.54
L
Process
-Focus
0.54
L
Process
-Focus
0.54
L
Process
-Focus
0.53
L
Process
-Focus
0.50
L
Process
-Focus
0.56
L
Process
-Focus
0.53
L
Process
-Focus
0.55
L

Distrust
of others
(Distrust)

InGroup
Bias
(IGB)

0.14
0.28
M
H
Motivational
Perception:
Close to Zero-sum
0.05
0.21
L
H
Zero-sum
0.19
H

0.32
H

Focused
0.11
L

0.25
H

Zero-sum
0.06
L

0.25
H

Zero-sum
0.15
M

0.23
H

Close to Zero-sum
0.20
H

0.21
H

Focused
0.23
H

0.14
L
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Respect

Domestic

Closed
Pragmatic
0.34
0.39
0.56
0.34
M
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate

Process
-Focus
0.52
L
Process
-Focus

OpportunityGrabbing
0.16
0.29
M
H
Close to Zero-sum

Note. High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

B. Constraints & Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea
Constraint 1: North Korea’s Resistance to the Sunshine Policy
Around the time when Kim Dae-jung was elected president in December 1998, interKorean relations had remained at a nadir.117 Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung declared his
willingness to bring to an end the vicious circle in inter-Korean relations prolonged under
President Kim Young-sam’s inconsistent strategy which was based on an imminent collapse
theory, the linkage principle, and disapproval of civilian contacts. At his inauguration, Kim Daejung declared his willingness to pursue reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and to
help North Korea in improving relations with the United States and Japan. This was in stark
contrast with his predecessor who would readily bristle at any hint of rapprochement. 118 In his
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In handling North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s death on July 9, 1994, President Kim Young-sam stoked anti-North Korean
sentiments among South Koreans, which further deteriorated inter-Korean relations. Moreover, tensions emerged between the
United States and South Korea as President Kim Young-sam opposed the Clinton administration’s strategy to address the
nuclear issue through bilateral negotiations.
118
In his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim said, “If interaction and cooperation between the South and
North are realized, we are prepared to support North Korea even if it pushes for interaction and cooperation with our friends,
including the United States and Japan as well as international organizations. Despite the current economic difficulties, the new
administration will carry out the promises the Republic of Korea made in connection with the construction of light water
reactors in North Korea. We will not be stingy in extending food aid to North Korea from the Government and private
organizations through reasonable ways. … I hope that interaction between the South and North will expand in many fields
based on the South-North Basic Agreement.”
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address, Kim also made an array of proactive proposals on official inter-Korean dialogues, an
inter-Korean summit, and exchange of envoys, which North Korea refused to accommodate.
In the initial period of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency, North Korea fiercely resisted the
Sunshine Policy, considering it literally as a scheme to take off its cloak as the Aesop fable goes.
Ironically, North Korea perceived elements of containment in Kim Dae-jung’s engagement
policy. Therefore, the North averred that Kim Dae-jung was attempting to scorch their skin
through their coat with his sunshine (S. Y. Lee, 2010). Regarding North Korea’s resistance to the
Sunshine Policy during this period, Rah Jong-il, President Kim’s long-time adviser on political
affairs, indicates that, at the time, North Korea even found offensive President Kim’s vow not to
pursue unification by absorption as one of three principles’ of the Sunshine Policy since they
regarded it as deriving from the notion putting the North in a position inferior to the South (J. I.
Rah, personal communication, October 4, 2016).
Awaiting a response from the North to his proposals, Kim Dae-jung kept a close watch
on North Korea’s behavior, planning to seize upon whatever opportunity would arise for interKorean dialogues (Kim, 2011b, p. 71). The opportunity eventually came in March 1998 when
the North requested the shipment of 200,000 tons of fertilizer at the fifth Red Cross talks in
Beijing in March 1998. This led to the North-South Vice Ministerial Talks in April 1998 in Beijing,
the first inter-Korean meeting since June 1994 (Shinn, 2001, pp. 14–15). Regarding this event,
Kim Dae-jung issued a presidential mandate instructing the Unification Ministry to link the
provision of fertilizer in the spring with the North’s agreement to hold a reunion of separated
families in the fall. That is, Kim tried to apply the ‘principle of reciprocity’ in holding the talks
with the North. However, the North appeared only interested in the fertilizer assistance,
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turning down the South’s proposition that inter-Korean cooperation at the government level is
based on the principle of reciprocity (Shinn, 2001). According to Jeong Se-hyun, South Korea’s
representative at the talks and the then Vice Unification Minister, North Korea vehemently
protested the proposal, accusing the South of attempting to associate “humanitarian needs”
with “a political issue,” claiming that applying the principle of reciprocity to a humanitarian
issue was “inhumane.” As the North had rebuffed the Southern proposal, the talks broke down
after a protracted tug of war between the two sides. The North Korean representative
expressed strong doubts about the policy by saying, “Is the Sunshine Policy a scheme to melt us
down into death, isn’t it?” (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). This
way, the North expressed their profound weariness of the Sunshine Policy, which they saw as
effectively intended to attain unification by absorption.

Response
With North Korea shunning all official contact with South Korea, the implementation of
Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy for this period largely revolved around sending humanitarian aid
in the form of food and fertilizer to Pyongyang, taking institutional measures to promote interKorean exchanges and cooperation at the civilian level, and enlisting support of his peace
initiative from the United States and the broader international community. The Mt. Kumgang
tourism project, which marked the culmination of President Kim’s efforts to promote interKorean cooperation and exchanges at the civilian level, kicked off in November 1998. He openly
rejected unification by absorption which was the actual policy of his predecessors, committing
the country to the cause of peaceful coexistence, a goal he intended to achieve during his term
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of office. In early March, Kim underlined his pledge by authorizing large shipments of food aid
to the North. He then lifted restrictions on business deals between North and South Korean
companies in April, and called upon the United States to terminate economic sanctions against
the North in June 1998.
After all, the fertilizer talks served as an essential turning point in the implementation of
the Sunshine Policy as North Korea’s extreme defensiveness led the Kim administration to push
ahead with the engagement policy in far more earnest manners than before, and to decisively
shift away from the principle of strict reciprocity to the principle of flexible reciprocity (S. H.
Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). In other words, with the failed talks as a
starting point, the policy’s conceptual framework changed from the one based on the exchange
of discrete favors and inducements to one permitting deferral of reciprocation and pursuit of
change in North Korea’s perception of the South. In the wake of the incident, Kim Dae-jung
became more visibly focused on alleviating North Korea’s threat perception, showing sincerity,
and thus building genuine trust with the North.
With the long-awaited talks with North Korea collapsing, Kim Dae-jung proceeded with a
conceptual change in the reciprocity principle of the Sunshine Policy, shifting from strict quidpro-quo to flexible reciprocity which involved “non-synchronous, non-symmetrical, and nonequivalent” interactions (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016). A revised
principle of flexible reciprocity can be summarized as follows: (1) Easy tasks first, difficult tasks
later (先易後難); (2) Private channel first, government channel later (先民後官); (3) Economy
first, politics later (先經後政); (4) Give first, take later (先供後得) (Lim, 2012, p. 212).
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In the aftermath of the failed talks, President Kim and his policy team decided to put the
civilian sector at the forefront of implementing the North Korea policy with the government
supporting it from behind. In fact, North Korea preferred economic cooperation with the South
at the civilian level to government-level contact and dialogue since the former did not threaten
the survival of its regime. Kim Dae-jung took an array of bold measures to eliminate restrictions
on the amount and areas of investment in North Korea in accordance with the principle of
separation of politics and economy.
This way, the Kim government allowed businesses to freely decide on economic
cooperation with North Korea without any government meddling based on the principles of the
market economy (Lim, 2012, p. 179). At the end of April 1998, the Kim Dae-jung administration
announced “Measures to Vitalize Economic Cooperation between the North and South,” and
moved to allow business people to travel to North Korea, approved the free provision of
production facilities to the North, and to lift the $1 million limit on loans to the North. (Lim,
2012, p. 179).119

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Regarding North Korea’s defensive attitudes manifested at the fertilizer talks, Kim Daejung said in his autobiography, “It brought home to me that North Korea had far more pride
than I believed. The failed talks taught me a lesson that a significant degree of caution needs to
be exercised on our part when giving the North a favor given that we are a better-off party in
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This means that, regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation, the Kim Dae-jung government switched from a “positive
system” that authorized particular investment areas to be on a list to a “negative system” that imposed no restriction on
investment save some sensitive areas (Lim, 2012, p. 179).
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possession of more resources” (Kim, 2011b, pp. 71–72). In fact, the failed inter-Korean talks led
him to take note of North Korea’s siege mentality that he saw as an essential attribute of the
communist regime, which will be discussed below concerning the first Yeonpyeong naval battle.
Stressing the need to adopt a more patient approach to North Korea, Kim Dae-jung said, “when
we deal with North Korea, we must maintain an attitude of patience and a goal of engagement
backed by a resolute security posture, rather than reacting to every North Korean action with
alternating joy and disappointment. … We must not forget that North Korea is the most
dangerous when it is isolated. We can learn a lesson from the fact that the detente policy of the
United States from the mid-1970s was based on power and brought changes in the Communist
bloc, including the Soviet Union.120

Constraint 2: North Korea’s Submarine Infiltration (June 22, 1998)
On June 22, 1998, a North Korean submarine on a spy mission was discovered entangled
in fishing nets in South Korean waters off the eastern coast. The incident took place amid the
ongoing discussion on the Mount Kumgang tourism project and Chairman Chung’s second visit
to North Korea that would deliver the second batch of 501 head of cattle to the North (C. S.
Lee, 1998a).
In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Unification Minister Kang decided to
temporarily suspend the ongoing economic cooperation projects and humanitarian aid to the
North, including Hyundai’s plan on Mt. Kumgang tourism project and the transportation of 501
head of cattle, pending an official apology from the North (K. Y. Son, 1998). Immediately after

120

President Kim Dae-jung’s speech on October 8, 1998, before the Japanese Diet in Tokyo.
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the sub was found in the South Korean territory, the English-language Korean Central News
Agency -North Korea’s state news agency-, issued an unusual announcement that it had lost a
submarine and was searching for the sub and its crew (Kristof, 1998). However, a few days
later, the North denied responsibility stating that they had nothing to do with the incident and
that the body found was not that of its agent (Kirk, 1998).

Response
In contrast to U.S. government’s strong, immediate reaction to the incident,121 President
Kim refrained from immediately defining it as an armed provocation and instead cautioned
against a hasty conclusion, adopting a wait and see approach (Y. J. Oh, 1998a). By doing so, he
was cautious not to aggravate the situation. In fact, Kim’s Dae-jung’s measured approach was a
clear departure from the usual hardline stance taken by the previous administrations.122 The
National Security Council Standing Committee (NSSC), which President Kim presided over upon
the outbreak of the incident, decided to take a “flexible” approach under the guiding principle
of separation of politics and economy regardless of whether the North issued an apology for its
provocative actions (K. Y. Son, 1998).123 With the official probe concluding that the incident
resulted from North Korea’s infiltration, Kim Dae-jung used strong rhetoric condemning North
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The United States and South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), immediately defined the incident as an armed provocation,
and strongly condemned the North for its second intrusion into the South. The Clinton administration’s strong reaction was
clearly divergent from its wait and see attitude as shown in the case of the September 1996 submarine incident.
122
Under the previous governments, South Korea’s responses to North Korean provocations were eye-for-an-eye
counteractions characterized by immediate accusations but often without deeds matching words (Y. J. Oh, 1998a). When the
first submarine incident occurred in Sept 1996 with 26 agents landing on South Korea’s east coast, President Kim Young-sam
defined the incident as a “military provocation” and warned of “all-out war.” He then took strong steps avowing to increase in
military spending and instructing a freeze on all aid and contact with the North pending its apology (Sullivan, 1996).
123
At the end of this NSC meeting, the statement was issued that “any provocations from the North will never be tolerated, but
the Sunshine Policy will be maintained based on its guiding principles of separation of politics and economy ” (Kim, 2011b, p.
94).
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Korea’s provocation as an intolerable violation of the armistice and the 1991 Basic Agreement
at the Cabinet meeting (C. S. Lee, 1998b). Still, Kim stressed the need for “concrete evidence”
so that the government would “nip in the bud any North Korean propaganda.” By so doing, he
sought to assure that the incident should not derail his Sunshine Policy (C. S. Lee, 1998c; “South
Urges Joint Inquiry On NKn Sub,” 1998).
Reaffirming the principle of separation of politics and economy, Kim Dae-jung then
pushed ahead with the Hyundai Group’s Mt. Kumgang tourism project, regardless of North
Korea’s issuance of public apology, which he had demanded as a condition for moving ahead
with this project (K. Y. Son, 1998). Adopting a changed tone from its initial response, North
Korea, for its part, denied having dispatched the submarine and claimed that South Korean
soldiers killed its crew members. In response, Kim Dae-jung suggested that the two Koreas
conduct a joint investigation into North Korea’s submarine infiltration (“South urges Joint
Inquiry on NKn Sub,” 1998).
Meanwhile, in an unprecedented development, the General Officers’ Talks were held
between the United Nations Command (UNC) and the North Korean People’s Army at
Panmunjom upon the outbreak of the submarine incident (C. S. Lee, 1998d). At the Panmunjom
meeting, North Korea expressed its willingness not to argue over the submarine incident at a
time when two Koreas were moving to build a friendly atmosphere. North Korea’s soft attitude
was interpreted by the South as an encouraging sign that the submarine controversy would be
quickly resolved (C. S. Lee, 1998d).
After all, it was the Kim administration that made these talks possible in the first place.
In effect, North Korea withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) in 1991 in

170

protest against the appointment of a South Korean general as the UNC’s chief representative
on the MAC.124 Taking note of the importance of the re-opening of Panmunjom in improving
North-South relations, President Kim via his top adviser Lim persuaded the Defense Ministry to
put pragmatic interests before their bureaucratic position. At the time, the Defense Ministry
maintained that the meeting should be held within the previous framework of the MAC
wherein the ROK representative had an equal voice. Finally, Kim Dae-jung managed to gain
North Korea’s acceptance of his government’s revised proposal (Lim, 2012, p. 182). 125
Eventually, South Korea’s decision to let an American general represent the UNC and its efforts
to resolve disputes between Washington and Pyongyang ended up with the General Officers’
Talks being held between the United States and North Korea even in the wake of the submarine
incident. This, in turn, significantly helped reduce the tension on the Korean peninsula.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
For President Kim Dae-jung, the submarine incident in June 1998 constituted the first
major challenge he faced in dealing with North Korea. He called the incident “the first-ever
ordeal” he faced since the Sunshine Policy’s inception, and “a test board” of the Sunshine Policy
(Kim, 2011b, pp. 93–94). Despite the initial concerns he had about the submarine incident, Kim
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In fact, the problem began with the UNC appointing a South Korean general as its senior representative for the MAC in 1991.
North Korea then declared the UNC-North Korea MAC meeting invalid, and then had ignored the MAC for seven years. Intended
to exclude South Korea and talk to the United States instead, North Korea demanded in 1994 that the UNC-North Korea MAC
meeting be replaced by a “North Korea-US General Officers Meeting.” This was simply unacceptable to South Korea.
After President Kim Dae-jung took office in the South, North Korea revised its proposal to hold a “General Officers Meeting
between the KPA and the UN Forces. Still, no progress was made on this issue due to some objections by South Korea’s Ministry
of Defense (Lim, 2012, p. 182).
125
The presidential office convinced the Ministry of Defense of the need to revise the existing proposal based on the
“framework of the Military Armistice Commission” to reflect a higher concept of the “framework of the Military Armistice
Agreeent” (Lim, 2012, p. 182).
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Dae-jung’s perception of the incident seems to have changed in terms of the degree of the
incident’s salience. As General Officers’ Talks were held between the UNC –represented by the
United States- and North Korea following the incident and North Korea showed what seemed
to be an unusually softened attitude, Kim Dae-jung came across as even more decisive in
pushing ahead with his peace initiative.
Regarding the General Officers’ talks, Kim Dae-jung said in his autobiography, “I saw a
ray of hope in that the UNC-North Korea talks were held in Panmunjom for the first time in
seven years amid all the controversies surrounding the submarine incident” (Kim, 2011b, p. 95).
Regarding the submarine incident, Lim Dong-won, President Kim’s top adviser, observes, “The
incident was a kind of provocation by the North against the South. However, it must also be
noted that it was at the lower end of the provocation’s scale considering that it runs the gamut
of salience from atomic bombing, full-scale war, and attacks on certain targets, to limited
exchanges of fire, and information gathering activities” (D. W. Lim, personal communication,
October 19, 2016).

Constraint 3: The First Yeonpyeong Battle (June 15, 1999)
The first naval battle, which would later be officially named “the First Yeonpyeong
Battle,” erupted on June 15, 1999, following a nine-day standoff in disputed waters in the West
Sea as North Korean naval ships opened fire at South Korean patrol ships. The incident occurred
at a time when South Korea and the United States were waiting for North Korea’s response to
the package peace deal handed over by U.S. envoy William Perry in May 1999. Every June,
North Korean fishing boats would intrude south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL) to catch crabs,
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and usually readily scuttled north of the line when warned by South Korean patrol boats.
However, in early June 1999 North Korean fishing boats stayed south of the NLL fishing every
day while being protected by North Korean patrol ships despite warnings from the South
Korean navy (Lim, 2012, pp. 225-226). The NSSC, which convened frequently to deal with the
situation, decided to take the position demanding “North Korea’s compliance with the NLL and
immediate withdrawal from south of the NLL.” As the North continued to defy South Korean
warnings, the NSSC accepted Defense Minister Cho Seong-tae’s recommendation that the
South Korean navy push the North Korean vessels back to north of the Northern Limit Line (NLL)
(Lim, 2012, p. 226).
President Kim Dae-jung then issued the presidential instructions as follows: “Hold the
NLL by all means. However, do not fire first. If the enemy opens fire first, punish them
resolutely. When an exchange of fire occurs, prevent escalation under all circumstances.” In
giving instructions, he was careful not to go into much detail as someone who was not an
expert in military affairs. Regarding his careful management of the incident, he said, “I was
afraid that my half-baked ideas might undermine the otherwise sophisticated military
strategies” (Kim, 2011b, p. 180). A fierce exchange of gunfire between the two Koreas that
lasted for fourteen minutes ended up in a resounding victory on the part of the South as the
North suffered heavy losses with more than thirty casualties (e.g., Lim, 2012, pp. 225-227).
Regarding the first naval battle that erupted with North Korea’s violation of the NLL, Kim Daejung and the National Security Council sought to find out North Korea’s possible intentions. The
NSSC took note of the fact that the North Koreans were advancing too far in violation of the NLL
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in order to meet their mandatory quota for crab fishing (Lim, 2012, pp. 225-226). 126

Response
Despite the inter-Korean naval battle, Kim Dae-jung decided to continue the Mt.
Kumgang tourism project as scheduled based on the principle of separation of politics and
economy. When the naval incident occurred, the Kim Dae-jung administration asked Hyundai
Group, the only existing communication channel, to contact the North immediately. When
informed by Hyundai Group of the North Korean stance that they strongly wanted the Mount
Kumgang tourism project to continue without interruption despite the naval clash, Unification
Minister Lim moved to approve the departure of the cruise ship.
Two days after the incident, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group also decided to resume
the shipment of 14,000 tons of fertilizer to the North (WuDunn, 1999). Regarding the decision
on whether to recall the ships that had left for the North just prior to the naval battle, the
relevant bureaucracies overwhelmingly insisted on the need to recall them. Nevertheless,
Unification Minister Lim Dong-won decided not to recall the ships and continued to send the
North fertilizer assistance as originally scheduled (Lim, 2012, pp. 228-229). Moreover, President
Kim and his policy elite decided to hold vice ministerial-level talks as scheduled despite the
naval incident (South Korean Ships Sink North Korean Patrol Boat, 1999).
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In fact, North Korea never recognized the NLL, sticking to a 12-nautical mile maritime demarcation. This is because the NLL,
which was based on 3 nautical miles of territorial waters, had been unilaterally drawn by the UNC to control military vessels
and airplanes under its jurisdiction. Regarding this issue, two Koreas agreed in the Basic Agreement (December 1991) to
continue to observe the currently existing jurisdictions, meaning the NLL, until a maritime borderline is established (Lim, 2012,
p. 226).
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Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
According to Kim Dae-jung, the First Yeonpyeong Battle in June 1998 demonstrated,
internally and externally, that the Sunshine Policy was “neither innocent ideas nor the soft-line
appeasement policy.” Kim referred to the outcome of the naval incident as empirical evidence
showing that the Sunshine Policy did not merely aim to achieve inter-Korean reconciliation and
never underestimated the need to maintain the country’s top defense preparedness.127 From
Kim Dae-jung’s perspective, North Korea’s provocative behaviors were mainly attributable to
the confrontation between hawkish and dovish elements inside the northern regime at a time
when the tension appeared to decrease between Pyongyang and Washington (H. Lee, personal
communication, November, 2016).128 Believing that the Sunshine Policy was “the most painful
policy for the hawkish elements in the North,” Kim Dae-jung was confident that his policy would
help empower dovish forces and weaken hawkish elements inside the North Korean regime (C.
S. Lee, 1998c).
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on North Korea’s provocative behavior, Kim,
Hang-jung, President Kim’s long-time aide and the former Chief Presidential Secretary, says,
“From DJ’s perspective, the unruliness, belligerence, and provocative actions of North Korea
constituted a unique, paradoxical way of expressing the sense of isolation and vulnerability.
That is, because North Korea is weak, they strive to appear strong, and because they are
isolated, they often insist on pride excessively. In giving instructions to those officials who were
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President Kim Dae-jung’s speech on March 1, 1999, commemorating the Independence Movement day.
Lim Dong-won, the then Unification Minister, who was faced with irritable reaction from the North Korean delegation at the
failed vice-ministerial talks held in Beijing on June 22-26, 1999, reasoned that the North appeared to “be caught between the
military hardliners, who were obstructing the dialogue with the South after suffering serious damage from the naval clash, and
the cold reality of its need for fertilizer.” At the talks, the North demanded an apology and an assurance against a recurrence of
the naval incident and refused to discuss the issue of separated families (Lim, 2012, p. 230).
128
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going to negotiate with North Koreans, President Kim would say, “Don’t be affected by North
Korea’s offensive, aggressive words and behaviors at the meeting. Please note that these are
their tactics and part of their culture. How can we talk with them if we confront them the same
way they do?” This way, he suggested that South Korean officials show a degree of
magnanimity in dealing with their northern counterparts.” Kim Dae-jung profoundly
understood the fundamental nature of the North Korean state. That is, he was acutely aware
that what appeared to be North Korea’s reckless behavior and attitude, which often invited
derision and ridicule, essentially derived from the recognition of its own weakness and
vulnerability. He fully grasped that the North Korean regime’s desperate desire for survival
amid the external environment fraught with various threats was closely connected with its
‘siege mentality’ (H. J. Kim, personal communication, October 18, 2016).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment
Constraint: Resistance to the Sunshine Policy by Republican-led U.S. Congress
During this period, North Korea’s missile test and the lingering suspicion over its alleged
nuclear development at the underground Kumchang-ri site led to severe resistance among
Republican members of U.S. Congress to President Clinton’s engagement approach. In July
1998, amid a growing suspicion over the Kumchang-ri nuclear site, the U.S. Congress issued a
report titled “Threat Assessment of Long-range Ballistic Missile to the United States.”
Moreover, following North Korea’s missile test on August 31, 1998, Republican members of U.S.
Congress moved to cut the budget for the provision of heavy fuel oil to North Korea which was
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part of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework signed in October 1994. In doing so, they demanded
that the Clinton administration thoroughly review its North Korea policy and revert to the
hardline approach (Lim, 2012; Lippman, 1998, p. 199). Also, the so-called Rumsfeld Report was
issued concluding that rogue states like North Korea, Iraq, and Iran would be capable of
developing long-range ballistic missiles that could pose a threat to the security of the
continental United States within five years (Rumsfeld, 1998). This report gained increasing
support from U.S. hardliners who had opposed the Clinton government’s engagement approach
in dealing with North Korea (Lim, 2012, p. 199).
There occurred still more actions in this period on the part of U.S. politicians demanding
an overhaul of the Clinton administration’s engagement of North Korea. In May 1999, U.S.
House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee issued a press release indicating
that U.S. policy toward North Korea needed a major overhaul. Also, Representative Benjamin A.
Gilman, the Chairman of that committee, introduced bipartisan legislation called the “North
Korea Threat Reduction Act of 1999.” This bill not only targeted North Korea but also aimed at
torpedoing South Korea’s Sunshine Policy (Steinberg, 1999).
Japan and the United States fiercely reacted to North Korea’s ballistic missile test on
August 31, 1998, from the village of Musudan-ri on its northern coast.129 The discovery of the
suspected underground nuclear site and North Korea’s test of a multi-stage rocket touched off
speculation in the United States that North Korea, having frozen its existing nuclear program in
exchange for two light water reactors, had clandestinely engaged in an alternative nuclear
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Startling Japan, the missile, called Daepodong, flew over the main Japanese island of Honshu before landing harmlessly in
the sea 800 miles from the launch site (Kirk, 2009, p. 152).
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program (J. H. Paik, 1999, p. 47). Under growing pressure from the Republican-led Congress for
overall revision of his North Korea policy following North Korea’s missile test, President Clinton
appointed former Secretary of Defense William Perry as North Korea Policy Coordinator in midNovember 1998, instructing him to undertake the policy review and submit a final report to the
Congress (“Former US D Sec Called to Deal with NK Policy,” 1998).
Following a series of negotiations in New York, North Korea agreed to allow U.S.
inspectors access to the suspected facilities at Kumchang-ri in return for reciprocal measures to
improve US-North Korea relations including the lifting of economic sanctions and providing
food aid. On May 20-24, 1999, a U.S. inspection team investigated the underground site and
found no evidence of nuclear activities. Despite the settlement of the controversy over the
Kumchang-ri site, the United States remained suspicious of the possibility that the North might
have been storing nuclear materials in other hidden facilities (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 146).

Response
In an interview with the New York Times held days prior to his visit to Washington for
his first summit with Clinton, Kim Dae-jung urged the international community to mitigate
economic sanctions against North Korea. During his visit to the United States, Kim suggested
again, this time in a somewhat subdued tone, that it would be desirable to ease economic
sanctions against the North. In fact, President Kim’s actions left the Clinton administration with
more room for policy maneuvering with regard to South Korea’s engagement policy (K. Y. Park,
2001, p. 82). During the first Kim-Clinton summit in June 1998, President Clinton not only
expressed strong support of President Kim’s North Korea strategy but also effectively handed
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over the majority of the initiative in managing North Korean affairs to President Kim. In doing
so, President Clinton said, “Given your stature and experience, I would like you to lead on the
issue of the Korean Peninsula… You take the driver’s seat, and I will take the seat beside to help
you” (Lim, 2012, p. 188). President Clinton reiterated his firm support of Kim Dae-jung’s peace
initiative while visiting South Korea in November 1998 for the second summit.
In response to North Korea’s missile test, Kim Dae-jung and his government adopted a
highly measured approach, interpreting the missile launch as a politically inspired move on the
part of Kim Jong-il to bolster his posture prior to the Supreme People’s Assembly scheduled for
the day following the missile launch (Kirk, 2009, p. 152; Kim, 2011b, pp. 103-4). Despite North
Korea’s first long-range missile test on August 31, 1998, the Hyundai Group led by chairman
Chung Ju-young moved forward with the plan to make his second visit to North Korea and
launch the Mount Kumgang tourism project. Strictly applying the separation principle between
politics and economy, the Kim Dae-jung government actively supported the Hyundai-led interKorean tourism venture (Kirk, 2009, p. 152). By doing so, Kim Dae-jung showed the
international community and the Clinton administration his firm willingness to push for his
peace agenda in spite of North Korea’s missile test.
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration sought to address the Korean problem via fourparty talks involving the United States, two Koreas, and China aimed at reducing tension on the
peninsula and replacing the Korean War armistice with a permanent peace regime. 130 Despite
Kim Dae-jung’s efforts to continue the talks, the four-party talks never got off the ground as
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The four-party talks were proposed to the North by President Clinton and President Kim Young-sam in April 1997 as a way of
addressing North Korea’s reluctance to negotiate directly with the South. North Korea had long sought bilateral talks with the
United States, hoping to marginalize South Korea (Myers, 1997).
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they broke down with the parties unable to reach a basic agreement over North Kroea’s
insistence on a peace treaty and the withdrawal of US forces from Korea (sa jahwedam
chulbom [Launch of the Four-Party Talks], 2017).
Upon President Clinton’s nomination of William Perry as North Korea Policy
Coordinator, Kim Dae-jung made arduous endeavors to persuade Perry and his North Korea
Policy Review team to adopt an engagement approach based on the Comprehensive Approach
suggesting a package settlement of all major pending issues in accordance with the principle of
“give and take” and “mutual threat reduction.” In effect, the idea of “a package deal” involving
“give and take” on the nuclear issue and diplomatic and economic concessions was exactly
what Kim Dae-jung proposed in April 1993 in the United Kingdom as a way to resolve North
Korea’s first nuclear crisis that erupted in March 1993. The Comprehensive Approach was
intended for a fundamental resolution of the roots of the problem by improving US-North
Korea relations (J. H. Paik, 1999, p. 54).
Kim Dae-jung moved to persuade William Perry face-to-face while he was visiting Seoul
in early December 1998. In response to Perry’s questions about his views on U.S. policy toward
North Korea, Kim Dae-jung referred to the European détente process and stressed the need for
a package solution through a process of give and take. He also provided Dr. Perry with detailed
advice on what kind of ‘sticks and carrots’ could be used in negotiations and what specific
options were available to the United States (Lim, 2012, p. 205).131 In late January 1999,
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As possible carrots, Kim Dae-jung proposed such options as food aid; lifting sanctions; removal of North Korea from the list
of state sponsors of terrorism; allowing the North’s access to international financial institutions; compensation for the
suspension of missile exports; normalizing relations with Japan; and compensation from Japan for the colonial past. As possible
sticks, he suggested such alternatives as cancellation of the Light Water Reactor project, suspension of Chinese assistance, and
military pressure (Lim, 2012, p. 205).
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President Kim then dispatched Lim Dong-won as a special envoy to Washington with a mandate
to persuade Perry’s North Korea Policy Review team to accommodate the Comprehensive
Approach as U.S. policy toward North Korea. This time, the South Korean team explained a
detailed action plan of the Comprehensive Approach (Lim, 2012, pp. 206 -209). President Kim
then dispatched Lim to Japan, China, and Russia to secure their understanding and support
(Lim, 2012, pp. 189-193, 210-213). In early March 1999, the Perry team visited Seoul again to
brief President Kim on a “Tentative Review of the U.S. Policy towards North Korea” at the
instruction of President Clinton (Lim, 2012, p. 213).132 Highly satisfied with Perry’s proposal
faithfully reflecting his Comprehensive Approach, Kim Dae-jung suggested that Perry visit
Pyongyang to explain the proposal directly to the North Koreans, a suggestion which the latter
accepted on the spot (Lim, 2012, pp. 215-216).133 After holding a trilateral policy coordination
meeting among South Korea, the United States, and Japan in Honolulu in mid-April, William
Perry traveled to Pyongyang in May 1999 to persuade the North to accept his proposal and
undertake a process designed to mutually reduce the threat (Lim, 2012, pp. 216-217).
Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung strongly advocated North Korea’s admission to the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (Moon, 2102, p. 42).
Ahead of Perry’s visit to Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group worked to
persuade North Korea to accept the South Korean proposal and to undertake a process of
mutual threat reduction (Lim, 2012, p. 217). In a monthly press conference at the Blue House,
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In his meeting with President Kim Dae-jung, Perry stated that even if a crisis was created by North Korea’s negative
responses, the United States would take strong measures to prevent war. Satisfied with Perry’s briefing, Kim said, “Instead of
being overly concerned about failure, we should confidently focus our efforts on persuading the North Koreans. Confidence can
produce better results.”
133
In this meeting, President Kim provided William Perry detailed advice on how to persuade the North to accept the proposal
while gaining international support and cooperation for the strategy that Korea and the United States had agreed upon.
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Kim sent the North a message by stating that there was no deadline for the North to accept his
comprehensive approach designed to put the regime on the path to openness, reform and
inter-Korean reconciliation. He stressed that North Korea should not miss this rare opportunity
and capitalize on William Perry’s upcoming visit to Pyongyang as a way to terminate the Cold
War structure on the Korean Peninsula (C. S. Lee, 1999). Toward the end of May 1999, the
North accepted the Perry team’s visit to Pyongyang.134 All the efforts made by President Kim
and his policy team culminated with the announcement of the Perry Process on September 14,
1999, which closely reflected the South Korean proposal. According to the Perry Report, the
United States would take steps to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea and lift
economic sanctions in return for North Korea’s implementation of measures to mitigate
concerns of the United States and other nations regarding its missile and nuclear weapons
program (“Perry Submits Report to US Congress,” 1999).
Regarding William Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999, Leon Sigal observes that it
was a critical development in terms of US-DPRK relations and inter-Korean relations. 135 When
Perry visited Pyongyang in May 1999, he brought a draft of the US-DPRK Joint Communique
which would be issued on Vice Marshall Jo Myung-rok’s visit to Washington in October 2000. 136
After all, Perry’s visit to Pyongyang in May 1999 effectively opened the way for the North-South
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Ahead of Perry’s visit to Pyongyang (May 26-28), the North accepted a visit by Ambassador Kartman’s delegation (May 1415) and a visit to Kumchari by the U.S. inspection team (May 18-25).
135
Leon V. Sigal is the Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council and
the author of Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking; and Disarming Strangers: Nuclear
Diplomacy with North Korea.
136
The US-DPRK Joint Communique was explicit about steps to take to bring an end to mutual animosity between North Korea
and the United States. Within weeks, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il to
prepare for President Clinton’s visit to Pyongyang. At his talks with Secretary Albright, Kim Jong-il offered to end the missile
program, specifically exports, development, production, and deployment of all medium and longer-range missiles. This was
followed by the resumption of missile talks wherein North Korea agreed upon the moratorium on missile tests while the talks
lasted (Sigal, 2017).
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summit in June 2000. It also opened the way for improved US-North Korea relations as it was
followed by the issuance of the US-DPRK Joint Communique (on October 12, 2000) as well as
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang (October 22-24, 2000) wherein Kim
Jong-il decided to put the missile deal on the table (L. Sigal, personal communication,
September 20, 2017).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Whenever North Korea engaged in provocative actions, Kim Dae-jung sought to read its
underlying motives and to address the problem at its core. Regarding North Korea’s first missile
test, Kim concluded that it was intended to draw attention from the international community
and to invoke the ‘rally round the flag effect’ for domestic purposes. Also, considering that the
North wanted to be perceived as a strong and prosperous nation, Kim saw it as aimed at
creating a festive mood to celebrate the opening of the Kim Jong-il era in time for the 50 th
anniversary of the founding of the nation on September 9 (Kim, 2011b, p. 102-103).
President Clinton’s remarks involving the “driver seat” analogy at a summit in
Washington constituted a significant achievement for Kim Dae-jung. For Kim, this was the
moment in which a major step was taken toward reaching the goal he sought to achieve during
this period. Kim recalls, in his autobiography, that at the time he felt exhilarated by President
Clinton’s remarks since it meant that, for the first time in the country’s contemporary history,
South Korea effectively took over the initiative from the United States in addressing North
Korean issues involving international security (Kim, 2011b, p. 82). Nevertheless, President
Clinton’s decision to appoint William Perry to be in charge of reviewing U.S. policy toward
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North Korea amid growing misgivings about the Agreed Framework among U.S. hardliners was
a source of concern for Kim Dae-jung. Upon hearing the news, President Kim was reminded of
the fact that William Perry was a hawkish Defense Secretary who had proposed a preemptive
air strike on the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon to President Clinton upon the outbreak of North
Korea’s first nuclear crisis in 1994 (Kim, 2011b, p. 136). In the face of this development that he
believed could jeopardize the peace process he was pursuing, Kim Dae-jung moved to take a
series of steps to persuade the Clinton administration to adopt the engagement strategy, and
by extension, to incorporate the so-called Comprehensive Approach in U.S. strategy vis-à-vis
North Korea.137
After all, Kim Dae-jung took Perry’s appointment as a potential obstacle to and at the
same time a crucial opportunity for the Sunshine Policy. As it turned out, the Perry Report
issued in September 1999, was framed around fundamental concepts underlying the
“Comprehensive Approach” as suggested by the South Korean government. The
Comprehensive Approach, which was drafted by then Unification Minister Lim Dong Won,
clearly mirrored President Kim Dae-jung’s ideas on how to fundamentally dismantle the Cold
War structure on the Korean Peninsula to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.
President Kim was so satisfied with the Comprehensive Approach drafted by Lim that he called
it a “nearly perfect idea” and said, “it was just as if he has (Lim, Dong-won) gotten inside my
head” (Kim, 2011b, p. 138).
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s approach to the United States in relation to his North Korea
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All such efforts eventually ended up with the Perry Report, based on which the Clinton administration would resolve North
Korean issues through diplomatic engagement aimed at mutual threat reduction (Perry, 1999).
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policy, the then Presidential Press Secretary Park Sun-sook, notes that Kim profoundly
understood the underlying mechanism of inter-Korean relations and this was practically
embodied in his strategy. She says, “Even though DJ considered South Korea’s choices and
views as a crucial factor for improvement in inter-Korean relations, he precisely understood in
realistic terms that, in the absence of a move made by the United States, and of consent being
given by the United States, it would be difficult to yield any tangible result in addressing issues
of the Korean peninsula and inter-Korean relations. DJ knew that he had to persuade the
United States and that he could not go alone” (S. S. Park, personal communication, November
23, 2016).
Leon Sigal takes note of a similar point regarding Kim’s role in relation to the Perry
Process. He states, “Kim Dae-jung was always very realistic both about North Korea and about
the importance of getting engagement between North Korea and the United States. That is the
key to being able to do what he wanted to do with North Korea and North-South (relations). …
He did some tough stuffs when he saw North Koreans challenging him. But the key was getting
the Americans through the Perry Process to re-engage North Korea. Kim Dae-jung and Lim
Dong-won were critical in getting Perry to try a serious diplomatic engagement with North
Koreans” (L. Sigal, personal communication, September 20, 2017).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 1: 1998-1999)
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
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Constraint: Resistance to the Sunshine Policy among Conservatives in the Wake of North
Korea’s Provocations
North Korea’s provocations committed mainly against South Korea and the United
States –e.g., the submarine incident, missile test, and the naval skirmish- during the initial two
years of Kim’s presidency served to bolster opposition to the Sunshine Policy among the
opposition party and conservative media. When confronted with domestic resistance to the
Sunshine Policy in the wake of North Korea’s aggressive acts as discussed above, Kim Dae-jung
would express his strong will to maintain his planned course of actions and implement his
agenda as previously planned.
Upon the outbreak of the submarine infiltration in June 1998, conservative critics
including the opposition Grand National Party called on the government to take firm punitive
measures against North Korea and warned against continuing numerous inter-Korean exchange
programs (“Seoul Backs Hyundai’s Mt. Kumgang Project,” 1998). However, President Kim chose
to proceed with the ongoing inter-Korean project and events like the Mt. Kumgang tourism
project and Hyundai Chairman Chung’s visit to North Korea as they were initially scheduled
without interruption even though North Korea failed to issue an apology as demanded by his
government (C. S. Lee, 1998a).
In the wake of a gun-ship battle in the West Sea in June 1999, the opposition Grand
National Party (GNP) vehemently resisted the Sunshine Policy. Citing it as the culprit for the
military clash and the detention of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang, 138 opposition
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At the time of the naval battle, a South Korean tourist detained by the North Korean regime. This further aggravated the
opposition’s protest to the Sunshine Policy.
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lawmakers urged the government to abolish the Sunshine Policy, suspend all humanitarian aid
to North Korea, and cancel the planned vice-ministerial talks. Moreover, the opposition party
condemned Unification Minister Lim Dong-won for pushing for the Kumgang tourism project
and demanded his resignation (Yoo, 1999). They accused the Sunshine Policy of slackening the
country’s defense posture, decrying that the government was totally unaware of the
seriousness of the situation (“Sunshine Policy to Continue Despite Naval Clash,” 1999).
On the following day of the naval battle, President Kim Dae-jung convened heads of the
ruling and opposition parties to hold a meeting, intending to show the public that bipartisan
efforts were underway to properly address an emerging security threat. In this meeting, the
leader of the opposition Grand National Party, called on the president to reconsider the
Sunshine Policy. In an attempt to convince Chairman Lee Hoe-chang and other opposition
leaders of the credibility of the policy, Kim explained the necessity of maintaining the Sunshine
Policy (Kim, 2011b, p. 181). Kim Dae-jung strongly assured them that he would be patient and
long-term oriented in dealing with the North, and no longer pursue the North Korea policy with
a Cold War-era mentality while warning the North against launching further armed
provocations (“Sunshine Policy to Continue Despite Naval Clash,” 1999). Moreover, combined
with North Korea’s prolonged failure to reciprocate President Kim’s overtures, a growing
criticism of the Sunshine Policy among conservative detractors of the policy as a one-sided love
affair and a policy of appeasement that could undermine South Korea’s national security,
effectively put the survival of the Sunshine Policy in jeopardy by the end of the year 1999 (C.
Moon, 2012, p. 43).
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Response
Upon taking office, Kim Dae-jung appointed some conservative heavyweights in senior
positions. Such appointments included Kang In-duk, the former ranking intelligence officer
under Park Chung-hee’s government (1961-1979), as the first Unification Minister and Lee
Hong-koo, the former Unification Minister under President Roh Tae-woo and Prime Minister
under President Kim Young-sam, as his first Ambassador to the United States. By recruiting
Kang In-duk, a prominent conservative figure as his first Unification Minister, Kim Dae-jung
sought to mitigate domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy and gain support both from the
Korean public and the Clinton administration. In relation to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung
appointed another conservative figure, Park Jae-kyu, as his Unification Minister (December
1999 - March 2001).
In a way, President Kim’s recruitment of conservative officials for some key government
posts can be seen as linked with the fact that the ruling party, National Congress for New
Politics, was forming a coalition government with Kim Jong-pil’s conservative United Liberal
Democrats. Still, Kang’s appointment as the first Unification Minister was widely viewed as a
bold move as it stunned both the conservatives and liberals. This is because the post of
Unification Minister in South Korea was arguably the most important cabinet position when it
came to the country’s North Korea policy and North Korea policy was not the issue area of
primary interest for the ULD. In other words, Kim Dae-jung would have been able to appoint an
individual who had been more ardently supportive of the Sunshine Policy or more closely in line
with himself in beliefs and ideas on how to deal with North Korea. It was indeed a politically
shrewd choice on the part of Kim Dae-jung who had been anticipating hurdles to be imposed on
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his Sunshine Policy by his critics and conservative opponents. Kim Dae-jung was well aware
that: there were forces in Korea “who, influenced by over 25 years of vilification of Kim Daejung by his opponents, will regard what they might view as excessive accommodations for the
North as detrimental to South Korean national interests and security,” as David Steinberg
(1999, p. 74) put it.
Hearkening back to his appointment as the Unification Minister by President Kim Daejung, Kang In-duk, indicates that, in accepting President Kim’s offer, he was prepared to
implement the Sunshine Policy, even if it meant some concessions could be made to North
Korea. According to Kang, he accepted the appointment despite his conservative beliefs and
ideas on North Korea because he felt the urgent need to improve inter-Korean relations and
peacefully manage the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at a time when the country was badly
struggling to overcome the worst-ever economic crisis since the Korean War. That is, he
believed that the Sunshine Policy would help build a peaceful domestic environment which
would attract desperately needed foreign investment into the country (I. D. Kang, personal
communication, November 8, 2016).
As it turned out, Kim Dae-jung’s strategy was highly effective in mitigating domestic
resistance to the Sunshine Policy. Then Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs Lee
Hoon, observes, “President Kim sought understanding of the Sunshine Policy from his
conservative unification ministers, who in turn sought the public understanding of the policy.
This effectively had a bit of ‘buffering’ effect in relation to those who were worried about the
Sunshine Policy at the time” (H. Lee, Personal communication, November 22, 2016).
Meanwhile, during the summit in Washington on June 10, 1998, President’s Clinton
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expressed his willingness to hand over the initiative to President Kim on North Korea policy.
Moreover, during his visit to Seoul in November 1998 for a second summit meeting, Clinton
watched live on television the scene of the second cruise ship with 600 South Korean tourists
aboard leaving the East Sea port for Mt. Kumgang. President Clinton described his impression
of the historic emotional scene at the press conference the next day. 139 Clinton’s strong support
of the Sunshine Policy had a significant effect on the increase in credibility of the Sunshine
Policy and the relevant authority of President Kim in the country. This, in turn, helped mitigate
the resistance to his peace initiative among conservative critics.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Stephen Costello, Kim Dae-jung’s long-time political adviser from the early 1990s
through to his presidency, indicates that, as the first progressive politician who was elected
president in Korean history, Kim Dae-jung knew that he did not want to “just push it (the
Sunshine Policy) in their face and have overturned the cart since he was much smarter than
that. … Kim Dae-jung was keenly aware of the South Korean society, and that he needed to
have some comfort and some legitimacy even with conservatives” (Personal communication,
November 3, 2017).
Kim Sung-jae, Kim Dae-jung’s longtime aide and the Minister of Culture and Tourism
under his administration, notes, “Having long been labeled as a Commie (a Red) or a leftist,
President Kim wanted to relieve the public (with such appointments). At the time, the
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At the press conference held after a summit with President Kim, President Clinton described his impression of the scene,
stating that he was moved by the festive mood of peace. He said it was “a very inspiring and beautiful scene” (Lim, 2012, p.
185).
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conservative circle was taken aback by Kang’s appointment as the first Unification Minister (of
President Kim Dae-jung), while the progressive camp, for their part, severely criticized it.”
During the presidential campaign, he went on to explain, Kim Dae-jung’s predecessor President
Kim Young-sam claimed that the United States and the South Korean military were against Kim
Dae-jung’s election as president. Under such circumstances, Kim Dae-jung acutely felt the need
to counter the ideological offensive persistently taken against him so that he would be able to
properly implement his peace initiative with backing from, and trust established with, the
United States (S. J. Kim, personal communication, October 14, 2016).
Then Press Secretary at the presidential office and long-time personal secretary to Kim
Dae-jung Choi Kyung-hwan indicates that such moves reflected the level of President Kim’s
confidence. He observes, “President Kim was open to recruiting conservative officials if they
basically opposed war and agreed with him on the need to pursue inter-Korean reconciliation
and cooperation. In fact, President Kim was so confident about his leadership that he was
willing to recruit conservative officials if such a move would relieve the people” (K.H. Choi,
personal communication, October 18, 2016). This appears to indicate that, in undertaking the
Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung had a flexible mind, and was not strictly bound by an ideologydriven orthodoxy.
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that President Kim Dae-jung did not see the domestic
opposition to the Sunshine Policy as a constraint grave enough to pose an effective threat to
the Sunshine Policy. According to President Kim’s top adviser on North Korea, Lim Dong-won,
this is not least because the president considered the conservative opposition to be politically
motivated and mainly designed to gain the upper hand on the domestic political front (D. W.
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Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).
Another variable that had a considerable impact on Kim Dae-jung’s perception of
domestic constraints is the public opinion. In fact, Kim Dae-jung had strong confidence in
popular support of the Sunshine Policy, which appeared robust even amid North Korea’s
occasional provocations during this period. With the people of South Korea being united and
rallying around the cause of overcoming the financial crisis, the Sunshine Policy relished strong
popular support in general. As the internal and external environment turned favorable to the
Sunshine Policy by the end of this period (1998-1999), the opposition Grand National Party
(GNP), for its part, would have found it difficult to express outright disapproval of the Sunshine
Policy.

Public Opinion on the Sunshine Policy
Throughout Kim Dae-jung’s term of office, the Sunshine Policy enjoyed a significant level
of public endorsement. Table 8 (S. W. Park, 2002) displays President Kim Dae-jung’s approval
ratings and the public support of the Sunshine Policy, as measured throughout his tenure by
surveys conducted by conservative and liberal press, as well as Gallup Korea and the Ministry of
Unification.

Table 8
President Kim Dae-jung’s Approval Ratings and the Public Support of the Sunshine Policy (%)
(1998.3-2002.4)
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1998 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 2001. 2001. 2002. Aver3-6 7-12 1-6 7-12 1-4
5-8 9-12 1-6 7-12 1-4 age
Conservative
Press

Liberal Press

Gallup Korea
(March 23,
2003)
The Ministry
of
Unification

Approval
Rating
Sunshine
Policy
Approval
Rating
Sunshine
Policy
Approval
Rating
Sunshine
Policy

54.6 65.0 70.7 49.8 48.5

54.4

48.2 26.9

30.5 33.0 48.16

83.8 70.9 72.8

86.7

69.9 33.9

63.0 59.5

74.9

47.2 18.8

19.5 27.2 47.72

95.7

57.1

58

49.0

54.8 63.47 69

78.9 74.7 54.2

44.4
72.3

70.5 64.0

No
70.92
Data

70.7 62.8 52.0 49.8

48.5

54.5

30.2

86.9 72.6

85.2

93.7

79.6 76.7 76.8 73.5

65.6

65.5

29.1 31.1 26.0 45.47

79.81

Note. Adapted from South-South conflict and media: The role of media in reporting on North
Korea policy [Conference paper], by S. W. Park, 2002, Reconsidering North Korea Awareness
and North Korea Policy, Seoul Press Club.

As indicated in the table, the public endorsement of the Sunshine Policy was generally
higher than the approval rating of President Kim Dae-jung himself. The support for the Sunshine
Policy among the South Korean public showed a significant decrease in the year 2001,
according to the conservative media, before reverting back to near the original level by the end
of his term. Meanwhile, the president’s approval rating rapidly declined toward the end of his
term. As shown in the table, Kim’s approval rating had very little impact on public support for
the Sunshine Policy. In other words, the South Korean public somewhat differentiated the
Sunshine Policy from the general approval rating of the president or the evaluation of the
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overall performance of the government. In the initial period of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency,
public support for the Sunshine Policy was generally high, hovering around 80 percent as
determined in various surveys. Polls show that the Sunshine Policy was generally endorsed by
the majority of the South Koreans even with some vicissitudes shown across Kim’s tenure.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile regarding his peace initiative in Period 1 (1998-1999) by the
three different sources of constraints is summarized in Table 9.140

Table 9
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 1 (1998-1999) by
Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)
Period 1
North Korea
- N of doc: 28
- N of words: 26872
Foreign
- N of doc: 11
- N of words: 12181
Domestic
- N of doc: 17
- N of words: 14691
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BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

0.37
H

0.37
H

0.56
M

0.35
M

0.54
L

0.14
M

0.28
H

0.36
M

0.31
H

0.60
M

0.44
H

0.54
L

0.05
L

0.21
H

0.38
H

0.41
H

0.54
L

0.28
M

0.54
L

0.19
H

0.32
H

Kim Dae-jung’s traits scores based on the entire collection of North Korea-related materials content-analyzed in this study
were used to explore his leadership characteristics in dealing with North Korea–specifically, the constraints imposed by North
Korea on his peace initiative. For detailed discussion of the methodological approach to the content analysis, see the Methods
section of this study (Chapter 4. A.1.2. The Use of LTA in This Study).
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Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the
total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control
Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Taskfocus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).
For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

a. Source of Constraints: North Korea
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s North Korea policy, the LTA results show that his scores for
belief in the ability to control events (BACE) (0.37) and need for power (0.37) are both high in
strength in comparison to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders. The interplay of these two
scores evinces that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints in dealing with
North Korea during the timeframe of the analysis. His high internal locus of control (BACE)
coupled with a high need for power indicates that Kim Dae-jung was skilled in alternating
between direct and indirect means in challenging constraints he faced in dealing with North
Korea during this period (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005).
Meanwhile, the LTA results indicate that Kim Dae-jung’s score for conceptual complexity
(0.56) and his score for self-confidence (0.35) are both moderate in strength compared to a
norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung was closed to incoming
information in making decisions. All in all, the LTA results demonstrate that, in dealing with
North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was advocate in his leadership style during this period.

Advocate Leadership Style
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In dealing with North Korea in this period, Kim Dae-jung was highly proactive in initiating
proposals, took charge, and worked to have control over what happened in interacting with
North Korea. Beginning on the day of his inauguration, Kim Dae-jung sought to implement the
Sunshine Policy, which was the embodiment of his time-honored philosophies and strategies of
unification. Even though Kim was under heavy pressure from the task of overcoming the
country’s worst ever financial crisis from day one of his presidency, he did not wait for a “right
time” to take action in implementing his peace agenda. In the face of North Korea’s inaction,
nonchalance, and resistance to his goodwill gestures, he was proactive in initiating proposals
for inter-Korean rapprochement and taking institutional/legal measures to eliminate virtually all
existing restrictions on civilian contacts, exchanges, and investments in North Korea.
Equipped with a clear sense of purpose, Kim Dae-jung was determined to challenge
constraints imposed by North Korea in moving toward achieving his goals. For Kim Dae-jung, it
was crucial to show both South and North Koreans as well as the international community his
determination to implement his North Korea policy agenda based on strict adherence to the
principle of separation between politics and economy. Despite North Korea’s occasional
provocations against South Korea or the outside world in this period, Kim Dae-jung expressed
his determination to maintain his course of action and proceeded to implement his North Korea
policy agenda. Following the submarine incident, he encouraged Hyundai to promote the Mt.
Kumgang tourism project. Despite the outbreak of the inter-Korean naval battle, he authorized
the provision of fertilizer to the North, and ordered that Vice-Ministerial talks be held as
originally planned (South Korean Ships Sink North Korean Patrol Boat, 1999; WuDunn, 1999).
After all, the Mt. Kumgang tourism project was a symbol of consistency and boldness involved
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in the Sunshine Policy as the project was maintained without interruption in accordance with
the principle of separation between politics and economy despite North Korea’s occasional
provocations.
For advocate leaders, movement on an agenda framed around “a set of goals, an
ideology, a cause, or a prob most importance (Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 33). Sworn into
office with a pre-conceived agenda on North Korea, Kim Dae-jung committed the initial two
years of his term to setting the stage for his Sunshine Policy. The policy process during this time
revolved around a carefully devised, step-by-step approach, taken in a way that would achieve
a set of major goals Kim Dae-jung had set for this period.
The goals Kim Dae-jung sought to achieve for this period included the establishment of
the civilian-level contact and exchanges between two Koreas, the launching of the Kumgang
Mountain tourism project, and the promotion of separated family reunions. The sequential
steps taken by President Kim and his policy group throughout this period were intricately linked
such that they would end up properly achieving the goals they were aiming for by the end of
this period.
In achieving these goals, the Kim administration took a series of steps as follows: the
massive overhaul of laws and regulations to promote South Korea’ investment in North Korea
as well as inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation at the civilian level (March 1998); reopening
of the truce village of Panmunjom (May, 1998); the General Officers Talks between UNC
(represented by the United States) and North Korea at Panmunjom (March and June 1998);
Hyundai Chairman Chung’s spectacular visits to Pyongyang with 1001 head of cattle in two
batches to discuss with Kim Jong-il the possibility of the Mount Kumgang tourism project (June
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and October 1998). After all, all such developments and measures taken by the government
were intended as preparatory steps to launch the Kumgang Mt. tourism project in November
1998, as noted by Jeong Se-hyun, the former Unification Minister under Kim Dae-jung. He also
indicates, Kim Dae-jung’s decision to remove the ceiling on South Korean investment in North
Korea was effectively meant to pave the way for the inter-Korean joint project between
Hyundai Group and North Korea (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016; Y.
S. Han, 2002, p. 46).141
The handling of the submarine infiltration involved a highly measured, cautious, and
incremental approach, geared toward preventing any escalation of the tension. Kim Daejung’s response to this incident was gradual, from the initial wait and see attitude to a stern
accusation coupled with the appeal to caution against a hasty conclusion, and to finally a
strong push to move forward in achieving his policy goals. By doing so, Kim Dae-jung sought
to accurately assess the posture and intentions of the North Korean regime before deciding
on how to address the incident.142

High Need for power and High Belief in Control Events (Internal Locus of Control)
As reflected in the combination of a high BACE (or an internal locus of control) and a
high need for power, Kim Dae-jung showed himself highly confident in his own ability to be
control of the political situation and maneuver it to suit his ends in implementing his North
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In fact, Chairman Chung Ju-young had already made a deal with North Korea when he visited Pyongyang in 1989 to discuss
his plan to develop the Mount Kumgang tourism project with the North Korean regime.
142
A close examination reveals that Kim Dae-jung’s approach to leadership was more forceful in response to the first
(Yeonpyeong) naval battle (in July 1999) than in dealing with the submarine infiltration (in June 1998).
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Korea policy agenda. Moreover, the combination of these two trait scores enables the
projection that his dealings with constraints stemming from North Korea and domestic politics
in the first two years of his tenure likely would have incorporated both direct and indirect
tactics to challenge constraints. Kim’s penchant for an indirect, behind-the-scenes approach to
his North Korea policy agenda was evidenced in the way in which he implemented the policy.
Keenly aware of a deep-seated aversion to government-level exchanges on the part of North
Korea, Kim Dae-jung took full advantage of North Korea’s interest in joint business
opportunities with Hyundai Group. Throughout this period, President Kim effectively put
Hyundai at the forefront of contact with North Korea, with his government working vigorously
behind the scenes to support virtually every aspect of the joint venture. Regarding the HyundaiNorth Korea project, the activist government not only eliminated legal obstacles to business
deals with North Korea, but also played roles of financier and underwriter, by granting bailout
funds to troubled Hyundai subsidiaries and designating government agencies as the company’s
business partners (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 87). Meanwhile, his direct handling of constraints was
equally evident in this period, as was manifested in the unmitigated way he overcame the
obstacles posed by the first naval battle that was triggered by the North Korean navy’s
unprovoked attack on a South Korean vessel.

The impact of the Breakdown of the Inter-Korean Talks in April 1998 on Kim Dae-jung’s
Leadership Style
The failed inter-Korean vice minister-level talks (in April 1998) served as a major turning
point for the Sunshine Policy as it led President Kim to change an important element of his
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North Korea strategy. Upon facing North Korea’s strong reaction to the South’s attempt to link
the fertilizer aid with the North’s consent to hold a reunion of separated families in accordance
with the principle of reciprocity, President Kim adopted the principle of flexible or diffuse
reciprocity in dealing with North Korea (e.g., Y. G. Kim, 2013). This section of the study
examines if the breakdown of the inter-Korean talks had an impact on President Kim’s
leadership in terms of traits and styles.
As summarized in Table 10, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile based on a set of materials
dated before the collapse of the April 1998 Red Cross talks can be compared to the profile
based on the materials dated after the incident.143

Table 10
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profiles before and after the breakdown of the Inter-Korean Talks in
April 1998 (Leadership Trait Analysis)
Period, Materials used

BACE Power

Before the inter-Korean
Red Cross talks in April
1998
(January-April, 1998)
- N of doc: 5
- N of words: 5342
After the
(May-August,
inter1998)
Korean
- N of doc: 5
Red Cross
- N of words:
talks in
4277
April 1998

0.37
0.39
H
H
Challenge
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CC

SC

0.59 0.28
M
M
Closed

Advocate
0.34
0.36
M
H
Challenge

0.59 0.43
M
H
Closed

Advocate

Task

Distrust

IGB

0.61
M

0.15
M

0.30
H

Task/Relationship
Focus
0.53
L
Relationship
Focus

Close to ZeroSum
0.05
L

0.20
H

Zero-Sum

Kim’s leadership profile for the period before the April 1998 incident is based on the (five) materials dated from January to
April 1998. Kim’s two leadership profiles for the period after the incident are based respectively on the five materials dated
from May to August 1998 and on the other five materials dated from September to December 1998.

200

(May(SeptemberDecember December,
1998)
1998)
- N of doc: 5
- N of words:
3711

0.30
0.33
L
H
Challenge

0.58 0.43
M
H
Closed

Advocate

0.52
L
Relationship
Focus

0.15
M

0.42
H

Close to ZeroSum

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the
total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control
Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Taskfocus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).
For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

The LTA results show that Kim Dae-jung remained advocate in leadership style both
before and after the April 1998 Red Cross talks. However, notable changes were made in some
of his trait scores in the wake of the incident. Specifically, his score on self-confidence increased
(from moderate to high); and his score for task focus decreased (from medium to low). His
score on distrust of others decreased (from medium to low) for the four months following the
incident before it increased anew to a moderate level for the subsequent four-month-long
period. The most notable change was made in the score for his locus of control, or belief in
ability to control events (BACE). His BACE score continued to decrease from high (before the
incident) to moderate (for the four months following the incident) and to low (for the
subsequent four months).
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style regarding the North Korea policy in this period remained
advocate, both before and after the breakdown of the talks. Still, it is noteworthy that the
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incident had the impact of changing the strength of scores on certain personality traits: namely,
belief in ability to control events, self-confidence, task-focus, and distrust of others. This means
that, following the collapse of the talks, Kim Dae-jung showed a discernable change in the
‘tone’ of his leadership, if not the major approach to leadership and politics. The results also
indicate that, after the much-anticipated inter-Korean talks ended in a rupture, Kim Dae-jung’s
perception of North Korea became even more zero-sum for the four months after the incident,
before reverting back to a moderately zero-sum orientation.
All in all, this means that, following the incident, Kim became less direct and outright
and more indirect and behind-the-scenes in challenging constraints (a decrease in BACE) and
more focused on maintaining consistency (an increase in self-confidence) in dealing with North
Korea. This also indicates that he became more focused on building relationships, and attached
more importance to the process of the policy implementations (a decrease in task focus).
Moreover, a decline in his score for distrust others (from moderate to low) in the immediate
aftermath of the incident shows that President Kim became more inclined to put things into
perspective and address relevant constraints on realistic cues following the breakdown of the
talks (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005).
All in all, a close examination of this period suggests that Kim Dae-jung’s highly
assertive, forceful push for his planned courses of action combined with his meticulously
calculated, flexible, and cautious approach in consideration of the North Korea’s posture was
instrumental in challenging constraints imposed by the North. All this helped Kim Dae-jung
properly achieve a set of major policy objectives he had set forth at the beginning of this
period. In only nine months after Kim Dae-jung was sworn into office, the inter-Korean
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exchange and cooperation was already underway at the civilian level and many South Koreans
traveled to Mt. Kumgang in North Korea beginning in November of 1998.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment
According to the LTA results based on North Korea-relevant materials targeted at
foreign audiences for Period I (1998-1999), Kim Dae-jung’s score for belief in ability to control
events (BACE) (0.36) is moderate while his score for the need for power (Power) is high (0.31) in
strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. The two trait scores interrelate to
indicate that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge constraints imposed by the external
environment in conducting North Korea policy during this period. Regarding the two traits
indicative of the degree of openness to contextual information, Kim Dae-jung’s scores relative
to the norming group for conceptual complexity (0.60) and self-confidence (0.44) are moderate
and high respectively. It is worth noting that Kim Dae-jung’s self-confidence score in relation to
the external environment (at 0.44) is the highest of all three periods regardless of the source of
constraints, and is distinctly higher than the relevant scores in the same period for the other
two sources of constraints –North Korea (0.35) and domestic political environment (0.28)- that
are moderate in strength. Such a sharp increase in the score for self-confidence means that Kim
Dae-jung was more likely to be close to information in handling the external environment
regarding North Korea policy in this period. On balance, the LTA results of the four traits show
that, in dealing with the external environment, Kim Dae-jung showed an advocate leadership
style during this period.
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Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s relevant scores for distrust of others (0.05) and in-group bias
(0.21) are low and high respectively. These two trait scores denote that he held a zero-sum
behavioral predisposition toward the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy.
The fact that President Clinton not only expressed firm support of the Sunshine Policy but also
effectively handed over the initiative in managing North Korean affairs to President Kim
apparently had a tangible impact on the latter’s perception of the external environment
surrounding his peace initiative. This is also manifested in his scores for the two relevant
personality traits in this period: a high self-confidence (0.44) and a low distrust of others (0.05).

Advocate Leadership Style
In Period 1, Kim Dae-jung’s determined, unflinching push to implement his agenda amid
all the constraints stemming from the external environment reflected the advocate orientation
of his leadership style. He was consistently goal-driven in implementing the Sunshine Policy,
perceiving external constraints as something to be challenged and overcome, not something to
be acceded to. Regarding the external environment as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, Kim Daejung’s score on self-confidence (0.44) can be seen as especially high in this period given that his
self-confidence scores are moderate or low both for all other periods of interest and for the
other two sources of constraint in this period. This means that he was not easily subjected to
whims of contextual contingencies and tended to show consistency in behavior in dealing with
the external environment in this period (e.g., M. G. Hermann, 2005, p. 195). Having secured
firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy from President Clinton and the international
community including Japan, China, Russia and many European countries by the end of 1998,
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Kim Dae-jung moved to take charge and worked to have an impact on l what happened in the
external environment in relation to North Korea policy. This is demonstrated in his markedly
increased self-confidence score (0.44) with respect to the external environment in this period.
Kim Dae-jung perceived William Perry’s appointment as President Clinton’s North Korea
Policy Coordinator as an opportunity to seize and, at the same time, a challenge to overcome in
implementing his North Korea policy. With Republican members of the U.S. Congress remaining
resolutely opposed to the Agreed Framework and President Clinton’s engagement approach,
Kim Dae-jung strived to persuade North Korea Policy Coordinator William Perry to adopt the
Comprehensive Approach involving a package solution based on a ‘give and take’ strategy and
‘mutual threat reduction’ principles such that the United States and South Korea would be in
perfect consonance in terms of North Korea policy.
After all, in the face of difficulties imposed by the external environment, Kim Dae-jung
further expanded the scope of his policy agenda pushing ahead with it in a decisive way. Even
with a dramatic increase in tension on the Korean peninsula following the suspicion over the
Kumchang-ri site and the issuance of the Rumsfeld Report and North Korea’s first missile test,
Kim Dae-jung chose to broaden the horizon of his peace initiative. The enlargement of
President Kim’s agenda was embodied in the Comprehensive Approach that Kim persuaded the
Clinton administration to adopt as a revised North Korea strategy. President Kim came up with
a highly elaborate policy proposal with the help of Lim Dong-won, the then Presidential
Secretary for Security and Foreign Affairs, and was proactive in persuading William Perry to
embrace it (e.g., Lim, 2012, pp. 200-216). With the Clinton administration adopting the Perry
Process featuring the comprehensive strategic design as proposed by his government, Kim Dae-
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jung became more optimistic about improved U.S.-North Korea relations and, by extension,
about the prospect of possible dismantlement of the Cold War structure on the Korean
peninsula.

Motivational Perception: Zero-Sum
A zero-sum orientation toward the external environment as manifested in his low
distrust of others and high in-group bias indicates that Kim Dae-jung may have seen politics as a
zero-sum game in which there existed winners and losers and the role of the leader lied in
dealinig with threats and coming out on top (Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 41). That is, he
believed: if he lost this opportunity and failed to persuade William Perry and the Clinton
administration to engage North Korea, this would result in a permanent defeat on his part
against hardliners in Washington. This could mean the failure of his Sunshine Policy. In other
words, Kim Dae-jung believed that how he responded to the relevant constraints would have a
direct bearing on the failure or success of the policy. Such a perception led him to make
relentless efforts to convince the Clinton administration of the need to adopt the
Comprehensive Approach.
In sum, in dealing with external constraints during this period, Kim Dae-jung’s advocate
approach to leadership was manifested in his strong, decisive push for his agenda based on
strong personal conviction and robust self-confidence. Such propensities led him to be
generally closed to information or to largely dismiss the potentially disconfirmatory contextual
conditions linked with external constraints. His determined push for his ambitious agenda
involving the Comprehensive Approach paid off in the form of the North Korea policy review,
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called the Perry Process, adopted by President Clinton in October 1999. This contributed to the
building of external conditions that became far more favorable to the Sunshine Policy by the
end of the year 1999. Under such circumstances, President Kim expected the North to be more
willing to undergo a voluntary change of behavior. After all, Kim Dae-jung’s unswerving drive to
implement his agenda based on an advocate leadership style in this period went to great
lengths to achieve his goal of bringing all major players in the international community
including the United States onto the same page so as to move forward in achieving his longerterm goal of dissolving the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula.

C. Leadership Style (Period 1: 1998-1999)
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
The relevant literature notes that a regime’s orientation for foreign policy reflects the
ruling group’s general beliefs about foreign affairs as they are related to their nation’s internal
and external situation and the coalition of societal and political interests aligned with the
regime (Hagan, 1993, p. 214). Studies on domestic politics and foreign policy have suggested
that the impact of domestic politics in all but the most extreme political circumstances tends to
be ‘limited’ since debates concern relatively narrow aspects of issues (Hagan, 1993, p. 214).
That being so, the effects of political opposition may take the form of “amplifying or
constraining” the orientation of the regime’s foreign policy. For example, a moderate regime
facing hardline opposition will gravitate toward a more assertive foreign policy posture, while a
hardline regime confronted with the relatively moderate opposition will engage in less assertive
behavior. Such effects are to be measured by the extent to which leaders are able to implement
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their preferences (Hagan, 1993, p. 214). Regarding the impact of domestic opposition on a
regime’s foreign policy, Hagan (1993, p. 217) posits that the basic content of the foreign policy
remains intact, with political effects being manifested by the level of “commitment, initiative,
and affect involved in implementing that orientation.”
Regarding the domestic environment surrounding Kim Dae-jung's North Korea policy,
the LTA results show that his scores for need for power (0.41) and belief in ability to control
events (BACE) (0.38) are both high in strength in comparison to the norming group of Pacific
Rim Leaders. This indicates that he was predisposed to challenge constraints imposed by the
domestic political context in this period. One notable aspect of this tendency is that his score
on need for power (0.41) is the highest of all and is significantly so in comparison to the relevant
score for the external environment (0.31). Regarding such a difference, the relevant t-test
results show that his score on need for power for the domestic environment is significantly
statistically different from his relevant score for the external environment. This indicates that
Kim Dae-jung tended to become more indirect, subtle and behind-the-scenes in the use of
means to challenge constraints imposed by the domestic political context than in dealing with
the external environment during this period. Still, a high score on BACE indicates that he would
likely have been able to use direct means, if need be, in challenging constraints.
Regarding his predisposition to process information, a distinctly low conceptual
complexity (0.54) coupled with a moderate score for self-confidence (0.28) shows that he was
more likely to be closed to information. All in all, in dealing with the domestic political
environment in this period regarding his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was advocate in
leadership style. In achieving his goals, this indicates, he was prone to challenge constraints and
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to be a “cognitive miser,” narrowly focused and relatively insensitive to the political context
(e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, pp. 91-92).
In relation to the domestic environment in this period, it is notable that his scores for
distrust of others (0.19) and in-group bias (0.32) are distinctly high in strength in comparison to
the norming group. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung’s approach to domestic political opposition
in relation to his North Korea policy in this period was markedly focused in nature (e.g., Hagan,
1993, 1994; M. G. Hermann, 2005). In essence, distrust of others and in-group bias are
motivational traits deemed the most flexible and adaptable in nature. In other words, scores of
these traits tend to vary depending on the nature of the situation or the contextual conditions.
In this period, the pattern of these two trait scores differs between domestic environment and
external environment. That is, Kim Dae-jung’s scores for distrust of others vary from high to low
compared to the norming group between the two different types of environment –the external
environment and the domestic environment- in this period while in-group bias constantly
remains high. This implies that, in conducting his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was prone
to show a focused orientation in challenging domestic constraints while exhibiting a zero-sum
orientation when responding to constraints arising from the external environment during this
time.

Advocate Leadership Style
Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership style was manifested in how he addressed
constraints imposed by the domestic political environment during this period. In response to
domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy in the wake of North Korea’s provocations – such as
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the submarine incident, the first Yeonpyeong battle, and the first ballistic missile test- President
Kim challenged constraints by showing himself highly determined to stick to his plan of action.
He did so amid all signs of uneasiness among conservative critics over what they called his softline posture on the North. While condemning North Korea’s provocative behaviors, Kim
expressed his robust will to maintain the Sunshine Policy and moved to push ahead with interKorean projects as previously planned based on the principle of separating politics from the
economy. Kim Dae-jung tightly held on to his strategy of comprehensive engagement in a
remarkably consistent manner despite fierce condemnation of the Sunshine Policy among his
political opponents. By doing so, he sent the South Korean public a clear signal of his firm
willingness to pursue his engagement policy against all the odds.
President Kim’s appointment of prominent conservative officials such as Kang In-duk,
who was reputed for strong anti-communist credentials, as the first Unification Minister, and
Lee Hong-koo, as his first Ambassador to the United States, can also be seen as use of indirect
means to challenge domestic constraints presumed to be imposed on his peace initiative. In
appointing Kang as his first Unification Minister, President Kim expected his conservative
lieutenant to mitigate resistance among members of the conservative circle and to convince
them of the credibility of the Sunshine Policy on his behalf.

Linkage between Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective, Perception and Leadership Style
Kim Dae-jung’s dealings with the domestic political environment appears intimately
connected with his own perception of relevant constraints. When taking office, Kim Dae-jung
envisaged severe resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his political opponents and the
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conservative circle.144 Such a perception is also manifested in his distinctly high score on distrust
of others (0.19) in relation to the domestic political environment surrounding his North Korea
policy. As was indicated by his aides, Kim Dae-jung considered the steadfast opposition to his
peace process among his opponents and conservative critics as mainly “politically motivated,”
or as “a given” to a certain degree, something that remained inherently embedded in South
Korea’s political landscape. This means that he found it innately difficult to fundamentally
address the problem by persuading his opponents to endorse the Sunshine Policy. Even though,
for Kim Dae-jung, the South-South conflict was a significantly agonizing issue that he
desperately desired to solve, he stopped short of considering the domestic opposition to his
North Korea policy as posing a grave challenge to the Sunshine Policy (D. W. Lim, personal
communication, October 19, 2016).
Kim Dae-jung’s pespective on his political opponents influenced his advocate approach
to leadership in relation to the domestic environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy.
Moreover, a firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy both from the South Korean public and
the international community, including the Clinton administration, constituted a crucial
enabling factor for Kim Dae-jung’s determined push for his North Korean agenda with
confidence despite constantly staunch opposition from his political opponents.

Motivational Perception: Focused

144

Kim Dae-jung had long been a victim of South Korea’s version of McCarthyism that had been prevalent under prior
authoritarian administrations. He had been often labeled pro-communist or pro-North Korean since the 1970s.
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His distinctly high scores for both distrust of others and in-group bias in relation to the
domestic political environment in this period are instrumental in understanding Kim Dae-jung’s
perception of his adversaries. A focused approach, specifically an approach focused on
opposition or the enemy, can be seen as qualitatively different from a zero-sum orientation
which involves a low distrust of others and a high in-group bias, as was shown in his dealings
with the external environment during this period. In essence, the focused orientation is more
targeted, limited, or immediate in nature than the zero-sum approach, which is inherently more
permanent, dispersed, and fundamental in terms of the degree and scope of commitment
involved. Regarding this motivational orientation, which involves the most extreme beliefs
about the nature of politics on the part of the leader, Hagan (1993, 1994) posits that these
leaders are likely to see diplomatic means such as bargaining and restraint as meaningless.
In Kim Dae-jung’s case, he viewed his own capacity to convince his domestic political
opponents and critics of the Sunshine Policy as severely limited. Such a mindset appears to
have had an impact on how he dealt with domestic political constraints in this period. His
focused orientation toward the domestic political landscape indicates that Kim Dae-jung was
likely to see the resistance to his Sunshine Policy among his critics and political opponents as an
imminent problem to deal with in implementing North Korea policy. He may have believed that
he could win eventually as long as he properly dealt with domestic opposition. This, in turn,
means that he stopped short of associating challenges and difficulties stemming from the
domestic political landscape with the ultimate success or effectiveness, or lack thereof, of his
peace initiative. In other words, he saw whatever constraint was imposed by the domestic
political environment to the Sunshine Policy as something to be challenged and overcome in
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and of itself as problems arose, rather than as something that had a potential to pose any
serious, existential threat to the Sunshine Policy itself.

Personal Capital and Political Skills
As shown in the implementation process of the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s personal
capital was embodied in the way in which he implemented the North Korea policy in the initial
two years of his presidency. Aside from some of his personal capital resources deemed
fundamental to the Sunshine Policy in general—e.g., his commitment to peace and
reconciliation; and professional stature based on the relevant knowledge and expertise—
certain sources of his personal capital and political skills were vigorously tapped in this period.
In particular, Kim drew on his international recognition and aptitude for coalition
building—e.g., at both the international and national level in the implementation process of his
peace initiative during this period. Kim Dae-jung’s charisma as a prominent dissident-turnedpresident was a crucial source of personal capital that helped promote the rally-round-the-flag
effect at a critical juncture of the South Korean state. Moreover, the appointment of prominent
conservative figures in some key posts, including the first unification minister and the first
Ambassador to the United States, evidences his political aptitude for building a coalition with
conservative circles in implementing his agenda.
Regarding flaws of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy, it is
worth noting that, in response to domestic political constraints in this period, Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership was far less flexible than was in dealing with constraints imposed by North Korea.
When confronted with obstacles arising from North Korea, he moved to adjust his tactics and
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principles, as was evidenced in a change in the pattern of his personality traits. In contrast, in
the face of domestic resistance to the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was adamant in clinging to
his planned course of action, and in doing so, failed to seriously tried to persuade the
conservative circle and the public of the credibility of his peace initiative. President Kim
expected his conservative lieutenant, Unification Minister Kang, to help mitigate resistance to
the Sunshine Policy by his critics and political opponents. Truly, such an appointment is
indicative of Kim’s willingness to be inclusive and seek bipartisan support of his peace initiative.
However, he was willing to delegate authority in persuading the conservative circle to
participate in his peace process. Such dealings with the domestic opposition to the Sunshine
Policy can be viewed as a passive move on the part of President Kim Dae-jung in light of his
political skills such as the aptitude for building coalitions and his art of persuasion.
Interestingly, in contrast to Kim Dae-jung’s muted response to domestic opposition to
the Sunshine Policy, the leadership profile shows a distinctive pattern in his personality traits
for the domestic political environment during this period. In response to domestic political
constraints, his profile shows the highest scores for the three sources of constraints and for the
belief in ability to control events, need for power, distrust of others, and in-group bias, while
showing the lowest scores foe conceptual complexity and self-confidence. This apparently
represents the following inclinations: his clear consciousness of domestic resistance to the
Sunshine Policy; his perceived limited ability to persuade the conservatives to endorse his
approach; his relatively rigid response to domestic political constraints; his deftness at
alternating between direct and indirect means to challenge constraints; and profound mistrust
or wariness toward his critics and political opponents.
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While intending to join forces with the opposition in embarking on his peace initiative,
Kim Dae-jung stopped short of going the extra mile to address domestic resistance to the
Sunshine Policy. He was far less motivated to change the minds of his political opponents than
he was to change the minds of the North Koreans. After all, in Kim Dae-jung’s implementation
of the Sunshine Policy, the coalition-building skills in his political skillset were not properly
displayed in relation to his critics and opponents.
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Chapter 6. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy
Implementation (Period 2: 2000)
Heyday of the Sunshine Policy

A. Overview: Heyday of the Sunshine Policy (2000)
The period between January 2000 and December 2000 effectively constituted the
heyday of the Sunshine Policy. In this period, patient endeavors on the part of President Kim
and his government to bring about the fist inter-Korean summit bore fruit, leading to a
remarkable improvement in inter-Korean relations. Meanwhile, with inter-Korean economic
cooperation being conducted at a civilian level, the Hyundai Group had difficulties managing
the Mt. Kumgang tourism project. The project was suffering from severe financial difficulties as
it was not as lucrative as expected, mainly due to high cost and rigid regulations set by the
North Korean authorities. The Mt. Kumgang tourism project played a pivotal role in improving
inter-Korean relations and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. Considering that the
Kumgang tourism project was closely intertwined with the fate of the Sunshine Policy, it was
crucial for President Kim to maintain the project despite its shortcomings. With a view to
propping up the project, Kim Dae-jung made the state-run Korea Land Corporation (Koland)
participate in the tourism project as Hyundai’s business partner starting in November of 2000.
Under the new business scheme, Koland and the Kim Dae-jung government were to shoulder all
of the financial burdens involved in the construction of the next inter-Korean project, the
Kaesung Industrial Complex, totaling an estimated US$175 million (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 129).
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In this period, domestic political factors posed burdens for the Sunshine Policy despite
all the achievements made in both inter-Korean relations and in U.S.-DPRK relations.
Conservative critics staunchly opposed the Sunshine Policy while the opposition party even
refused to join the presidential delegation in visiting Pyongyang for the June 15 summit. The
first inter-Korean summit and the related developments became a source of heated debate in
South Korean politics. North Korea, for its part, became far more active in acceding to South
Korean overtures to improve inter-Korean relations than in the previous period. Meanwhile,
the external environment, including the United States, surrounding the Sunshine Policy was
largely favorable throughout this period as unprecedented headway was made in U.S.-North
Korea relations in this period.
Before moving on to discuss President Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the
implementation of the Sunshine Policy in this period, some background to the process of
actualizing the inter-Korean summit and post-summit developments is discussed below. Also,
the leadership profiles of the two leaders of Koreas, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, are discussed
and analyzed in terms of their leadership styles and traits, on the basis of the conversation they
had during the summit meeting on June 14.

1. Background to the First Inter-Korean Summit
Berlin Declaration
In the first official step to achieve the goal he had set forth for this period, Kim Dae-jung
issued a major policy statement known as the Berlin Declaration. Kim Dae-jung indicated in his
autobiography that he took extreme care to draft his speech, and it took him nearly endless
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revisions to complete a final draft. In his speech delivered at Berlin Free University on March 9
2000, Kim pledged to assist the North with rehabilitating its bankrupt economy through interKorean cooperation and, among other things, modernizing its infrastructure, while urging the
regime to abandon nuclear and missile development. He also called on the North to work
together to reunite separated families and convene government-level talks to discuss all
pending issues to dismantle the Cold War structure on the Korean peninsula. He claimed that
the summit, if it materialized, would help North Korea more actively join with the international
community as a responsible state. Ahead of President Kim’s speech, the document was
delivered to the North Korean authorities through the truce village of Panmunjom as a goodwill
gesture while copies were also sent to the United States and Japan.
On June 3, ten days before the summit, President Kim dispatched Intelligence Chief Lim
Dong-won as his special envoy to Pyongyang so that Lim could exchange views with Kim Jong-il
about how to establish a successful summit and secure Chairman Kim’s consent on a joint
declaration based on the draft statement previously sent to the North. One major task assigned
to special envoy Lim was to seek objective, accurate, and concrete information about Kim Jongil and detailed knowledge about North Korea’s intent for the summit as President Kim was
discontent with the information provided by the NIS about the Northern leader as it was mostly
negative (Lim, 2012, pp. 12–13). This special envoy’s visit to 1 proved highly useful in acquiring
much-needed information on Kim Jong-il’s style and personality that would give President Kim
some concrete ideas about how to interact with Chairman Kim in the summit meeting.
The First Summit in Pyongyang
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The historic summit meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il
was held on June 14 between three o’clock to seven o’clock at the Baekhwawon conference
room. From the Southern side, three delegates and the president joined the meeting. 145 The
initial dicussion addressed the four main issues Kim Dae-jung had in mind as the subject of the
summit talks: unification, reduction of tensions and peace, promotion of exchange and
cooperation, and separated families (Lim, 2012, p. 40). During the summit, the two leaders had
a four hour-long in-depth discussion on a wide array of issues involving: inter-Korean relations,
unification formula, North Korea’s foreign relations, Kim Jong-il’s views on US forces in South
Korea, the opposition GNP’s stance on North Korea, North Korean defectors, National Security
Law, the South Korean Defense Ministry’s designation of the North as the main enemy, a
military hotline, and North Korean nuclear and missile issues, among other things.146
The summit proved to be the most efficient and effective policy tool available for
President Kim to achieve his goal of making a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations during his
term of office. It helped revive a broken official channel of communication and substantially
expanded inter-Korean social, cultural, and economic cooperation and exchanges.

2. Leadership Profiles of the Two Leaders at the Summit Meeting: Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jongil (LTA)
The content analysis of Kim Dae-jung’s four-hour-long conversation with Kim Jong-il on
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The three delegates who attended the meeting are: Director of National Intelligence Service (NIS) Lim Dong-won as the
presidential special envoy; Senior Secretary for National Security Hwang Won-tak; and Senior Economic Secretary Lee Ki-ho.
From the Northern side, only Secretary for South Korean Affairs Kim Yong-soon attended the meeting even though the two
sides had agreed that three personnel from each side would accompany their leaders (Lim, 2012, p. 37).
146
For detailed information on the summit discussion between the two leaders, see Lim, 2012, pp. 31-66.
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June 14, 2000, informs us of how Kim Dae-jung interacted in person with his North Korean
counterpart during the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang.
The LTA results indicate that, when meeting face-to-face with Kim Jong-il, Kim Dae-jung’s scores
for belief in ability to control events (BACE) (0.39) and need for power (0.41) were both high in
comparison with a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. That is, Kim Dae-jung was predisposed
to challenge constraints, and was skilled in alternating between direct and indirect means of
doing this. Meanwhile, his score on conceptual complexity (0.71) was high and self-confidence
moderate (0.30) in strength. On balance, the LTA results show that Kim Dae-jung was strategic
in his leadership style when conversing with the North Korean leader during the historic summit
In Pyongyang. Table 11 represents Kim Dae-jung’s personality profile based on his conversation
with Kim Jong-il during the June 14 summit meeting in 2000.

Table 11
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting
Kim Dae-jung

BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

Conversation
with Kim Jong-il
(N of words:
1875)

0.39

0.41

0.71

0.30

0.57

0.12

0.29

H

H

H

M

L

Challenge
Constraints

Open to
Information

Relationship/Proces
s-Focused

M
H
Close to
Zero-Sum
(Motivational
Perception)

Strategic (Charismatic) Leadership Style
Note. N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content
analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual
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Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group
Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s personality profile as presented above, it is noteworthy that
his score for conceptual complexity (0.71) is the highest of all of the relevant scores for the
three periods under study. The personality profile demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung was
strategic, and more specifically, charismatic, in his leadership style.147
In other words, Kim Dae-jung showed a distinctly different leadership style when dealing
face-to-face with the North Korean leader. In effect, regarding the North Korea policy, his
leadership profiles showed neither a high score on conceptual complexity nor a strategic
leadership style. In talking with Chairman Kim in the summit meeting, however, President Kim
demonstrated a strategic leadership style based on a characteristically high need for power and
a distinctly high conceptual complexity.
During the four-hour-long tête-à-tête with the Northern leader, Kim Dae-jung was highly
sensitive to information, as evidenced in his high score for conceptual complexity. During the
meeting, Kim Dae-jung closely watched Kim Jong-il trying to size him up. While being convinced
of where to go in overall strategies, he was interested in collecting information about what
Chairman Kim was like and what he had in mind. By doing so, he sought to figure out what
would be possible and how far he could push to move forward to carry out his agenda. In
seeking to collect the right information as much as possible during the historic forum, Kim Daejung sat back and tried to listen to his North Korean counterpart.

147

A strategic leader who is relationship-focused is termed charismatic in terms of leadership style in the leadership typology
(e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 95).

221

Regarding the issue of the Joint Declaration to be announced on the following day,
Chairman Kim suggested that the two leaders should mainly agree upon a broad outline of the
statement, and that the rest of the work should be delegated to ministerial-level meetings so
that the details would be worked out in compliance with the will of their superiors. Chairman
Kim argued that the important thing would be to supervise and control the implementation of
agreements. President Kim refuted Chairman Kim’s proposal, arguing that the two leaders
ought to discuss all specific details of the pending issues for implementation. In persuading his
counterpart to change his mind, Kim Dae-jung explained that the principles of unification and
the method for improving inter-Korean relations had been already agreed upon in the July 4
(1972) Joint Statement and the 1991 North-South Basic Agreement. Eventually, Kim Jong-il
decided to accept Kim Dae-jung’s counterproposal, and had in-depth conversation with the
latter on a broad range of topics (Lim, 2012, pp. 44-56). Table 12 displays Kim Jong-il’s
personality profile based on his conversation with Kim Dae-jung during the summit meeting on
June 14, 2000.

Table 12
Kim Jong-iI’s Profile’s leadership profile during the June 14 Summit Meeting
Filename

BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

Conversation
with Kim
Dae-jung (N
of words:
2446)

0.38

0.25

0.75

0.27

0.48

0.15

0.23

H

M

H

M

L

M

H

Challenge
Constraints

Open to
Information

Relationship
/ProcessFocused

Close to
Zero-Sum
(Motivational
Perception)
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Strategic (Charismatic) Leadership Style
Note. N of words: Number of the total words contained in the documents used for content
analysis. Belief in Ability to Control Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual
Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Task-focus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group
Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L). For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il’s personality profile based on what he said during the June 14
summit meeting with President Kim shows that the North Korean leader was also strategic—
and charismatic—in his leadership style. Very interestingly, the personality profiles of the two
leaders based on what they said verbatim during the summit are nearly identical in terms of the
relative strength of their trait scores. The only difference between these two profiles lies in
their scores for need for power. Their profiles are alike for six out of seven traits: both leaders
show a high belief in ability to control events, a high conceptual complexity, a moderate selfconfidence, a low task focus, a moderate distrust of others, and a high in-group bias. This means
that, as with his Southern counterpart, Kim Jong-il exhibited a strategic leadership style, being
inclined to challenge constraints and to be open to incoming information. Moreover, the North
Korean leader was also relationship-oriented and showed a (close to) zero-sum motivational
perception of the summit meeting.
Their personality profiles are different only in one trait: the need for power. Kim Jong-il’s
need for power score is moderate (at 0.25) while Kim Dae-jung’s is distinctly high (at 0.41)
compared to a norming group. The two leaders’ profiles as relevant to the June 14 summit are
reflective of how they dealt with each other and how they perceived the summit meeting. In
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actuality, the two leaders showed a different way of dealing with each other. The difference in
their scores on need for power is useful in understanding why and how the two leaders dealt
with each other in divergent manners. During the summit, Kim Jong-il, with a high locus of
control (BACE) and a moderate need for power, sought to take charge and to be in control—at
least, visibly more so than his Southern counterpart. Showing a lower score on need for power,
Kim Jong-il was less skilled at reading how to influence the other party and manipulating him to
have the desired outcome. Appearing more direct and less measured in demeanor than Kim
Dae-jung, Kim Jong-il sent more signals concerning his intentions and motivations than Kim
Dae-jung would have. In seeking to have control over the event and his South Korean
counterpart, the Chairman was far more voluble than Kim Dae-jung, while Kim Dae-jung was far
more focused on listening than on talking.
Kim Jong-il acted in more direct, straightforward manners, revealing his intention more
directly. In contrast, Kim Dae-jung acted in a calm and controlled fashion. Lim Dong-won, who
attended the summit along with two other presidential aides,148 indicates in his memoir that
President Kim showed a “logical and orderly style of presenting.” In contrast, Lim observes,
Chairman Kim sounded “free-flowing and led the conversation in a somewhat disorderly
manner” while making all the points he desired to make (Lim, 2012, p. 43). In his conversation
with President Kim Dae-jung, the chairman brought up a range of offensive or sensitive topics
and expressed strong dissatisfaction with what was going on in the South. 149 In response, Kim
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From the South’s side, three delegates in addition to the president attended the meeting: Lim Dong-won, the presidential
special envoy, Senior Secretary for National Security Hwang Won-tak, and Senior Economic Secretary Lee Ki-ho (Lim, 2012, p.
37).
149
For example, Chairman Kim opened a dialogue complaining about the recent incident in South Korea wherein some college
students were prosecuted for violating the National Security Law after raising the DPRK flag on a college campus. He also
expressed strong discontent at an array of issues including the National Security Law; the South’s designation of the North as
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Dae-jung sought to give clarifying explanations and persuade Kim Jong-il to put things into
perspective. The LTA results suggest that, during their summit meeting, the two strategic
leaders vigorously sought to size each other up in order to gain an accurate sense of each
other’s position—presumably in an attempt to decide on their next move.

What is the ground for considering that there are common elements in the two Koreas’
different unification proposals?
During the summit, the two leaders discussed the topic of reunification, both seeking to
persuade each other to accommodate their respective unification scheme in deciding on the
wording of the Article 2 of the Joint Declaration. North Korea’s unification formula -the
“Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo” argued for a unified state in the form of a federation
while the South’s proposal called for the creation of the confederation as the first stage in the
unification process.
Regarding Article 2 of the Joint Declaration, the two leaders ended up agreeing upon the
following statement: “Acknowledging that there are common elements for achieving
reunification in the South’s proposal for a confederation as well as the North’s proposal for a
federation of a lower stage as the formula, the South and the North agreed to promote
reunification in that direction.”
North Korea has persistently pursued federation as its unification strategy since August
14, 1960, when Kim Il-sung proposed an interim system of federation wherein the two Koreas

the “main enemy”; the South’s acceptance of North Korean defectors; the opposition party’s failure to join the reconciliation
process; etc. (Lim, 2012, pp. 37-56).
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with different political systems would coexist for a certain period of time prior to a final stage of
unification. The core of Kim Il-sung’s unification plan, framed around the Juche ideology, was a
theory composed of “independent national liberation” and “people’s democratic revolution”—
meaning the South Korean revolution (or communization) for national liberation. However,
North Korea’s strategic goal has gradually changed from hegemonic revolutionary unification to
unification based on the coexistence between the two Koreas. 150
That being so, in 1980, Kim Il-sung presented North Korea’s official unification formula, titled
“Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo”, as a final form of unification. The formula comprised
one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments. Under this proposal, North
and South Korea should form a federation while retaining their existing systems and ideologies.
North Korea then moved to eliminate anti-revolutionary elements from its unification
policy, and instead demanded preconditions for establishing a federation, including the
abolishment of the South's National Security Law, withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea,
and a guarantee that communists be allowed a greater voice in South Korea. This led some
people in the South to have antipathy to North Korea’s federation unification, viewing it as a
mere ploy to extend the latitude of communist forces in the South (W. Choi, 2001, pp. 116–
117).
In his 1991 New Year’s address, Kim Il-sung presented a modified unification formula in
which greater authority—e.g., diplomatic and military rights—would be temporarily accorded
to the autonomous regional governments, but with a gradual step-by-step shift of power to the
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North Korea’s economic decline amid the rapidly deteriorating external conditions and the resulting discrepancy in national
power between the two Koreas led the communist regime to shift its focus away from unification toward regime survival (W.
Choi, 2001).
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central government over time (W. Choi, 2001). Notably, it was in 1991 when the so-called Basic
Agreement was signed between the two Koreas—the inter-Korean agreement which stipulated
a gradual approach to unification—that North Korea began to go with “a loose federation” (Lim,
2012, p. 47). In fact, a “loose form of federation” is considered little different from the
federation formula originally proposed by Kim Il-sung. Meanwhile, the North’s “loose form of
federation” has also been viewed as having some elements in common with South Korea’s
confederation unification plan, in that it implies one nation, one state, two systems, and two
governments. That is, under a loose form of federation, both Koreas are to maintain their
existing authority and functions involving political, military, and diplomatic rights.

B. Constraints & Responses
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea
Constraint 1: North Korea’s request for cash support
Despite the smooth appearance of the process that led to the agreement between the
two sides upon the inter-Korean summit, it was later revealed that the Kim Dae-jung
government and Hyundai covertly funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to North Korea
before the summit was held in Pyongyang. Details of the so-called cash for summit scandal
began to emerge through the independent counsel’s investigation and court trials in June 2003
during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. In fact, President Kim and his advisors sought to
conceal the cash transfer because they were afraid that, when made public, it might cause
major backlash from the conservative circle and the public. Nonetheless, it was reported in
January 2003 in the waning days of Kim Dae-jung’s term of office that a cash payment of
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US$450 million had been made to the North through Hyundai several days before the summit
was held.151
Before leaving office on February 14, 2003, President Kim Dae-jung admitted to
irregularities involved in the money transfer to North Korea and made a public apology. He said
that the transfers were part of a business deal. Kim firmly opposed a special investigation into
the case, arguing that the abnormality of inter-Korean relations necessitated dealings outside
the usual legal boundaries (Marquand, 2003; K. Y. Son, 2006, pp. 113–114). Not only did the
investigations threaten to tarnish the legacy of his Sunshine Policy but the fallout from the
probe could seriously alter the government’s strategy regarding North Korea at a highly
sensitive time in inter-Korean relations. It could also further exacerbate the already serious
political division underway in South Korea (Marquand, 2003).
Nonetheless, the GNP-dominated National Assembly rammed through a bill on February
26, 2003, to appoint an independent counsel to investigate into the so-called Cash for Summit
scandal with the ruling MDP lawmakers boycotting the congressional session. President Roh
Moo-hyun, who strongly advocated the Sunshine Policy as a way to make peace with the
communist regime of Kim Jong-il, chose not to veto the bill and gave a reluctant nod for the
special counsel’s investigation into the scandal. This led the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)
and the independent counsel to launch two separate investigations into Hyundai’s
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In effect, speculation began to surface in March 2002 when Larry Niksch of the U.S. Congressional Research Service raised
the suspicion citing that the U.S. Military Command in Korea and the Central Intelligence Agency had alleged that Hyundai had
paid the North an estimated US$800 million including the remittance of US$400 million for the right to operate a tourism
project at Mt. Kumgang (Niksch, 2001, p. 9). The timing of the scandal could not have been worse for those who advocated the
Sunshine Policy. At the time, Kim Jong-il remained in direct confrontation with the United States with the erupting nuclear crisis
upon North Korea’s alleged admission of a secret highly-enriched uranium program (HEUP) during a U.S. envoy’s visit to
Pyongyang in October 2002.
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remittances.152
At the end of the seventy-day probe, the independent counsel announced on June 26,
2003, that North Korea had requested cash support while the two Koreas discussed the
possibility of a summit. The counsel stated that the South Korean government “promised” to
send $100 million to North Korea on April 8, 2000 (S Koreans Charged over Summit Cash, 2003).
The head of the independent counsel concluded that the money was clearly linked with the
summit and had been sent covertly through improper channels (S Koreans Charged over
Summit Cash, 2003). Regarding the issue of how the cash remittances should be defined, the
independent counsel judged that out of the $450 million agreed upon during the secret envoy’s
meeting on April 8, around US$350 million was assessed to be Hyundai’s ‘up-front’ payment for
investment in seven joint business projects with North Korea. The independent council defined
US$100 million as “policy-level assistance” provided by the Kim Dae-jung government.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled that this portion of payment constituted an “incentive” to
hold the summit, and thus was “illegal,” even though it stopped short of classifying it as a bribe
(Ahn, 2003; C. Moon, 2012, p. 36).

Response
By choosing to accommodate North Korea’s demand for cash support, Kim Dae-jung
decided to take risks and assume a hefty price to accomplish what he believed to be a greater
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Regarding President Roh’s decision, pundits note that it was impractical for the president to exercise the veto under the
domestic political circumstances at that time. First, President Roh took office on the pledge of impartiality and willingness to
run state affairs in a transparent manner and thus found it difficult to veto the bill. Moreover, with the opposition constituting
the majority at the National Assembly, Roh was in desperate need of cooperation from the opposition, and consequently was
not in a position to confronting the GNP by exercising the veto to block investigation. (J. Y. Choi, 2014, pp. 148–149).
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goal (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 111). In doing so, he was keenly aware that if it were revealed that the
money had been transferred illegally to the North, it would not only blacken his reputation, but
also lead to a powerful argument against his engagement policy toward North Korea.
As the government found it difficult to raise $100 million in cash, Minister Park Ji-won
asked an executive at Hyundai Asan Corporation to provide the money on the government’s
behalf. The Kim government then moved to arrange for the Hyundai group to secure $341.6
million USD -or ₩400 billion won- in loans from the state-run Korea Development Bank (KDB).
Hyundai then secretly transferred the money to North Korea mostly through Macao a few days
before the June 13-15 summit (Demick, 2003). Lim Dong-won, the then NIS chief, instructed his
deputies to assist the associated processes (K. Y. Son, 2006, pp. 115–116). As it turned out, the
NIS assisted Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. with converting the money into U.S. dollars at the
KDB, enabling the company to send $187 million to North Korean accounts at a Chinese bank in
Macao on June 9, 2000 (Gordon, 2003; Woo, 2003). At the end of its investigation, the
independent counsel concluded that the cash transfer in fact constituted a collaboration among
those from the presidential Blue House, the NIS, financial institutions, and Hyundai. Eight
individuals were indicted153 while a total of six individuals were convicted in connection with
the illegal cash transfer to North Korea (Ward, 2003).154
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Among those indicted were Chung Mong-hun (the Chairman of Hyundai Asan); Lim Dong-won (President Kim Dae-jung's
former Intelligence Director); Park Ji-won (a former Minister of Culture and Tourism). Park Ji-won was charged with abuse of
power and obstruction of public business. The charges for most of them were for fairly minor offenses such as violation of a law
requiring government approval for any donations or aid to North Korea (Demick, 2003).
154
Even though the independent counsel judged that President Kim Dae-jung was aware of the cash transfer, they indicated
that they chose not to conduct an investigation on President Kim since there was no evidence that he had been involved in an
illegal act (“Cash Transfer Was Linked with the Summit,” 2003). Minister Park, Intelligence Chief Lim and Chairman Chung were
charged with violating the law on South-North Exchanges and Cooperation and the law on Foreign Exchange Transactions.
Minister Park was additionally indicted of abusing official power and Chairman Chung of doctoring company books to cover up
the money transfers (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 117).
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After all, the Kim Dae-jung government’s interaction with North Korea in the months
leading up to the summit largely centered around secret contacts and behind-the-scenes
negotiations. From the beginning, the process of setting the terms and conditions for the
summit mainly involved the two Koreas and Hyundai as the Kim administration sought
assistance from Hyundai to organize the summit.155 In the pre-summit period, the roles of NIS
director Lim Dong-won and Culture and Tourism Minister Park Ji-won, the two key presidential
advisers, were particularly important as key implementers of the Sunshine Policy. Lim Dongwon was the major architect of the Sunshine Policy after President Kim, while Park Ji-won, who
worked for both the ruling party and the government, was one of the most prominent political
figures in the Kim administration (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 118). President Kim denied allegations that
the payment was a backhander intended to induce North Korea to agree to hold the summit,
claiming that the remittance was made to secure Hyundai’s right to launch seven projects
involving railways, electricity, communications, and the Kaesong industrial park in North Korea
(Y. S. Kim, 2003). Not surprisingly, the Cash for Summit scandal, when breaking out in February
2003, wrought havoc on the moral high ground the Sunshine Policy was commanding, impairing
the policy’s legitimacy and the corresponding transparency and validity of means of the policy’s
implementation (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 11).
At the first secret envoy’s meeting in Shanghai on March 23, one week after the
preliminary meeting, the North requested some cash support. As Special Envoy Park Ji-won
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Hyundai’s business partner in North Korea was KAPPC, which was in charge of a variety of inter-Korean projects as one of
the key front organizations of the Workers’ Party. The KAPPC was a powerful organization led by Kim Ong-sun, the party’s
secretary, who was in charge of promoting political, economic, and cultural exchanges with countries with which North Korea
had no diplomatic ties. The KAPPC was a dual-front organization entitled to represent the North as a state organ and to sign
business deals with foreign entities as a quasi-business agency. While the South Korean government and Hyundai jointly
worked to organize the summit, the KAPPC handled the two parties simultaneously (K. Y. Son, 2006, p. 114).
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flatly rejected the request, the second session of the envoy’s meeting was delayed after the
first day (Lim, 2012, pp. 6-7). Upon North Korea’s request for cash support, Kim Dae-jung and
his top adviser Lim Dong-won engaged in an intense debate.
They discussed whether to provide $100 million worth of rice and fertilizer as a gift or
direct cash support as the North demanded. The remark President Kim made when he decided
to accept the North Korean demand is suggestive of what he had in mind in doing so. When
giving instructions to Special Envoy Park Ji-won, Kim reportedly said, “A rich older brother
should not visit the poor younger brother’s home empty-handed. As we are going to hold a
historic summit, it seems that we need to consider providing food aid for the North Koreans
who are in extreme distress, doesn’t it? Special Envoy Park, please tell them we will offer $100
million (in cash) as a gift for the summit. That is the bottom line for your negotiation” (Lim,
2012, p. 7).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
By deciding to accede to the North’s demands, Kim Dae-jung desired to seize the window of
opportunity that had been coaxed open by his patient endeavors to pull off the successful
launch of the joint tourism project and to enable the Perry Process in the previous two year
period. Eventually, Kim Dae-jung chose to take a substantial risk and pay a steep price if need
be. Such a move, if disclosed, had the potential to not only severely undermine the integrity of
his peace process and derail its overall implementation, but also lead to paralyzing political
backlash in South Korea. Kim Dae-jung explained why he made such a decision when making a
public apology on February 14, 2003 as follows:
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The Government accommodated this, even though there were some legal problems
because it judged that such projects would be helpful for peace and the national
interest. … According to our law, the North Korean regime is an anti-state entity.
Cooperation with it is subject to stern punishment in accordance with the National
Security Law. However, based on a national consensus, we are pursuing reconciliation
and cooperation with the North while maintaining a strong security stance. Because of
the dual nature of South-North relations and because the North is so closed, there are
times when inter-Korean relations inevitably have to be dealt with covertly and outside
the framework of our laws. This kind of relationship can be found in the historic ties
between East and West Germany. The current case arose from the fervent desire to
prevent war under any circumstance and assure peace and prosperity on the Korean
Peninsula so we could go about living peacefully with the hope of achieving reunification
eventually. I will assume responsibility for the incident currently in question. I only hope
that the nation will understand that it was motivated by my earnest desire to realize
peace and national interests. (K. Y. Son, 2003)
With little tangible outcome yielded in inter-Korean reconciliation into the third year of
his presidency, Kim Dae-jung apparently believed that the cash transfer was a “necessary evil”
as long as if it served as a catalyst for a summit and the amelioration of inter-Korean relations
where any ground rules or relevant precedent remained practically absent (K. Y. Son, 2003).

Constraint 2: North Korea’s insistence on President Kim’s visit to Keumsusan Palace
In the process of arranging the summit meeting, North Korea posed another constraint
that could have hampered the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. In arranging the itinerary
for President Kim’s visit to Pyongyang, North Korea insisted that the Geumsusam Memorial
Palace be included in his itinerary so that President Kim could pay tribute to the dead body of
late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung.156 Arguing that it was not only the practice and protocol of
politics for state visitors to their Republic but also a matter of courtesy, North Korea showed
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This request was conveyed by Lim Dong-ok, the North Korean official in charge of North-South relations, to Lim Dong-won,
who was visiting Pyongyang on March 27 as a presidential secret envoy in preparation for the upcoming summit.
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extreme rigidity in holding fast to its demand. Under South Korea’s political context, however,
visiting the palace called the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum was a nonstarter for any president. Aside
from a dispute over the violation of the National Security Law, it is simply not acceptable to the
South Korean people that their president pay tribute to the body of the late North Korean
leader. Doing so could have not only badly damaged President Kim Dae-jung’s reputation, it
also could have caused tremendous turmoil even if it resulted in a historic inter-Korean summit
(Lim, 2012, p. 6).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Despite Lim Dong-won’s stern rejection and call for understanding, North Korea was
adamant. They threatened to cancel Lim’s meeting with Chairman Kim during his visit to
Pyongyang as a presidential envoy on May 27 if they did not agree. After returning home
without any result, Lim Dong-won went on a second visit to Pyongyang a week later on June 3.
Upon Lim’s return from the May 27 visit to Pyongyang, President Kim decided to accept the
North Korean demand after “agonizing deliberation.” He said, “Holding the summit is more
important than the issue of visiting the Keumsusan Memorial Palace. Improving North-South
relations is more important than protocol. If we fail to hold a summit now, it would bring
despair to our nation’s seventy million people, and we would become the laughing stock of the
world. We must hold a summit and announce a joint declaration. Tell them I can visit the palace
after I do these things” (Lim, 2012, pp. 13–15).
Kim Dae-jung’s decision was indeed a ‘bold’ move considering that it had the propensity
to invite harsh accusations from his domestic opponents and adversely affect the

234

implementation of his peace initiative (C. Moon, 2012). Eventually, however, President Kim was
spared a visit to the Keumsusan Palace, mainly by dint of Lim Dong-won’s relentless efforts to
persuade the North Korean leadership, including Chairman Kim Jong-il, even after President
Kim’s decision to accept the North’s request. After repeated attempts to persuade the North
Koreans, Special Envoy Lim eventually succeeded in extracting a concession from Kim Jong-il on
this issue on the day of the summit. In fact, Lim interpreted President Kim’s difficult decision as
indicative of his desperate desire to have a summit with Chairman Kim despite his reluctance to
visit the palace. Therefore, Envoy Lim kept trying to persuade Chairman Kim to abandon his
plan to have President Kim visit his deceased father’s palace both on his second visit to
Pyongyang as a special envoy and on the day of the summit meeting. Finally, Kim Dae-jung’s
visit to the Keumsusan Palace did not take place as Kim Jong-il ended up withdrawing his
insistence, deciding to accede to Lim’s request (Lim, 2012, pp. 34–35; 60–61).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 2: 2 000)
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment
Relatively Little Constraint was Imposed on the Sunshine Policy
In this period, the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy was generally
favorable as a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations coincided with a major improvement in
U.S.-DPRK relations. That is, in the year 2000, the external environment regarding the United
States posed little constraint to Kim Dae-jung’s peace initiative. A chain of promising
developments occurred in U.S.-North Korea relations beginning from William Perry’s visit to
Pyongyang in May 1999. The ensuing momentum grew throughout the latter part of 1999 and
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continued into the year 2000 before it began to unravel in early 2001 with President Bush
effectively shelving a missile deal that had been reached between the Clinton administration
and the Kim Jong-il regime in Berlin in September 1999 (Sanger, 2001).157
In the previous two years, the Clinton administration consistently maintained close
coordination with South Korea and Japan in seeking to resolve pending U.S. concerns about
North Korea. President Kim Dae-jung was particularly careful to work in close policy
coordination with Washington, informing the Clinton administration of each and every move
made by his government in dealing with North Korea. All such efforts, in turn, contributed to a
significant improvement in relations between Washington and Pyongyang in this period (Lim,
2012, p. 247). In September 2000, the U.S.-DPRK missile talks resumed in New York, and the
two countries issued a joint statement on terrorism in October, a move that represented
significant progress toward removing North Korea from the State Department’s terrorism list.
This also made it easier for North Korea to join international financial institutions including the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (North Korea Handbook, 2003; Perlez, 2000).
On October 9-12, Chairman Kim’s special envoy Jo Myung-rok, the number two man in North
Korea, visited Washington to meet with President Clinton and conveyed to him a letter from
Chairman Kim in which Kim invited Clinton to visit Pyongyang. Upon being informed of
Chairman Kim’s invitation of President Clinton to Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his
message to Clinton wherein he sought to persuade the latter to accept Kim Jong-il’s invitation
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A landmark deal on North Korean missiles was struck in Berlin between the United States and North Korea from September
7-13, 1999. Under the deal, North Korea promised to suspend its missile testing in return for U.S. measures to ease economic
sanctions (“US Agrees to Ease NK Sanctions in Return for Missile Launch Halt,” 1999). The following day, the Perry Report was
submitted to U.S. Congress, and, three days later, President Clinton eased parts of economic sanctions that had been imposed
against North Korea (“A Step Forward With North Korea,” 1999).
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(Lim, 2012, p. 250; Perlez, 2000). In his message to President Clinton, President Kim suggested
that the American President meet with Kim Jong-il and hold a US-DPRK summit, referring to
President Nixon’s visit to China at a time when the United States had no diplomatic relationship
with that nation (Lim, 2012, p. 250).
By doing so, Kim Dae-jung sought to play a mediating role between the two sides,
seeking to take advantage of a promising development then underway in inter-Korean ties in a
way that would lead to a substantial improvement in relations between Pyongyang and
Washington.158 With President Clinton deciding to accept Chairman Kim’s invitation to visit
Pyongyang, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright traveled to Pyongyang on October 23 in a bid
to prepare for a visit by President Clinton. In his meeting with Secretary Albright, Chairman Kim
reportedly said he was ready to make concessions if North Korea’s security was assured and it
were provided economic assistance. At the press conference following her visit to Pyongyang,
Secretary Albright said, “We made important progress, but much work remains to be done,”
expressing her satisfaction with the talks with Kim Jong-il (Jun, 2000; Lim, 2012). Even though
Secretary Albright’s trip to Pyongyang was designed to prepare for President Clinton’s visit, his
trip to Pyongyang was canceled in the fading days of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency. 159

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Throughout this period, Kim Dae-jung was highly optimistic about the prospect of U.S.-
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With a view to giving advice and consultation to the US team prior to Madame Albright’s visit to Pyongyang, President Kim’s
top adviser Lim Dong-won traveled to San Francisco with Ambassador Bosworth to meet with U.S. Policy Coordinator Wendy
Sherman and Ambassador Kartman (Lim, 2012).
159
President Clinton personally called President Kim on December 21, 2000, a week before the public announcement was
made, explaining that he had to cancel his visit to North Korea due to the time pressure further intensified by the ongoing
Middle East peace process (Kim, 2011, pp. 361-364).
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DPRK relations, and by extension, of his Sunshine Policy with the near perfect policy
coordination and close cooperation maintained between Washington and Seoul. The Perry
Process featuring the Kim Dae-jung administration’s suggested Comprehensive Approach was
vigorously implemented under President Clinton, who gave Kim Dae-jung’s peace initiative
framed around the Sunshine Policy a full, sustained endorsement (see Kim, 2011b, p. 354-356).
President Kim was thus all the more frustrated with President Clinton’s decision to cancel his
planned trip to Pyongyang in December 2000, and with Chairman Kim’s failure to seize the
golden opportunity to accept President Clinton’s invitation and visit Washington. Kim Dae-jung
expressed his regret by saying, “Had Chairman Kim visited the United States, the normalization
of relations would have materialized, and the Bush administration would have had no choice
but to recognize it. Then, no more conflict would have occurred between Washington and
Pyongyang, and by extension, inter-Korean relations would have made unprecedented progress
(Kim, 2011b, pp. 361-364).

B. Constraints and Responses (Period 2: 2000)
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
Constraint 1: President Kim’s Weak Power Base in Domestic Politics
The minority status of the ruling party at the National Assembly caused the Kim
government an array of difficulties in implementing both various reform measures as well as
the Sunshine Policy. A set of reform measures ran aground while the Sunshine Policy began to
lose its momentum as little tangible result had been produced in inter-Korean relations at the
government level by the end of initial two years of Kim’s presidency.
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Kim’s two years in office had received somewhat mixed reviews. Even though there was
a general consensus that the president had achieved significant successes in the fields of
democracy, economy and the North Korea policy, he was criticized on the grounds that his
performance regarding human rights, political reform, and social justice had been somewhat
disappointing (French, 2000). Some observers resented that he had shown much of the imperial
style of his authoritarian predecessors. Conservative critics and some independent
commentators observed that his government took a vindictive attitude toward critics and
perceived political opponents. The cases most frequently cited involved tax prosecutions and
other legal measures to penalize the owners of conservative newspaper companies, including
JoongAng Daily and the head of Korean Air (French, 2000).
With his newly reformed Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) holding barely one-third
of the seats at the National Assembly, things remained uncertain at best. At the time, his
coalition with the conservative party led by Kim Jong-pil, who had just resigned as Prime
Minister, appeared distinctly fragile. Public polls showed that his MDP and the main opposition,
GNP, were almost neck and neck (French, 2000).160 The polls conducted in the weeks prior to
the April 13 general elections showed that voters were increasingly turned off by the North
Korea Policy and that the policy only appeared to be a marginal issue in the upcoming elections.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
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In a fervent “rejection” drive waged by an alliance of civic groups against politicians deemed “incompetent and corrupt,” the
name of President Kim’s coalition partner Kim Jong-pil appeared at the top of the list. Those supportive of former Prime
Minister Kim Jong-pil accused President Kim of seeking to outmaneuver their man by having him step down from his position
and then allowing for a disconcerting attack on his reputation (French, 2000; Kirk, 2000).
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President Kim desperately needed to win the April 13 election. Most South Koreans
agreed that the elections would be decisive in its implications. He aspired to crown his
presidency not only with inter-Korean reconciliation but also with a second round of economic
reform in the remaining two years in office. Regarding the April general elections, Kim said in a
New Year’s press conference, “We must win the general elections to ensure political stability,
without which we cannot carry out reforms. Only when there is reform and politics becomes
stable, will inter-Korean dialogue go smoothly” (“Kim to Propose S-N Summit After April
Election,” 2000). Kim expressed his desire to win by stating in an interview with the New York
Times, ''Only with a mandate can we promote our agenda of a new human rights law, a new
anticorruption law, a new national security law and legislation to further democratize this
country. … 'We must win these elections” (French, 2000).161

Response
In an attempt to create much-needed momentum for his critical reform measures and
the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung established a new political party, the Millennium Democratic
Party, and expanded his power base beyond his existing progressive political realm. In the
months before the elections, Kim Dae-jung assiduously worked to renovate his political wing
into a broad-based party. In expanding his power base, he engaged in political maneuvering in
multiple ways. To begin with, he moved to recruit some conservative politicians into his new
party. In establishing the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) in January 2000, President Kim
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President Kim also says, “The ruling party must win in this election in order to continue its reforms, and to make Korea a
leader in the world'' (French, 2000).
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merged the ruling National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) with a conservative party -New
People’s Party (NPP)- led by Rhee In-je, a prominent conservative politician. He then co-opted
leaders of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and encouraged many progressive NGOs to
cooperate with the government to overhaul the country’s politics. He also strongly endorsed
“clean-up” campaigns waged by NGOs to drive corrupt politicians away from the political scene.
The president’s move dealt a severe blow to the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) and, to a
lesser degree, the Grand National Party (GNP) (Y. S. Han, 2002).
With the two Koreas agreeing to hold a summit at the end of the month-long process of
secret negotiations, President Kim may have envisaged that the announcement of the planned
summit would affect the outcome of the elections to his advantage. Therefore, he made a
dramatic announcement of an unprecedented inter-Korean summit three days before the April
13 general elections. It seems safe to assume that such a move on the part of President Kim
Dae-jung was intended to increase the odds of a parliamentary majority, or at least plurality,
being formed in his favor in the upcoming elections.
Not surprisingly, the timing of the announcement became highly controversial with
President Kim’s political opponents charging it as a political ploy to influence the election. The
conservative Grand National Party (GNP) immediately cried foul, citing President Kim’s earlier
pledge not to take political advantage of inter-Korean relations or use them for electoral
purposes. Calling the announcement of a South-North summit “a surprise political show” and
“an election gimmick,” the conservative parties –e.g., the Grand National Party (GNP), the
Democratic People’s Party (DPP) and the United Liberal Democrats (ULD)- vehemently accused
the president of politicizing inter-Korean relations for domestic political purposes. The GNP
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challenged the government to come clean about what it promised to give the North in return
for the surprise show. Raising suspicions of a secret deal with North Korea, the GNP’s chief
campaign manager said, “The inter-Korean summit must have been arranged at an exorbitant
cost. People have the right to know what kind of burden they should bear in return for the
summit.” Moreover, the opposition party assailed the government for what it called “the
beggar’s attitude,” citing North Korea’s official announcement that it agreed upon the summit
at the request of President Kim Dae-jung (“Opposition Decries S-N Summit as Campaign
Gimmick’,” 2000).
Despite all his efforts to expand his power base for the remaining half of his five-year
term, President Kim’s strategy failed to yield the desired results as the opposition GNP won the
parliamentary majority in the April 13 general elections, leaving the ruling MDP with a minority
status at the National Assembly.162 The April legislative elections made the country’s political
landscape an unstable two-party system which pundits expected would further complicate
President Kim’s national agenda ranging from continued economic reform to the improvement
of inter-Korean relations.163 In an attempt to maximize his political force even after the election
dealt him a bitter blow, Kim Dae-jung drew four mavericks elected in his home district of Cholla
into his party and successfully persuaded disgraced Kim Jong-pil to reverse his position to
restore the coalition (Hong, 2000).164
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The MDP came in a distant second in the April 13 general elections by winning 115 of the 273 parliamentary seats, while the
opposition GNP garnered 133, only four seats short of a majority. The United Liberal Democrats (ULD) headed by Kim Jong-pil,
who had just severed his coalition with President Kim, suffered a stunning decline in its National Assembly seats from 50 to 17
in the elections.
163
A bipartisan paradigm, a political construct centering around a dominant ruling party and a minority opposition party, is not
unusual in South Korea. What appeared peculiar about this election was that the ruling party remained as a minority while the
opposition gained plurality, leaving neither party equipped with a legislative majority (Hong, 2000)..
164
Nevertheless, the total force of the ruling party was still short of a majority that required 137 parliamentary seats.
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Constraint 2: Controversy over the inter-Korean Summit amid Deteriorating South-South
Conflict
At the end of Period 1 (1998-1999), what appeared to be South Korea’s continued
unilateral, conciliatory actions vis-à-vis North Korea without reciprocation caused considerable
political backlash, seriously undermining the momentum of the Sunshine Policy (C. Moon,
2012). However, the historic summit between two Koreas helped reinvigorate domestic
support for the Sunshine Policy. Following the summit, an absolute majority of South Koreans
expressed endorsement of the policy reflecting the heightened post-summit euphoria (H. S.
Paik, 2009; S. W. Park, 2002).165 Still, public opinion became increasingly divided with criticism
in the mainstream conservative media beginning to devalue political dividends from the summit
(Y. S. Han, 2002; C. Moon, 2012).
Meanwhile, the opposition GNP refused to join the presidential delegation to North
Korea for the summit in Pyongyang which comprised 24 special delegates including
representatives from political parties, social and economic organizations, business entities,
press groups, and academia. After the summit in early August 2000, the South Korean media
group composed of forty-eight heads of news organizations, went on a weeklong visit to North
Korea at Chairman Kim Jong-il’s invitation. However, the country’s two largest newspaper
companies, the Chosun Ilbo and the Dong-A Ilbo, refused to join in the media group’s trip to
North Korea led by Minister of Culture and Information Park Ji-won (Lim, 2012). Another source
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According to public opinion polls conducted by three conservative newspapers–Chosun, Dongah and Joongang– for the
period from May to August 2000, the approval ratings for the Sunshine Policy were 86.7 percent on average while the polls by
the progressive newspapers -Hankyoreh, Hankook, and Kyounghyang- showed the policy’s average approval rating to be 95.7
percent (S. W. Park, 2002).
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of worry for President Kim Dae-jung was that the GNP’s chairman refused to cooperate with
the government in relation to the Pyongyang summit. Even though President Kim tried to
inform him of what was going on during the summit, the opposition leader even declined to
meet with the presidential aide (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016).
The South-South conflict only worsened in the wake of the summit as the hitherto latent
ideological polarization between conservatives and progressives was brought to the surface.
Conservatives vehemently expressed skepticism about the Sunshine Policy, labeling it as “proNorth Korea and anti-U.S. leftist” and a “give-away” policy (Ko, 2006; H. S. Paik, 2009). With the
national euphoria sweeping across the country following the televised summit meeting,
domestic opposition to the Sunshine Policy was largely muted in the overall atmosphere of
excitement. However, as the enthusiastic mood dissipated in the latter half of 2000, the
conservative media and opposition began to raise their voices and struck back with the
skepticism of the Sunshine Policy. Making a case for the need to “adjust the speed” in
improving inter-Korean relations, President Kim’s conservative opponents urged him to put the
brakes on the Sunshine Policy. They also warned President Kim against being obsessed with
improving inter-Korean relations, denouncing him for confusing values and being duped by
North Korean tricks (W. S. Lee, 2003).
Furthermore, the summit agreement became a bone of contention in the domestic
political arena. Regarding the South-North Joint Declaration signed by the two leaders at the
end of the summit meeting, a political controversy flared up as the opposition GNP immediately
expressed concerns over Article II of the Joint Declaration. The article reads, “For the
achievement of reunification, we have agreed that there is a common element in the South's
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concept of a confederation and the North's formula for a loose form of federation. The South
and the North agreed to promote reunification in that direction.” The opposition party voiced
their concerns over the government’s partial approval of the “one state, two regimes” system
as had been suggested in North Korea’s unification formula. They argued that the
confederation system as indicated in Article II might run counter to the “one state, one regime”
unification principle of the South Korean government given that the constitution defines the
entire peninsula as South Korea’s sovereign territory and denies the legitimacy of the North
Korean state.
The GNP’s criticism was based on the notion that the “confederation system” as
addressed in Article II is indicative of the first stage of President Kim’s three-stage unification
formula. This was opposed to the government’s officially adopted unification scheme; that is,
the Korean National Community Unification Formula (KNCUF) devised under President Roh Taewoo and later revised by President Kim Young-sam under the title of the National Community
Unification Formula (NCUF). In brushing off such concerns, the presidential Blue House
emphasized that the Kim government’s official unification policy did not change from the
previous government’s unification formula (Y. B. Kim, 2000; K. Son, 2000). Some pundits note
that the “concept of a confederation” as addressed in the Joint Declaration is reflective of a
South-North confederation, as was indicated as the second stage of the Korean National
Community,166 and also as the first stage of Kim Dae-jung’s Three-Stage Unification Formula
(Cho et al., 2001).
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Under the Korean National Community Unification Formula, which was adopted at the end of 1988 after a series of National
Assembly hearings and a process of collecting public opinion, stipulates three stages of unification as follows: 1) Reconciliation
and Cooperation; 2) a South-North Confederation; and 3) Complete Unification.
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Regarding the June 15 Joint Declaration, the GNP also questioned the absence of
reference to North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and prisoners of war arrested by the
North during the Korean War. This was because the Joint Declaration (Article III) only addressed
the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South (Y. S. Han, 2002;
C. Moon, 2012).167 President Kim Dae-jung was also under fire for “being too easy” on the North
over the sensitive issue of South Koreans held in the North. The Kim administration sent back
63 North Koreans on September 2, 2000, as President Kim acceded to Chairman Kim’s demand
to repatriate those unconverted political prisoners who had been long held in the South.
However, the North denied the existence of South Korean POWs. The opposition GNP also
accused President Kim of his plan to provide a food loan to the North in response to the North’s
demand for one million tons of food in total with 200,000 tons scheduled to be delivered by the
end of October. The opposition party held a massive protest rally against what they called
President Km’s mismanagement of North Korea policy. Over 10,000 protesters took to the
streets in Inchon, west of Seoul, condemning the Sunshine Policy for its “irresponsibility” and
“lack of reciprocity” (“South Korean Opposition Condemns Food Aid for North,” 2000).168 In
September 2000, in the wake of the state visit to the South by the secretary for inter-Korean
affairs at the Korean Workers’ Party, Kim Yong-soon, the opposition GNP launched an all-out
offensive against the Sunshine Policy. The conservative media, the GNP, and its chairman all
fervently demanded the resignation of Lim Dong-won (Lim, 2015).
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Article III of the Joint Declaration is as follows: The South and the North have agreed to promptly resolve humanitarian
issues such as exchange visits by separated family members and relatives on the occasion of the August 15 National Liberation
Day and the question of unswerving Communists serving prison sentences in the South.
168
The GNP issued a statement saying that “It is irresponsible to offer 200,000 tons of food as a loan (to North Korea) as there
is no way (for South Korea) to get it paid back."
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In another significant development, the Nobel Committee announced President Kim
Dae-jung as the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize on October 13, 2000. This further polarized
South Korean society chiefly along the regional lines, as the mainstream conservative media set
out to release unfavorable reports and editorials after a brief period of favorable coverage. The
opposition party and media harshly criticized President Kim for leaving the country to accept
the Nobel Prize for seven days in the midst of the country’s economic instability and the
ensuing political uncertainty (B. S. Kim, 2000).

Response
With the opposition GNP refusing to support the government’s peace initiative and to
join the presidential delegation for the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim Dae-jung sought
to make his initiative more inclusive, promoting a visit to North Korea by conservative
politicians. President Kim suggested to Chairman Kim Jong-il during the June 14 summit
meeting that the latter invite GNP Chairman Lee Hoe-chang to Pyongyang, a demand which
Chairman Kim readily accepted. After the summit, President Kim suggested, albeit in vain, that
the GNP leader visit Pyongyang to meet with the North Korean leader. He also authorized GNP
Vice Chairwoman Park Geun-hye’s visit to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong-il in May 2002 (K.
H. Choi, personal communication, October 18, 2016; D. W. Lim, personal communication,
October 19, 2016).
On August 8, 2000, one and a half months after the summit, President Kim undertook a
cabinet reorganization, and in doing so, signaled his determination to maintain consistency in
his North Korea policy by retaining all key members of his Cabinet in charge of defense, foreign
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affairs, unification, and national intelligence. By doing so, President Kim sought to assure the
Pyongyang regime as well as the domestic opposition and the international community that
South Korea would maintain continuity in its approach to North Korea (C. S. Lee, 2000). On Kim
Dae-jung’s watch, members of the advisory group were responsible for informing the public of
the process of the Sunshine Policy. However, a couple of informed sources indicate that, during
Kim’s presidency, such efforts were made chiefly with the media, scholars, leaders of religious
or civic groups rather than with the general public.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Kim Dae-jung was deeply frustrated with the South-South conflict that grew
progressively worse throughout his presidency. For Kim Dae-jung, this constituted arguably the
most agonizing issue to deal with in implementing the Sunshine Policy. Lim Dong-won,
President Kim’s top adviser on North Korea policy, indicates that, President Kim found the
South-South conflict much more difficult to address than the North-South conflict, and SouthSouth communication even much harder than North-South communication. Despite all of
President Kim’s and his aides’ efforts to overcome the issue, little proved effective in addressing
the problem (D. W. Lim, personal communication, October 19, 2016). Apparently, Kim Dae-jung
found the situation in which conservative critics and opponents continued to resist the
Sunshine Policy mainly out of political considerations quite hopeless.
That is, Kim Dae-jung would likely have taken the domestic opposition to the Sunshine
Policy as ‘a given’ or something that remained so deeply ingrained in the South Korean political
landscape that there was little he could do to resolve it. Regarding domestic opposition to the
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Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s long-time aide observed, “Kim Dae-jung knew very well what
was the basis for this very big strange, anti-sunshine or anti-engagement feelings. … DJ knew
very well they were rooted, first of all, in the Korean War, and secondly, it is (was) very rooted
in the authoritarian, anti-democratic nature of South Korea’s ideological conservatism” (S.
Costello, personal communication, November 3, 2017).
Under President Kim Dae-jung, public opinion was taken into account only after a
decision was made, or was referred to, in considering how the policy might be explained to the
public. Kim Dae-jung believed that leaders must ‘lead’ as opposed to ‘follow’ public opinion, as
many informed sources testified. Regarding the influence of Kim Dae-jung’s views on public
opinion on his North Korea policy, it seems fair to say that public opinion did not affect the
government’s policy choices, even though he found it important to generate public support for
the Sunshine Policy through efforts to “lead” the public. In other words, President Kim cared
about public opinion to a certain degree, even though it did not constrain or limit the options
available to him as the final decision-maker or serve as a guide to his policy choices (Foyle,
1999). Regarding his perspective on public opinion, Kim Dae-jung believed that it was important
to gain public support for a chosen policy, but that it was not necessarily desirable for public
opinion to influence specific policy choices. In this sense, Kim Dae-jung held negative normative
beliefs and positive practical beliefs about public opinion.169
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This indicates that Kim Dae-jung held pragmatic beliefs about public opinion according to Douglas Foyle’s typology (1999).
Douglas Foyle (1999) examines individuals’ beliefs about public opinion in two areas of normative beliefs and practical beliefs.
Normative beliefs involve an individual’s judgement about the desirability of input from public opinion influencing foreign
policy choices. Practical beliefs represent the leader’s assessment of the necessity of public endorsement of a foreign policy for
its success. He categorizes those leaders who hold positive normative and practical beliefs about public opinion as “delegates”;
those with positive normative beliefs but negative practical beliefs, as “executors”; those with negative normative beliefs but
positive practical beliefs, as “pragmatists”; and those with negative normative and practical beliefs as “guardians.”
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C. Leadership Style (Period 2: 2000)
Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s personality profile for Period 2 (2000) is
summarized in Table 13 by the three sources of constraints.

Table 13
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for Period 2 (2000)
(Leadership Trait Analysis)
Period 2
North Korea
- N of doc: 19
- N of words: 29869
Foreign
- N of doc: 8
- N of words: 11814
Domestic
- N of doc: 9
- N of words: 14862

BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

0.35
M

0.36
H

0.55
L

0.29
M

0.53
L

0.11
L

0.25
H

0.29
L

0.33
H

0.56
M

0.33
M

0.50
L

0.06
L

0.25
H

0.40
H

0.38
H

0.55
L

0.24
L

0.56
L

0.15
M

0.23
H

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the
total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control
Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Taskfocus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).
For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.
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a. Source of Constraints: North Korea
According to the overall LTA results for this period, Kim Dae-jung’s score on belief in
ability to control events (BACE) (0.35) is moderate while his score for the need for power (0.36)
is high in strength compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This means that he was
predisposed to challenge constraints in dealing with North Korea. Regarding the traits indicative
of the leader’s predisposition to process information, Kim’s score on conceptual complexity
(0.55) is low while his score on self-confidence (0.29) is moderate in strength in comparison to
the norming group. This indicates that Kim Dae-jung was prone to be closed to information in
dealing with North Korea during this period. On balance, Kim’s leadership profile demonstrates
that he was an advocate in his approach to leadership in dealing with North Korea during this
period. Meanwhile, the coupling of a high in-group bias (0.25) and a low distrust of others (0.11)
indicates that Kim Dae-jung’s motivational perception was essentially zero-sum with regard to
North Korea.

Advocate Leadership Style
In this period, Kim Dae-jung acted highly proactively in dealing with the North and
sought to secure his dominance over the policy process in pursuing his peace initiative.

Decision-Making Process in the Pre-Summit Period
In conducting North Korea policy during this period, Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership
style involving a high need for power and a low conceptual complexity was manifested in the
ways in which he managed the decision-making process in the months leading up to the inter-
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Korean summit. Kim Dae-jung’s scores on these two traits and a high level of interest and
expertise in the issue domain interrelate to shape a distinct leadership style in relation to the
relevant decision-making process in this period. According to Preston (2001), three leadership
characteristics in particular –that is, need for power, conceptual complexity, and prior policy
experience- play a crucial role in shaping the presidential leadership style with regard to
decision-makings in foreign policy. In this period, Kim Dae-jung showed leadership styles of the
director (a leader with a high score on need for power and extensive policy expertise) and the
sentinel (a leader with a low conceptual complexity score and extensive policy expertise). Kim
Dae-jung’s leadership style regarding the decision-making process can be classified as director
(that is, a leader with a high score on need for power and extensive policy expertise) and
sentinel (a leader with a low conceptual complexity score and extensive policy expertise) in
Preston’s typology.

Director and Sentinel
In the pre-summit period, from the start of secret contacts with North Korea in early
February to the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in mid-June 2000, Kim Dae-jung showed a
director approach to leadership, which was evidenced in his high need for power (Winter, 1973;
McClelland, 1975; Etheredge, 1978; Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990). During
this period, as reflected in his director leadership style, he reinforced his sway over the policy
process and, in making decisions, mainly relied his own policy judgments.
Moreover, as manifested in his sentinel style of leadership, involving low conceptual
complexity and extensive policy expertise, Kim Dae-jung showed a “deductive expert” style of
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information processing in this period. That is, he was even more reluctant to conduct broad
information search or gather competing views within his advisory group in making decisions
than in the previous period (e.g., Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Driver, 1977; Suedfeld & Tetlock,
1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984; P. Tetlock, 1985; M. G. Hermann, 1987). Instead, he trusted his
own intuition and insight, demonstrating a highly decisive, less deliberative style. He did not
reconsider his views once an action had been taken (e.g., Preston, 2001). The resulting
decisions and strategies were immune to change while tactical elements were subject to
modification in tandem with the situation (e.g., G. Snyder & Diesing, 1977). 170

Personalized Decision-Making Process and Maintenance of Secrecy
During the pre-summit period, President Kim relied on a highly personalized decisionmaking mechanism that was centralized within a tight inner circle of close advisers. In managing
secret inter-Korean contacts and the special envoy’s visits to Pyongyang in the months leading
up to the summit, President Kim made key decisions while his two advisors, Minister of Culture
and Tourism Park Ji-won and Intelligence Chief Lim Dong-won, served as key implementers of
his decisions.
Moreover, President Kim was careful to maintain top-level secrecy in negotiating with
North Korea to discuss the possibility of the summit. As a result, even senior members of the
policy group were kept in the dark up until the day before the public announcement on the
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A close examination shows that the relevant decision-making system applied throughout his term of office, as analyzed in
Chapter 4, was distinct from the system adopted specifically for the pre-summit period (Period 2). The difference was
particularly salient in the degree of openness to information and of personalization of the decision-making system. Such a
difference was manifested in the difference in the strength of his scores–in relation to a norming group–for conceptual
complexity between the overall period of his presidency (moderate) and Period 2 (low).
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summit was made on April 10, 2000. Even the Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu and the Foreign
Affairs and Trade Minister were not aware of the secret process. Only Prime Minister Park Taejoon and four or five individuals from the U.S. government -including President Clinton,
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Stephen Bosworth- were
informed of secret inter-Korean contacts at the time (Lim, 2015, pp. 28–29). While maintaining
the highest-level of secrecy even within his own government, Kim Dae-jung was extremely
careful to maintain trust in his relationship with the United States.
In fact, such a decision-making process was a clear departure from the regular, formal
decision-making mechanisms centered around the National Security Council. In this period, the
process of organizing the summit was not subject to discussion at the NSC meetings. Seeking to
complete the first stage of the unification plan, the stage of peaceful coexistence based on
peaceful exchange and cooperation, he may have felt time pressure as inter-Korean relations
had not yet made any headway at the government level.
Kim Dae-jung chose to streamline the decision-making process and maintain outright
secrecy in organizing the summit. After all, such a strategy resulted in remarkable speed in
moving forward in the implementation of his policy agenda. Under this system, difficult
decisions such as whether to accept North Korea’s request for a sizable cash remittance were
made by the president himself without interruption and were speedily implemented. With a
clear roadmap for a peace-making strategy in mind, Kim Dae-jung strived to speed up the policy
process so that he could achieve the set of goals he had established for this period. All this
made it possible for the announcement of the summit to be made on April 10, only one month
after the first contact via secret envoys was made between two Koreas on March 8.
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Strengthened Influence
In dispatching his special envoys to negotiate with North Korea, President Kim issued
detailed instructions on what to discuss, what to say, and how to interact with their North
Korean counterparts. In preparing for the summit after the public announcement was made on
April 10, President Kim continued to hold sway over the decision-making process. The Summit
Preparation Committee led by Yang Young-shik, the Vice Unification Minister, was set up to
discuss and negotiate with the North on various issues in preparation for the summit. Members
of this committee discussed an array of agenda items that had been formulated along
presidential guidelines and instructions issued in detail (Y. S. Yang, personal communication,
October 29, 2016). This also shows that the enhanced presidential leverage characterized the
policy process involved in the first inter-Korean summit.
As reflected in his handling of the North Korean demand for cash transfer and his
decision to visit the Keumsusan Memorial Palace, or the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum, Kim Dae-jung
decidedly challenged constraints. In pursuing his peace agenda, he was not reluctant to make
bold decisions that entailed potentially serious political risks and severe backlash from the
public. His tasks at times involved covert actions on the part of his government that could be
conceived as breaking the law. He chose, however, to resolutely challenge constraints by
making decisions that could have subjected him to stern punishment under the National
Security Law.

High Need for Power
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In his period (2000), Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership style was integrated with a high
need for power and a low conceptual complexity to yield an idiosyncratic aspect of his
leadership (Terhune, 1968; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983;
Kaarbo & Hermann, 1998; Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). In the year 2000, Kim Dae-jung’s
approach to leadership appeared highly manipulative in pursuing his peace agenda. Kim Daejung resorted to indirect means and worked behind the scenes in challenging constraints. His
decision to accommodate North Korea’s demand for cash transfer as a way to increase the
chances of holding the summit demonstrates that he was readily manipulative in achieving his
goal. In response to North Korea’s demand for cash transfer and for his visit to the Keumsusan
Memorial Palace, or the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum, Kim Dae-jung challenged constraints by
making bold decisions that could entail serious political risks and severe backlash from the
public. President Kim was well aware that the illegal cash transfer to the North days before the
scheduled summit could subject him to stern punishment under the National Security Law. He
had such a strong personal conviction about his course of action that he believed his decision
constituted a necessary evil to pursue national interest and achieve the goal of realizing peace.
Kim Dae-jung’s high score for need for power–in relation to a norming group–was also
reflected in his effort to work behind the scenes to implement elaborate strategies step-by-step
so as to push his agenda while minimizing risks. Each and every step he took in holding the
summit was carefully choreographed and calculated to help achieve his goal. In an interview
with Japan’s Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) on February 9, 2000, President Kim Dae-jung
expressed his fairly positive view on Chairman Kim Jong-il. He stated that the North Korean
leader had “a good judgement” and “insight as a leader” (Kim, 2011b, p. 225). In fact, Kim Dae-
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jung’s favorable assessment of Kim Jong-il was a calculated move to induce the latter to
embrace the idea of a summit and to leave the reform-minded officials in Pyongyang with more
leeway to maneuver among more policy options available to them. Kim Dae-jung says in his
autobiography that he intended to send the North a conciliatory signal via this interview
seeking to achieve the main goal through a strategic use of the unique political circumstances
of the communist regime (K. Y. Park, 2001, pp. 83–84; Kim, 2011b, p. 225). 171
The Berlin Declaration was publicly known as President Kim’s first official proposal to
North Korea for economic cooperation and building mutual confidence.172 As it turned out,
however, the South had begun the contact with the North behind the scenes and already held
the first secret talks in Singapore a day before his landmark speech in Berlin. This was because
he wanted to increase the chances of the Berlin Declaration leading to the inter-Korean summit
(Lim, 2012, pp. 2-5). 173 Eventually, North Korea, which had rebuffed President Kim’s repeated
proposals for an inter-Korean summit throughout his initial two years in office, expressed its
intent to hold an inter-Korean summit unofficially via the Hyundai channel in late January,
2000.
Ultimately, Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership style based on a high need for power
and a low conceptual complexity enables an understanding of how this major breakthrough in
inter-Korean relations was made in a remarkably short span of time, effectively rendering the
171

In giving this interview, Kim Dae-jung had in mind the fact that the North Korean system was mainly comprised of two
groups: military hardliners and those taking a more pragmatic approach wanting to benefit from the improvement in interKorean ties.
172
The Berlin Declaration was meant to persuade the North to accommodate the Southern proposal to promote governmentlevel inter-Korean cooperation.
173
The first secret meeting between special envoys Park Ji-won and Song Ho-kyung, from South and North Korea respectively,
was held on March 8 in Singapore, a day prior to President Kim’s Berlin Declaration. A series of secret special envoy and
working-level meetings were subsequently held in Shanghai and Beijing, eventually resulting in an agreement to hold the first
inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang from June 12 to 14 (e.g., Lim, 2012).
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year 2000 a heyday of the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung’s Berlin Declaration (March 9), which
marked a watershed moment in inter-Korean relations, was followed by an earth-shattering
announcement of a planned summit (April 10) and finally the first inter-Korean summit in
Pyongyang and the formulation of the Joint Declaration (June 14-15), which was an essential
turning point in inter-Korean relations from distrust and confrontation to cooperation and
reconciliation. Following the first historic summit, there occurred a rapid expansion of interKorean cooperation and reconciliation as the two sides proceeded to implement an array of
summit agreements by holding a series of talks and events in various fields. The ensuing
rapprochement between the two Koreas helped reshape the political, economic, and sociocultural landscape of inter-Korean relations during this period.

Motivational Perception: Zero-sum
Kim Dae-jung’s decision to comply with Pyongyang’s excessive demands to transfer cash and
visit the Kim Il-sung Mausoleum is indicative of the degree of pressure Kim Dae-jung was feeling
about achieving the goal of holding the first inter-Korean summit in this period. Kim’s
personality profile shows that the controversial choices he made in dealing with North Korea
were linked with his zero-sum motivational percetion of the cocmmunist regime, as manifested
in his high score on in-group bias and low score on distrust of others. His zero-sum motivational
perception indicates that he may have thought: “I could lose everything if I didn’t gain
everything. If I lose this opportunity, it would mean a permanent defeat for my peace
initiative.” Such a perception may have led him to bend over backward to hold the first interKorean summit and then make it an effective turning point in inter-Korean relations. To do so,
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he may have regarded an advocate approach to leadership as most befitting the nature of the
situation at hand.

Note.
Regarding the External Environment in Period 2 (2000): Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in relation to
the external environment for Period 2 is not discussed in the analysis section of this study. The
reason for this is as follows: The study is focused on delving into how Kim Dae-jung addressed
the constraints and difficulties imposed by contextual conditions surrounding the Sunshine
Policy. In fact, as explained in the above section, in Period 2, virtually little constraint was posed
to the Sunshine Policy by the external environment. Several informed sources indicate that this
was in accord with Kim Dae-jung’s own perspective on this period. Therefore, the relationship
between Kim Dae-jung’s leadership style and how external constraints were dealt with in Period
2 is beyond the scope of this analysis.

C. Leadership Style (Period 2: 2000)
b. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
The LTA results indicate that, when compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders,
Kim Dae-jung’s scores for belief in ability to control events (BACE) (0.40) and need for power
(Power) (0.38) are both high. This means that Kim Dae-jung tended to challenge constraints in
dealing with the domestic political environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy in the year
2000. Regarding two traits indicative of the leader’s predisposition to process information,
Kim’s scores for conceptual complexity (CC) (0.55) and self-confidence (SC) (0.24) are both low
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in strength in comparison with a reference group of Pacific Rim leaders. These two scores
indicate that Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to be closed to information. The LTA results
indicate that Kim Dae-jung tended to be an advocate in his leadership style in relation to the
domestic political environment in conducting North Korea policy in this period.

Advocate Leadership Style
With the Sunshine Policy beginning to lose popular support due to its prolonged failure
to produce any tangible results in inter-Korean relations by the end of the year 1999 and a
seeming lack of change in North Korea’s behavior, Kim Dae-jung desperately sought to create a
momentum for the Sunshine Policy in terms of domestic politics. He earnestly challenged
constraints arising from the ruling party’s minority status at the National Assembly, the
constraints he had been struggling with since he was sworn into office. He embarked on a
series of bold moves to expand his power base in order to push for his North Korea policy
agenda more actively. Instead of waiting until the next general election, scheduled for April 13,
and hoping for his party -the National Community for New Politics (NCNP)- to win the majority
at the National Assembly, Kim Dae-jung launched his new party called the Millennium
Democratic Party (MDP) in January 2000. President Kim then launched a recruiting drive in
earnest to expand his power base. In this period, Kim Dae-jung seemingly switched the main
goal of his peace initiative from undertaking the Sunshine Policy based on national consensus
and a coalition with the ULD to building his own independent power base via the successful
results of the Sunshine Policy (Y. S. Han, 2002). By doing so, he chose to be the master of his
own destiny and improve his lot in a proactive manner showing an advocate approach to
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leadership.
Kim Dae-jung’s vigorous drive in challenging domestic political constraints in this period
is shown in his high score on belief in ability to control events (BACE) (0.40) that is indicative of a
firm internal locus of control. His BACE score regarding the domestic environment (0.40) is
distinctly higher than for the external environment, a low score at 0.29. This indicates that, in
handling domestic politics with regard to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to be more
in control and was less likely to seek compromise than in dealing with the external
environment. In enlarging the scope of his influence, Kim Dae-jung did not delegate authority
for tasks to ensure that his preferred courses of action would be properly enacted. As reflected
in his high BACE score coupled with a high need for power, Kim Dae-jung’s response to domestic
political constraints in this period was more direct and outright than in response to the external
environment. A combination of high scores for these two traits also indicate that Kim was more
likely to be skilled at alternating between direct and indirect means in challenging constraints
when handling domestic politics.
In this period, President Kim strived to enlarge his power base through various means
while attempting to turn the progress made in inter-Korean ties into political benefits. He
deliberately timed the announcement of the historic summit to be made just before the
legislative elections, seeking to influence voters to his political advantage. Furthermore, after
the election, he attempted to forge an artificial political realignment by co-opting some GNP –
the main opposition party- members to make up a parliamentary majority in the ruling party’s
favor (Hong, 2000). All this demonstrates that his handling of domestic political constraints in
relation to North Korea policy was not so much passive or indirect as proactive and direct
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during this period.
Moreover, his low scores for both conceptual complexity (0.55) and self-confidence
(0.24) show how closed he was to information in dealing with domestic politics in relation to his
peace initiative during this period. In dealing with North Korea, he did not seek feedback from
the opposition or the public because, from his perspective, an alternative course or fallback
strategy to the Sunshine Policy was a dead loss. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung did not see growing
calls by his opponents and critics to “adjust the speed” or even to scrap the policy altogether as
something that posed a serious constraint to the implementation of his North Korea policy. In
this period, the worsening South-South conflict surrounding the inter-Korean summit was
another source of concern for Kim Dae-jung. As noted by several informed sources, Kim Daejung found his ability to resolve this problem inherently limited while considering domestic
opposition and the resulting South-South conflict as arguably the most agonizing issue he was
faced with. This was manifest in Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile. That is, regarding domestic
politics in this period, Kim’s relevant score for self-confidence (0.24) is distinctly low in strength
compared to a norming group.174 This may be understood in the context of Kim’s different
perspectives on two different sources of constraints regarding the Sunshine Policy, the external
environment and the internal environment. This shows that Kim Dae-jung was less confident in
his ability to challenge constraints imposed by the domestic political environment than was in
the case of the external environment in this period.
As was discussed in the previous section, Kim Dae-jung held negative normative beliefs
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Both in Period 1 and Period 2, Kim’s self-confidence score regarding the domestic environment was constantly lower than in
relation to the external environment.
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and positive practical beliefs about public opinion. Also, he believed in need to ‘lead,’ as
opposed to following, the public. In short, it was important for President Kim to obtain public
support for the Sunshine Policy even though he did not find it necessarily desirable to reflect
public opinion in specific policy choices. All this combined with his perception of limited ability
to persuade his political opponents of the credibility of the Sunshine Policy appears to lead him
to adopt an advocate leadership style in dealing with domestic politics in relation to the
Sunshine Policy. That is, Kim Dae-jung showed a determined push to implement his North Korea
policy agenda without being highly sensitive to growing accusation of his policy on the domestic
political scene.

Motivational Perception: Close to Zero-sum
Another salient aspect of his approach to leadership regarding the domestic political
landscape in this period concerns a decrease in distrust of others from a high score in Period 1
to a moderate one (from 0.19 to 0.15) in Period 2. Such a change in the leader’s perception of
the domestic political environment had an impact on how he undertook the concerned policy.
That is, the zero-sum behavioral predisposition he showed vis-à-vis North Korea in Period 2 was
a shift from the focused orientation –or radical orientation in Hagan’s terminology (1993,
1994)- he demonstrated in Period 1. This means that, regarding his handling of domestic
politics in relation to the Sunshine Policy, Kim may have thought: ‘if I keep going this way, I
won’t make it.’ Having seen domestic opposition to his peace initiative as something to be dealt
with in and of itself, independent of the success of the Sunshine Policy (in Period 1), Kim Daejung, in Period 2, appears to have felt the need to address the problem in more fundamental
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ways as he believed: “if I do not make a change, I could lose everything and see the legacy of
my peace process badly undermined.” During this period, Kim strived to turn around the
domestic political landscape in a way that would render it more conducive to his peace process.
After all, a change in his motivational perception translated into a series of proactive moves he
made in relation to his North Korea policy on domestic political fronts during this period.

Political Skills
Meanwhile, what happened in the domestic political arena in relation to the Sunshine
Policy during this period sheds light on some rough edges of Kim Dae-jung’s leadership.
Showing a consistently low score on task focus throughout his tenure, Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership profile indicates that he was an innately relationship/process-oriented leader. In this
period, his leadership in dealing with North Korea was mainly advocate, and more specifically,
evangelistic.175 In leadership typology, evangelistic leaders refer to those advocate leaders who
are relationship/process oriented. Evangelistic leaders are inclined to be even more concerned
with the relationship with relevant constituencies than with the issues facing their
organizations. Evangelists tend to focus on persuading others to accept their message and join
their cause (Hermann et al., 2001, p. 97). Considering that the persuasive ability constitutes a
core ingredient in Kim Dae-jung’s political skills inventory, it is not surprising that Kim was an
inherently evangelistic leader. Nonetheless, the relationship/process focus was less than salient
to the way in which he handled domestic political constraints in implementing the North Korea
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In their study delving into the relationship between leadership styles and foreign policy behaviors based on leadership
typology, Hermann and associates (2001) classify those advocate leaders who are relationship/process-oriented as evangelists,
and the advocate leaders who are task-oriented as expansionists (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001).
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policy.
In Period 2 (2000), in a bid to fundamentally address domestic political constraints
imposed on the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung committed much of his energy and resources to
expanding his power base and turning the headway made in inter-Korean relations into his
political benefit. This way, he strived to create domestic political conditions conducive to the
implementation to his peace initiative. Showing an advocate leadership style, Kim Dae-jung
exercised a constantly assertive push to implement his policy agenda, seeking to create
desperately needed momentum for his peace initiative in domestic political terms. Upon taking
office, President Kim underscored the importance of pursuing the rapprochement on the basis
of national consensus. In this period, however, he seemingly shifted away from the pursuit of
national consensus as a major operating principle of the Sunshine Policy, towards expanding his
own power base via tangible outcomes in inter-Korean relations.
Expansionist leaders–e.g. advocate leaders who are task-focused–tend to focus on
broadening their power base, whereas evangelistic leaders are more concerned with
persuading their constituencies to endorse and join their cause. In this sense, on the domestic
political front, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership appeared closer to an expansionist than to an
evangelistic style of leadership. In undertaking the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung worked
hard to persuade foreign leaders and the North Korean regime to join his peace initiative while
striving to build trust with North Korea and the U.S. government. Nonetheless, he apparently
was not as earnestly committed to persuading domestic audiences and his political opponents
of the need to endorse the Sunshine Policy. That is, in engaging in his peace initiative, the art of
persuasion and coalition building, the two major ingredients in Kim Dae-jung’s political skillset,
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were mainly displayed on the North Korean and international front; this was not quite the case
with the domestic political front.
In fact, he made little, if any, serious effort to lessen misunderstandings or controversy
over, or facilitate understanding of, the terms of the Joint Statement among the Korean public
in the wake of the summit in Pyongyang. Upon his arrival back in Seoul from Pyongyang on June
15, 2000, President Kim explained what the Joint Statement was about by delivering a speech
briefing the South Korean public on the outcome of the summit. However, he could have held a
press conference, directly communicated with the public, and explained what transpired during
his visit to Pyongyang.
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy in the year 2000 mainly
centered around his advocate—more specifically, evangelistic—leadership style, with a focus
lying on building trust with North Korea and making a genuine leap forward in inter-Korean ties.
However, regarding the North Korea policy, his ability to persuade and build coalition, the two
core ingredients in his political skillset, were underutilized on the domestic political front.
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Chapter 7. How was the Sunshine Policy Conducted? Policy
Implementation (Period 3: 2001-2002)
Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis
A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)
a. Source of Constraints: North Korea

Constraint 1: Stalled inter-Korean relations due to North Korea’s withdrawal from interKorean cooperation
In protest to President Bush’s hardline stance toward Pyongyang, North Korea cut off
official channels for inter-Korean dialogue one after another beginning in early 2001 (Lim,
2012).176 North Korea’s unilateral decision to suspend dialogue with the South brought all
government-level exchanges to a complete halt for one year.177 The inter-Korean relations only
resumed in April 2002 after special envoy Lim Dong-won reached an agreement with Chairman
Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang to resume the process of promoting the stalled inter-Korean relations.
The September 11 attacks led the Bush administration to take an even harder line vis-àvis North Korea, further aggravating U.S.-North Korea relations, 178 and having an adverse impact
on inter-Korean relations. Upon the outbreak of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Kim
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Following Kim Dae-jung’s first summit with President Bush in March 2001, North Korea abruptly canceled the fifth round of
inter-Korean ministerial talks scheduled for March 13, 2001 in Seoul on the day of the meeting on the grounds that President
Kim had failed to persuade President Bush (Lim, 2012).
177
The two rounds of Ministerial talks, held on September 8 and November 8, 2001, were the only government-level interKorean dialogues held in this period.
178
Following September 11, President Bush and U.S. hardliners repeatedly questioned North Korea’s development of nuclear
weapons and criticized it as a “threat to the security of the international community” (K.-S. KIM, 2002, p. 104).
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administration took emergency steps to protect the U.S. forces stationed in Korea and major
strategic facilities from a possible terrorist attack. Taking issue with the South’s support of the
Bush administration in the War on Terrorism, the North abruptly canceled plans to send a
group of separated families to Seoul for family reunions. North Korea’s actions constituted a
political embarrassment to President Kim, dealing a severe blow to his Sunshine Policy (Kirk,
2001).

Response
In a bid to push ahead with the Sunshine Policy amid North Korea’s rejection of interKorean dialogue and cooperation, Kim Dae-jung appointed Lim Dong-won, the Director of the
National Intelligence Service (NIS), as the Unification Minister on March 26, 2001. By doing so,
President Kim expressed his willingness to push ahead with his planned course of action despite
unfavorable contextual conditions. This appointment left Lim, the top presidential adviser on
North Korea, unencumbered by whatever constraints and restrictions had been linked with the
position of Intelligence Chief in pursuing inter-Korean rapprochement. This enabled him to
openly negotiate with the North and to persuade the South Korean people and the United
States to support the government’s North Korea strategy from the forefront.
This appointment was interpreted as President Kim’s clear message that his Sunshine
Policy would stay on course despite the discrepancy in opinions between himself and President
Bush that became apparent during the summit. With North Korea suspending inter-Korean
dialogue and cooperation in reaction to the Bush administration’s hardline posture, Kim Daejung chose to unilaterally implement the inter-Korean agenda, as agreed upon with North Korea
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during the June 15 summit, regardless of whether the Northern side performed its share of
tasks.
A handful of former aides to President Kim indicated that, by the end of his presidential
term, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group had nearly fully implemented their North Korea policy
agenda, except for the revision of National Security Law and Chairman Kim Jong-il’s return visit
to Seoul for a second summit.179 Meanwhile, the Kim administration’s patient endeavors to
persuade the North to get back on the engagement track finally led the North to issue a
proposal on September 8, 2001, to resume inter-Korean talks after a six-month hiatus (Y. J. Oh,
2001b). In the process of organizing the sixth North-South Ministerial Talks scheduled for
November 2001, North Korea abruptly demanded that the venue of the talks change from the
previously agreed upon Pyongyang to Mount Kumgang instead. After exchanging fourteen
proposals and counter-proposals with the North within three weeks, the South chose to
accommodate their demand on the ground that substance should prevail over form or
sustaining dialogue mattered more than anything in improving inter-Korean relations (Lim,
2012). Such a flexible attitude of the South Korean government led inter-Korean contact to be
sustained, albeit sporadically, throughout this difficult period.

Breakdown of the North-South Ministerial talks

179

As Chairman Kim accepted President Kim’s proposal, the agreement was made between two Kims at the June 15 summit
upon a second North-South summit in Seoul. After delaying a discussion on the issue for quite a while, Chairman Kim proposed
Irkutsk of Russia as the venue for the next summit in his meeting with Special Envoy Lim in April 2002. Concluding that it was
not acceptable, President Kim proposed a summit, this time, at Panmunjom if Seoul was not acceptable to the North. As the
North then withdrew the proposal altogether, a second summit failed to materialize between the two Koreas.
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Despite the high hopes President Kim held for resumed inter-Korean relations, the sixth
Ministerial Talks held in Mt. Kumgang on November 8, 2001, broke down without reaching an
agreement as a senior delegate from South Korea, Unification Minister Hong, walked out of the
talks after entering into acrimonious exchanges with his North Korean counterpart over the
dates for the next round of talks. By doing so, the South Korean representative disobeyed the
presidential instruction that he reach an agreement with the North and issue a joint statement
at the end of the talks.

Response
For President Kim, who found it critically important to make headway in inter-Korean
relations, the November 8 meeting was a hard-won opportunity to have dialogue with the
North and to increase the odds of gaining U.S. support for his engagement strategy. However, it
was his own team which was to blame for the breakdown of the talks, ruining everything.
Feeling extremely disappointed, President Kim proceeded to dismiss the Chief Delegate as the
Unification Minister, excluding him from the peace process altogether going forward (Kim,
2011b; Lim, 2012, p. 287).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Meanwhile, North Korea did not show any sign of change by the end of March 2002.
Kim Dae-jung expressed his frustration in his autobiography by saying, “I felt exasperated and at
the same time deeply frustrated with the North Korean behavior. On the other hand, I felt
sympathy for them. I was extremely disappointed with the North Koreans at the time” (Kim,
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2011b). Nevertheless, in this period, Kim Dae-jung perceived more opportunities than threats
from a series of moves by the North Korean regime that appeared indicative of its possible
opening and reform. Such moves include the rapid expansion of North Korea’s diplomatic
normalization with other countries such as Italy, the Philippines, Australia, the U.K. (in 2001),
Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and Spain (in 2001).180 In this period, Kim Jong-il also revised the
socialist constitution: 1) to authorize private ownership of property, abeit in a limited fashion,
2) to introduce various concepts of the market economy, and 3) to allow freedom of travel.
Moreover, North Korea’s first economic reform was undertaken through ‘economic
management improvement measures’ beginning on July 1, 2002. In Septemner 2002, the first
Japan-North Korea summit meeting was held in Pyongyang. During this period, Kim Jong-il
displayed eagerness to seek a change in the socialist system both at home and abroad (K. Y.
Park, 2001).
Regarding the opportunities he perceived from the North, Kim Dae-jung said in his
speech in Washington D.C. in March 2001, “North Korea today is not the North Korea of the
past, which had criticized Chinese reforms and openness as a corruption of socialism. We
cannot say for certain whether North Korea will follow China’s lead, but it is surely opening up.
We must not lose this opportunity. We must assist the North so that it can continue along the
path of change. We must help so that it does not return to its old ways, which would be
unwelcome by other countries and would not be good for North Korea itself” (Kim, 2001b).
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Moreover, Kim Jong-il’s visits to China in 2001 and 2002 confirmed for him the futility of opening up without reform.
Regarding his visit to Shanghai in January 2001, North Korea’s state-run media reported at length the Chinese city’s finance,
culture, industry and foreign-owned corporations including a General Motors’ factory, which were symbolic of the city’s efforts
to open and reform (K. Y. Park, 2001, p. 59).
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Response
With the tension between Washington and Pyongyang further escalating in the wake of
President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech on January 29, 2002, Kim Dae-jung sought to maintain an
emergency hotline and a secret channel with the North. As a result, a secret communication
channel between the South’s intelligence agency (NIS) and the Unification Front Department of
Korea Workers' Party was maintained through the end of Kim Dae-jung’s term of office even
amid a protracted stalemate in inter-Korean dialogue (S. J. Yim, personal communication,
December 7, 2016; Seo H., personal communication, October 25, 2016). Even in this difficult
period, some closed-door contacts occurred between the two sides in Kaesong and Beijing (J. Y.
Shim, 2001).
Having achieved a positive outcome in his efforts to persuade President Bush on his visit
to Seoul to change U.S. strategy, Kim then embarked on an initiative to persuade North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il to change his plan of action by dispatching a special envoy to Pyongyang on
April 3, 2002.181 While sending his own letter to Chairman Kim making suggestions on how to
address pending issues involving North Korea’s relations with the United States and South
Korea, President Kim Dae-jung gave his special envoy detailed instructions on what to discuss
with the North Korean leader regarding three major issue areas: U.S.-DPRK relations, JapanDPRK relations, and North-South relations (Kim, 2011b; Lim, 2012).
Lim Dong-won met with Kim Jong-il on April 4, 2002, at the Baekhwawon Guest House
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Prior to Lim’s visit, President Kim had sent a letter to Chairman Kim conveying his views on pressing issues such as the Bush
doctrine, the changing international security environment, and U.S.-DPRK relations along with his advice on how to manage
North Korea’s relations with the United States and Japan. President Kim’s letter reportedly persuaded Chairman Kim to accept
the presidential emissary (Lim, 2012).

272

and had a five-hour-long in-depth discussion on a broad range of critical issues (Lim, 2012). 182
Envoy Lim told Chairman Kim that even though the two Koreas had wasted valuable time since
the previous year, the eleven months that remained of President Kim’s presidency was not a
short time. Lim urged Chairman Kim to join a “speed battle” in North-South dialogue to make
up for the lost time. He also suggested that the North switch from an “America first and the
South later” strategy to a “South first and America later” one (Lim, 2012, p. 305). Lim’s visit to
Pyongyang resulted in the April 8 North-South Joint Statement, which was followed by the
resumption of inter-Korean cooperation, the reunion of separated families at Mount Kumgang
in April, and the provision of 200,000 tons of fertilizer in May 2002.

Another deadlock in inter-Korean relations
However, inter-Korean relations were halted again, albeit temporarily, as the North
closed itself off after holding a round of family reunions in late April 2002. Having canceled the
inter-Korean economic cooperation promotion meeting scheduled for early May 2002, Kim
Jong-il suspended inter-Korean dialogue for two months.

Response

182

During the discussion, Chairman Kim made numerous on-the-spot decisions on major issues involving US-DPRK relations and
inter-Korean relations at the suggestion of Lim. During his meeting with Lim, Kim Jong-il expressed his desperate willingness to
normalize relations with the United States while condemning the Bush administration’s hawkish stance on North Korea. He also
took issue with Bush’s insistence on the South getting U.S. approval to promote inter-Korean relations during the Kim-Bush
summit in March 2001, and protested what he called President Kim’s surrender to President Bush’s pressure. Lim refuted
Chairman Kim’s assertions and explained how President Kim and his policy team strove to persuade President Bush to shift his
hardline stance on North Korea. Lim relayed to Chairman Kim President Kim’s advice that the North engage in open dialogue
with the United States to draw international attention so as to weaken hard-liners’ influence on President Bush (Lim, 2011, pp.
312-317).
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To proceed with his peace agenda, Kim Dae-jung decided in May 2002, to indefinitely
postpone the publication of the Defense White Paper designating North Korea as South Korea’s
“main enemy.” Observers indicated that the decision was a clear reflection of how desperate
the government was to bring the North back to the negotiating table. As it were, as a precondition for resuming inter-Korean dialogue, North Korea had demanded that the South
abolish the main enemy concept from its Defense White Paper claiming it conflicted with the
spirit of the June 15 inter-Korean summit. Determined to salvage whatever remained of
goodwill between the two Koreas, President Kim, through his top adviser Lim, persuaded
Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin and other members at the NSC to approve a delay of the
publication so that the Defense Ministry would not issue the Defense White Paper during his
presidency (S. J. Son, 2002a). In the South Korean political context, the Defense Ministry’s
designation of North Korea as the country’s main enemy has been the subject of fierce debate
and political wrangling. Regarding this decision, President Kim was vehemently accused of what
they called his “obsession” with the Sunshine Policy to the point of disregarding what appeared
to be obvious self-serving maneuvers of the North (S. J. Son, 2002a).

Constraint 2: the 2nd Yeonpyeong Naval Battle (June 29, 2002)
On June 29, 2002, amid a national frenzy about the World Cup Games co-sponsored by
South Korea and Japan, the second West Sea battle erupted with a North Korean patrol boat
launching an unprovoked attack on South Korea’s naval vessels in the West Sea. In the
exchange of fire, one South Korean naval patrol boat sank and four South Korean sailors killed
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and another 19 were wounded (S. J. Son, 2002b).183 Immediately after the incident, the North
warned of more clashes if South Korea and the United States claimed their right to obstruct
North Korean ships from proceeding south of a line in the West Sea that the North had never
recognized (Kirk, 2002). Both critics and supporters made the forecast at the time that the naval
clash would make it impossible for President Kim Dae-jung to adhere to the Sunshine Policy for
the last year of his presidency. Many observers both in Seoul and Washington were perplexed
by the timing of the second inter-Korean sea battle in three years and expected it to badly
disrupt U.S.-North Korea relations as well as inter-Korean relations (Struck, 2002a). The timing
of the incident could not have been worse. The skirmish occurred only hours after Washington
confirmed its proposal to send a ranking State Department official to Pyongyang to resume
negotiations that had been frozen since President Bush’s election (Struck, 2002b). Blaming the
North for starting the gunfight and calling it an “armed provocation,” the Bush administration
withdrew its proposal to dispatch a delegation to Pyongyang (Dao, 2002). Moreover, the naval
clash outraged many South Koreans, who had grown impatient with North Korea’s reluctance
to reciprocate the South’s goodwill gestures (Torchia, 2002).

Response
Upon the outbreak of the naval clash, President Kim put the South Korean military on
high alert and condemned the North for opening fire on the South Korean navy, calling it “an
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Two North Korean navy gunboats reportedly opened fire when they were deterred by two South Korean patrol boats for
crossing what South Korea claims is an extension of the sea boarder and fired on its boats (August & Kay, 2002; Struck, 2002a).
Regarding North Korea’s provocative act, pundits observed that the shooting was the North Korean navy’s retaliatory act
against a similar clash in the same area in 1999 wherein the South Korean navy claimed no casualties, winning a clear victory
(Struck, 2002a).
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obvious breach of the armistice agreement” that ended the 1950-1953 Korean War and saying
that South Korea “can’t tolerate” it (Y. B. Shin, 2002; Struck, 2002a). Kim Dae-jung also said his
government would demand an apology from the North (Kirk, 2002).

Hotline message from North Korea
On the following day of the naval battle, however, North Korea sent a message via the
hotline expressing regret, stating that the incident was not deliberately planned and that they
did not want any further escalation. The message was even more surprising for the President
Kim’s government considering that the statement just hours ago the North had issued warning
of more possible clashes upon the eruption of the incident. The message also proposed
ministerial-level talks with the South and steps to resume the stalled process to achieve interKorean rapprochement (Kirk, 2002). Over three weeks later, on July 25, North Korea sent the
South another message, this time officially, concerning the naval incident (Lim, 2012, p. 322;
“SKn President Says North Virtually Apologized,” 2002).
In handling the second naval battle, Kim Dae-jung and his advisory team were careful
not to undermine trust with North Korea. Kim Dae-jung chose to take the (first) hotline
message expressing regret as an apology. (Jeong, S.H., personal communication, November 22,
2016). Although the first hotline message played a crucial role in easing tensions, President Kim
and his advisers decided not to highlight it publicly (Jeong, 2013, p. 145; Lim, 2012, p. 320).
Instead, they took a highly restrained response. As the Kim Dae-jung government decided to
maintain civilian exchanges despite the naval incident, a cruise ship with 520 South Korean
tourists on board left the port of Sokcho for North Korea’s Jangjeon Port and Mount Kumgang
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on June 30, 2002, the day after the clash (Seo, 2002). President Kim, for his part, moved to take
a ‘cool’ response, seeking to prevent the escalation of tension. At the risk of being severely
criticized by his political adversaries, he went on a scheduled trip to Japan to attend a summit
meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister and the closing ceremony of the joint World Cup
Games (Jeong, 2013, p. 145). While still criticizing the North for violating the armistice treaty,
Kim demanded the North publicly apologize, punish those responsible for the incident, and take
measures to prevent the occurrence of such incidents in the future. Meanwhile, at the summit
meeting in Japan, President Kim obtained agreement from Prime Minister Koizumi to respond
calmly to the naval battle and expressed his commitment to maintaining the Sunshine Policy
(“Koizumi, Kim Agree,” 2002). After all, the second Yeonpyeong battle had little, if any, adverse
impact on inter-Korean relations. Rather, the process of promoting inter-Korean exchanges and
cooperation accelerated following the naval incident as the North began to reciprocate the
South’s overtures in an unprecedentedly prompt manner (H. K. Kim, personal communication,
November 2, 2016).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Regarding the official message that the North sent on July 25, Kim Dae-jung considered
it a public apology even though critics claimed that the message fell far short of an apology. 184
Kim said, “Some people say it is unsatisfactory, but it is unprecedented for the North to make
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He defended his Sunshine Policy, rebutting arguments that the engagement policy pampered the North such that it gained
the confidence to commit an armed provocation against the South. Reaffirming that he would pursue dialogue with the North
based on firm security, Kim said, “There were cases of North Korea’s armed provocation when the Sunshine Policy did not exist.
The Sunshine Policy has nothing to do with the provocation” (“SKn President Says North Virtually Apologized,” 2002).
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an expression of regret so quickly.” Moreover, the South Korean public’s general endorsement
of the government’s North Korea strategy was another source of momentum for the Sunshine
Policy. Kim indicated in his autobiography that despite growing criticism of the Sunshine Policy
by the opposition and media companies, as well as calls for suspension of the Kumgang Mt.
tourism project, “the South Korean people did not budge [in their support of the Sunshine
Policy]. He also saids, “This is where the power of the Sunshine Policy derived from” (Kim,
2011b, p. 469).
Regarding the naval incident, Lee Hoon, Kim Dae-jung’s longtime aide and the former
Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs, explains that President Kim was careful to
prevent the clash from evolving into a more serious development that could shake the
fundamentals of the Sunshine Policy while handling it as if it were an isolated incident with
limited implications. In doing so, he strictly adhered to the principles of the Sunshine Policy by
sternly responding to North Korean provocations in military terms while confining the handling
of it to the dimension of an “accident” (H. Lee, personal communication, November 22, 2018).
Meanwhile, Kim and his policy elite held a realistic assessment of the North Korean
behavior. Regarding North Korea’s handling of the second naval incident, then Unification
Minister Jeong Se-hyun, notes that the government effectively attributed North Korea’s
apparently “softened attitude” not so much to its trust in the Sunshine Policy as to its desire to
receive scheduled deliveries of rice and fertilizer. In effect, Jeong observes, it was a material
reward, more specifically, the food and fertilizer assistance from the South that effectively
inclined the North to prevent any military confrontation from developing into a more serious
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conflict in the form of a limited or localized warfare (S. H. Jeong, personal communication,
November 11, 2016).

A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)
b. Source of Constraints: External Environment
Constraint 1: The Bush administration’s Hardline Stance on North Korea
The first Bush-Kim Summit in Washington
Anxious about a possible change of course on the part of President Bush from the
Clinton administration’s Comprehensive Approach in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung
hurriedly organized a summit with President George W. Bush in Washington. 185 By any
standard, this was hardly a pleasant start to the relationship between the two heads of state. At
this time around, the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea remained in flux and was
fiercely disputed internally. At the breakfast meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell on
the day of the summit, Kim Dae-jung explained the fundamentals of the Sunshine Policy. In
response, Powell expressed his strong support of Kim’s strategy (Kim, 2011b, p. 396). Kim Daejung felt relieved as Powell’s remarks were construed both as the Bush administration’s
intention to continue the Clinton administration’s North Korea strategy and as the
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In fact, the Japanese Prime Minister was scheduled to visit Washington as the first Asian leader to have a summit with the
newly elected American president on March 1, 2001, six days before the Bush-Kim summit. However, Japan wanted to put it off
for about a week due to the prime minister’s scheduled attendance at the parliamentary interpellation session. Under these
circumstances, Washington asked the Kim administration to postpone the Bush-Kim summit by a week or so to accommodate
the Japanese request. However, the Kim government refused to adjust the plan insisting on holding the summit as originally
planned (Yang, 2015, pp. 126–128). From the outset, Bush reportedly was not inclined to have a summit with President Kim.
Before Kim left for the summit in Washington, Bush talked with him on the phone for the first time. As Kim sang the praises of
his Sunshine Policy, Bush held the phone away from his head, covered the mouthpiece, and said to his aide, “Who does this guy
think he is?” (Rothkopf, 2005, pp. 403–404).
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endorsement of his own of the Sunshine Policy (Powell, 2001).186 Powell’s remarks from his
breakfast with Kim were immediately reported by the media. However, Powell’s remarks that
he was inclined to continue Clinton’s policies with regard to North Korea generated an almost
immediate rebuke from the White House, forcing Powell to rectify his position (Rothkopf, 2005,
p. 403).
Kim Dae-jung’s first summit with Bush in March 2001 turned out to be a miserable
failure, as described in the South Korean media (Funabashi, 2007, p. 226). 187 In an attempt to
get President Bush to support his engagement path at the summit on March 8, 2001, President
Kim expounded on the Sunshine Policy, suggesting that the American President adopt the
“comprehensive principle of reciprocity” (Lim, 2012, p. 272; Y. Oh, 2001). Kim Dae-jung’s
proposed approach was a combination of Bush’s strict rule of reciprocity and his more tolerant
approach in dealing with North Korea. Kim also suggested that Bush adopt a strategy intended
to make inter-Korean relations and U.S.-North Korea relations go side by side, complementing
each other. He called on Bush to seize the momentum to negotiate the missile issue and play a
proactive role in ending the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula (Lim, 2012, p. 272).
However, the hurriedly-organized summit by the South Korean government was nightmarish to
Kim Dae-jung as President Bush continued to express strong skepticism about North Korea and
its leader and avowed that he had no intention of resuming dialogue with Pyongyang any time
soon. During the summit meeting, Bush bluntly said, “When you make an agreement with a
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Powell had made similar remarks at a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister on the day before President
Kim’s arrival in Washington. On March 6, 2001, Powell stated at a joint press briefing with the Swedish foreign minister, “We
want to make sure that our North Korea policy is totally synchronized with what our South Korean friends are doing. … We do
plan to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off.”
187
At President Kim Dae-jung’s first summit with President Bush on March 8, 2001, the issue of North Korea reportedly
dominated about half of the discussion between two leaders (Mufson, 2001).
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country that is secretive, how are you aware as to whether or not they are keeping the terms of
the agreement?”(Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea, 2001).
Bush also urged that South Korea not promote any reciprocal visit of Kim Jong-il to Seoul, which
Kim Dae-jung said he was expecting to occur by the end of June around the first anniversary of
the North-South Joint Declaration (H. C. Kim, 2006, p. 223).
Bush also expressed profound skepticism about the Clinton administration’s two-year
campaign to reach a deal on the North Korean missile issue and the eventual normalization of
relations with North Korea. During the summit, Bush told Kim that he would not resume missile
talks with the North anytime soon (Sanger, 2001). During the press conference, President Bush
called President Kim “this man,” while appreciating Kim’s leadership in reaching out to North
Korea. This caused a media frenzy especially in South Korea where Bush’s blunt statement was
considered deeply offensive (“Calling Kim ‘This Man’ Earns Bush a Censure,” 2001).
Kim Dae-jung was frustrated with the outcome of the summit. On the following day of
the summit, Kim sought to persuade those Americans in positions of influence of the need to
support his course of action at a conference held at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and
in a meeting with Republican members of Congress. Moreover, before leaving Washington, Kim
made a call to former President H. W. Bush to ask him to persuade his son, George W. Bush, to
shift his strategy and engage North Korea (Kim, 2011b, pp. 397–9).
Despite all his efforts, U.S.-DPRK relations continued to deteriorate. The Bush
administration unilaterally severed the existing ‘New York channel.’ In response, North Korea
declared that it would not enter into negotiations with the United States unless it were
compensated for the damage done by the loss of the communication channel (Funabashi, 2007,
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p. 109). On June 6, the Bush administration announced a revised policy agenda toward North
Korea, which was aimed at comprehensively eliminating all North Korean threats posed by both
nuclear and conventional weapons.188 In its revised agenda, the Bush administration retained
the dialogue option, stating that the U.S. was willing to negotiate “without conditions and
virtually whenever and wherever the North Koreans wanted it” (“Interview with President Kim
Dae-jung,” 2003). However, despite the Bush administration’s offer of dialogue to North Korea
with the announcement of the revised policy, U.S.-DPRK relations only grew worse amid a
prolonged absence of dialogue.189

Axis of Evil Speech
In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the situation even more rapidly
declined as they led the Bush administration to reconsider the earlier review of its strategy
concerning North Korea. Kim Dae-jung felt deeply frustrated with the lack of control over
escalating tension between Pyongyang and Washington (Kim, 2011b, p. 248). After all, the
September 11 attacks gave the Bush administration a good excuse to discard the Sunshine
Policy altogether and outright embrace the containment approach entailing a series of sticks.
President Bush then designated North Korea as part of the ‘axis of evil’ along with Iraq and Iran
in his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002. Regarding U.S. policy toward North
Korea, this speech was practically construed as the expression of U.S. intent not to
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The revised North Korea policy agenda stipulated: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North
Korea’s nuclear activities; verifiable restrictions on North Korea’s missile programs and a ban on its export of missiles; and a
less-threatening conventional military posture on the part of North Korea.)
189
In response to President Bush’s North Korea policy review, North Korea immediately rejected Washington’s offer to resume
negotiations, calling it an “utterly unacceptable agenda” that is “unilateral, preconditioned”, and inherently “hostile” (Lim,
2012, p. 278).
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diplomatically engage the North but to pursue a goal of bringing down its regime through
military means or preemptive strike and regime change. Not surprisingly, the North Korean
foreign ministry strongly reacted to the speech by immediately issuing a statement that read,
“This time Bush revealed his reckless attempt to attack us militarily. … This is tantamount to a
declaration of war against us… Our people will never forgive the preposterous U.S. attempt to
stifle us. We will ruthlessly crush the invaders”(Lim, 2012, p. 289).
Following President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, U.S. news media reported on the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was drafted by the Bush administration as a guideline for
the use of nuclear weapons in case of an emergency. The NPR listed seven countries as
potential targets of a nuclear attack: North Korea topped the list and was followed by Iraq, Iran,
Syria, Libya, China, and Russia (M. Gordon, 2003).

Response
With the Bush administration considering a military option vis-à-vis the North Korean
nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung strived to deter President Bush and his policy team from using
military force in dealing with North Korea. In February 2002, Bush traveled to South Korea for a
third summit meeting with Kim Dae-jung, who eagerly sought to take advantage of the
opportunity. During the summit in Seoul, Kim Dae-jung addressed the Clinton administration’s
emergency plan, which projected the loss of one million people in the event of an attack,
underscoring that this must be avoided at any cost. He also said, “No South Korean, including
myself, praises the North Korean regime. But we cannot openly denounce it, either. It will not
be wise to try to change it by force. I beg for your understanding on this particular point.” Kim
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Dae-jung also expressed his uneasiness about the concept of the “axis of evil.” Kim stated,
“Diplomacy is not about who is good and who is bad. It is about national interest and peace.” In
making his point, Kim used the analogy of Ronald Reagan. He said, “Ronald Regan had called
the Soviet Union an evil empire, but he engaged in constructive dialogue with Mikhail
Gorbachev. North Korea invaded South Korea, but the United States signed an armistice treaty
with the invader, and somehow this has enabled us to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula
for the past 50 years. Nothing is solved by just mentioning that North Korea is evil.” When Kim
was talking about Reagan, Bush nodded his head several times (Funabashi, 2007, p. 111).
Eventually, Kim Dae-jung’s efforts to change Bush’s mind appear to have paid off. At the
press conference following the summit, Bush showed an apparent turnabout in his position on
North Korea. He said, “I support the Sunshine Policy… We are peaceful people. We have no
intention of invading North Korea. South Korea has no intention of attacking North Korea, nor
does America. We're purely defensive. And the reason we have to be defensive is because
there is a threatening position on the DMZ. But we long for peace. It is in our nations' interest
that we achieve peace on the Peninsula.” Bush also said that he would seek to resolve the issue
through dialogue and that he would continue to provide food aid to the North Korean people (P
Bush & P KDJ Meet in Seoul, 2002). As it turned out, Bush’s remark that “We have no intention
of invading North Korea” had not been included in the talking points prepared for the talk.
While the summit meeting was originally planned to be about fifteen minutes long, the two
leaders discussed for an hour (Funabashi, 2007, p. 111).
In search of an effective way of persuading President Bush, Kim Dae-jung sought to
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include a visit to Dorasan railway station in Bush’s itinerary after lunch.190 In fact, President
Bush had been scheduled to visit the U.S. army base near the Demilitarized Zone to make a
tough statement against North Korea (S. J. Kim, personal communication, October 14, 2016).
The Dorasan station, which was the newly-built railroad station along the railway linking the
two Koreas through the DMZ, was a symbolic place of peaceful coexistence and representative
of the improved inter-Korean relations under the Sunshine Policy. Showing another approving
gesture at the Dorasan station, President Bush, wrote on a crosstie, “May this railroad unite
Korean families.” Bush then stated in his speech, “President Kim has just shown me a road he
built, a road for peace. And he's shown me where that road abruptly ends, right here at the
DMZ. That road has the potential to bring the peoples on both sides of this divided land
together, and for the good of all the Korean people, the North should finish it.” Bush said in
answering a question asked by the press, “During our discussion, President Kim reminded me a
little bit about American history, when he said that President Reagan referred to Russia as the
"evil empire," and yet, was then able to have constructive dialog with Mr. Gorbachev.” All such
positive remarks notwithstanding, President Bush still expressed his negative views on North
Korea and its leader, as shown in his description of the North as an “evil” and “despotic regime”
oppressing its people (Remarks at the Dorasan Train Station in Dorasan, South Korea, 2002).191
In fact, one portion of the speech prepared by the White House was modified at the last
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On January 17, 2003, President Kim discussed inter-Korean relations and the North Korea policy of the Bush administration
with Donald P. Gregg, former U.S. Ambassador to Korea. Ambassador Gregg advised Kim to have a candid, “Texas-style”
dialogue with President Bush. The ambassador also gave him detailed advice on Bush’s visit to Seoul suggesting that the
American President be ushered to the DMZ and given a tour around the Dorasan Station (Kim, 2011b, p. 444).
191
He also said, “I will not change my opinion on the man, on Kim Chong-il, until he frees his people and accepts genuine
proposals from countries such as South Korea or the United States to dialog, until he proves to the world that he's got a good
heart, that he cares about the people that live in his country”
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minute. At the urging of Kim Dae-jung during the summit discussion, Bush’s reference to the
evil regime in North Korea was reportedly dropped from the text (Funabashi, 2007, p. 113). In
assessing the outcome of the summit, some in the U.S. Defense Department expressed
confusion by complaining that President Bush “went too far” (Lim, 2012, p. 299).
Kim Dae-jung then moved to take the diplomatic initiative to improve Japan-DPRK
relations. At a summit meeting with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Seoul on March 22,
2002, Kim encouraged the Prime Minister to improve Japan’s relations with North Korea, and
strongly suggested that the Prime Minister visit Pyongyang to meet with Chairman Kim” (Kim,
2011, p. 452). In a follow-up on this proposal, President Kim advised Chairman Kim in a letter
handed over through Special Envoy Lim on his visit to Pyongyang on April 4, 2002 saying that
the improvement in North Korea’s relations with Japan was inevitable due to North Korean
economic considerations. President Kim also shared with Chairman Kim his views on how to
resolve the issue of Japanese abductees. Kim Dae-jung’s behind-the-scenes endeavors to
improve the relationship between Japan and North Korea eventually bore fruit with the KimKoizumi summit meeting in Pyongyang which was followed by the adoption of the historic
Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration on September 17, 2002 (Osedo, 2002). 192

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Kim Dae-jung’s first summit meeting with Bush on March 8, 2001 left him in agony. Even

192

In the declaration, the two sides agreed to resume the Japan-North Korea normalization talks in October 2002. Koizumi
made an apology for its past colonial rule and said that Japan would be ready to provide the North financial assistance, though
not war reparations. Kim Jong-il, for his part, admitted for the first time responsibility for the abduction issue and confirmed
that he would “take necessary steps to let them return home or visit their hometowns if they wish” (Osedo, 2002).
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though the Joint Statement issued after the summit contained Bush’s official endorsement of
the Sunshine Policy,193 Kim Dae-jung became gravely concerned about the prospect of his peace
initiative. Kim Dae-jung found President Bush’s attitude at the press conference highly
“unpleasant and inappropriate.” He was disconcerted by the American President’s blunt
remarks and Secretary Powell’s abrupt change of posture shown at the summit (Kim, 2011b, pp.
397–398). According to Kim Taek-geun, who authored Kim Dae-jung’s autobiography based on
over forty sessions of interviews and conversations with him from July 2006 to April 2009,
indicates that, from Kim Dae-jung’s perspective, the Bush administration’s hardline policy
toward North Korea constituted the most significant threat posed to the implementation of his
peace process (T. G. Kim, personal communication, October 26, 2016).
For Kim Dae-jung, the fate of his Sunshine Policy hinged on President Bush’s visit to
Seoul scheduled for February 2002. Therefore, Kim made desperate efforts to seize what he
saw as an invaluable opportunity to convince the American President of the need to change
course and engage the North in dialogue lest the United States should apply the Bush Doctrine
to North Korea. The ‘Axis of Evil’ speech reminded President Kim of an unpleasant memory of
his first summit with President Bush a year before, which effectively brought the inter-Korean
relations to a stalemate (Lim, 2012, p. 293; Y. J. Oh, 2002). Kim Dae-jung said in his
autobiography that he literally “strained every nerve” to persuade President Bush on his visit to
South Korea (Kim, 2011b, p. 445).
According to then Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, President Kim was highly satisfied
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The joint statement was a consolation for Kim Dae-jung as Bush expressed endorsement of South Korea’s Sunshine Policy
and Kim Jong-il’s visit to Seoul, and promised to stick to the 1994 Agreed Framework.
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with the outcome of the summit, and regarded the Dorasan event and, by extension, his
summit with Bush in Seoul greatly successful overall. Kim appreciated that President Bush who,
only less than a month earlier, had effectively designated North Korea as a target for regime
change by preemptive strike, shifted his stance and pledged that he would neither attack nor
invade North Korea (S. H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016).

Constraint 2: Assistant Secretary Kelly’s Visit to Pyongyang and North Korea’s Second Nuclear
Crisis
With the stalled inter-Korean relations getting back on track following Special Envoy
Lim’s visit to Pyongyang in April 2002, President Bush dispatched Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly to Pyongyang from 3-5 October 2002 as a special
envoy.194 Despite all anticipations made on the part of North and South Korea, this visit proved
catastrophic for the Sunshine Policy as it was followed by the collapse of the 1994 Agreed
Framework and the outbreak of North Korea’s second nuclear crisis.195 The crisis began with
North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-joo’s statement which was interpreted as a
defiant admission of the existence of the uranium enrichment program. In his conversation
with the American delegation, Kang reportedly protested by saying, “When the United States
designates North Korea as the axis of evil and threatens to launch a preemptive attack with
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In addition to the hard-won breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, some other positive developments occurred
surrounding the Korean Peninsula at the time such as North Korea’s promotion of opening of economic reform; Japanese prime
minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang and the Japan-North Korea summit; and the ASEM’s declaration of peace on the
Korean Peninsula” (Lim, 2012, pp. 333–334).
195
In fact, what North Korea anticipated from Kelly’s visit was a package deal to be negotiated between the highest levels of
Pyongyang and Washington (Lim, 2012, pp. 336–337). Kim Dae-jung and his government, for their part, had a positive outlook
on Kelly’s upcoming visit to Pyongyang based on a series of positive developments surrounding the Korean Peninsula at the
time (Lim, 2012, pp. 333–334).
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their enormous quantity of nuclear weapons, North Korea has no option but to develop nuclear
weapons or even something more powerful for the protection of national security” (Lim, 2012,
p. 336).
In the wake of this statement, Seoul and Washington showed fundamental differences
in opinion regarding how to interpret Kang’s remarks and what kind of countermeasures to
take. Seoul officials noted that Kang Sok-joo’s statement needed to be carefully studied
because it would likely have been rhetoric claiming North Korea’s sovereign right to possess
nuclear weapons, rather than a legitimate declaration on the existence of its nuclear program
(Lim, 2012, p. 337).196
Upon hearing the news, President Kim was even more frustrated as all this happened at
a time when inter-Korean cooperation, which had been suspended after a brief period of
resuscitation, was getting back into a full swing beginning in the summer of 2002. Washington’s
public announcement on October 16, 2002 concerning North Korea’s admission on a highly
enriched uranium program (HEUP) sent shockwaves across the globe. The announcement
meant that North Korea had been pursuing an alternative nuclear program representing a
switch from a previous plutonium-based program that the North had agreed to halt in the
groundbreaking 1994 Agreed Framework (Slevin & DeYoung, 2002; Laney & Shaplen, 2003).

Response

196

The Kim government cautioned the Kelly team to exercise prudence in accepting what they saw as the exaggerated and
emotional language of North Koreans. In his meeting with Kelly, Lim Dong-won raised the issue of ambiguity over whether the
North Korean question “Why should not we have our own nuclear weapons?” was an admission of the existence of the HEUP or
insistence on their right to have nuclear weapons (Lim, 2012, p. 337).
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In an attempt to play a mediating role between Pyongyang and Washington and achieve
a peaceful solution to an evolving crisis, Kim Dae-jung began by persuading the international
community. With Japan-DPRK relations appearing to improve, President Kim dispatched his
envoys to Moscow and Beijing and sought help from Russia and China in persuading North
Korea to end its nuclear brinkmanship (“SKn Vice Foreign Minister to Leave for Moscow,”
2003).197 Having secured the support for his peace initiative from Russia, China, and Japan,
which echoed the same voice calling for the United States to engage North Korea, Kim Dae-jung
then moved to persuade the Bush administration and North Korea with only about four months
remaining until the end of his tenure.
In the run up to his summit meeting with President Bush at APEC in Los Cabos, Mexico
scheduled for October 26, 2002, Kim Dae-jung prodded North Korea to issue a statement
expressing its desire for peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, laying the groundwork for
persuading President Bush (Lim, 2012, p. 341).198 In accommodating President Kim’s suggestion,
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a public statement to announce its official position on
October 25, one day before the trilateral summit in Los Cabos. In its statement, North Korea
sought to explain the background against which Vice Foreign Minister Kang made the
statement in question, and assured them that the North Koreans were “ready to clear the
security concerns of the United States if the United States legally assures the DPRK of non-
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In tandem with his efforts at inter-Korean talks, Kim Dae-jung dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Tae-sik to Beijing and
Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hang-kyung to Moscow to seek their help in persuading North Korea to end its nuclear brinkmanship
198
President Kim’s letter was conveyed to Chairman Kim through Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, who went on a visit to
Pyongyang for an eighth round of Ministerial Talks from October 19-23, 2002. President Kim also suggested in his letter to
Chairman Kim that North Korea “take proactive steps to engage the United States by sending First Vice Foreign Minister Kang
Sok-ju to Washington, and that in any situation, they should not engage in any act that would contribute to the abolishment of
the Agreed Framework.”
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aggression, including the non-use of nuclear weapons” (Lim, 2012, p. 343). 199
Kim Dae-jung then proceeded to persuade President Bush directly at the summit
meeting on the sidelines of the APEC in Los Cabos on October 26, 2002.200 Following the APEC
summit, the leaders of the United States, Japan, and South Korea issued a joint statement
calling on the North to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a prompt and verifiable
manner, while warning Chairman Kim that North Korea’s relations with the international
community hinged on his swift response to their joint appeal. Despite U.S. efforts to form a
joint front against North Korea, the joint statement did not include the condemnation of the
North that the Bush administration was eagerly seeking. Instead of including talks of reprisals,
the trilateral statement urged dialogue, which was close to what South Korea, along with China,
sought to achieve (Allen & DeYoung, 2002).201

2nd Nuclear Crisis
Immediately after the APEC summit, the hardliners in Washington, who had raised the
issue of North Korea’s HEUP, took steps to terminate the provision of heavy fuel oil to the
North, effectively causing the collapse of the Agreed Framework in November 2002. Eventually,
North Korea’s restart of its nuclear program was followed by an announcement of its decision
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In its statement, North Korea also proposed a package solution for the dismantlement of its nuclear program in return for a
non-aggression treaty (Lim, 2012, pp. 341–342).
200
In his message intended for President Bush, Kim Dae-jung called for concerted efforts to mobilize all diplomatic means
through international cooperation to peacefully resolve the nuclear issue and indicated that North Korea had just proposed a
package solution for the dismantlement of its nuclear program in return for a non-aggression treaty. Kim also called for
prudence and caution against any attempt to take measures to abolish the Agreed Framework in consideration of the
dangerous risks involved.”
201
The Joint Statement said both South Korea and Japan would continue ongoing normalization talks with North Korea, in
which they would raise the nuclear issue and warn that continuation of the nuclear program would jeopardize further
improvement in relations (“Bush’s Efforts on Iraq, N. Korea Flag,” 2002).
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to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003, which in turn resulted in
North Korea’s second nuclear crisis.

Response
Upon the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis, Kim Dae-jung employed a
three-step approach in challenging the constraint: 1) to persuade the Bush administration; 2) to
gain support of China, Japan, and the international community; and 3) to persuade North
Korea. First, Kim Dae-jung conveyed his proposal to the Bush administration by dispatching
Senior Secretary for National Security Yim Sung-joon to Washington. 202 By sending his proposal,
Kim Dae-jung sought to persuade the Bush administration to switch from its “bold approach” to
a “gradual step-by-step approach.”203 In effect, the bold approach adopted by the Bush
administration was a conditional offer meaning “North Korea’s change first, negotiations later.”
To President Kim’s proposal, Secretary Powell and National Security Adviser Rice showed a
positive response saying that they were expecting South Korea to persuade Pyongyang.
However, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did not support the South Korean proposal.
Upon his return to Seoul, Senior Secretary Yim briefed President Kim on the atmosphere
of the Bush administration by stating, “In view of the Korean people’s choice of Roh Moo-hyun -who pledged to inherit the Sunshine Policy in the presidential election- as the next president,
North Korea’s strong reaction, the advice from China and Russia for dialogue, and their need to
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This time around, Roh Moo-hyun, the Democratic Party’s candidate, had just been elected as South Korea’s next president in
the December 19 election.
203
The Bush administration had expressed its intention to take a bold approach at the TCOG meeting held in San Francisco
(June 17-18) by saying that if North Korea showed a fundamental change by taking positive steps regarding the military threat
and the human rights issue, the United States would take a ‘bold approach’ in response.
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concentrate on the Iraqi war, the hawks seemed to have taken a step back in order to see how
the doves deal with the situation” (Lim, 2012, pp. 348–349).
With the two rounds of ministerial-level talks making little headway in addressing the
nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung moved to dispatch Special Envoy Lim Dong-won and his delegation
to Pyongyang on January 27, 2003, to “discuss with Chairman Kim the outcome of profound
consultations with the U.S. side on the nuclear issue and to come up with necessary measures”
(Lim, 2012, p. 349). The eight-member delegation included Lee Jong-seok, a North Korea expert
who was expected to assume a key post in the incoming Roh administration. In fact, as his
presidency was to end in one month, Kim Dae-jung wanted to assure Kim Jong-il that Presidentelect Roh Moo Hyun would be a like-minded successor to his government and that the Sunshine
Policy would continue to be upheld (Funabashi, 2007, p. 203). President Kim sent a letter to
Chairman Kim advising him on how to address the nuclear issue and improve U.S.-DPRK
relations. However, Special Envoy Lim was not even given a chance to meet Chairman Kim this
time.

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
Kim Dae-jung was outraged at the outcome of his special envoy Lim’s visit to Pyongyang
in January 2003. In an interview he had in May 2006, he expressed how anxious he had been
about this incident.204 Even though Kim Dae-jung had been informed of Kim Jong-il’s consent to
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Regarding this, Kim Dae-jung said in an interview in 2006, “Kim Jong Il had said he would see my special envoy. But once I
dispatched one, he wouldn’t see him, even though he was bringing with him my personal letter. Kim Jong Il ignores
international customs, diplomatic protocol, and even courtesy. Moreover, he hasn’t even mentioned anything about a return
visit” (Funabashi, 2007: 205).
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meet his special envoy, North Korea had not made its promise. Lim Dong Won’s visit to
Pyongyang with only one month remaining in President Kim’s term seemed like an act of South
Korea’s one-sided courtship for North Korea (Funabashi, 2007, p. 205).
In his autobiography, Kim Dae-jung expressed how deeply disheartened and dispirited
he had been at the time. He says, “North Korea’s move to challenge the United States with its
nuclear development was indeed dangerous at a time when the neoconservatives were gaining
power in Washington. For me, it was not easy to persuade Washington and Pyongyang at the
same time. Domestically, the Cold-War mentality deeply embedded among conservatives
constituted another obstacle that was hard to surmount. I felt too bitter about both the United
States and North Korea. Especially, I was very concerned about the hardline approach of the
Bush administration which first reneged on its commitment (to the Agreed Framework). All this
was represented later in the form of North Korea’s (active) nuclear development” (Kim, 2011b,
p. 489).

A. Constraints and Responses (Period 3: 2001-2002)
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
Constraint: Mankyongdae incident (August 2001) and a Deteriorating Domestic Political
Environment Surrounding the Sunshine Policy
On August 15, 2001, the South Korean delegation of 337 people including 26 journalists
flew to Pyongyang on a direct air route over the West Sea for a week-long visit to jointly
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celebrate the anniversary of Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule. 205 Despite
objections from relevant bureaucracies including the National Intelligence Service (NIS),
President Kim instructed Unification Minister Lim Dong-won to authorize the group’s visit to
Pyongyang. The problem arose when around 80 members of a progressive organization visited
a monument dedicated to the North’s unification policy and Mangyongdae, the birthplace of
former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung (Lim, 2012, p. 279; “Seoul to Take Punitive Steps
Against Visitors to NK,” 2001). At Mangyongdae, a South Korean professor wrote an allegedly
pro-North Korean message in a guestbook saying, “Let’s uphold the Mangyongdae spirit to
accomplish the great task of national unification.” In South Korea, any act praising or expressing
support for the communist North is considered a violation of the anti-communist National
Security Law (“SKn Professor Charged over North Reunification Festival Message,” 2001). When
the South Korean delegation returned to Seoul after their week-long trip, sixteen of the 300
South Koreans who attended the unification festival in Pyongyang were arrested at the airport
(“SKn Professor Charged over North Reunification Festival Message,” 2001). The controversy
over the behaviors of these individuals swiftly turned into major political strife as the incident
caused a furious reaction from South Korea’s conservative circle. Opposition lawmakers and the
mainstream conservative press vehemently criticized the government and demanded the
resignation of Unification Minister Lim as well as a complete overhaul of the Sunshine Policy (H.
J. Kim, 2001; J. H. Kim, 2001; Lim, 2012, p. 279).

205

In fact, South Korea’s Unification Ministry had initially prohibited the delegations from visiting the North. It was because the
relevant agencies including the National Intelligence Service had concurred that the government ought to disapprove the
civilian visit on the grounds that a planned event could possibly be exploited by North Korea’s propaganda and that behaviors
of over-300 individuals representing over one hundred organizations would be hard to monitor and control. However, President
Kim Dae-jung pushed forward and approved of the group’s visit to Pyongyang (Lim, 2012, p. 280).
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GNP lawmakers moved to submit to the National Assembly a motion of no-confidence in
Unification Minister Lim Dong-won, holding him responsible for authorizing the group’s visit to
Pyongyang. Despite President Kim’s determined will to keep him in the Cabinet, the noconfidence vote on Lim was passed on September 1, 2001, with the support of the United
Liberal Democrats (ULD), the government’s coalition partner, enforcing the resignation of
Minister Lim. This eventually brought an end to the DJP (Kim Dae-jung -Kim Jong-pil), or MDPULD (Millennium Democratic Party-United Liberal Democrats) coalition government (Y. J. Oh,
2001a).206 Following the parliamentary censure against Lim, the 22-member cabinet resigned en
masse (J. H. Shim, 2001). Throughout the unfolding of the incident, the conservative
newspapers, the opposition GNP, and the ruling coalition ULD joined forces to fight the Kim
Dae-jung government and the Sunshine Policy.

Response
In fact, the domestic political environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy had already
begun to deteriorate prior to the Mankyongdae incident. Beginning in January 2001, the
government undertook a massive tax audit of media companies, striking a lethal blow against
the country’s major newspapers. In the process, several major newspaper companies were
slated to be prosecuted for tax evasion (Y. S. Han, 2002, p. 62). The Kim government’s massive
tax audit on the media was severely condemned by the opposition parties and the conservative
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Regarding the coalition partner ULD’s participation in the GDP-initiated no confidence motion at the National Assembly, it is
notable that it was not so much indicative of their discontent with the Sunshine Policy per se as of their protest against
President Kim’s breach of a promise to introduce a parliamentary system. In fact, Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil and his ULD in
general did not pose any serious challenge to the Sunshine Policy since North Korea policy was not the issue area of primary
interest for the ULD coalition partner at the time (S.H. Jeong, personal communication, September 27, 2016).
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circle as President Kim’s politically-motivated, retaliatory measure to repress or close down
conservative newspapers that were principal critics of the Sunshine Policy (“Opposition Moves
to Impeach President Kim,” 2001). The three major conservative newspapers –Chosun Ilbo,
Dong Ah Ilbo and JoongAng Ilbo- and the opposition GNP stood at the forefront of the protest
against the government’s move. In the process, the country’s political landscape became even
further polarized (Y. S. Han, 2002, p. 62).
A flurry of negative reports portraying the Mankyongdae incident from an ideological
angle continued to make headlines while conservative critics fervently demanded the dismissal
of the Unification Minister. Under these circumstances, President Kim made an official
statement that he would not change the Unification Minister and that the individual behavior
of members of the group had nothing to do with the viability of the Sunshine Policy (Lim, 2012,
p. 282). In effect, Kim Dae-jung was not obligated to abide by the no-confidence motion as it
was not the National Assembly but the President that elected the Cabinet (“Kim Dae-jung at the
Crossroads,” 2001). Nonetheless, Kim Dae-jung opted not to go with the confrontational
option.
Instead, on September 12, 2001, shortly after the parliamentary vote on Lim Dongwon’s dismissal as the Unification Minister, Kim appointed Lim as the Special Advisor to the
President for National Security and Unification despite the expectation of severe resistance
from the opposition (Kim, 2011b, p. 418; J. H. Shim, 2001). By reinstating his point man on the
Sunshine Policy in a newly created post immediately after his parliamentary dismissal as the
Unification Minister, President Kim made Lim Dong-won return to work so as to continue to
serve as a de facto Chief of Staff and a key implementer of the Sunshine Policy (Lim, 2012, p.
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285).
In fact, the period between the Mankyongdae incident and the 2 nd Yeonpyeong Battle
(August 15, 2001 - June 29, 2002) was the most difficult period for the Sunshine Policy in
domestic political terms, as noted by the then Vice Unification Minister (H. K. Kim, personal
communication, November 2, 2016). With the parliamentary motion to dismiss Lim being
passed with the help of the ULD, the coalition government collapsed in three years and eight
months. The incident also made President Kim anticipate a rough road ahead for the Sunshine
Policy as the leader of a minority government (Kim, 2011b, p. 418).

Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective
By reinstating his top adviser Lim Dong-won as the Special Adviser shortly after he
resigned as the Unification Minister after the parliamentary motion against him, Kim Dae-jung
sought to express his iron will to maintain the Sunshine Policy both at home and abroad (Kim,
2011b, p. 418). Regarding the reasons why he quickly restored Lim Dong-won as his Special
Advisor, the President noted, “As someone playing a preacher’s role in terms of the Sunshine
Policy, he served to implement the North Korea policy of the Government of the People. …
Despite an increasingly fierce attack (on the Sunshine Policy) from the opposition, I could not
replace him as my chief associate working for unification. He was gaining profound trust from
leaders of other countries including North Korea and China. If I dismissed him, it may well have
given the wrong impression both at home and abroad that the keynote of the Sunshine Policy
was faltering or could have been interpreted as indicative of the retrogression of the Sunshine
Policy. Despite the difficult political situation, I could not yield ground when it came to inter-
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Korean relations. Minster Lim was a man of ability indispensable for the future of the Korean
Peninsula. … I had to keep him on my side” (Kim, 2011b, p. 417; Lim, 2012, p. 284).

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile in relation to the North Korea policy for Period 3 (2001-200)
by the three different sources of constraints is summarized in Table 14.

Table 14
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Profile as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy in Period 3 (2001-2002) by
Three Different Sources of Constraints (Leadership Trait Analysis)
Period 3

BACE

Power

CC

SC

Task

Distrust

IGB

North Korea (N=21)
- N of doc: 21
- N of words: 20521

0.33
M

0.34
H

0.59
M

0.34
M

0.53
L

0.20
H

0.21
H

0.32
M

0.29
M

0.61
M

0.35
M

0.55
L

0.23
H

0.14
L

0.34
M

0.39
H

0.56
M

0.34
M

0.52
L

0.16
M

0.29
H

Foreign
- N of doc: 11
- N of words: 10125
Domestic (N=10)
- N of doc: 10
- N of words: 10396

Note. N of doc: Number of the documents used for content analysis; N of words: Number of the
total words contained in the documents used for content analysis. Belief in Ability to Control
Events (BACE); Need for Power (Power); Conceptual Complexity (CC); Self-confidence (SC); Taskfocus (Task); Distrust of others (Distrust); In-group Bias (IGB). High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).
For the norming group data, refer to Table 5.
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a. Source of Constraints: North Korea
Regarding the overall results reflecting Kim Dae-jung’s personal profile regarding North
Korea policy for this period, his score on belief in ability to control events (0.33) is moderate
while his score for need for power (0.34) is high in strength in comparison to a norming group of
Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was prone to
challenge, rather than respect, constraints. Kim’s scores on conceptual complexity (0.59) and
self-confidence (0.34) are both moderate in strength compared to a reference group of Pacific
Rim leaders. This means that he was likely to be closed to input from others and the
environment. On balance, the LTA results show that in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung
was advocate in his leadership style during this period. Meanwhile, his high scores for both
distrust of others and in-group bias indicate that Kim Dae-jung was more or less focused or
targeted in his motivational orientation toward North Korea in this period.

Advocate Leadership Style
From the beginning of this period, North Korea posed a challenge to the Sunshine Policy
by unilaterally suspending inter-Korean dialogue and exchange in protest of the Bush
administration’s hardline posture and what they saw as South Korea’s surrender to U.S.
pressure. During this period, President Kim’s advocate leadership was salient in his patient,
relentless endeavors to implement his peace agenda while being closed to information with the
external environment rapidly deteriorating surrounding the Sunshine Policy.
In the six month-long hiatus in inter-Korean relations following North Korea’s
cancellation of inter-Korean talks in March 2001, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group were
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focused on implementing the agenda as agreed upon during the June 15 summit and the Joint
Declaration regardless of whether North Korea carried out its share of tasks. With inter-Korean
projects and cooperation remaining at a standstill, he strived to promote inter-Korean
exchanges with North Korea at the civilian level.
Moreover, President Kim pushed ahead with his decision to authorize a massive
delegation of South Koreans working for non-government organizations to visit Pyongyang to
join the National Liberation Day ceremony on August 15, 2001, despite objections on the part
of relevant bureaucracies. This means that he was dismissive of the information that could have
been disconfirmatory of his planned course of action.
After all, Kim Dae-jung’s resolute, uncompromising drive for his planned strategy made
it possible for inter-Korean relations to become prosperous in the wake of the second naval
battle in June 2002. By appointing Lim Dong-won, the intelligence chief and his point man on
North Korea, as the unification minister, President Kim effectively conveyed his strong will to
maintain his strategy and overcome whatever obstacles were posed—whether by North Korea
or by unfavorable internal and external conditions. The decision to postpone the publication of
the Defense Ministry’s White Paper (May 2002), which designated the communist regime as
the country’s main enemy, was a proactive move on the part of President Kim, intended to
prevent the North from making excuses for its failure to carry out its share of tasks agreed upon
in the Joint June 15 Declaration.
Kim’s advocate leadership style was also evidenced in the ways in which he dealt with
the rupture of the sixth inter-Korean ministerial talks, which his government managed to hold
in November 2001 following the six-month-long deadlock in inter-Korean relations. When the
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eagerly-anticipated talks broke down after the South Korean representative, the then
Unification Minister, entered into a dispute with his North Korean counterpart and failed to
comply with presidential instructions to reach an agreement with the North, President Kim
moved to exclude him from the policy process altogether by dismissing him as the Unification
Minister. This way, Kim Dae-jung took charge and maintained persistent sway over the overall
implementation of his North Korea policy, assuring that his preferred course of action would be
properly enacted. With one month to go until the end of his tenure, Kim’s overriding concern
about the rapprochement agenda encouraged a decision to send a special envoy to Pyongyang
to meet with Kim Jong-il. In doing this, he hoped to break the deadlock in inter-Korean
relations, and to mitigate rapidly escalating tensions between Pyongyang and Washington.

High Need for Power
Meanwhile, in dealing with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung exhibited an assortment of
leadership characteristics deemed closely linked with his high need for power (e.g., Terhune,
1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; M. G.
Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). In an attempt to head off unfavorable public sentiment toward
his rapprochement agenda, Kim Dae-jung interpreted the messages from North Korea in which
they expressed “regret” over the naval conflict as an apology that would help to rationalize his
planned mode of action. This indicates that the processing of information on the part of the
president was highly selective and arbitrary in dealing with North Korea.
Furthermore, in an attemp to prevent the incident from negatively affecting his peace
process, Kim and his policy group adopted a fairly restrained, measured approach. President
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Kim chose not to emphasize the informal hotline message the North sent the day following the
naval battle out of concern that making it public could hamper the trust-building process
between the two Koreas. This way, the activist government’s handling of the incident largely
revolved around an extreme level of caution to avoid giving the North a wrong signal and thus
to prevent the incident from evolving into a more serious situation.
By sticking to his schedule to attend the World Cup closing ceremony in Japan at the risk
of exacerbating domestic criticism of his conciliatory posture, Kim Dae-jung sought to assure
that the incident did not exert any adverse impact on the inter-Korean relations. This way, Kim
Dae-jung sought to send the North a positive signal in a way that would lead the North Korean
leader to willingly join his peace process even after the naval incident. In short, Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership characteristics associated with a high need for power were notable in the way in
which he handled the second Yeonpyeong naval battle in the summer of 2001.
Ultimately, President Kim’s steadfast, assertive pursuit of his policy agenda, as well as
his subtly manipulative, highly discreet, restrained handling of the constraints imposed by
North Korea, all combined to elicit belated but active reciprocation from the North in the wake
of the naval clash. The naval incident was followed by successive developments leading to
unprecedentedly rapid progress in the inter-Korean rapprochement process even though it all
began to unravel with the U.S.-DPRK relations taking another disastrous turn in the wake of
Assistant Secretary Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2002.

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)
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b. Source of Constraints: External Environment
In comparison to the norming group of Pacific Rim Leaders, Kim Dae-jung’s scores for
Power (0.32) and belief in ability to control events (0.29) are both moderate in strength. This
indicates that he was predisposed to respect constraints. Regarding the two traits suggestive of
the leader’s tendency to process information, Kim’s scores for conceptual complexity (0.61) and
self-confidence (0.35) are both moderate in strength. This means that he was prone to be
closed to incoming information. Notably, the scores of these four traits are all moderate in
strength compared to the norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. This indicates that, in dealing
with constraints imposed by the external environment –e.g., the United States- to his peace
process, Kim Dae-jung showed a pragmatic leadership style during this period.
In comparison to the previous two periods, it is noteworthy that Kim’s score on need for
power shows a remarkable shift–from high to moderate–during this period in relation to the
external environment. In fact, this is indicative of a significant change being in his leadership
style from the advocate to the pragmatic.
Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s low score for in-group bias in relation to the external
environment during this period is also distinct in that his score on this trait constantly remained
high for all periods under study, or throughout his term of office, regardless of the type of
environment and for the two other sources of constraints -North Korea and domestic political
environment- during this period. Kim Dae-jung’s high score on distrust of others coupled with a
low in-group bias in relation to the external environment in this period indicates that, in
implementing his peace agenda, he was focused on catching whatever opportunities were
posed by the external environment. This is suggestive of a crucial change occurring in his
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motivational perception toward the external environment surrounding his peace initiative from
the zero-sum orientation in Period 2 to the opportunity grabbing orientation in Period 3.

Pragmatic Leadership Style
Kim Dae-jung’s trait scores indicate that, in this period, he showed the most flexible
approach to leadership of all three periods of interest in the face of what he viewed as the most
serious threat to his peace-making efforts. That is, in dealing with the external environment as
relevant to the Sunshine Policy in this period, Kim Dae-jung was more likely to work within the
political constraints, be driven by the situation, and be willing to adjust his goals in tandem with
the changing situation. This also means that he was more likely to be sensitive to political
constraints and work within established parameters than in the previous periods of interest.
A significant decrease in the score for need for power as related to the external
environment in this period was evident in how Kim Dae-jung interacted with George W. Bush
during the first summit. For all the importance he attributed to his first summit with President
Bush in March 2001, President Kim was not tactful or skillful enough to get the best possible
results from what he saw as an invaluable opportunity to address constraints that could pose a
serious threat to his peace process. Even though President Kim firmly believe that he would be
able to persuade President Bush successfully, such confidence in his ability to persuade did not
work well during the first summit. A former government officer who served the Kim Dae-jung
administration points out that President Kim tended to push forward somewhat excessively as
soon as President Bush was sworn into office, and that such an approach may not have been
highly regarded by George W. Bush. This is all the more so, he says, considering that Bush, as
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the newly elected president, may have been highly exultant and ambitious about pursuing his
own agenda upon taking office. He added, “I personally believe that it (the summit) would have
been more successful if President Kim had attempted to win over President Bush by taking
more time in trying to persuade him” (S.C. Yang, Personal communication, October 12, 2016).
Under the heavy pressure to win over Bush in the first summit meeting, Kim was less skilled in
reading how to manipulate the environment, and was more likely to signal his intent to the
other party than in the previous periods. All of this can be properly understood in light of his
personality profile, involving a notable decrease in his score on the need for power (from high
to moderate compared to a norming group) in this period in relation to the external
environment (e.g., McClelland, 1975; D. G. Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; Kaarbo
& Hermann, 1998; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). A longtime aide and adviser to Kim Daejung presents a different view, noting that President Kim could have employed any range of
approaches to President Bush, but there is little that would have been successful in persuading
him at the time. That is, it did not matter how Kim approached Bush; nothing would have
worked, mainly because of “who President Bush was and who the team around him was” as
well as “what they were doing.” He holds that, despite all this, Kim Dae-jung did all he could do
to persuade Bush to engage North Korea while on his first visit to Washington (S. Costello,
personal communication, November 3, 2017). This means that no matter how he approached
his first summit with Bush, it would not have affected the outcome of the summit.
Having had a bitter experience from his first summit with Bush, Kim took extraordinary
care to prepare for the summit in Seoul scheduled for February 2002 to make sure that the
hard-won opportunity would not go down the drain as in the case of the first summit of a year
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ago.207 With U.S.-North Korea relations rapidly declining, President Kim Dae-jung made
desperate endeavors to persuade his American counterpart to change his strategy for North
Korea from a hardline stance as reflected in the “Axis of Evil’ speech.
The fact that Kim was highly satisfied with Bush’s statement that he had no intention of
either attacking or invading North Korea while Bush still expressed his negative views on North
Korea and its leader indicates that Kim Dae-jung had adjusted his policy goals in relation to the
Bush administration in tandem with the changing circumstances. Indeed, President Bush’s
remarks made during his visit to Seoul were less than equivalent to the type of engagement
President Kim had been seeking from the United States. In other words, this time around, Kim’s
goals regarding the Bush administration was to deter it from conducting military action or a
preemptive strike against North Korea.
In short, the deteriorating contextual conditions surrounding his peace process in the
wake of the September 11 attacks and President Bush’s subsequent ‘Axis of Evil’ speech led Kim
Dae-jung to scale back the scope of his agenda and adjust relevant policy goals to make them
more realistic. In the face of what he perceived as the most serious threat ever posed to his
Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung became more willing to adjust his agenda according to the
situation at hand or in consideration of the needs and wants of the Bush administration.
Likewise, Kim Dae-jung exhibited a distinctly different pattern of leadership style, that is, a
pragmatic approach to leadership, during this period.
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With a view toward persuading Bush to change his course of action, Kim Dae-jung availed himself of his time off during
Lunar New Year holidays by staying at the Walkerhill Hotel (in Seoul) where he discussed the summit strategy with his staff
including Lim Dong-won, his Special Adviser, and Yim Sung Joon, his Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs and National Security
(Lim, 2012, p. 293; Y. J. Oh, 2002).
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Even though Kim Dae-jung had a clear political agenda, he may have believed he must
work within the parameters that defined his political space in the international arena during
this period. However, even while adjusting the scope of his agenda in relation to the external
environment, he pushed ahead with his policy agenda in terms of inter-Korean relations. This
way, he continued to stick to the separation principle between inter-Korean relations and U.S.DPRK relations or North Korea’s nuclear issue. In doing so, he differentiated his leadership style
with regard to North Korea from that in relation to the external environment surrounding his
North Korea policy.
Regarding his North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung differentiated his approach to
leadership in relation to the external environment from in relation to North Korea and in
relation to the domestic political environment. It is worth noting that his score for need for
power is distinctly moderate in relation to the external environment during this period while
the scores on the same trait remain high regarding both North Korea and the domestic political
environment; his scores for the trait were high in the other two periods under study regardless
of the sources of relevant constraints. This means that, in the face of what he perceived as a
potentially existential threat to his overall peace process –the Bush administration’s hardline
policy toward North Korea- Kim Dae-jung showed a change in his approach to leadership,
shifting from an advocate leadership style to a pragmatic one.
In this period, Kim Dae-jung exhibited the most versatile approach to leadership in
pursuing his peace initiative. He showed a pragmatic leadership style in dealing with the
external environment, while showing an advocate leadership style regarding the domestic
political context and North Korea –or the overall policy toward North Korea. Kim Dae-jung’s
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uniquely pragmatic approach to leadership in response to constraints and setbacks arising from
the external environment appears to be closely associated with his own perception of the
relevant constraints. That is, he considered the constraints imposed by the Bush administration
and the resulting tension between Pyongyang and Washington as the most serious threat ever
posed to his peace initiative. Such a perceptional change for Kim Dae-jung seemingly resulted in
a change in his approach to leadership.

Motivational Perception: Opportunity-Grabbing
Furthermore, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile shows that his two motivational traits
also underwent a significant change in relation to the external environment during this period.
His high distrust of others and low in-group bias combine to be indicative of a change in his
motivational perception regarding the external conditions surrounding his North Korea policy.
With the external context rapidly deteriorating, Kim may have believed that if he continued to
employ the same approach to leadership as before, he would likely lose and would never
achieve his goal.
Regarding the external environment, Kim Dae-jung’s high scores for distrust of others
and low in-group bias indicate that he was likely to be obsessed with grabbing whatever
perceived opportunities emerged from the external conditions to move forward on his peace
agenda amid all the difficulties and setbacks arising from the relevant environment. In this
difficult period, Kim Dae-jung remained highly optimistic about what he could do to improve, if
not fully resolve, the situation, seeking to make use of whatever opportunities arose from the
evolving contextual conditions.
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The situation further exacerbated amid growing suspicions over North Korea’s alleged
highly enriched uranium program (HEUP) in the wake of Assistant Secretary James Kelly’s visit
to Pyongyang in October 2002. Demonstrating a pragmatic leadership style, he sought to play
an intermediary role not only between the United States and North Korea, but between Japan
and North Korea. By doing so, he sought to lead the inter-Korean, Japan-DPRK and U.S.-DPRK
relations to all make headway simultaneously, even though the end result was less than
promising under swiftly aggravating contextual conditions over North Korea’s nuclear issue.
From Kim Dae-jung’s viewpoint, the world and politics were not anarchic, and thus the
cooperation was not only possible but made for a good policy. In a nutshell, as a pragmatist in
his leadership style in dealing with the external environment surrounding his North Korea
policy, Kim Dae-jung showed himself as a diplomat and mediator at heart. That is, he firmly
believed in dialogue and persuasion as major policy instruments (M. G. Hermann & Gerard,
2009, p. 35).

B. Leadership Style (Period 3: 2001-2002)
c. Source of Constraints: Domestic Environment
In relation to the domestic political environment in Period 3 (2001-2002), Kim Daejung’s score on BACE (0.34) is moderate while his score on power (0.39) is high in strength
compared to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders. That is, in dealing with the domestic
environment, Kim was predisposed to challenge, rather than respect, constraints. Moreover,
regarding scores for traits suggestive of the self-other orientation, Kim’s scores for conceptual
complexity (0.56) and his self-confidence (0.34) are both moderate in comparison to the
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norming group. This means that Kim Dae-jung was likely to be closed to information from
contextual conditions. All in all, the LTA results demonstrate that, when it came to the domestic
political environment, Kim Dae-jung was likely to show an advocate leadership style during this
period.

Advocate Leadership Style
With a robust sense of purposes and personal convictions, Kim Dae-jung pushed for his
plan of action regardless of the cost it may have incurred in domestic political terms in this
period. Amid the worsening domestic environment in the wake of a massive tax audit of major
newspaper companies and the Mankyondae incident, Kim Dae-jung sternly resisted calls to
reconsider his comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. His advocate leadership
style was evident in the ways in which he handled the Mankyongdae incident that erupted on
August 15, 2001. By reinstating Lim Dong-won in a newly created post of Special Adviser on
Foreign Affairs and Security shortly afterward, Kim Dae-jung expressed his renewed
determination to maintain his peace policy. As manifested in his high scores on both ability to
control events (BACE) (at 0.40) and need for power (Power) (at 0.38), Kim Dae-jung was selfassured in his ability to take the reins and remain in firm control of the political situation
despite all the constraints imposed on his rapprochement agenda.
Kim Dae-jung’s handling of the second Yeonpyeog naval battle on June 29, 2002, also
suggests that he was insensitive to domestic political conditions in making decisions on North
Korean issues. This way, he sought to meet the challenge head-on and was decisive in
advocating his position. Immediately after the naval clash, he decided to leave for Japan to
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attend the scheduled summit meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister and the closing
ceremony of the joint World Cup Games. Even though it was not highlighted in public, President
Kim had already ascertained the communist regime’s position on the naval incident through a
hotline message –the North expressed regret and certainly did not want any escalation of the
incident- when he decided to take a cool response. By doing so, he sought to cope with the
aftermath of the incident in a way that would prevent the situation from any further escalation
and would not leave the global community with any negative impression of the security of the
Korean Peninsula (J. H. KIM, 2015; Lim, 2012, p. 320). In making such a move, Kim Dae-jung
risked incurring grave political costs, being harshly blamed for leaving the country on the day
after the incident without attending the group memorial for those soldiers killed in the naval
battle.
With the end of his presidency drawing near, Kim Dae-jung, under severe time pressure,
could not afford to be adversely affected by a deteriorating political landscape in pursuing his
rapprochement agenda. Moreover, Kim Dae-jung and his policy group decided not to play up
North Korea’s hotline message received on the day following the 2 nd Yeonpyeong battle out of
concern that making it public could hamper the trust building between the two Koreas despite
critics’ growing attack on the Sunshine Policy for being culpable for the incident. This
demonstrates that President Kim strived to achieve the goal of promoting inter-Korean
reconciliation via trust building at all costs that it incurred in domestic political terms. In sum, in
implementing the Sunshine Policy during this period, Kim Dae-jung was hardly influenced by the
deteriorating domestic political conditions. One important contributing factor for Kim Daejung’s determined pursuit of his peace agenda, despite all the obstacles and setbacks he was
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confronted with, was the persistent backing to the Sunshine Policy on the part of the majority
of South Koreans. Ultimately, the near constant public support of the Sunshine Policy
constituted a crucial enabling factor for President Kim’s resolute, unflinching drive for his
strategy vis-à-vis North Korea in the midst of an array of constraints imposed by the domestic
political environment (Kim, 2011b, pp. 469).
Regarding the type of means used in the domestic political scene, Kim Dae-jung’s tactics
in dealing with his critics and political opponents were mostly circuitous, diplomatic, political,
and subtle in nature. Such an indirect approach to the policy process was manifested in his
constantly high scores for need for power (0.39). Still, it is noteworthy that he also resorted to
means that appeared very direct in dealing with detractors opposed to the Sunshine Policy.
Having focused on expanding his political power base in the previous period (the year 2000),
President Kim undertook a massive tax audit of media companies, which resulted in the arrest
or conviction of the heads of the major conservative media companies. His moves were
vehemently condemned by the conservative circle as “retaliatory” against those opposed to the
Sunshine Policy (G. M. Lee, 2003), Meanwhile, in most other cases, he stopped short of being
directly confrontational or overbearing in dealing with the opposition to his Sunshine Policy. In
effect, he could have ignored the parliamentary no-confidence motion against Minister Lim
Dong-won, if he chose to do so.208 Still, he opted to avoid confrontation with his opponents.
Instead, he reinstated his Chief of Staff in a newly created post of Special Advisor to the
President.
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This is because he had no obligation to observe it as the Cabinet was elected by the President and not the National Assembly
(“Kim Dae-Jung at the Crossroads,” 2001).
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Even though Kim Dae-jung showed an advocate leadership in relation to both North
Korea and the domestic political environment in this period (2001-2002), the tone of his
leadership was qualitatively different, albeit in subtle ways. One reason for this appears to be
closely linked with his motivational perceptions of the two different sources of constraints in
this period. That is, his motivational perception vis-à-vis North Korea was mainly focused in
nature while he was close to zero-sum in motivational perception with regard to the domestic
political arena. As in the previous period of analysis (the year 2000), Kim Dae-jung viewed
domestic politics as a zero-sum game in which the universe consists of us and them (friends and
enemies), or winners and losers. For President Kim, his group’s gain would likely have meant
the opposition’s loss, and vice versa.

Motivational Perception: Close to Zero-Sum
Although he was deeply concerned about growing political polarization over the
Sunshine Policy, President Kim stopped short of incorporating it into his policy agenda, giving
the impression that he was remiss in pursuing national consensus and making his peace
initiative more inclusive.
The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung’s zero-sum motivational perception of domestic
politics–based on a distinctly high in-group bias and a moderate distrust of others–combined
with a relatively low conceptual complexity and a high need for power translated into a highly
emphatic and uncompromising drive to carry out his policy agenda, no matter what happened
in the domestic political context surrounding his peace initiative. Kim’s advocate orientation
regarding domestic politics reflects a tendency to be closed to disconfirmatory information
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from the domestic political scene—the information about growing resistance to the Sunshine
Policy among conservative critics and a rapidly polarizing domestic political landscape. This may
have made his leadership appear self-righteous and inflexible in terms of domestic politics with
regard to the Sunshine Policy, as noted by his critics.
Kim Dae-jung’s approach to leadership in handling domestic politics in this period was
clearly distinguished from his leadership styles shown in relation to both North Korea and, to a
greater degree, the external environment wherein his relevant leadership appeared far more
flexible and adaptable. The second Yeonpyeong battle in June 2002 was illustrative of a notable
difference between his handling of North Korea and that of the domestic political environment
in terms of the degree of commitment, initiative, and affect involved. In addressing the
incident, President Kim appears to have clearly prioritized building trust with North Korea and
maintaining the reconciliation process, while showing himself to be somewhat insensitive to
the resulting domestic political costs. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that President Kim
constantly remained in a difficult dilemma, stuck between a rock and a hard place when it came
to dealing with domestic political opposition to the Sunshine Policy. In fact, the more focused
he was on finding a new way forward in pursuing rapprochement with North Korea, the more
severe his conflict with the opposition party and his conservative critics, and the greater the
political polarization in the country.

Personal Capitals & Political Skills
In striving to rescue his Sunshine Policy from an evolving crisis situation in Period 3, Kim
Dae-jung exhibited much of his personal capital and political skills. Aside from the sources of
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personal capital constituting fundamental aspects of the Sunshine Policy—e.g., tenacity,
professional stature based on expertise, commitment to peace, and international recognition—
Kim Dae-jung vigorously displayed political skills involving the ability to persuade and build
coalition in implementing his North Korea policy. Notably, this was primarily the case with his
dealings with North Korea and the external environment. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s ability to
remain unperturbed and self-possessed under intense stress, which was reflective of his sense
of efficacy, shone through in this period, particularly when he came under tremendous
pressure imposed by a looming crisis amid a rapidly escalating confrontation between
Washington and Pyongyang.
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Chapter 8. What Aspects of Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Constituted a Key
Mechanism for the Sunshine Policy?
A. Kim Dae-jung’s Personal Capital & Political Skills based on the Biographical Sketch
Personal Capital
Kim Dae-jung’s prior life and experience as a dissident politician brought him his own
extraordinary courage and character, which constituted immense personal capital. His tenacity,
commitment to peace and rapprochement, and political stature based on his interest,
knowledge and expertise in a broad array of relevant domains all constituted vital enabling
factors for the Sunshine Policy, South Korea’s first comprehensive engagement toward North
Korea. During his presidency, Kim Dae-jung’s lifelong commitment to peace and reconciliation,
a major source of his personal capital, was faithfully embodied in the form of the Sunshine
Policy. In undertaking his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung desired to become a change agent by
making a significant change for the better not just for his own country but for the world in
general.
In essence, Kim Dae-jung’s sense of pragmatism (elements of “Other Important Personal
Characteristics”) combined with his nationalist orientation (as evidenced in his distinctly high
score on in-group bias) to produce a unique type of engagement policy toward North Korea.
Kim Dae-jung’s tenacity is a crucial element of personal capital that had been constantly tested
in his lifelong struggle for democracy, human rights, and inter-Korean reconciliation. Kim Daejung was never deterred in pushing for his course of action in undertaking his peace initiative
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amid all the constraints and challenges imposed by the external and internal contextual
conditions.
Another important source of personal capital that facilitated the implementation of the
Sunshine Policy was Kim Dae-jung’s professional stature based on his knowledge and expertise.
A constant evolution of his thesis on unification culminated in the Three Stage Unification
Formula (1995), which served as conceptual framework for the Sunshine Policy. His professional
stature also influenced the nature of the decision-making process, who joined the advisory
group, and how issues were framed and problems were addressed. Kim Dae-jung’s formal and
informal networks of contacts across the world as well as international recognition as a
champion of democracy and human rights also proved a valued source of personal capital that
helped reinforce the credibility of his peace initiative. This in turn helped to facilitate the
implementation of his peace agenda during his term of office. By the end of 1998, the first year
of his presidency, he secured staunch support for his peace initiative from President Clinton and
many other foreign leaders including leaders of Japan, China, Russia, and other Asian and
European nations.
Kim Dae-jung’s charisma also served as a vital source of personal capital that affected
both the decision-making and implementation process of the Sunshine Policy. In implementing
the North Korea policy, the charisma factor drove him toward innovation and made him
constantly look for opportunities to manage the problem and improve the situation amid all the
obstacles and setbacks encountered. In the process of the policy’s implementation, Kim’s
charismatic appeal may have helped to enhance his advisors’ loyalty and commitment.
Meanwhile, the charisma factor, combined with his professional stature based on his expertise,
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was linked with attributes of the system involving a groupthink phenomenon, as well as limited
room for forthright feedback or opportunities for communication between the president and
lower-ranking officials.
The study also finds that sophisticated cognitive qualities and self-restraint and
composure–“other important personal characteristics”–all constitute important factors that
had a significant impact on Kim Dae-jung’s leadership regarding the Sunshine Policy, in that
they were closely connected with an approach to leadership that was highly cautious,
meticulous, measured and restrained in nature.

Political Skills
Kim Dae-jung’s oratorical and writing skills, which partly constituted his political skillset,
served as a useful tool to promote his peace agenda during his presidential tenure. For him,
public speeches were an important tool for persuading people at home and abroad to back his
peace initiative. Viewing presidential speeches as a “record of history,” Kim Dae-jung took great
care in drafting speeches.
It is noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung’s persuasive ability is part and parcel to his political
skills set. Especially in Period 3 (2001-2002) when Kim Dae-jung’s peace initiative faced its
gravest-ever constraint, the Sunshine Policy was arguably all about his unrelenting campaign to
persuade leaders of the United States, North Korea, and the international community including
Japan, China, and Russia, to join his efforts to sustain the peace process that had been put in
jeopardy amid rapidly increasing tension between the United States and North Korea.
Throughout his term, he made vigorous endeavors to build an external milieu conducive to
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North Korea’s change by persuading all major players in the international community to stand
on the same page in joining his peace initiative aimed at dissolving the Cold War structure on
the Korean peninsula. As regards the North Korea policy, his art of persuasion, however, was
not properly exercised domestically, either with the public or with conservative opposition
forces. Even though he occasionally attempted to engage the opposition party, including its
leader, in his peace process, his efforts were somewhat muted or passive, and not sufficiently
vigorous to make any practical difference in the aggravating political division.
In undertaking the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s political skills at building coalition
were eagerly exercised at the international level. In implementing his peace initiative, President
Kim vigorously pursued a collaborative, interdependent foreign policy. He relentlessly sought to
join forces with the United States and the broader international community, particularly those
countries with stakes in a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula, such as Japan, China and
Russia. His ability to build coalition and join forces with his political opponents was also
demonstated domestically, mostly in the initial period of his presidency. 209 However, it seems
safe to say that Kim Dae-jung’s political skills at building coalitions were not properly tapped,
and remained underutilized in undertaking the North Korea policy. For the rest of his tenure, he
did not appear as committed to seeking national consensus on, or bipartisan support of, his
peace agenda. He was severely criticized for further exacerbating the polarization over the
North Korea policy in South Korean society during his term of office.
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In his first year in office, President Kim sought to gain support for his peace agenda from the conservative circle by recruiting
distinguished conservative figures including in the positions of the Unification Minister and the Ambassador to the United
States.

320

B. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits & Styles through the Prism of the Sunshine Policy
1. Kim Dae-jung’s Three Distinct Leadership Traits
In undertaking his North Korea Policy, Kim Dae-jung showed a set of distinct leadership
qualities and traits that made his approach to leadership idiosyncratic in nature. The LTA, an ata-distance method for content analysis, demonstrates that Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile
was distinct in relation to a norming group of Pacific Rim leaders in terms of three personality
traits: 1) a high need for power; 2) a high in-group bias; 3) a low task-focus.

A. High Need for Power
During the first three years in office, Kim Dae-jung consistently showed an advocate
leadership style based on a high need for power, regardless of the sources of constraints (19982000) (McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; S. G. Walker, 1983; Kaarbo & Hermann,
1998; Keller, 2005; Hermann, 2005). In his last two-year period in office (2001-2002), President
Kim continued to show an advocate leadership style in undertaking his North Korea policy.
Meanwhile, the contextualization of materials for content analysis based on the type of
audience indicate that, in this period, he exhibited a pragmatic leadership style in dealing with
the external environment, while simultaneously relying on an advocate leadership style in
response to domestic political constraints imposed on his peace initiative.
In sum, regarding the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile consistently showed
a high need for power throughout his term of office. The only exception to this was his dealings
with the external environment surrounding his peace initiative in the last two years of his
presidency (Period 3 (2001-2002)), when he showed a moderate score (0.29) for the need for
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power. Still, in this period, he showed a consistently high need for power in addressing
constraints imposed by North Korea (0.34, the score related to the overall North Korea policy
for this period) and the domestic political environment (0.39). In actuality, in implementing his
peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung showed a flurry of leadership characteristics that reflected a high
need for power.
As evidenced in his high need for power, he was more inclined to challenge constraints
than to respect them. In implementing his peace agenda, he sought to preserve dominance of
the overall policy process. Also, he was skilled in sizing up situations and sensing what tactics
would be effective in achieving his goals. Moreover, he was adept at challenging constraints
indirectly and working behind the scenes to ensure that his position would eventually prevail.
He was occasionally manipulative, if need be, in challenging constraints and obstacles that
encumbered his path. A case in point was his handling of the inter-Korean issues in the year
2000, in which he was in desperate need of building positive momentum toward his goal. In this
period, he made an array of decisions–e.g., announcement of a planned summit days before
the general elections, and illegal cash transfer–that might well become a bone of contention in
domestic politics. Regarding the procedural aspect of the policy, Kim Dae-jung consistently
maintained effective control over the decision-making system and process. Notably, however,
his control over the decision-making system was not so much direct, outright, or overbearing,
as subtle, indirect, and behind-the-scenes in nature. This was evident in a constantly high score
on need for power as reflected in his leadership profile regarding the North Korea policy during
his presidency. President Kim’s shrewd reliance on his Chief of Staff Lim Dong-won as a
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custodian manager of the relevant system and process constituted another crucial enabling
factor for an effective control he maintained over the overall policy process.
Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power was also manifested in the ways in which he dealt
with his political opponents and critics domestically. In conducting his North Korea policy, Kim
Dae-jung was politically astute and adroit enough to push for his agenda and achieve his goals
without being confrontational with his adversaries and critics. Rather, he sought to be inclusive
by appointing conservative officials in some key government posts and co-opting conservative
politicians to join his party. However, he largely relied on his conservative lieutenants to prevail
over the conservative circle to endorse the Sunshine Policy. Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power
was also manifested in how he challenged constraints arising from North Korea. His eagerness
to size up and build trust with North Korea by assuaging its threat perception and siege
mentality translated into a highly cautious, measured, and guarded approach he adopted in
dealing with North Korea. By doing so, President Kim was careful not to send a wrong signal
that could have encumbered his path forward in achieving his rapprochement agenda. This
demonstrates the extent to which he was subtle and sophisticated in the use of means to
challenge the constraints in conducting his North Korea policy.

B. Low Task-focus
Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile was distinct in terms of
the task focus, which represents a leader’s motivation for seeking office. As far as the North
Korea policy is concerned, Kim Dae-jung’s score for the task trait is consistently low regardless
of the period of time or the source of constraints -or the type of environment-, meaning that he
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was innately relationship/process-focused rather than task/achievement-focused in his
motivational perception. That is, for Kim Dae-jung, building relationships was more important
than achieving excellence in task performance, and that the process of achieving a goal was
more important than achievement of the goal itself when it came to North Korea policy. 210
Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung believed that means and process mattered
more than an end result. By the same token, he prioritized building trust with North Korea in
conducting his North Korea policy. Such a behavioral tendency on the part of Kim Dae-jung also
appears related to the lessons he learned from German unification during his stay in the United
Kingdom in the mid-1990s. His consistent focus on relationship/process–rather than task
accomplishment–had a significant impact on the ways in which he dealt with North Korea,
conducted diplomacy, and managed the advisory system involved in his peace initiative
(McClelland, 1961; Hersey & Blanchard, 1982; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1996, 2005).

C. High In-Group Bias
With regard to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership profile shows an invariably
high score for in-group bias across the three periods of interest regardless of the source of
constraints except for the Period 3 in relation to the external environment in which his in-group
bias was scored low (at 0.14) compared to a norming group. This means that he was the type of
leader who held strong emotional attachments to his own group (e.g., Druckman, 1968; R. A.
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Winter (2005, p. 561) notes that achievement-motivated, or task-oriented, leaders are highly flexible in business settings,
but often show themselves quite rigid in politics. Studies show that achievement-motivated leaders enter office with
considerable idealism, which will inevitably collide withl various constraints inherent in politics such as opposition,
compromises, cost overruns, delays, and intractable bureaucracies.
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Levine & Campbell, 1972; Driver, 1977; Brewer, 1979; Stuart & Starr, 1982). This also means
that, in undertaking his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung constantly perceived threats from the
environment and confronted challenges and adversaries (Hagan, 1993, 1994). 211 As manifested
in this trait score, Kim Dae-jung was a nationalist leader; in engaging in his peace initiative, he
strived to reinvigorate the people’s aspirations to be the master of their own destiny. Put
simply, Kim Dae-jung was at once a nationalist and a pragmatist, as was manifested in the tone
and pattern of his approach to leadership. Kim Dae-jung’s scores for the trait of in-group bias
are to be discussed below in connection with his scores on distrust of others, another
motivational variable, as these two personality traits interrelate to reflect the leader’s
motivational perception of specific sources of constraints.

2. Kim Dae-jung Challenged Constraints or Worked Within Constraints Depending on the
Degree of Constraints
Regarding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung was more likely to challenge and overcome
constraints so as to move forward with his agenda and achieve his goals. A marked exception to
this was during the last two years in office (2001-2002), in which he exhibited a pragmatic
approach to leadership and showed himself to be willing to adapt to the situation at hand. That
is, he was more likely to be driven by the situation and to behave within the parameters newly
set by the changing circumstances than he had been in the previous periods of interest.
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Underlying this logic is the “statist approach” to foreign policy decision-making, as opposed to the “regime structure
approach,” which posits that the general structure of a regime largely determines the types of leaders selected to rule as well
as how they respond to political constraints (Hagan, 1993, 1994).
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Kim Dae-jung’s personality profiles indicate that he was inherently an advocate leader,
predisposed to challenge constraints and to be closed to information. However, he changed his
leadership style when faced with what he perceived as a genuine constraint to his peace
initiative. By shifting from the advocate to the pragmatic in leadership style in response to a
serious threat posed to his peace policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to escape a losing position and to
explore opportunities amid an evolving crisis situation. By shifting from the advocate to the
pragmatic in leadership style in response to a serious threat posed to his peace policy, Kim Daejung sought to escape a losing posture position and to explore opportunities amid an evolving
crisis situation.
The study suggests that Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power and his flexibility in terms of
leadership style led him to be effective in attaining his major goals with respect to North Korean
issues. While inclined to be closed to information in making decisions, Kim Dae-jung stopped
short of being rigid or inflexible to the point of failing to sufficiently challenge or overcome
constraints in order to achieve his goals. This can be attributed in part to his approach to
leadership based on a high need for power, as well as to his pragmatic inclinations, which the
study (the Who chapter) showed were part of his personal characteristics.

3. Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Style by Periods
As demonstrated in Table 15, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership styles by the three periods of
interest and across the three sources of constraints indicate that he shifted between the
advocate and the pragmatic in his approach to leadership and that he was inherently close to
an advocate in undertaking the Sunshine Policy.
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Table 15
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership styles shown during his presidency (1998-2003) across the three
different periods of his presidency and by the three sources of constraints.

Period 1 (1998-1999)
Period 2 (2000)
Period 3 (2001-2002)

North Korea

Foreign (US)

Domestic

Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Advocate (or
Evangelist)

Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Pragmatic (or
Consultative)

Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Advocate (or
Evangelist)
Advocate (or
Evangelist)

Note. In leadership style typology as developed by Hermann and associates (Hermann et al.,
2001), advocate leaders who are relationship-focused are categorized as evangelists, and
pragmatists who are task-focused as consultative leaders.

A. Period 1 (1998-1999): Setting the Stage for the Sunshine Policy amid Uncertainty
In Period 1 (1998-1999) in which Kim Dae-jung sought to lay the groundwork for the
Sunshine Policy, both internally and externally, the overall degree of constraints was about
midway between the other two periods. Regardless of the source of constraints, Kim Dae-jung
mostly exhibited a determined, assertive push for his course of action in this period based on
strong personal convictions and belief in his strategy, as evidenced in an advocate leadership
style.
In the initial two years of his tenure, he sought to accurately assess the fundamental
posture of the North Korean regime and properly set the stage so as to establish a solid
groundwork for his ambitious peace initiative. In the process, from Kim Dae-jung’s perspective,
it was critically important to mitigate North Korea’s perception of threat to induce its active
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response to his overtures. Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership style integrated his proactive,
forceful push to implement his pre-conceived agenda with his calculated, cautious, and
restrained use of tactics, with the aim of promoting inter-Korean relations at the civilian-level
and inducing the North to accede to his overtures; this was instrumental in achieving a set of
goals he had established for this period.

B. Period 2 (2000): Heyday of the Sunshine Policy
Low Scores for Distrust of Others
By almost all conceivable standards, the year 2000 (Period 2) was the prime time of the
Sunshine Policy as major breakthroughs were achieved not only in inter-Korean relations but
also U.S.-North Korea relations. Even though some constraints were imposed on the Sunshine
Policy in this period, especially by the domestic political environment, the constraints were
much less severe than in the other two periods under study.212 A close look into his leadership
profile indicates that the pattern of Kim Dae-jung’s distrust scores reflect the perceived severity
of relevant constraints that he was faced with in conducting the Sunshine Policy. That is, his
distrust scores were at the lowest level in Period 2 and the highest in Period 3, with the Period 1
situated in between.
In Period 2 which was the virtual heyday of the Sunshine Policy, Kim consistently
exhibited an advocate style of leadership in dealing with constraints imposed on his North
Korea policy. Having persuaded the Clinton administration to espouse the Comprehensive
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This was manifested in Kim Dae-jung’s relatively lower scores for distrust of others in this period. Specifically, in Period 2, his
scores on distrust of others were especially low with regard to North Korea (0.11, low) and the external environment (0.06,
low), while being moderate (0.15) in relation to the domestic political environment.
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Approach as its revised North Korea strategy by the end of Period 1 (or the year 1999), Kim
Dae-jung came across as even more pushy and assertive in implementing his policy agenda in
Period 2. The analysis suggests that Kim Dae-jung further accelerated his drive to push forward
his peace agenda exhibiting an advocate leadership style when the environment surrounding
his policy was largely favorable affording him ample room for maneuver in conducting his North
Korea policy.
With regard to the overall North Korea policy in this period, Kim Dae-jung adopted a
highly streamlined and personalized decision-making process. The decision-making system he
adopted in the pre-summit period was a clear departure from the regular decision-making
mechanism involving the National Security Council. As discussed in Chapter 4, with a high need
for power and extensive expertise in the policy domain, Kim Dae-jung demonstrated the activist
leadership style of the director in managing the decision-making system throughout his
presidency. Meanwhile, the analysis shows that, in Period 2, he exhibited a sentinel leadership
style in addition to that of a director. This is because, in this period, his profile shows a notable
decrease in conceptual complexity (from moderate to low compared to a norming group) (e.g.,
Preston, 2001).
In Period 2, President Kim adopted a system centered around a tight inner circle of his
closest advisers. In effect, he made key decisions mostly by himself while his two closest
advisers –e.g., Lim Dong-won and Park Ji-won–served as the key implementers of his decisions.
During this period, he further increased influence over the overall policy process and
maintained top-level secrecy. He trusted his own insight, knowledge, and expertise in making
decisions, exhibiting a highly decisive, less deliberative decision-making style. All this was
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reflected in a distinctly low score for conceptual complexity (0.55) coupled with a high score for
need for power (0.36) regarding the overall North Korea policy in this period. In this period, his
unrelenting push to achieve his goals coupled with a decision-making system further centralized
within his tight inner circle helped him achieve his goal in a timely manner. By his term’s
halfway point, the first inter-Korean summit was held, a major breakthrough in inter-Korean
relations, which was followed by a flurry of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, both at
the government and the civilian level.

C. Period 3 (2001-2002): Rescuing the Sunshine Policy from Crisis
The nature of the overall environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy in Period 3
(2001-2002) was in stark contrast to Period 2 (2000) in terms of the severity of constraints
involved. The Sunshine Policy faced the greatest-ever challenge in Period 3 (2001-2002) as the
Bush administration effectively invalidated all the landmark agreements, including the US-DPRK
Joint Communique signed in Washington in October 2000, made with North Korea under the
Clinton administration and took an outright hawkish posture. In this period, Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership became more flexible and maneuverable than in the previous three years. In
response to what he regarded as the biggest obstacle ever posed to his peace initiative, Kim
Dae-jung moved from the advocate to the pragmatic in leadership style. What is worth noting
is that his opportunity-grabbing type of motivational perception, or orientation to politics,
indicates that, when confronted with the constraints he perceived as genuine threats to his
Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung sought to find opportunities and benefit from rapidly unfolding
situations. Amid all the difficulties posed to his Sunshine Policy, he remained optimistic about
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what was possible, viewing the world around him as giving more opportunities than threats,
and sought to promote cooperation.

4. Kim Dae-Jung’s Leadership Style by Three Sources of Constraints
A. North Korea
In addressing constraints derived from North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was persistent in
showing an advocate leadership style. His leadership characteristics based on a high need for
power were salient in his dealings with North Korea across his presidency, or across the three
periods of interest. In period 1 in which he strived to set the stage for the Sunshine Policy by
putting the civilian contact and exchanges into full operation amid North Korea’s outright
rejection and occasional provocations, Kim Dae-jung exhibited an advocate leadership linked
with a high need for power. The opening and smooth operation of the Kumgang Mountain
tourism project, the most crucial attainment of his goal for this period, was in large part
attributable to his unique approach to leadership, involving advocate orientations based on a
high need for power. Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership style continued into Period 2 (2000)
in which the relevant threat considerably dwindled as the North began to actively join the
peace process following the first summit in Pyongyang. In dealing with North Korea, President
Kim adopted an enormously streamlined and personalized decision-making system in this
period, and sought to make the best of North Korea’s excessive demands–e.g., for cash
transfer. In this period, his advocate leadership based on a high need for power helped him
achieve an array of goals on his North Korea policy agenda in a quicker time, and consequently
unprecedented progress was made in inter-Korean ties. In period 3 (2001-2002), the
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communist regime posed a fresh set of challenges and dilemmas by withdrawing from all
ongoing inter-Korean talks and projects amid its escalating confrontation with the United
States. Showing himself as an advocate in leadership style, President Kim adhered to his peace
agenda by appointing Lim Dong-won, his point man on North Korea, as the unification minister,
thereby affording his intelligence chief a freer hand in implementing the North Korea policy. He
also implemented his policy agenda regardless of whether the North carried out its share of the
task. At the same time, his dealings with North Korea in this period involved a highly selective
processing of information in order to rationalize his planned course of action–e.g., the second
naval battle in June 2002. Utterly single-minded in his aim to make progress in his peace
agenda, he sent his envoy to Pyongyang with one month left before the end of his term.

B. Domestic Political Environment
As in relation to North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was persistently advocate in leadership style
vis-à-vis the domestic political environment throughout his term of office. In other words, in
dealing with domestic political constraints, Kim Dae-jung was predisposed to challenge
constraints and to selectively perceive information.
It is noteworthy that Kim Dae-jung’s advocate leadership on the domestic front was
distinguished to a degree from that on the North Korean or the external front. Even though he
was inherently a relationship/process-oriented leader, rather than a task-oriented one, the
empirical evidence shows that such a tendency was much less salient in the way in which he
handled domestic politics than in the way he dealt with North Korea or the external
environment. As a result, his leadership style on the domestic political front in relation to the
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North Korea policy looked more expansionist (e.g., an advocate leader who is task-focused in
motivational perception) than evangelist (e.g., an advocate who is relationship/processfocused) (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001). All this relates to the fact that his persuasiveness
and ability to build coalition, the two major ingredients in his political skillset, were not
sufficiently exercised to make any difference in the polarizing political division in South Korean
society over the North Korea policy. After all, Kim Dae-jung’s advocate orientation in leadership
style on the domestic political front enabled him to carry out his agenda very rapidly and
without interruption amid all signs of unease and resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his
opponents and critics.
Upon being elected president in December 1997, President Kim Dae-jung was fully
occupied with overcoming the country’s worst-ever financial crisis. Nevertheless, already
armed with a well-formulated North Korea strategy, he never relented in moving forward in
implementing his peace agenda. In doing so, he showed an advocate leadership style in the face
of vehement resistance and criticism on the part of his political opponents and conservative
detractors. In the process, he sought to send a clear signal to both domestic and international
audiences of his determined will to push for his policy against all odds.
In Period 2, he continued to show an advocate leadership style in striving to create fresh
momentum for the Sunshine Policy concerning domestic politics. He bent over backwards to
consolidate and expand his power base in a way that helped build a domestic political
landscape deemed favorable to his Sunshine Policy. In this period, he sought to take political
advantage of positive developments in inter-Korean relations prior to the inter-Korean summit,
demonstrating a manipulative tendency as reflected in his high need for power. With the
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domestic political environment growing unstable surrounding his peace agenda in tandem with
the swiftly exacerbating external conditions in Period 3, Kim Dae-jung maintained an advocate
leadership style. That is, he decisively challenged constraints and remained largely closed to
information. As a result, neither parliamentary dismissal of Unification Minister Lim Dong-won
nor a fierce condemnation of the Sunshine Policy among his adversaries–e.g., in the wake of the
second naval battle–adversely affected the implementation of his policy agenda.

C. External Environment
In dealing with the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy, he showed
two different types of leadership style across his term of office: an advocate leadership style
and a pragmatic leadership style. In Period 1 (1998-1999) and Period 2 (2000), with a view to
establishing the favorable external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung
largely dismissed conditions that were ‘disconfirmatory’ of his policy agenda, showing an
unflinching drive to attain his goal. In Period 1, Kim Dae-jung’s advocate approach to leadership
led him to expand the scope of his peace agenda and push ahead with it. In doing so, Kim Daejung exerted concerted efforts to persuade William Perry, Clinton’s newly appointed North
Korea Policy Coordinator, to adopt the so-called Comprehensive Approach as Washington’s
revised North Korea policy. Kim’s relentless efforts to persuade the Perry team through a
special envoy eventually paid off in the form of the Perry Process which faithfully reflected the
Comprehensive Approach as suggested by Kim’s government. In Period 2, Kim Dae-jung
continued to show an advocate leadership style in dealing with the external environment
surrounding his peace policy. Notably, in this period, the external environment became
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remarkably favorable toward his Sunshine Policy as a major breakthrough was made in U.S.DPRK relations.
In Period 3, Kim Dae-jung showed a pragmatic leadership style in response to
constraints stemming from the external environment. In other words, he was more likely to
consider ‘how to co-opt or accommodate the broadest range of constituents’ when confronted
with an array of constraints and setbacks emanating from the external environment
surrounding his peace initiative (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Gerard,
2009). This way, his leadership became markedly more adaptable and accommodating in this
period. Under rapidly worsening contextual conditions in the wake of President Bush’s Axis of
Evil speech (on January 29, 2002), Kim Dae-jung became more willing to work within the
constraints, scale back the scope of his agenda, and adjust his goals, particularly in response to
constraints imposed by the Bush administration. With the prospect of the Sunshine Policy
growing increasingly dubious amid tensions rising between Washington and Pyongyang over
the nuclear issue, Kim Dae-jung moved to embark on extensive diplomacy, seeking to persuade
President Bush and Chairman Kim Jong-il simultaneously to change course while bringing the
international community including major stakeholders such as Japan, China, and Russia into line
with his peace agenda. When it became imperative to conduct sweeping diplomacy, not only
between the United States and North Korea but involving numerous stakeholders in the
international community, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership became remarkably adaptable in this
period.213
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His relatively higher score for conceptual complexity compared to a norming group (at 0.61, moderate in strength) in
relation to the external environment in this period also shows that he was more sensitive to incoming information and what
major (external) constituencies wanted in this period in conducting North Korea policy.
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5. Linkage among Kim Dae-jung’s Perspective, Motivational Perception, and Leadership Style
As shown in Table 16, during his term of office, Kim Dae-jung alternated among the
three different types of motivational perception–zero-sum, focused, and opportunity-grabbing
orientations–across the three different sources of constraints and the three different periods of
time.

Table 16
Changes in Kim Dae-jung’s Motivational Perception and Leadership Style across the Three
Periods of Interest and the Three Sources of Constraints

Kim Dae-jung’s
Leadership Traits
Period 1 (19981999)

Source of
Constraints

Distrust of
Others

In-Group
Bias

North Korea

Moderate

High

External

Low

Domestic

Motivational
Perception

Leadership Style

High

Moderately
Zero-sum
Zero-sum

Advocate

High

High

Focused

Advocate

North Korea

Low

High

Zero-sum

Advocate

External

Low

High

Advocate

Domestic

Moderate

High

Zero-sum
Moderately
Zero-sum

North Korea

High

High

Advocate

External

High

Low

Domestic

Moderate

High

Focused
OpportunityGrabbing
Moderately
Zero-sum

Advocate

Period 2 (2000)

Advocate

Period 3 (20012002)
Pragmatic
Advocate
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A. North Korea
From Kim Dae-jung’s perspective, North Korea was a brother state with economic and strategic
vulnerabilities and a partner to collaborate with for peaceful unification and mutual prosperity,
rather than “the major enemy” to defeat or prevail over as indicated in the White Paper
published by the Defense Ministry. For him, North Korea’s obstinacy, belligerence, and
occasional provocations constituted a unique way of expressing their vulnerabilities and
weaknesses. Understanding that North Korea’s desperate pursuit of survival effectively derived
from its permanent siege mentality, Kim Dae-jung stressed that North Korea was likely to
become most dangerous when isolated (e.g., Harrison, 2003, pp. 8–20). With North Korea
feeling vulnerable and besieged, he believed, any ill-conceived dealings with North Korea could
well jeopardize the overall peace process.
In addressing constraints imposed by North Korea in Period 1 and Period 2, Kim Daejung showed a zero-sum orientation in his motivational perception. This means that, in these
periods, President Kim regarded North Korea as a source of constraints requiring a strategy to
‘fundamentally’ address the problem as it had the potential to make or break the fate of his
peace process. Meanwhile, his motivational perception on North Korea became distinctly
focused in orientation in Period 3. This means that, in Period 3, Kim Dae-jung did not see North
Korea as a source of a permanent threat to his peace process but rather as a problem in need of
a more targeted or focused approach, in contrast to the fundamental approach befitting a zerosum perception as was the case in the previous periods. This indicates that he no longer
associated his handling of constraints imposed by the North with the fate of his overall peace
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process and instead sought to address relevant constraints and difficulties individually so that
he eventually became the victor in this game.

B. Domestic Political Environment
From Kim Dae-jung’s perspective, the sustained resistance to the Sunshine Policy among
conservatives was politically motivated. Kim Dae-jung viewed the so-called South-South conflict
regarding the North Korea policy as grounded in deep-seated regionalism and saw it as arguably
the most agonizing issue he had to address. Nevertheless, he perceived his own capacity to
persuade his opponents and critics to support the Sunshine Policy as fairly limited. President
Kim, however, stopped short of viewing the domestic resistance as posing a genuine threat to
his Sunshine Policy. In other words, Kim Dae-jung was less optimistic about his own capacity to
persuade his domestic political opponents to be supportive of his peace process than he was in
relation to North Korea and the United States.
In Period 1 (1998-1999), Kim Dae-jung showed a focused orientation in motivational
perception vis-à-vis domestic political constraints. This means that, in this case, the leader will
believe, “I can definitely win so long as this problem is properly dealt with.” In this case, the
leader stops short of associating relevant constraints with the success or failure of the policy or
the fate of his organization. Therefore, he seeks to address the issue in and of itself since, from
his viewpoint, it is not a make-or-break issue. In this case, bargaining or restraint does not make
sense from the leader’s perspective (e.g., Hagan, 1993, 1994). Kim Dae-jung’s focused
orientation toward the domestic political environment implies his belief that he would be able
to succeed in achieving his goal insofar as he addressed the domestic problems he was
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confronted with in and of themselves such that the implementation of his peace agenda would
not be adversely affected. That is, President Kim viewed domestic political constraints imposed
on the Sunshine Policy as having little potential to pose a serious threat to the fate of the
Sunshine Policy or his administration.
Throughout his presidency, Kim Dae-jung constantly showed an advocate leadership
style vis-à-vis the domestic political environment. Kim’s perspectives on the domestic political
environment as a source of constraints for the Sunshine Policy led to focused or moderately
zero-sum orientations in motivational perception, depending on the nature of the situation at
hand.

C. External Environment
Regarding Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on the United States in relation to the North
Korea policy, he found it imperative to get his course of action to be perfectly coordinated with
US strategy for North Korea. He also regarded the fundamental mechanism underlying interKorean relations as intricately intertwined with U.S.-North Korea relations. He firmly believed
that he could not go it alone, and that if he did not get the United States on his side, he would
never make it, and the Sunshine Policy would end in failure.
A leader with a zero-sum orientation tends to view how he would address the problem
as having a direct influence on the success of the policy or even the fate of his government. In
this case, the leader seeks to resolve the problem at its core in a fundamental way. 214 Kim Daejung’s zero-sum orientation in Period 1 and Period 2 (1998-2000) indicates that he aspired to

214

See the table adapted from Hagan, 1993, Hermann 2005.
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fundamentally address the problem and to commit whatever resources were available in
challenging external constraints.
As regards the external environment, Kim Dae-jung’s motivational perception changed
from a zero-sum orientation in Period 1 and Period 2 (1998-2000) to an opportunity-grabbing
orientation in Period 3 (2001-2002). That is, Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on the United States
regarding his North Korea policy, as discussed above, led to different types of motivational
perception under different types of situation as perceived by himself. In Period 3, with external
conditions turning extremely unfavorable towards his Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung’s
motivational perception underwent a dramatic change from a zero-sum orientation to an
opportunity-grabbing orientation. In other words, he became more preoccupied with seizing
whatever opportunities emerged from the swiftly deteriorating conditions surrounding the
Sunshine Policy. This also indicates that Kim still remained optimistic about his capacity to cope
with the crisis situation.
Kim Dae-jung viewed the Bush administration’s hardline posture on North Korea as a
genuine threat and the most serious constraint ever imposed upon his overall peace initiative.
The situation as perceived by President Kim, combined with his view (perspective) that his
peace process could never be successful without U.S. backing, led to a shift in his relevant
motivational orientation. This, in turn, led to a pragmatic leadership style for President Kim in
dealing with the external environment, zeroing in on diplomacy and being more open to making
compromise. In Period 3, he became more willing to work within the constraints and adjust his
policy goals in tandem with evolving contextual conditions. Believing in the power of
persuasion, Kim Dae-jung made the best of his abilities as a mediator and diplomat. He bent
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over backwards to play an intermediary role between Washington and Pyongyang as well as
between Japan and North Korea while conducting active diplomacy involving a broader
international community.215

215

According to Hagan (1993, pp. 199–200), a leader with this type of perception tends to focus on “diplomacy” in which
“bargaining, compromise, and even more limited forms of cooperation” are employed.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion

A. Findings Based on the Who-Why-How-What framework
In exploring the fundamental dynamics of leadership as a critical component of a peace
initiative that was mainly leadership-driven, the study has uncovered the primary mechanism
involved in the role of leadership as the major enabling factor for South Korea’s first
comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea. The study reveals the relationship
between leadership characteristics and the nature of the policy as reflected in the form of its
procedural and implementation process. With a view to elucidating aspects of his leadership
that constituted a primary mechanism for his peace initiative (the What), the study explores the
ways in which multiple personality variables, such as: personal capital; political skills (the Who);
beliefs and philosophy (the Why); and leadership traits and styles, perspectives, and
motivational perceptions (the How) combined to shape Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as it relates
to the Sunshine Policy during his term of office.

1. The Who & The Why
Kim Dae-jung’s philosophies, beliefs, and ideas formulated in the initial period of his
political career served as a guiding vision that provided the “why” for the Sunshine Policy. As
discussed in the Who chapter, Kim Dae-jung’s forty year-long political career as an opposition
leader and democratic activist left him with a great deal of sources of personal capital and
political skills. The study suggests an array of sources of Kim Dae-jung’s personal capital
involved in his leadership as relevant to the Sunshine Policy as follows: 1) Tenacity, 2) Charisma,
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3) Professional stature based on knowledge and expertise in the issue domain, 4) Commitment
to peace and reconciliation, and 5) International fame and recognition. Moreover, the
biographical sketch suggests a set of political skills, which were honed throughout his political
career and would have influenced the Sunshine Policy, as follows: 1) Ability to build coalitions,
2) Oratorical & writing skills, and 3) Persuasive ability. The study also uncovers a set of personal
characteristics that would have had a mostly indirect but significant bearing on how his
leadership was exercised in conducting the Sunshine Policy: 1) A sense of realistic pragmatism,
2) Sophisticated cognitive qualities, and 3) Self-restraint and composure.
It is worth noting that sources of Kim Dae-jung’s personal capital and political skills were
linked with both positive and negative aspects of his leadership relating to North Korea. Kim
Dae-jung’s charisma was effective in enhancing the power of political discourse and inspiring
members of the advisory group toward deeper commitment and trust. The study suggests that
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership characteristics associated with his persuasive ability, his ability to
build coalitions (even with his adversaries), and his relationship/process-focused orientation
were at least in part attributable to the charisma factor.
Meanwhile, the charisma factor had its share of negative implications for the procedural
aspect of the Sunshine Policy, as will be discussed below. Throughout his term of office, Kim
Dae-jung’s art of persuasion and coalition-building skills were vigorously exercised vis-à-vis both
North Korea and the external environment–the United States—in particular surrounding his
peace initiative. It is worth noting, however, that Kim Dae-jung’s political skills were not
exercised as vigorously or evenly at the level of domestic politics—apparently except for the
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initial period of his tenure. President Kim’s response to domestic opposition to the Sunshine
Policy appeared somewhat passive, rigid, and occasionally dismissive.

2. The How and The What (LTA)
The Leadership Trait Analysis (LTA) was applied based on speeches and interviews
dealing with North Korea-relevant topics given by President Kim Dae-jung during his presidency.
LTA analysis demonstrates an array of leadership characteristics involving leadership styles (as a
function of traits) as they relate to the decision-making system involved in the Sunshine Policy
and the relevant policy implementation. In examining the relationship between leader
perspective and policy process, a collection of data from semi-structured, in-depth elite
interviews conducted with over twenty individuals, who were directly involved in the decisionmaking process or the implementation of the Sunshine Policy, were used in this study.

2. a. Findings (LTA): Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles as reflected in the DecisionMaking System
Divergence in leadership characteristics involved between the regular decision-making system
and the system in place for Period 2 (2000)
As shown in Table 17, Kim Dae-jung’s approach to leadership in managing the decision-making
process in Period 2 (2000) was subtly but importantly distinguished from that shown in
managing the regular decision-making system for his overall term of office.

Table 17
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Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles as Relevant to the Sunshine Policy for his Term of
Office (1998-2003) and for Period 2 (2000) (Leadership Trait Analysis)

Kim Dae-jung’s
Term of Office
(1998-2003)
Leadership Style
Period 2 (2000)
Leadership Style

Belief in
Ability to
Control
Events

Need for
Power

Conceptual
Complexity

SelfConfidence

Task Focus

Moderate

High

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Advocate
Director (Extensive Expertise + High Need for Power)
Moderate

High

Low

Moderate

Low

Advocate
Director (Extensive Expertise + High Need for Power)
Sentinel (Extensive Expertise + Low Conceptual Complexity)

Kim Dae-jung’s traits and styles as relevant to North Korea policy for his term of office
(1998-2003), as summarized in the table above, help to explore what type of decision-making
system he preferred and how he managed it.216 In managing the decision-making system
involved in the Sunshine Policy, Kim Dae-jung showed an advocate leadership style, as well as
the activist presidential style of the director 217 (Preston, 2001; M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M.
G. Hermann, 2005; M. G. Hermann, 2008; Hermann & Gerard 2009). The decision-making
system that was in place throughout his term of office largely centered around the National
Security Council (NSC). The model can be classified as a formal system featuring a highly

216

This is because the system, once adopted, remained in full force throughout his presidency.
With extensive expertise in the policy domain and a high need for power in his personality profile, Kim Dae-jung showed a
director style of leadership style in handling the decision-making system as regards the Sunshine Policy (Preston, 2001).
217
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centralized, hierarchical advisory structure (George and Stern, 1998; Preston, 2001; Mitchell,
2005). Without being directly involved in the regular decision-making process, he maintained
effective and efficient control over the system throughout his presidency; meanwhile, Lim
Dong-won, his most trusted adviser and point man on North Korea, served as a custodian
manager of the overall system.
Regarding Kim’s personal capital and the nature of the decision-making system, the
study suggests that the charisma factor served to reinforce the hierarchical nature of the
decision-making machinery. Access to the president was highly limited within the system; even
the access of deputy minister-level officers was restricted, let alone that of subordinate
officials. Kim Dae-jung’s remarkable calmness and emotional stability could reinforce the
impression of aloofness and disengagement. His self-assured style of leadership appears
reminiscent of Weber’s concept of “pure charisma.” This leadership style, combined with his
high need for power and relationship focus, contributed to a unique decision-making system; it
featured hierarchy and remoteness in terms of access to president, while at the same time
promoting teamwork and a collegial atmosphere among members of the advisory system.
Meanwhile, during the pre-summit period in 2000, Kim Dae-jung opted for a system that
was clearly differentiated from the regular decision-making mechanism. In this period, in
addition to advocate and director styles of leadership, he demonstrated a sentinel leadership
style–characterized by a low conceptual complexity and extensive expertise–in making policy
decisions. In this period, his decision-making process was enormously streamlined, more
personalized, less deliberative, more behind-the-scenes, and extremely confidential in nature
(Preston, 2001; Mitchell, 2005; For a low CC, see Suedfeld & Rank, 1976; Driver, 1977; Suedfeld
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& Tetlock, 1977; M. G. Hermann, 1984; P. Tetlock, 1985; M. G. Hermann, 1987; For a high need
for power, see Terhune, 1968; Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977;
Etheredge, 1978; M. G. Hermann, 1984, 1987; Winter, 1987; House, 1990; Winter, 2003; M. G.
Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). The analysis suggests that the difference between the two
systems is mainly attributable to the difference in his scores for conceptual complexity. With
respect to North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s scores on conceptual complexity remained
moderate except for Period 2 (2000), during which his conceptual complexity was scored low
compared to a norming group.

2. b. Findings (LTA): Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles as reflected in the Policy
Implementation
Regarding the implementation aspect of the policy, the LTA results suggest that Kim
Dae-jung’s leadership was highly consistent across different periods of time and across different
types of situations in terms of the severity of constraints involved, while at the same time being
highly flexible. The pattern of Kim Dae-jung’s personality traits and leadership styles as relevant
to the Sunshine Policy by the three periods under analysis and across the three sources of
constraints is demonstrated in Table 18.

Table 18
Kim Dae-jung’s Leadership Traits and Styles for Three Periods under analysis and for Three
Sources of Constraints (Simplified) (Leadership Trait Analysis)
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Personality
Traits

Source of
Constraints
North Korea
(Overall)

Foreign

Domestic

North Korea
(Overall)
Foreign
(Little
Constraint)
Domestic

North Korea
(Overall)
Foreign

Domestic

Belief
in
Ability
to
Control
Events
(BACE)

Need
Conceptual
Selffor
Complexity confidence
Power
(CC)
(SC)
(Power)

Period I (1998-1999)
H
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Leadership Style:
Advocate
M
H
M
H
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
H
H
L
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
Period II (2000)
M
H
L
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
L
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
H
H
L
L
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
Period III (2001-2002)
M
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate
M
M
M
M
Respect
Closed
Pragmatic
M
H
M
M
Challenge
Closed
Advocate

Note. High (H); Moderate (M); Low (L).

Taskfocus
(Task)

L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus
L
ProcessFocus

Distrust
of others
(Distrust)

InGroup
Bias
(IGB)

M
H
Motivational
Perception:
Close to Zero-sum
L
H
Zero-sum
H

H
Focused

L

H

Zero-sum
L

H

Zero-sum
M

H

Close to Zero-sum
H

H
Focused

H
L
OpportunityGrabbing
M
H
Close to Zero-sum
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Consistency: Tendency to Challenge Constraints
Regarding North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership was consistent throughout his
tenure in challenging, rather than respecting, constraints. The president held enormous sway
over the overall policy process, showing himself innately advocate in his approach to
leadership. Kim Dae-jung’s advocate inclinations allowed him to move forward on the agenda
rapidly and without interruption. This was possible in Period 1 and Period 2 in particular
because his agenda matched both that of the domestic public and that of the Clinton
administration.218

Consistency: High Need for Power, Relationship Focus, and High In-Group Bias
Regarding his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung consistently demonstrated both a stable set
of personality traits and a specific pattern of leadership styles. His leadership profile reliably
showed a strong need for power, a relationship/process focus, and a high degree of in-group
bias–compared to a norming group of 79 Pacific Rim leaders–regardless of the passage of time
or the type of situation he found himself in. The study finds that aspects of the policy
considered characteristic of a leader with a high need for power were intimately linked with Kim
Dae-jung’s personal characteristics involving personal capital and political skills as discussed in
the Who chapter. Meanwhile, his consistent focus on relationship/process–rather than task
accomplishment–had a significant impact on the ways in which he dealt with North Korea,

218

If the political conditions facilitate the agenda of these leaders, or there is a match between the agenda they pursue and
that of the public, implementation of the agenda will be rapid and difficult to interrupt (M. G. Hermann et al., 2001, p. 95; M. G.
Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 34; e.g., Suedfeld, 1992; M. G. Hermann & Preston, 1994; M. G. Hermann & Kegley, 1995; Kowert
& Hermann, 1997).
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conducted diplomacy, and managed the advisory system involved in his peace initiative (Hersey
and Blanchard, 1982; Smith, 1992; Winter, 1996; Winter, 2005). In implementing his North
Korea policy, he was more concerned with the process –or how to achieve the goal–and with
building relationships than he was with achieving the goal itself. As reflected in his high ingroup bias, he drew on nationalism in reinvigorating the Korean people’s aspirations to be the
masters of their own destiny (e.g., Druckman, 1968; R. A. Levine & Campbell, 1972; Driver,
1977; Brewer, 1979; Stuart & Starr, 1982).

Advocate Leadership Style based on High Need for Power
The study finds that another source of idiosyncrasy in Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as
relevant to the Sunshine Policy was the unique combination of an essentially advocate
approach to leadership and a high need for power. As evidenced in the latter, Kim Dae-jung’s
control over the policy process and the manner in which he challenged constraints were not so
much direct, straightforward, or outright as indirect, roundabout, subdued, or behind-thescenes in nature.
Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power was also evidenced in his efforts to carry out his
meticulously choreographed strategies step-by-step in a way that properly achieved a set of
goals he had set for a relevant period. The sequential steps taken to implement his
rapprochement agenda were intricately interconnected in a way that made all the steps
contribute to the attainment of the goals in a timely manner.219

219

In a way, Kim’s leadership characteristics and qualities appear to have closely resembled those of strategic leaders. The
content analysis suggests that this was largely attributable to his markedly consistent high need for power as manifested in his
leadership profile throughout his presidency. It seems safe to say that Kim Dae-jung’s high need for power had the effect of
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The implementation of the North Korea policy agenda under Kim Dae-jung persistently
involved a significant level of caution, restraint, measured moves, and highly calculated
strategies and corresponding tactics, designed to minimize the risk of sending the wrong signals
to the North. In addition, in implementing his peace agenda, President Kim showed himself
occasionally manipulative in taking advantage of the situation at hand (e.g., Terhune, 1968;
Winter, 1973; McClelland, 1975; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Etheredge, 1978; S. G. Walker, 1983;
Winter, 1987; M. G. Hermann, 2005; Keller, 2005). Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung’s calm demeanor,
restraint and discipline were also closely related to his high need for power. Winter (2011, p.
1075) posits that the high need for power helps foster a calm demeanor by alleviating “the
inevitable frustrations of politics.”
The combination of a high score on need for power and a moderate score on belief in
control events in Kim Dae-jung’s overall personality profile regarding the North Korea policy
indicates that, more likely than not, he was more interested in having influence over the
situation (or his organization) and manipulating it to suit his needs than in being in complete
control of the situation or his organization.220 As manifested in how he managed the regular
decision-making system in relation to the North Korea policy, Kim Dae-jung was willing to give
his lieutenants considerable authority and discretion in implementing the peace agenda, and
did not pursue complete control over the decision-making machinery.

making his inherently advocate leadership as relevant to his peace initiative appear quite similar to the strategic style of
leadership (e.g., M. G. Hermann et al., 2001; M. G. Hermann & Gerard, 2009).
220
It is worth noting that his belief in control events (BACE) was more flexible, in that its scores went up and down over the
course of his presidency across the three periods of interest and according to the source of constraints he was dealing with.
Still, his moderate score on BACE in his average (or overall) personality profile for his term of office (1998-2003) indicates that
he was inherently close to moderate in this trait.
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Kim Dae-jung’s idiosyncratic approach to leadership based on advocate inclinations and
a high need for power enabled him to implement his peace agenda swiftly and without
interruption. This enabled him to attain his goals amid all the constraints arising from internal
and external environments; for example, the Kumgang Mountain tourism project (1988), the
adoption of the Comprehensive Approach on the part of the United States as a revised policy
toward North Korea (1999), and the first inter-Korean summit (2000), among other things. His
approach to leadership integrated a proactive, forceful push to implement his preconceived
agenda with an extremely calculated, cautious, and restrained use of tactics to induce the
North to lower its threat perception and join his rapprochement agenda.

Flexibility: Change in Leadership Styles
The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung’s leadership was flexible in that his approach to
leadership shifted in tandem with the changing contextual conditions. The study suggests that it
was the severity of constraints as perceived by the leader, rather than the source of constraints,
that led to a change in his leadership style. In dealing with the constraints deriving from
Washington’s hardline policy toward North Korea in Period 3 (2001-220), which he perceived as
a serious impediment to his peace agenda, he exhibited a pragmatic approach to leadership;
this was distinguished from the advocate leadership style he exhibited in dealing with North
Korea or domestic politics in the same period. In the face of what he assessed to be an
existential threat to his peace process, he became markedly pragmatic in his leadership style,
adjusting the scope of his agenda and working within the bounds of political constraints. At the
same time, he challenged constraints and pushed for his rapprochement agenda in dealing with
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North Korea and the domestic political environment. Likewise, Kim Dae-jung’s response to
constraints was differentiated according to the perceived level of threats, demonstrating
flexibility in his approach to leadership.

Divergence in his handling of the two different types of environment surrounding the
Sunshine Policy: North Korea vs. Domestic political environment
Kim Dae-jung was more likely to be cautious and guarded in his approach to leadership
in dealing with North Korea than in dealing with domestic politics. Whenever North Korea
created obstacles to his peace initiative, Kim Dae-jung sought to read its underlying motives. His
perspective on North Korea involving its threat perception and siege mentality was closely
associated with his highly cautious, vigilant, elaborately planned moves intended to build trust
with the northern regime. Meanwhile, Kim Dae-jung was distinctly less sensitive to the
vicissitudes of the domestic political situation or opposition than he was with respect to North
Korea or the external environment surrounding the Sunshine Policy. From his perspective,
sustained resistance to the Sunshine Policy among his opponents was primarily politically
motivated. Therefore, he was hardly optimistic about the prospect of properly addressing the
problem stemming from growing political polarization in Korean society. He did not, however,
view domestic opposition as having the potential to pose any grievous threat to the Sunshine
Policy.221 Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on the domestic political context in turn affected how he
processed information in making decisions, making him effectively more closed to information
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The study suggests that firm endorsement of the Sunshine Policy on the part of the South Korean public and the Clinton
administration all constituted an important contributing factor for this tendency.
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in response to domestic constraints than he was in dealing with North Korea or the external
environment surrounding his peace initiative. Kim Dae-jung’s handling of the external
environment in Period 3 (2001-2002) indicates that he was fundamentally more contextually
oriented in conducting foreign policy than in addressing domestic politics.

Linkage among Leader Perspectives, Perceptions & Leadership Styles
The analysis shows that Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on a given source of constraints had a
significant bearing on how he addressed those constraints and the way in which he undertook
the relevant policy. The study suggests that leadership motivational perception of specific
constraints may serve as a mediating force between the leader’s perspective on the relevant
source of constraints and the type of leadership style exhibited in dealing with these
constraints.222 In other words, Kim’s motivational perception is instrumental in understanding
how and why this leader, who had a certain perspective on a given source of constraints, chose
to address those constraints in a specific way, as reflected in his leadership style under given
contextual conditions.
For example, in Period 1 (1998-1999), in which he sought to set the stage for the
Sunshine Policy, his motivational perception of North Korea was essentially zero-sum. That is,
his perception of North Korea as a source of constraint imposed on this peace initiative was
permanent and fundamental in nature, meaning that he perceived how he would address
relevant constraints as directly linked with the fate of his peace process. Such motivational
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In essence, a leadership motivational perception can be seen as a highly adaptable variable in that its two trait components–
that is, distrust of others and in-group bias–are essentially the most flexible personality variable (e.g., Hermann, 2005).
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perceptions on the part of Kim Dae-jung apparently influenced the way in which he dealt with
the relevant constraints in this period, such as North Korea’s resistance to the Sunshine Policy
and its series of provocations against the South. Meanwhile, in period 3 (2001-2002), he
showed a focused type of motivational perception vis-à-vis North Korea under the rapidly
deteriorating external conditions surrounding the Sunshine Policy. This indicates that, unlike in
the previous periods (1998-2000), he no longer associated his handling of constraints posed by
the North with the fate of his overall peace process. Instead, he sought to address relevant
constraints individually, such that the implementation of his peace agenda would not be
negatively affected. These motivational perceptions on the part of Kim Dae-jung may have
influenced the way he handled relevant constraints, including North Korea’s withdrawal from
inter-Korean cooperation, and the second naval battle. Regarding the external environment,
Kim Dae-jung viewed the Bush administration’s hardline policy toward North Korea as the most
serious threat ever posed to the Sunshine Policy. Nonetheless, under rapidly escalating tensions
between Washington and Pyongyang, he still remained optimistic about what he was able to do
to address the crisis situation. Kim Dae-jung’s perspective on the Bush administration’s hardline
stance on North Korea entailed an opportunity-grabbing orientation in his motivational
perception. This made him show a uniquely pragmatic approach in dealing with the Bush
administration regarding his peace agenda. Believing in the power of persuasion, Kim Dae-jung
made the best of his abilities as a born mediator and diplomat in this period.

B. Contribution, Limitations, and Next Steps
Contribution
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The study explores the importance of the leader and his approach to leadership and
politics in understanding the nature of the relevant policy, in terms of its procedural and
implementation aspects. The study is expected to contribute to knowledge in the field of
leadership and decision-making, as well as Korea Studies. Despite its significance as the subject
of scholarly investigation, the political leadership of Korea has rarely, if ever, been explored in
an analytically sophisticated or methodologically rigorous manner. Even though many scholars
and practitioners perceive Kim Dae-jung’s leadership as arguably the most important enabling
factor for the Sunshine Policy, an understanding of specific ways in which his leadership was
exercised, and which aspects of his leadership played a crucial role in engaging in the peace
initiative, has been murky at best. The study demonstrates how an individual leader can
become a significant driving force behind political processes which have the potential to yield a
major breakthrough in the long-standing conflict on the Korean peninsula.
The study suggests ways to achieve a holistic understanding of the statesmanship of an
individual leader as reflected in carrying out a flagship policy. Considering that leadership
attributes develop over time and through various events and circumstances, the study
identifies the components of leadership that need to be explored to achieve a holistic
understanding in relation to a specific policy. In order to achieve that holistic understanding,
the study also helps to understand how an assortment of leadership variables can be
interrelated.
The study also highlights the importance of exploring idiosyncratic aspects of a leader’s
approach to leadership. The study suggests that an effective way to do this is to explore
variations in a given leadership style as a function of a set of traits. That is, the idiosyncratic
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leadership aspects of a certain individual are manifested in divergent patterns of scores for a
set of personality traits. In Kim Dae-jung’s case, the pattern of trait scores remained remarkably
consistent in terms of their strength–compared to a norming group–throughout his term of
office.223 The resulting advocate orientation in leadership style is reflective of the leader’s
tendency to push for his agenda, dismiss opposition, expand his power base, and strengthen
control of his organization. However, such orientations were mitigated, albeit to varying
degrees, with interventions of certain traits. For example, in Kim’s case, a moderate degree of
closedness to information had the effect of mitigating his innately advocate tendency.224
Moreover, Kim’s moderate scores on belief in ability to control events and distrust of others, as
well as a low task focus (or relationship focus), all combine to moderate the leadership
attributes linked with authoritarian orientations generally deemed characteristic of an advocate
leader. Likewise, the study surmises that the analysis of individual trait scores can give clues to
the idiosyncrasies involved in the statesmanship of an individual leader.
Moreover, the study contributes to typological flexibility when it comes to the
conceptual framework of motivational perceptions, as manifested by the interplay between
distrust of others and in-group bias. Existing literature focuses on extreme forms of political
activity, such as whether to go to war or how to confront enemies. I reinterpreted the typology
of motivational perceptions developed in the literature in a way that can be applied to cases
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Specifically, his profile consistently showed a high need for power, a low task focus, and a high in-group bias across the three
periods under analysis.
224
For example, the degree of Kim’s selectiveness in processing information as evidenced in medium scores for both
conceptual complexity and self-confidence–compared to a norming group–is considered moderate in relation to other cases
involving, say, low scores for both traits or a low conceptual complexity and a high self-confidence.
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involving more conventional political situations or activities.225 Specifically, the original
typology, developed by Hagan (1993, 1994) and adapted by Hermann (2005), involved
categorical attributes such as pragmatic, military, and radical regimes. These categories were
respectively replaced in my study with opportunity-grabbing, zero-sum, and focused
orientations, with attendant revised narratives.

Limitations
The study has its share of limitations and weaknesses. To begin with, the study is not a
comparative analysis, but a single case study. Therefore, the analysis does not allow
Kim Dae-jung’s leadership to be compared and contrasted to other global or South Korean
leaders in terms of his leadership styles, qualities, and attributes. Moreover, personality
attributes such as personal capital, political skills, and other leadership characteristics, as
discussed in the Who chapter, were not subject to any measurement. For example, the data
concerning leader interest and expertise in the domain of interest would have been more
accurate had it been measured to reflect factors such as the nature of the leader’s previous
political positions, the degree to which he was devoted to relevant issue areas, and the extent
to which he had other relevant policy experiences (Preston, 2001, p. 13; see also Preston,
1996). Regarding the extent to which the individual chapters are tightly connected in a way that
makes them fit into the study as an organically integrated body of work, the Why chapter,
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The typological classification of leadership orientations toward adversaries, as suggested by Hagan (e.g., 1993, 1994), and
then adapted by Hermann (2005), addresses the linkage between domestic politics and war proneness.

358

dealing with the philosophical and conceptual aspect of the concerned policy, is relatively less
closely intertwined with the other parts of the study–e.g., the Who, How, and What chapters.
Moreover, as regards the How chapters, the replicability of the analysis is somewhat
limited without a collection of data available in public repositories. In this study, the content
analysis on leadership traits and styles was based on verbal materials available in the public
domain. The fact that only those segments of the text materials addressing North Korea or
related topics were extracted for content analysis indicates that a degree of subjective
judgements were involved in material selection procedures. Moreover, the interview data
included only a couple of former legislators who were opposed to the Sunshine Policy at the
time of Kim Dae-jung’s administration. In Seoul in the fall of 2016, I attempted to recruit a few
additional leading opposition figures who were opposed to the Sunshine Policy under Kim Daejung; this attempt was less than successful. I believe that the inclusion of these individuals as
interviewees would have been a great boon to my research.

Next Steps
Regarding leadership style typology, the interplay between the leader’s propensity to
respond to constraints and to process information determines four types of leadership style.
The incorporation of a motivational dimension–e.g., a task/relationship focus that is
represented by either of two extremes on a continuum–into the matrix further categorizes the
four leadership styles into eight sub-types of leadership, within which characteristics are
shared.
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The ideal type of advocate leadership can be further subdivided into two categories of
leadership style, according to whether the leader shows a high need for power compared to a
norming group. By the same token, the ideal type of strategic leadership can be further
classified into one category based on a high need for power, and another based on a low need
for power. Meanwhile, a pragmatic leadership style can be further divided into one category
based on a moderate degree of closedness to information, and another based on a significant
degree of closedness to information. My study shows that it is necessary to differentiate, within
a certain ideal type of leadership style, between a high need for power and a low need for
power, on one hand, and between a moderate closedness to information and a significant
closedness to information, on the other. The study highlights the importance of such scholarly
endeavors for methodological development in the field of leadership.
In future research, the scope of my study can be expanded to situate Kim Dae-jung’s
leadership in relation to other South Korean leaders who took office before and after Kim’s
tenure regarding North Korea policy. Building on the outcome of my analysis, such future
studies would be aimed at achieving a broader goal of understanding the primary mechanism
involved in South Korea’s policy toward North Korea. In this case, the subject of research can be
the leadership of those presidents who came to power after South Korea’s first democratic
elections in 1987.226
Comparative research in Korean leadership may address the question of how those
three presidents who engaged North Korea–Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993), Kim Dae-jung (19982003), and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)–differed from each other in terms of leadership traits
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The presidential term has since been constitutionally limited to a single term of five years in South Korea.
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and styles or operational codes.227 Future studies may also examine how the two progressive
leaders who adopted comprehensive engagement policy toward North Korea–Kim Dae-jung
and Roh Moo-hyun–were distinguished in terms of leadership traits and styles or operational
codes, both from each other and from Roh Tae-woo, the conservative president who engaged
the North but stopped short of adopting comprehensive engagement strategy. Future studies
may also explore whether, and if so how, the engagers (soft-liners) differed from the containers
(hardliners) in terms of leadership traits and styles or operational codes regarding North Korea
policy.

Future of the Sunshine Policy
The process of implementing the Sunshine Policy involved painstaking endeavors on the
part of Kim Dae-jung and his advisory group to deal with a vast array of difficulties and
challenges posed by the internal and external environment. Domestically, the conservative
circle and his political opponents resisted the Sunshine Policy, castigating it for jeopardizing
national security and pandering to the communist regime. While North Korea’s resistance,
nonchalance, and unpredictable and occasionally provocative behaviors posed another set of
challenges to the Sunshine Policy, the Bush administration’s hardline policy toward North Korea
for the last two years of Kim’s tenure effectively posed an existential threat to the Sunshine
Policy. Throughout his term of office, Kim Dae-jung bent over backwards to achieve his goal of
completing the first stage of his unification plan—that is, the stage of Confederation he
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(For operational code analysis, see Alexander L. George, 1969; O. Holsti, 1970; McClellan, 1971; L. Johnson, 1977; S. Walker,
1977; Starr, 1984; Ayubi, 1992; Crichlow, 1998.)
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regarded as a de-facto unification—through peaceful exchange and cooperation with North
Korea.
Certainly, Kim Dae-jung’s leadership in relation to the Sunshine Policy had its fair share
of drawbacks and limitations. He was accused by his critics and opponents of attempting to turn
the progress made in inter-Korean relations into political benefits. He occasionally maneuvered
the situation to suit his goals and protect his political position in implementing his peace
agenda. The participation of the National Assembly in the relevant policy process was minimal
at best. The ultimate failure to gain bipartisan support for, and national consensus on, the
Sunshine Policy was at least in part attributable to his passive dealings with domestic
opposition to the policy. Moreover, he failed to have any institutional safeguard measures in
place–e.g., ratification of the inter-Korean agreements by the Congress–which would have been
necessary to ensure that the progress made in inter-Korean relations under him and his
successor President Roh Moo-hyun would remain in effect, and thus that the inter-Korean
agreements would not be revoked as easily. These agreements were virtually declared null and
void in 2008. Indeed, going back to square one involved excruciatingly painful time and effort,
and the process is still underway.
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that what transpired in inter-Korean relations under
Kim Dae-jung’s statesmanship constituted a change for the better. In embarking on his peace
initiative, Kim Dae-jung served as an agent of change, effecting improvement in inter-Korean
relations at a critical juncture for the country’s fate. The Sunshine Policy originated from Kim
Dae-jung’s creative and pragmatic insight, which was elaborated into a broader vision of
change. As manifested in the tone and pattern of his approach to leadership and politics, Kim
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Dae-jung was a nationalist and yet, even to a greater degree, a pragmatist. My study suggests
that this was key to the idiosyncrasy involved in his leadership as regards the Sunshine Policy. In
the face of all the constraints and challenges, he sought to break through confining structural
barriers and redefine structural parameters of inter-Korean relations, from conflict and
confrontation to exchange and cooperation. By the end of his term of office, Kim Dae-jung
strived to fulfil his mission as a trailblazer, with the help of Lim Dong-won, his alter ego in the
rapprochement with North Korea. For all of its drawbacks and shortcomings, the Sunshine
Policy has at least demonstrated a potential to stimulate limited but momentous behavioral
change from North Korea.
Admittedly, the Sunshine Policy has been less than successful in making any systematic
breakthrough for peace. Rather, there remains ongoing confrontation between the two Koreas,
sustained tension between Washington and Pyongyang, and a continued Cold War structure on
the Korean peninsula. In a way, the U.S.-DPRK relations constitute another crucial variable in
the equation for peace on the Korean peninsula—arguably an even more crucial variable than
inter-Korean relations, especially when it comes to the North Korean denuclearization that
could lead to the eventual achievement of permanent peace on the Korean peninsula. Still, it
seems safe to say that progress made in inter-Korean relations through a proper engagement
policy led by South Korea will positively contribute to some form of peace on the Korean
peninsula. The Sunshine Policy, as initiated by Kim Dae-jung and inherited by his two successors
thus far, is an ongoing process. The majority of Koreans remain hopeful that Kim Dae-jung’s
creative efforts to provide the optimal solution to the Korean problem will ultimately bear fruit
and prove transformational in terms of practical end results.
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Appendix A: List of Documents Coded for Leadership Trait Analysis
Materials used for content analysis: Interview responses and speeches on North Korea-relevant topics.
Leader
Kim Daejung
(68
Documents)

Date of
Interviews
& Speeches
1998 0220

Audience (Source
of Constraints)
(Foreign/Domestic)
Foreign

1998 0225

Document Type
(Interview/Speech)

Occasion

Number of Words

Interview

Newsweek (United States)

934

Domestic

Speech

Inaugural address

816

1998 0301

Domestic

Speech

National Independence Day

707

1998 0316

Domestic

Speech

590

1998 0404

Foreign

Speech

1998 0529

Domestic

Interview

Commencement Ceremony at
Korean Military Academy
London University (United
Kingdom)
Korea Times

1998 0608

Foreign

Speech

1998 0609

Foreign

Interview

1998 0610

Foreign

1998 0817

2295
899
1076

Speech

Meeting with Korea Society,
Asia Society and Council on
Foreign Relations, (New York)
NewsHour with Jim Lehrer
(United States)
US Congress (Washington D.C.)

Domestic

Speech

National Liberation Day

837

1998 0923

Domestic

Speech

The 8th term Advisory Group

791

1998 1001

Domestic

Speech

Armed Forces Day

926

1998 1112

Foreign

Speech

Beijing University (China)

923

904
561
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1998 1121

Domestic

Interview

526

Speech

Press conference (with
President Bill Clinton)
State Dinner (For President
Clinton in Seoul)
New Year’s Message

1998 1121

Domestic

Speech

1999 0101

Domestic

1999 0224

Domestic

Speech

Press Conference at Blue House

742

1999 0301

Domestic

Speech

Independence Day

593

1999 0308

Domestic

Speech

Korea Military Academy

1051

1999 0309

Foreign

Interview

International Herald Tribune

673

1999 0310

Domestic

Speech

Korea Air Force Academy

1308

1999 0312

Domestic

Speech

Korea Naval Academy

1288

1999 0505

Foreign

Interview

CNN

1198

1999 0704

Foreign

Speech

1507

1999 0815

Domestic

Speech

Philadelphia Liberty Medal
Award Ceremony (Philadelphia)
Liberation Day

1999 0913

Foreign

Interview

Time (United States)

643

1999 1001

Domestic

Speech

Armed Forces Day

1780

1999 1108

Foreign

Interview

1467

2000 0102

Foreign

Interview

Washington Times (United
States)
CNN (United States)

2000 0225

Foreign

Interview

Le Figaro (France)

866

2000 0301

Domestic

Speech

Independence Movement Day

1432

2000 0307

Domestic

Speech

Korea Air Force Academy

1451

545
535

757

598

365

2000 0309

Foreign

Speech

Berlin Speech (Germany)

2598

2000 0314

Domestic

Speech

Korea Military Academy

1215

2000 0316

Domestic

Speech

Korea Naval Academy

1590

2000 0605

Domestic

Speech

2000 0614

North Korea

2000 0615

Domestic

2000 0615

North Korea

Speech

2000 0625

Domestic

Speech

2000 0906

Foreign

Speech

2000 0908

Foreign

2000 1001

Opening of the 16th National
Assembly
Statement/Conversa
Inter-Korean Summit
tion
(Pyongyang)
Speech
Arrival in Seoul from Pyongyang

1228
2036
2534
1157

Speech

Grand Dinner with Kim Jong-il
(Pyongyang)
50th Anniversary of Korean
War
UN Millennium Summit (New
York)
Korea Society (New York)

Domestic

Speech

52nd Armed Forces Day

1814

2000 1101

Domestic

Interview

Korea Times

1348

2000 1127

Foreign

Speech

2092

2000 1210

Foreign

Speech

2000 1213

Foreign

Speech

2001 0307

Foreign

Interview

Institute of South East Asian
Studies (Singapore)
Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance
Speech (Oslo, Norway)
Parliament of Sweden
(Sweden)
Press Conference with
President Bush (Washington,
D.C.)

2250
710
2255

1033
1662
585

366

2001 0308

Foreign

Speech

1571

Speech

American Enterprise Institute
and Council of Foreign
Relations (Washington, D.C.)
Korea Naval Academy,

2001 0309

Domestic

2001 0313

Domestic

Interview

Korea Military Academy

1464

2001 0423

Foreign

Interview

Newsweek (United States)

708

2001 0616

Domestic

Speech

Jeju Peace Forum

1618

2001 0815

Domestic

Speech

National Liberation Day

716

2001 0925

Foreign

Speech

739

2001 0928

Domestic

Speech

2001 1204

Foreign

Interview

World Statesman Award
Ceremony (New York)
53rd Armed Forces Day
Anniversary
Bergens Tidene (Norway)

2001 1207

Foreign

Speech

2001 1208

Foreign,

2001 1211

1018

1004
760
1690

Interview,

Nobel Centennial Symposia
(Oslo)
Nepszabadsag of Hungary

Foreign

Speech

European Parliament (France)

1567

2002 0125

Foreign

Speech

526

2002 0219

Domestic

Interview

1118

2002 0220

Domestic

Speech

Defender of Democracy Award
at Annual Parliamentary Forum
Press Conference (with
President George W. Bush)
Dorasan Station

2002 0603

Foreign

Interview

Business Week (United States)

644

2002 0715

Domestic

Speech

International Communication
Association Conference (Seoul)

577

726

615

367

Kim Jong-il

2002 0815

Domestic

Speech

Liberation Day

1455

2002 0924

Foreign

Speech

ASEM Summit in Demark

609

2003 0214

Domestic

Speech

Statement to the Nation

811

Conversation

Inter-Korean Summit
(Pyongyang)

2446

2000 0614

368

Appendix B: Interview Questions

The interview protocol consisted of a set of main questions, as listed below, as well as
follow-up questions and probes intended to seek detailed, in-depth information on the themes,
topics, and stories that the interviewee mentioned, or to seek illustrative examples or
clarification (Rubin & Rubin, 2012, pp. 115–129).

A. Kim Dae-jung’s Perspectives on Possible Sources of Constraints in relation to the Sunshine
Policy:
- From President Kim’s perspective, what contextual factors (such as North Korea’s unprovoked
aggressions, domestic opposition, conservative media, public opinion, the Bush
administration’s hardline policy toward North Korea) do you think posed serious constraints or
difficulties in undertaking his North Korea policy?

1) US Policy toward North Korea
- What was President Kim’s perspective on U.S. policy toward North Korea?


How did he perceive the Clinton administration’s policy toward North Korea?
(Perception)



How did he perceive the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea?
o Did he consider US policies toward North Korea under the respective
administration as giving an opportunity for, or posing a constraint or threat to,
his Sunshine Policy? Why do you think so?
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2) Domestic Politics
- What was President Kim’s perspective on domestic politics with regard to the formation and
implementation of the Sunshine Policy?


What did he do, if anything, to deal with the constraints or difficulties imposed by the
domestic political environment?

- What were President Kim’s (normative and practical) beliefs about public opinion? From his
perspective, was it desirable and/or necessary for public opinion to affect the government’s
policy choices regarding North Korean issues?


How did public opinion influence President Kim in implementing his Sunshine Policy?



Do you think President Kim tried to influence public opinion with respect to the
Sunshine Policy? If so, how did he do so?

3) North Korea
- What was President Kim’s perspective on North Korea’s occasional provocations against South
Korea (for example, the two naval battles near the Yeonpyeong Island in 1999 and 2002) and its
unilateral decision in 2001 to avoid dialogue that put inter-Korean engagement on hold for a
year?

B. Decision-Making System involved in the Sunshine Policy
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- To what extent was the National Security Council (NSC) systemized or established as a
formally institutionalized decision-making body?228
- Were there any differences in policy preference between key advisers or relevant bureaucratic
organizations in conducting North Korean policies? If so, how were such differences addressed
or reconciled?
- How was the NSC organized?


What type of decision-making system and chain of command were in place at the NSC?



Did the system revolve around orderly policy-making with well-defined procedures or
rather informal procedures?
o Was it a hierarchical advisory structure or informal, less hierarchical advisory
structure designed to enhance participation by subordinates?
o To what extent was teamwork or collegiality emphasized among its members?



What was the major function of the NSC Standing Committee (NSSC)?
o Did it effectively serve its intended function as a central coordinating agency?
o How did the system coordinate and integrate differing positions among
ministries to formulate and implement policies?

Role of the President
- Regarding North Korea policy, how were final decisions made?

228

Prior to the Kim administration, an institutionalized system of decision-making was not established on important issues of
foreign affairs, national security and North Korea. The National Security Council involved no designated sponsoring agency and
its meetings were held on an ad hoc basis producing no binding decisions.
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To what extent was the president influenced by expert advice?



Did the president’s own policy preferences dominate?



What was the range of views the president took into account when making decisions on
North Korea policies?
o Was it possible for a member of the advisory group to convey dissenting views
on major policy decisions on North Korea to the president?

- How often did the president attend the NSC meetings?


Did the president attend top-level interagency meetings or did he rely on his chief of
staff or others to keep him informed of developments?

- Did he prefer direct personal involvement throughout policy process or did he delegate policy
formulation and implementation tasks to his advisers or lieutenants?

Role of the Chief of Staff: (Questions designed for Lim Dong-won) 229
- Regarding North Korea policies, what role did you play in the decision-making process? Were
you more of a custodian manager of the policy process, an honest broker, a gatekeeper, a highleverage policy advocate, or something else?


Were the minority or dissenting views also reported to the president? Was the
president interested in such views?

229

Lim Dong-won served as President Kim Dae-jung’s de factor Chief of Staff regarding North Korea policy during
his term of office.
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Was the Chief of Staff given discretion to make some important decisions on his own, if
need be, and to assign tasks to other advisers without necessarily consulting with or
being explicitly instructed by the president?



What kind of relationship was there between the president and his Chief of Staff?



What kind of relationship was there between the Chief of Staff and other key advisers?
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Appendix C: List of interviewees 230
1. Jeong Se Hyun: Deputy Unification Minister (1998-1999) and the Unification Minister (20012004) under Presidents Kim Dae-jung (hereafter referred to as KDJ) and Roh, Moo-hyun
2. Ra, Jong Il: First secretary of the National Intelligence Agency (1998-1999)
3. Lee, Hong Koo: Unification Minister under President Roh Tae-woo (1987-1993); Prime
Minister under Kim Young-sam (1993-1998); Ambassador to the U.S. under KDJ (1998.5 –
2000.7)
4. Yang, Sung Chul: Ambassador to the United States (2000.5 -2003.2)
5. Kim, Sung Jae: Senior Presidential Secretary for Civil Affairs, Senior Presidential Secretary for
Policy Planning; Minister of Culture and Tourism under President KDJ
6. Kim, Han Jeong: Chief Presidential Secretary under President KDJ (1999-2003); Chief
Secretary to former President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2005)
7. Choi, Kyung Hwan: Presidential Press Secretary; Press Secretary to the KDJ Peace
Foundation; Personal Secretary to KDJ during his post presidential years
8. Lim Dong Won: Senior Presidential Secretary for Unification, Security, and Foreign Affairs;
Minister of Unification; Director of National Intelligence Agency; Special Secretary for
Unification, Security and Foreign Affairs under KDJ (1998-2003)
9. Moon, Jung In: Director of the KDJ Presidential Library
10. Yang, Young Shik: Deputy Minister of Unification (1999.5-2001.4)
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Regarding the language used during interview, all interviewees spoke in Korean, except for three individuals
(Yang, Sung Chul; Leon Sigal; and Stephen Costello) who spoke in English.
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11. Seo, Hoon: Deputy Director at National Intelligence Agency in charge of North Korean
affairs during KDJ’s term (1998-2003)
12. Kim, Taek Keun: Writer of KDJ’s autobiography and biography (“Saebyuk” meaning Broken
Morning Calm in Korean)
13. Kim, Hyung Ki: Deputy Minister of Unification under KDJ (2001.4 – 2003.3).
14. Kang, In Duk: Unification Minister under KDJ (1998.3 – 1999.5)
15. Lee, Hoon: Presidential Secretary; Chief of the Presidential Office for State Affairs under
KDJ; Lee helped KDJ with drafting speeches before and after his election as president
16. Park, Jin: National Assemblyman for the opposition Grand National Party during KDJ’s
presidency
17. Park, Sun Sook: Presidential Press Secretary under KDJ; Spokeswoman for the presidential
Blue House under KDJ
18. Hong, Sa Duk: National Assemblyman and Member of the Standing Committee for
Unification, Diplomacy and Trade at the National Assembly at the time of the Sunshine Policy
19. Yim, Sung Joon: Senior Presidential Secretary for Diplomacy and Security (2002.1 – 2003. 2)
20. Kim, Il Beom: Presidential Interpreter
21: Leon Sigal: Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science
Research Council in New York; Author of “Disarming Strangers” (Princeton University Press)
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